DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF COMMERCIAL TAXES vs. H. R. SRI RAMULU
What did the Supreme Court hold?
The Supreme Court held that the contention advanced on behalf of the appellant (Deputy Commissioner) that the period of four years for computing limitation under Section 21(3) should be from the orders dated June 8, 1966 (made under Section 12A), and not from the initial assessment orders dated March 21, 1963, is well-founded. The Court reasoned that once an assessment is reopened under Section 12A, the initial assessment order ceases to be operative and is effectively vacated or set aside, replaced by the reassessment order. The reassessment orders under Section 12A were comprehensive and not limited to escaped turnover. Therefore, the only orders subject to revision by the appellant were the Section 12A orders. The Court relied on the principles established in V. Jagannathan Rao & Ors. v. Commissioner of Income-tax and Excess Profits Tax, Andhra Pradesh, Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh v. H. M. Esufali H. M. Abdulali, and International Cotton Corporation (P) Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer, Hubli & Ors. The appeals were allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the writ petitions filed by the respondent were dismissed.
What were the facts?
The assessee, H. R. Sri Ramulu, was assessed for the assessment years 1959-60 and 1960-61. Initial assessment orders were passed on March 21, 1963. Subsequently, fresh assessments were made under Section 12A of the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957, by the Commercial Tax Officer on June 8, 1966, to include turnover that had escaped assessment. These orders allowed deductions for shop rent and tree tax. The Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, the appellant, revised these orders on June 28, 1967, disallowing the shop rent deduction based on a court decision. The assessee's rectification applications and subsequent appeals to the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal were rejected. The High Court, however, quashed the Deputy Commissioner's orders, holding they were made without jurisdiction as they were beyond the four-year limitation period from the initial assessment orders.
What were the issues?
1. Whether the period of four years for exercising revisional powers under Section 21(3) of the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957, should be computed from the initial assessment orders dated March 21, 1963, or from the orders made under Section 12A dated June 8, 1966. (Question of law) Assessee's Contention (as argued by the appellant): The period of four years should be computed from the orders dated June 8, 1966, made under Section 12A of the Act, as these were the orders being revised. Revenue's Contention (as argued by the respondent): The period of four years should be computed from the initial assessment orders dated March 21, 1963, making the revision order barred by limitation. The High Court's decision was based on this contention.
Which sections of the Income-tax Act were involved?
Section 12A,Section 21(2),Section 21(3)
AI-generated summary — verify with the full judgment below
Cause title — parties, addresses and appearances
the initial assessment order. The result o.f reopening the assessment is that a fresh order for reassessment would have to be made includ- ing for those matters in respect Orf which there is no allegation of the turnover escaping assessment. As it is we find that in the present .case tfue assessment orders made under section 12A were comprehensive orders and were not confined merely to matters which had escaped assessment earlier. In the circumstances, the only orders which could be the subject matter of revision by the appellant were the orders made under section 12A of the Act and not the initial assess- ment orders. In the case of V. Jagannathan Rao & ors. v. Commissioner of Income-tax and Exrcess Profits Tax, Andhra Pradesh (') this Court ~ dealt with section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 which re- lates to reassessment in the case of income escaping assessment. It was held by this Court that once a·ssessment is reopened the previous under-assessment is set aside and the whole proceedings start afresh. Ramaswami J. speaking for the Court observed : "Section 34 in terms states that once the Income-tax Officer decides to reopen the assessment he could do so within the period prescribed by serving on the person liable to pay tax a notice containing all or any of the requirements which may be included in a notice under section 22(2) and may proceed to assess or reassess such income, profits or gains. It is, therefore, manifest that once assessment is ~------· OJ [1970J 1 s.c.R. 726=75 ITR 373. DY. COMMR. OF COMML. TAX v. H. R. SRI RAMULU (Khanna, !.) 597 reopened by issuing a notice under sub-~ection ( 2) of section 22 the pr~vious under-assessment is set aside and the whole assessment proceedings start afresh. When once valid pro- ceedings are started under section 34(1) (b) the Income- tax Officer had not only the juri iction but it was his duty to levy tax on the entire income that had escaped assessment during that year." In the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh v. fl. M. Esufali H. M. Abdulali(') this Court dealt with reassessment made under section 19 of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958. It was held that when reassessment is made, the former assessment is completely reopened and in its place fresh assessment is made. Hegde J. speaking for the Court observed : "What is true of the assessment must also be true of reassessment because reassessment is nothing but a fresh assessment. When reassessment is made under section 19, the former assessment is completely reop~_ned and in its place fresh assessment is made. While reassessing a dealer, the assessing authority does not merely assess him on the escaped turnover but it assesses him on his total esti- mated turnover. While making assessment under section 19, if the assessing authority has no power to make best judgment assessment, all that the assessee need do to escape reassessment is to refuse to file a return or refuse to produce his account books. If contention taken on behalf of the assessee is correct, the assessee can escape his liability to be reassessed by adopting an obstructive attitude. It is difficult to conceive that such could be the position in law." In International Cotton Corpn. (P) Ltd. "
Commercial Tax Officer, Hubli & Ors. (') this Court held that once can assessment order had been rectified and it was sought to make a further rectifica- tion of that order, the period of limitation for making such further rectification would commence not froni the date of the original assess- ment order but from the date of the earlier rectification order. Alagiri- swami J. speaking for the Court in this context observed : "The other attack that the rectification order is beyond the point of time provided in Rule 38 of the Mysore Sales Tax Rules is also without substance. What was sought to be rectified was the assessment order rectified as a conse- quence of this Court's decision in Yaddalam's case. After such rectification the original assessment order was no longer in force and that was not the order sought to be rectified. It is admitted that all the rectification orders would be within time calculated from the original rectification order. Rule 38 itself speaks of 'any order' and there is no doubt that the rectified order is also 'any order' which can be rectified under Rule 38;" - (1) [1973] 3 S.C.R. 1005=90 l.T.R. 271. (2) [1975] 2 S.C.R. 345. A B c D E F G H
A B c 598 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1977] 2 S.C.R. Although the above case related to an order which had been subse- quently rectified, the principle laid down therein would, in our opi- nion, be also applicable in cases where reassessment is made on the ground that certain amounts of turnover had escaped assessment. Before we conclude, we may observe that according to section 33B of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 the Commissioner cannot revise an order of reassessment made under the provisions of section 34 of the Act. Likewise, sub-section (2) of section 263 of the Income- tax Act, 1961 expressly prohibits the revision by the Commissioner of Income-tax of an order of reassessment made under section 147 of that Act. No such prohibition in the provisions of the Act with which we are concerned has, however, b~en brought to our notice. We would, therefore, accept the appeals, set aside the judgment of the High Court and dismiss the petitions under article 226 filed by the respondent. Looking to all the facts, we leav.e the parties to bear their own costs in this Court as well as in the High Court. S.R. Appeals allowed
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