MANOJKUMAR SUDHAKAR SALVI,RATNAGIRI vs. INCOME TAX OFFICER, RATNAGIRI

Registry has pointed out that the appeals are barred by limitation as they have been filed before this Tribunal with delay of 2272 days. Assessee has filed an Affidavit explaining the delay. Contents of the said Affidavit reads as follows :

We have gone through the above reasons putforth by the assessee. The point for consideration is as to whether such a long delay deserves condonation. At this stage, it is relevant to note the judgment of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in Vijay Vishin Meghani Vs. DCIT & Anr (2017) 398 ITR 250 (Bom) holding that none should be deprived of an adjudication on merits unless it is found that the litigant deliberately delayed the filing of appeal. In that case, delay of 2984 days crept in due to improper legal advice. Relying on Concord of India Ins. Co. Limited VS Nirmala Devi (1979) 118 ITR 507 (SC), the Hon’ble juri ictional High (2017) 98 CCH 0469 Bom HC, there was a delay of 1662 days in filing the appeal. Such a delay was not condoned by the Hon’ble High Court. In further appeal, condoning the delay, the Hon’ble 0231 ISCC, held that : `It is a matter of record that on the identical issue raised by the appellant in respect of earlier assessment, the appeal is pending before the High Court. In these circumstances, the High Court should not have taken such a technical view of dismissing the appeal in the instant case on the ground of delay, when it has to decide the question of law between the parties in any case in respect of earlier assessment year. For this reason we set aside the order of the High Court; condone the delay for filing the appeal and direct to decide the appeal on merits.’

Similarly, in Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Others v. Gobardhan Sao & Others (2002 AIR 1201), the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that the expression "sufficient cause" occurring u/s.5 the Limitation Act and analogous provisions must be construed liberally so as to advance substantial justice. The Court emphasized that rejection of condonation applications on trivial or fault-finding grounds should be avoided, particularly where negligence, lack of bona fides, or intentional delay cannot reasonably be attributed to the litigant.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court has, in a catena of decisions, unequivocally laid down that when an explanation regarding delay does not smack of malafides and is otherwise reasonable, acceptance ought to be the rule and refusal an exception. A hyper-technical or pedantic approach, resulting in the dismissal of matters at the threshold, is discouraged as it may cause irreparable prejudice by foreclosing adjudication on merits. The expression "sufficient cause" occurring in limitation statutes has consistently been interpreted to receive a liberal and justice- oriented construction, so as to advance rather than defeat the cause of substantial justice.

Having regard to the factual matrix of the case before us and the judicial precedents referred supra, we are of the considered opinion that ‘reasonable cause’ prevented the assessee in filing the appeals before this Tribunal with inordinate delay, which prima-facie cannot be attributed to the assesssee. We therefore condone the delay of 2272 days and admit the appeals for adjudication.

At the outset, ld. Counsel for the assessee submitted that due to reasons beyond control of the assessee, there was non- compliance which resulting in passing of exparte orders for the assessment years under appeal. He submitted that since there is no adjudication by ld.CIT(A) on merits, the issues raised in the instant appeals may be remitted back to the file of ld.CIT(A) affording one more opportunity so that the assessee can plead its grounds of appeal. Ld. DR raised no serious objection for the same.

We have given our thoughtful consideration to the finding given by ld.CIT(A) which reads as under :

From the above finding, it is ostensible that the assessment orders were passed u/s.144 of the Act and ld.CIT(A) dismissed the appeals in limine without discussing anything on merits. Ld.CIT(A) has not passed a speaking order as contemplated u/s.250(6) of the Act. Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case in the case of PCIT (C) vs. Premkumar Arjundas Luthra (HUF) (2017) 297 CTR 614 (Bombay) has held that ld.CIT(A)/NFAC is obliged to dispose of the appeal on merits even in an exparte order. It is claimed by the assessee by the assessee that it has filed grounds of appeal and statement of facts and ld.CIT(A) was incorrect to hold that assessee has not filed the same.

Under the given facts and circumstances, considering the prayer of the Ld. Counsel for the assessee as well as no objection raised by the ld. Departmental Representative, in the interest of justice and being fair to both the parties, we deem it proper to afford one more opportunity to the assessee. In view thereof, without dwelling into merits of the issues, we restore the issues on merit for the assessment years under appeal to the file of ld.CIT(A) for denovo adjudication. Needless to mention that in the set aside proceedings ld.CIT(A) shall provide reasonable opportunity to the assessee to Assessee is directed to provide latest email and contact detail on the ITBA portal. Assessee is also directed to remain vigilant and not to take unnecessary adjournment unless otherwise required for reasonable cause. Impugned orders are set aside and the effective grounds of appeal raised in these appeals are allowed for statistical purposes.

In the result, all the three appeals of the assessee are allowed for statistical purposes.

The Pr. CIT concerned. विभ गीय प्रतितनधि, आयकर अपीलीय अधिकरण, “B” बेंच, 4. पुणे / DR, ITAT, “B” Bench, Pune. ग र्ड फ़ इल / Guard File. 5. आिेश नुस र / BY ORDER,