ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX vs. AK. MENON AND ORS.

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CIVIL APPEAL No. 6323/1995Supreme Court1995 INSC 40318 July 1995Bench: 2 JudgesAuthor: A.M. AHMADI, S.P. BHARUCHA COMMISSIONER OF5 pages
AI SummaryAllowed

What did the Supreme Court hold?

The Supreme Court held that the Special Court has no jurisdiction to sit in appeal over the assessment of tax liability of a notified person by the authority, tribunal, or court authorized by the relevant statute. Consequently, the Special Court cannot determine whether any such assessment is bonafide, reasonable, justified, or enforceable. The Court clarified that the Special Court's power under Section 11 of the Act is limited to determining the priorities in which claims upon the property under attachment shall be paid. The judgment in S. V. Kondaskar v. V.M. Deshpande was distinguished, with the Court explaining that the observation regarding scrutiny of revenue claims by a liquidation court pertained to the extent to which a determined tax amount could be paid from available funds while safeguarding other creditors' interests, not to re-assessing the tax liability itself. The appeal was allowed, and the impugned order was set aside to the extent it permitted notified persons to challenge the bonafides of the tax claims.

What were the facts?

The Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax (appellant) sought the release of Rs. 80,80,198.34, representing tax liabilities of the respondents, who were notified persons under the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992. The funds were with the Custodian appointed under the Act. Counsel for the notified persons argued that they should be allowed to demonstrate that the tax demands were unreasonable and unjustified. The Special Court adjourned the matter, holding that while it could not sit in appeal over tax assessments, it had the power under Section 11 of the Act to examine the bonafides of claims to ensure priorities were observed and prevent absurdly large claims. The Income Tax Department appealed this order.

What were the issues?

1. Whether the Special Court has the jurisdiction to determine whether a tax liability claimed against a notified person is bonafide, reasonable, justified, or enforceable, under Section 11 of the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992? Assessee's Contention: The Special Court has no jurisdiction to sit in appeal over the assessment of tax liability by authorized authorities. It can only determine the priorities of claims on attached property. Revenue's Contention: The Special Court, while distributing funds under Section 11, must be able to examine the bonafides of claims to prevent unreasonable demands and ensure the Act's objectives are met. They relied on observations in S. V. Kondaskar v. V.M. Deshpande, AIR (1972) S.C. 878, regarding liquidation courts scrutinizing revenue claims.

Which sections of the Income-tax Act were involved?

Section 11

AI-generated summary — verify with the full judgment below

ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX v. AK. MENON AND ORS. JULY 18, 1995 [A.M. AHMADI, CJ AND S.P. BHARUCHA, J.] Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992: Section I I-Special Court-Juri iction of-Tax liability of a notified person-Held: Special Court has no jun' iction to detemiine whether the liability is bonafide reasonable, justified or enf orceable-lt can only deter- mine the pliorities in which claims upon the property under attachment shall be paid. A B c The Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act was enacted in 1992 to provide for the establishment of a Special Court for the trial of offences relating to transactions in securities D and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The appellant· Assistant Commissioner of Incometax sought release of a certain sum being the tax liabilities of the respondents, who were the notified persons under Act. The Special Court adjourned the matter holding that the notified parties were entitled to try and show to court that the claim was E unreasonable and unjustified. Hence this appeal. Allowing the appeal, this Court HELD : 1. The Special Court has no juri iction to sit in appeal over the assessment of the tax liability of a notified person by the authority or tribunal or court authorised to perform that function by the statute under which the tax is levied. The Special Court has, therefore, no juri iction to determine whether or not any assessment of the tax liability of a notified person by the appropriate authority is bona fide or reasonable or justified or enforceable. [185-E]

2.

The order under appeal is set aside insofar as it requires the appellant to· produce the records and permits the notified persons to satisfy the Special Court that the claims made in regard to their tax liability were not bonafide, or were unreasonable, unjustified or unenfor- ceable. [185-F] 181 F G H

182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. A S. V. Kondaskar v. V.M. Deshpande, AIR (1972) S.C. 878, distin- B c guished. CIVIL APPELLATE JURI ICTION Civil Appeal No. 6323 (NT) of 1995. From the Judgment and Order dated 21.3.95 of the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) at Bombay in Misc. Application No. 107 of 1993. D.P. Gupta, Solicitor General, (Ms. A. Subhashini) for S.N. Terdol for the Appellant. Atul Setalvad, A.D.N. Rao and A. Sobba Rao for the Respondent No.

1.

Jahangir DJ. Mistri, Kartik Desai and Ms. Lata Krishnamurthy for D the Respondents 2-14. E F The following Order of the Court was delivered : Special leave granted. This appeal is filed against an order of the Special Court appointed under the provisions of the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating To Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992. The appellant, an Assistant Commis- sioner of Income Tax, sought release of the sum of Rs. 80,80,198.34, being the tax liabilities of the respondents, who are notified persons under the said Act, from the funds available with the Custodian appointed under. the provisions thereof. Learned counsel appearing for some of these notified persons submitted to the learned judge that he wished to show .that the demands. of the appellant were unreasonable and unjustified and, if satis- fied, he should not order release of the amounts claimed. Having heard counsel, the learned judge passed the impugned order. It said that while the Special Curt could not sit in appeal over orders of the tax authorities, G it was entrusted with the task of distributing the funds in the manner laid down under section 11 of the said Act and the priorities laid down thereunder had to be observed. The priorities and objects of the said Act could and would -be defeated if the Special Court could not "go into the bonafides of a claim. In that case a party, like the Income Tax Department, H may make a claim in an absurdly large amount." Whether a claim was • ASSTI. COMMR. OF INCOME TAX v. AK. MENON 183 'justified or enforceable can only be decided by looking into that claim". A Counsel for the notified parties was, therefore, "entitled to try and show to court that the claim is unreasonable and unjustified". The appellant's application was adjourned for the purpose, and he has appealed. The said Act was enacted to provide for the establishment of a Special Court for the trial of offences relating to transactions in securities B and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The Act re- quires the appointment of a Custodian thereunder who is, inter alia, required to deal with the property of persons notified in such manner as the Special Court may direct. The Special Court has juri iction, under section 7 of the Act, exclusively to hear and decide prosecutions in respect C of offences under the said Act, that is to say, offences relating to transac- tions in securities after 1st April, 1991 and on or before 6th June, 1992. By reason of the amendment of the said Act and the inclusion of sections 9A and 9B, the Special Court is invested with civil juri iction in regard to such transactions. Section 11 is relevant for our purpose. Sub-section (1) states that the "Special Court may make such order as it may deem fit D directing the Custodian for the disposal of the property under attachment". Sub-section (2) states that "the following liabilities shall be paid or dis- charged in full, as far as may be, in the order as under:- (a) all revenues, taxes, cesses and rates due from the persons E notified by the Custodian under sub-section (2) of Section 3 to the Central Government or any State Government or any local authority: (b) xxx xxx xxx'' It is clear that the Special Court has no power to sit in appeal over or overrule the orders of the tax authorities, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal or the courts in regard to the tax liabilities of notified persons. F The only power of the Special Court is to determine the priorities in which claims upon the property under attachment shall be paid. The claims relating to the tax liabilities of a notified person are, along with revenues, G cesses and rates entitled to be paid first in the order of priority and in full, as far as may be. In relation to a claim for payment of the tax liability of a notified person, the Special Court has, therefore, only the limited power to determine what, having regard to the funds available, can be paid: that is to say, whether the claim can be satisfied in full or only in part. If a H

184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. A particular tax claim cannot at any time be paid in full, provision would have to be made for the balance, so far as may be, so that it is not jeopardized. B c Our attention was drawn by Mr. AM. Setalvad, learned counsel for the Custodian, to the judgment of this Court in S. V. Kondaskar v. V.M. Deshpande, AIR (1972) S.C. 878, and to the observation thereunder that the "liquidation court would have full power to scrutinise the claim of the revenue after income-tax h(!.s been determined and its payment demanded from the liquidator. It would be open to the liquidation court then to decide how far under the law the amount of income-tax determined by the Department should be accepted as a lawful liability on the funds of the company in liquidati"n. At that stage the winding up court can fully safeguard the interests of the company and its creditors under the Act". The question that this Court had to decide in the case was whether it was necessary for the income-tax officer to obtain the leave of the liquidation court when he wanted to re-assess the company in liquidation for escaped D income in respect of past years. This Court said: E F G H "The.Income-tax Act is, in our opinion, a complete code and it is particularly so with respect to the assessment and re-assessment of income-tax with which alone we are concerned in the present case. The fact that after the amount of tax payable by an assessee has been determined or quantified its realisation from a company in liquidation is governed by the Act because the income-tax payable also being a debt has to rank pari passu with other debts due from the company does not mean that the assessment proceed- ings for computing the amount of tax must be held to be such other legal proceedings as can only be started or continued with the leave of the liquidation court under Section 446 of the Act. The liqui- dation court, in our opinion, cannot perform the functions of the Income-tax Officers while assessing the amount of tax payable by the assessees even if the assessee be the company which is being wound up by the Court. The orders made by the Income-tax Officer in the course .of assessment or re-assessment proceedings are subject to appeal to the higher hierarchy under Income-tax Act. There are also provisions for reference to the High Court and for appeals from the decisions of the High Court to the Supreme Court and then there are provisions for revision by the Commis- sioner of Income-tax. It would lead to anomalous consequences if • ASSTT. COMMR. OF INCOME TAX v. AK. MENON 185 the winding up court were to be held empowered to transfer the A assessment proceedings to itself and assess the company to in- come-tax. xxx xxx xxx "The language of S.446 must be so construed as to eliminate such B startling consequences as investing the winding up court with the powers of an Income-tax Officer conferred on him by the Income- tax Officer ~onferred on him by the Income-tax Act, because in our view the legislature could not have intended such a result". It is after these observations that the court made the observation to which C Mr. Satalvad drew our attention. It is perfectly clear, in the circumstances, that this observation referred only to the obligation of the liquidation court to decide, having regard to the fact that the income-tax payable by the company in liquidation had to rank pari passu with other debts due by it, how far the amount determined could be paid while still safeguarding the D interests of the other creditors of the company in liquidation. We are of the view, therefore, that this judgment does not assist us in upholding the view taken by the Special Court. The Special Court has no juri iction to sit in appeal over the assessment of the tax liability of a notified person by the authority or tribunal or court authorised to perform that function by the statute under which the tax is levied. The Special Court has, therefore, no juri iction to determine whether or not any assessment of the tax liability of a notified person by the appropriate authority is bona fide or reasonable or justified or enforceable.

The appeal is allowed. The order under appeal is set aside insofar as it requires the appellant to produce the records and permits the notified persons to satisfy the Special Court that the claims made in regard to their tax liability were not bonafide, or were unreasonable, unjustified or un-en- forceable. There shall be no order as to costs. G.N . Appeal allowed. E F G

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