EDIGA TAYANNA GOUDA,RAICHUR vs. INCOME TAX OFFICER, WARD-1, RAICHUR

PER KESHAV DUBEY, JUDICIAL MEMBER:

These appeals at the instance of the assessee are directed against the separate orders of ld. CIT (A)/NFAC all dated 12.08.2024 vide DIN & Order No. ITBA/NFAC/S/250/2024- 25/1067530570(1) for the AY 2015-16, DIN & Order No. ITBA/NFAC/S/250/2024-25/1067529610(1) for the AY 2016-17 & DIN & Order No. ITBA/NFAC/S/250/2024-25/1067532687(1) for the AY 2017-18 passed u/s. 250 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (in short “the Act”). Since the issue raised in all these appeals is common in nature, these are clubbed together, heard together and disposed of by this common order for the sake of convenience.

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ITA Nos.2450 to 2452/Bang/2025 Ediga Tayanna Gouda, Raichur Page 5 of 46 the three different applications for condonation of delay all dated 23.2.2025 filed along with the affidavits in respect of each appeal in original sworn before the notary public which are reproduced below for ease of reference and record:

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ITA Nos.2450 to 2452/Bang/2025 Ediga Tayanna Gouda, Raichur Page 25 of 46 5.1 On going through the above applications for condonation of delay filed along with the Affidavit, we find that the assessee could not file all these appeals within the prescribed period for the reason that the ld. CIT(A)/NFAC had sent all the hearing notices including the Appellate Order to the email ID klkantharao@yahoo.com which belonged to the Tax consultant at that time instead of assessee’s personal email-id tgouda611@gmail.com provided in the Form-35 & for this reason the assessee was completely unaware of the order passed by the ld. CIT(A)/NFAC. The assessee received a call somewhere in late September, 2025 from the Department wherein it was informed that there was a demand outstanding for all these years. Thereafter, the assessee approached the tax practitioner where both got to know that the Order u/s 250 of the Act was already passed on 12/08/2024. The tax practitioner then expressed his inability to file the appeal & advised the assessee to meet the present counsel at Bengaluru. The present counsel prepared the appeal for filing & the same came to be filed on 29/10/2025 with a delay of 363 days. The ld. A.R. of the assessee submitted that the delay is unintentional and no benefit can be attributed to the assessee in filing the appeals belatedly. He thus prayed to condone the delay and requested to consider the issues raised by the assessee on merits.

5.2 On the contrary, the ld. D.R. vehemently objected for granting the condonation of substantial delay and submitted that the assessee had not only filed the appeal belatedly before the ld. CIT(A)/NFAC but also before this Tribunal which clearly demonstrate the carelessness attitude of the assessee.

ITA Nos.2450 to 2452/Bang/2025 Ediga Tayanna Gouda, Raichur Page 26 of 46 be noted that u/s 253(5) of the Act, the Tribunal may admit the appeal filed beyond the period of limitation where it has established that there exists a sufficient cause on the part of the assessee for not presenting the appeals within the prescribed time. The explanation therefore, becomes relevant to determine whether the same reflect sufficient and reasonable cause on the part of the assessee in not filing these appeals within the prescribed time. We have gone through the reasons explained by the assessee in which it is submitted that the ld. CIT(A)/NFAC had sent all the hearing notices including the Appellate Order to the email ID klkantharao@yahoo.com which belonged to the Tax consultant at that time instead of assessee’s personal email-id tgouda611@gmail.com provided in the Form-35 & for this reason the assessee was completely unaware of the order passed by the ld. CIT(A)/NFAC.

6.1 While considering a similar issue the Apex Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji and Ors. (167 ITR 471) laid down six principles. For the purpose of convenience, the principles laid down by the Apex Court are reproduced hereunder:

(1) Ordinarily, a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

(2) Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this, when delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. (3) 'Every day's delay must be explained' does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational, commonsense and pragmatic manner.

(4) When substantial justice and technical consideration are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a nondeliberate delay.

ITA Nos.2450 to 2452/Bang/2025 Ediga Tayanna Gouda, Raichur Page 27 of 46 (5) There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk. (6) It must be grasped that the judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. 6.2 When substantial justice and technical consideration are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have vested right for injustice being done because of non deliberate delay. Therefore, we have to prefer substantial justice rather than technicality in deciding the issue. As observed by Apex Court, if the application of the assessee for condoning the delay is rejected, it would amount to legalize injustice on technical ground when the Tribunal is capable of removing injustice and to do justice. Therefore, this Tribunal is bound to remove the injustice by condoning the delay on technicalities. If the delay is not condoned, it would amount to legalizing an illegal order which would result in unjust enrichment on the part of the State by retaining the tax relatable thereto. Under the scheme of Constitution, the Government cannot retain even a single pie of the individual citizen as tax, when it is not authorized by an authority of law. Therefore, if we refuse to condone the delay, that would amount to legalize an illegal and unconstitutional order passed by the lower authority.

6.3 Further, in the case of People Education & Economic Development Society Vs/ ITO reported in 100 ITD 87 (TM) (Chen), wherein held that “when substantial justice and technical consultation are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of non-deliberate delay”.

ITA Nos.2450 to 2452/Bang/2025 Ediga Tayanna Gouda, Raichur Page 28 of 46 6.4 The next question may arise whether delay was excessive or inordinate. There is no question of any excessive or inordinate when the reason stated by the assessee was a sufficient cause for not filing the appeal. We have to see the cause for the delay. When there was a reasonable cause, the period of delay may not be relevant factor. In fact, the Madras High Court in the case of CIT vs. K.S.P. Shanmugavel Nadai and Ors. (153 ITR 596) considered the condonation of delay and held that there was sufficient and reasonable cause on the part of the assessee for not filing the appeal within the period of limitation. Accordingly, the Madras High Court condoned nearly 21 years of delay in filing the appeal. When compared to 21 years, 363 days cannot be considered to be inordinate or excessive. Furthermore, the Chennai Tribunal by majority opinion in the case of People Education and Economic Development Society (PEEDS) v. ITO (100 ITD 87) (Chennai) (TM) condoned more than six hundred days delay. Therefore, in our opinion, by preferring the substantial justice, the delay of 363 days has to be condoned and accordingly, we condone the delay and admit the appeal for adjudication.

7.1 Before us, the ld. A.R. of the assessee submitted that assessee being an senior citizen faced so many health issues as he was suffering from Covid. Due to his various health issues, the assessee needed regular health checkups and follow-ups with doctors. Further, the ld. A.R. of the assessee submitted that the

ITA Nos.2450 to 2452/Bang/2025 Ediga Tayanna Gouda, Raichur Page 29 of 46 notices and order were sent by the AO to the e-mail id of the tax consultant who was neither traceable nor informed anything about the same to the assessee.

7.2 The ld. D.R. on the other hand again reiterates that the assessee is very callous in his approach in filing the appeals . The assessee not only filed the appeal belatedly before the ld. CIT(A)/NFAC but also before this Tribunal, which demonstrates the attitude and deliberate inaction on the part of the assessee as rightly contended by the ld.CIT(A)/NFAC and accordingly prayed that the appeals may be dismissed in limine by not condoning the delay.

7.3 Having heard the ld. Counsel for the assessee as well as ld. D.R., it is perceived that the explanation offered by the assessee is plausible and sufficient cause has been shown by the assessee in filing the appeal belatedly before the ld.CIT(A)/NFAC. Therefore, we are inclined to condone the delay before the ld.CIT(A)/NFAC and admit the appeals for adjudication.

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8.1. We have heard both the parties on admission of additional grounds. The Lucknow bench of the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in the case of CIT Vs. Sahara India (2012) 347 ITR 331 held that a legal issue can be raised at any stage but there shall be good reason for admitting the additional ground.In our Opinion all the facts are already on record and there is no necessity of investigation of any fresh facts for the purpose of the adjudication of above grounds. Further we are also of the opinion that the additional grounds raised in the present case are purely legal in nature &therefore these are critical for a fair adjudication of the matter.

ITA Nos.2450 to 2452/Bang/2025 Ediga Tayanna Gouda, Raichur Page 31 of 46 The Hon’ble Madras High Court in the case of CIT Vs Indian Bank (2015) 230 Taxman 635 (Madras) held that Rule 11 of the I.T. Rules makes it clear that the assessee has the right to raise additional grounds and if the same is beneficial to the assessee, the same should be considered by the Tribunal.

8.2 Further, the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the case of Gundathur Thimmappa & Sons vs. CIT, Mysore, reported in (1968) 70 ITR 70 held that when the point raised by the assessee is a point which went to the root of the matter and affected not merely his liability to pay tax but also jurisdiction of the Tribunals and Authorities themselves to subject the amount concerned to tax, the Appellate Tribunal had the discretion to permit point of law to be raised for the first time in appeal because the question went to the root of the case. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of National Thermal Power Co. Ltd. Vs CIT (1998) 229 ITR 383 held that undoubtedly, the Tribunal will have the discretion to allow or not allow a new ground to be raised. But where the Tribunal is only required to consider a question of law arising from the facts which are on record in the assessment proceedings, we fail to see why such a question should not be allowed to be raised when it is necessary to consider that question in order to correctly assess the tax liability of an assessee. Accordingly, we are inclined to admit the additional legal grounds for the purpose of adjudication as there was no investigation of any fresh facts otherwise on record and these are critical for a fair adjudication of the matter.

ITA Nos.2450 to 2452/Bang/2025 Ediga Tayanna Gouda, Raichur Page 32 of 46 necessity to desire we will proceed further with other grounds of appeal raised by the assessee. For the purposes of adjudication, we are taking the facts of AY 2015-16 as a lead.

ITA Nos.2450 to 2452/Bang/2025 Ediga Tayanna Gouda, Raichur Page 33 of 46 in the absence of any compliance from the assessee, the case should not be assessed to the best of judgement u/s. 144 of the Act. The said letter was physically served to the assessee on 17/02/2022 but the assessee had not made any response. Considering the above scenario, the AO was constraint to complete the assessment as per best judgement assessment u/s. 144 r.w.s 147 of the Act based on the details and materials available on records. As the DDIT(Inv.) had made a verification of a TEP against the assessee and stated that the assessee owns disproportionate assets worth RS. 30 crores during the FY 2012- 13 to FY 2016-17 and the assessee also failed to come forward to explain the nature and source of acquisition of the disproportionate assets worth Rs. 30 crores during the FY 2012- 13 to FY 2016-17, hence Rs.6 crores (Rs. 30 crores distributed equally among 5 FYs i.e 2012-13 to 2016-17) brought to tax under the provisions of section 69 of the Act for the AY 2015-16 by treating the same as unexplained investment and added back the same to the total income of the assessee. The AO finally concluded the assessment proceedings on a total assessed income of a Rs.6,08,66,940/-.

ITA Nos.2450 to 2452/Bang/2025 Ediga Tayanna Gouda, Raichur Page 34 of 46 12. Before us, the ld. D. R. vehemently submitted that the approval u/s. 151 of the Act was accorded in the ITBA module and the respective approval letter issued u/s. 151 of the Act contains the name, designation of the competent authority as well as details of the office of the competent authority. Further, the provisions of section 282A(2) of the Act are being referred to which illustrate that a notice or any other documents shall be deemed to be authenticated if the name and office of the designated authority is printed, stamped or otherwise written. In this case the approval order duly contains all the relevant details as envisaged under the provisions of section 282A (2) of the Act. Further, the ld. D.R. submitted that no Approval shall be invalid merely by reason of any mistake, defect or omission if such Approval is in substance and effect in conformity with or according to the intend and purpose of this Act. As the assessee participated in the proceedings before the AO, now at this stage the assessee shall be precluded from taking any such objection. Lastly, the ld. D.R. submitted that an unsigned approval is a curable defect and does not vitiate the entire assessment proceedings.

ITA Nos.2450 to 2452/Bang/2025 Ediga Tayanna Gouda, Raichur Page 35 of 46 this notice is being issued after obtaining the necessary satisfaction of the RANGE, GULBARGA. The assessee by way of paper book has also submitted the copy of approval letter dated 31/03/2021 accorded u/s. 151 of the Act which the assessee had obtained through the RTI application filed on 21/10/2025. The copy of the approval letter dated 31/03/2021 is reproduced below for ease of reference and convenience:-

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13.1 On going through the above approval u/s 151 of the Act dated 31/03/2021 vide DIN and document no. ITBA/AST/S/118/2020-21/1032032554(1), we take note of the fact that at the bottom of the first page of approval, there is a note which state that “if digitally signed, the date of digital signature may be taken as date of document”. However, we observed that it is neither digitally nor manually/ physically signed by the JCIT, Range, Gulbarga. Further, on going through the last page of the approval letter (page 4 of 4), we also noticed that it is also not physically or digitally signed by the JCIT. Therefore, we find the contention of the ld. A.R. of the assessee is enormously correct that the approval u/s. 151 of the Act dated 31/03/2021 is unsigned.

ITA Nos.2450 to 2452/Bang/2025 Ediga Tayanna Gouda, Raichur Page 39 of 46 We also take a note of the fact that granting of approval u/s. 151 of the Act and the issuance of notice u/s. 148 of the Act was on the same day i.e. on 31/03/2021. We are of the considered opinion that unsigned approval granted u/s. 151 of the Act on 31/03/2021 was in enormous haste and on the same day notice u/s. 148 of the Act was also issued to the assessee at the fag-end. Before us, the ld. D.R. fervently submitted that the approval was accorded in the ITBA module and the respective sanctions order issued u/s. 151 of the Act contains the name, designation of competent authority as well as details of the office of the competent authority and therefore as per the provisions of section 282A(2) of the Act the approval shall be deemed to be authenticated. Before proceeding further, it is apposite here to reproduce relevant provisions of section 282A of the Act for ease of convenience and reference.

Authentication of notices and other documents. 282A. (1) Where this Act requires a notice or other document to be issued by any income-tax authority, such notice or other document shall be signed and issued in paper form or communicated in electronic form by that authority in accordance with such procedure as may be prescribed. (2) Every notice or other document to be issued, served or given for the purposes of this Act by any income-tax authority, shall be deemed to be authenticated if the name and office of a designated income-tax authority is printed, stamped or otherwise written thereon. (3) For the purposes of this section, a designated income-tax authority shall mean any income-tax authority authorised by the Board to issue, serve or give such notice or other document after authentication in the manner as provided in sub- section (2).

13.2 On plain reading of the above section clearly exhibit that the first and foremost condition under sub-section (1) of section 282A is that the notice or other document to be issued by any I. Tax Authority shall be signed by that authority. Further, the expression "shall be signed" used in section 282A(1) of the Act makes the signing of the notice or other document by that authority a mandatory requirement. Therefore, a notice or other document as

ITA Nos.2450 to 2452/Bang/2025 Ediga Tayanna Gouda, Raichur Page 40 of 46 referred in section 282A(1) of the Act will take legal effect only after it is signed by that I. Tax Authority, whether physically or digitally. The usage of the word "shall" make it a mandatory requirement. We are of the considered opinion that an approval, to be a valid approval under section 151 of the Act has to be accorded by the Prescribed Authority under his signature on application of mind and not mechanically, as also held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chhugamal Rajpal (supra). Unless the Prescribed Authority under section 151 of the Act records his satisfaction on application of mind and under his signature, there cannot be a valid satisfaction empowering the AO to assume jurisdiction to issue notice under section148 of the Act.

13.3 Further, the Revenue has sought to rely on Section 282A of the Act to validate the unsigned Approval u/s 151 of the Act. On its plain reading, Section 282A of the Act requires that a notice issued under the Act by any Income Tax Authority shall be signed. Reliance is placed on sub-section (2) of Section 282A of the Act, which provides that every notice or other documents to be issued, served, or given for the purposes of the Act by any Income Tax Authority shall be deemed to be authenticated if the name and office of a designated Income Tax Authority is printed or otherwise written thereon. A reading of this sub-section, however, clearly shows that it does not dispense with the requirement of signing the notice or documents by the Income Tax Authority. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the reliance on Section 282A offers no assistance to the Revenue. Further, mere generation of DIN & Document number in the Approval letter is not sufficient to cure the inherent defects, lacunae, omissions and deficiency in the Approval u/s 151 of the Act. In holding so, we take support & guidance from the decision of the Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court in the case of the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax Circle- 4 (2)

ITA Nos.2450 to 2452/Bang/2025 Ediga Tayanna Gouda, Raichur Page 41 of 46 (1), Bengaluru. V. M/s. Yeshoda Electricals, reported in (KAR-HC) 2025 ITL 7637, the relevant paragraph are reproduced below-

“7. On consideration of the submissions of the respective counsels for the parties, the record indicates the undisputed fact that a notice under Section 148 of the Act was issued on 22.03.2012 for the Assessment Year 2007-08, and the said notice was not signed by the Assessing Officer. 7.1 It is well settled that any notice issued without the requisite signature of the issuing authority cannot constitute a valid notice under law. The mere fact that the Assessee did not raise an objection cannot, by itself, validate a notice that is otherwise invalid. The notice under Section 148 of the Act is a jurisdictional notice, and any defect therein cannot be ignored. Non-signing of a jurisdictional notice is a serious defect, which renders the notice invalid. Section 148 of the Act mandates the issuance of the notice, and such issuance is complete only when the notice bears the signature of the issuing authority. 8. The Revenue has sought to rely on Section 282A of the Act to validate the unsigned notice. On its plain reading, Section 282A requires that a notice issued under the Act by the Income Tax Authority must be signed. Reliance is placed on sub-section (2) of Section 282A, which provides that every notice issued, served, or given for the purposes of the Act by any Income Tax Authority shall be deemed to be authenticated if the name and office of a designated Income Tax Authority is printed or otherwise written thereon. A reading of this subsection, however, clearly shows that it does not dispense with the requirement of signing the notice by the Income Tax Authority. Therefore, reliance on Section 282A offers no assistance to the Revenue.”

13.4 Thus, It is well settled that any Notice/Order/Approval issued without the requisite signature of the issuing authority cannot constitute a valid notice under law. We are also of the considered opinion that the mere fact that the Assessee did not raise an objection as contended by the ld. DR cannot, by itself, validate an Approval that is otherwise invalid. In holding so, we take a guidance & support from the decision of the Hon’ble High court of Allahabad in the case of Vikas Gupta & ANR v. Union of India & Ors. Reported in (2022) 448 ITR 1, the relevant paragraph of reproduced below for ease of reference & convenience-

“25. Thus the expression "shall be signed" used in s. 282A(1) of the Act 1961 makes the signing of the notice or other document by that authority a mandatory requirement. It is not a ministerial act or an empty formality which can be

ITA Nos.2450 to 2452/Bang/2025 Ediga Tayanna Gouda, Raichur Page 42 of 46 dispensed with. "Signed" means to sign one’s name; to signify assent or adhesion to by signing one’s name; to attest by signing or when a person is unable to write his name then affixation of "mark" by such person. The document must be signed or mark must be affixed in such a way as to make it appear that the person signing it or affixing his mark is the author of it. Therefore, a notice or other document as referred in s. 282A(1) of the Act, 1961 will take legal effect only after it is signed by that IT authority, whether physically or digitally. The usage of the word "shall" make it a mandatory requirement. 26. In the case of Chhugamal Rajpal vs. S.P. Chaliha & Ors. (1971) 1 SCC 453 (para-5) : AIR 1971 SC 730 : (1971) ITR 603, Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the validity of recording satisfaction under s. 151 by the CIT for the purposes of issuance of notice under s. 148 of the Act, 1961 and held as under : "5. In his report the ITO does not set out any reason for coming to the conclusion that this is a fit case to issue notice under s. 148. The material that he had before him for issuing notice under s. 148 is not mentioned in the report. In his report he vaguely refers to certain communications received by him from the CIT, Bihar and Orissa. He does not mention the facts contained in those communications. All that he says is that from those communications ‘it appears that these persons (alleged creditors) are name lenders and the transactions are bogus’. He has not even come to a prima facie conclusion that the transactions to which he referred are not genuine transactions. He appears to have had only a vague feeling that they may be bogus transactions. Such a conclusion ‘does not fulfil the requirements of s. 151(2). What that provision requires is that he must give reasons for issuing a notice under s. 148. In other words he must have some prima facie grounds before him for taking action under s. 148. Further his report mentions : "Hence proper investigation regarding these loans is necessary. In other words his conclusion is that there is a case for investigating as to the truth of the alleged transactions. That is not the same thing as saying that there are reasons to issue notice under s. 148. Before issuing a notice under s. 148, the ITO must have either reasons to believe that by reason of the omission or failure on the part of the assessee to make a return under s. 139 for any assessment year to the ITO or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year, income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for that year or alternatively notwithstanding that there has been no omission or failure as mentioned above on the part of the assessee, the ITO has in consequence of information in his possession reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for any assessment year. Unless the requirements of cl. (a) or (b) of s. 147 are satisfied, the ITO has no jurisdiction to issue a notice under s. 148. From the report submitted by the ITO to the CIT, it is clear that he could not have had reasons to believe that by reason of the assessee’s omission to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for the accounting year in question, income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for that year; nor could it be said that he as a consequence of information in his possession, had reasons to believe that the income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for that year. We are not satisfied that the ITO had any material before him which could satisfy the requirements of either cl. (a) or (b) of s. 147. Therefore he could not have issued a notice under s. 148. Further the report submitted by him under s. 151(2) does not mention any reason for coming to the conclusion that it is a fit case for the issue of a notice under s. 148. We are also of the opinion that the CIT

ITA Nos.2450 to 2452/Bang/2025 Ediga Tayanna Gouda, Raichur Page 43 of 46 has mechanically accorded permission. He did not himself record that he was satisfied that this was a fit case for the issue of a notice under s. 148. To question No. 8 in the report which reads ‘Whether the CIT is satisfied that it is a fit case for the issue of notice under s. 148’, he just noted the word ‘yes’and affixed his signatures thereunder. We are of the opinion that if only he had read the report carefully, he could never have come to the conclusion on the material before him that this is a fit case to issue notice under s. 148. The important safeguards provided in ss. 147 and 151 were lightly treated by the ITO as well as by the CIT. Both of them, appear to have taken the duty imposed on them under those provisions as of little importance. They have substituted the form for the substance." (emphasis, italicized in print, supplied by me) Question No. (a) and (b)

ITA Nos.2450 to 2452/Bang/2025 Ediga Tayanna Gouda, Raichur Page 44 of 46 notices under s. 148, he was having no jurisdiction to issue the impugned notices under s. 148 of the Act, 1961. Consequently the impugned notices issued by the AO under s. 148 of the Act, 1961 were without jurisdiction. The questions No. (a) and (b) are answered accordingly. 30. Since we have come to the conclusion that there was no valid satisfaction under s. 151, therefore, the question whether Principal Chief CIT or Chief CIT or Principal CIT or CIT for the purposes of recording of satisfaction under s. 151 is a designated IT authorityunder s. 282A of the Act 1961, is left open.”

13.5 Now coming to another contention of the ld. DR that no Approval u/s 151 of the Act shall be invalid merely by reason of any mistake, defect or omission if such approval is in substance and effect in conformity with or according to the intend and purpose of this Act, we are of the considered opinion that non-signing of an Approval is a serious defect, which renders the Approval invalid. We are also of the considered opinion that section 292B of the Act is intended to ensure that an inconsequential technicality does not defeat the justice. But the signing of an Approval u/s 151 of the Act is not merely an inconsequential technicality. It is a requirement of the provisions of section 282A of the Act. We are of the considered opinion that the unsigned approval is an approval with body without soul. Hence, it is an invalid Approval and consequently, equivalent to no Approval. In holding so we rely on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Umashankar Mishra v. Commissioner of Income-tax reported in (1982) 136 ITR 330, the relevant paragraph are reproduced below-

“The first question for consideration is whether the Tribunal was right in holding that the notice issued to the assessee under section 271(1)(a) of the Act was a valid notice. Now, the Tribunal has found that that notice was not signed by the ITO. Section 282 of the Act provides that a notice under the Act may be served on the person named therein as if it were a summons issued by a court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Sub-rule (3) of rule 1 of O. 5, CPC, provides that every summons shall be signed by the judge or such officer, as he appoints. In view of this provision, it must be held that the notice to show cause why penalty should not be levied issued by the ITO should have been signed by the ITO and the omission to do so invalidated the notice. In B.K. Gooyee v. CIT [1966] 62 ITR 109 (Cal.), the question for consideration was whether the absence of the signature of the ITO

ITA Nos.2450 to 2452/Bang/2025 Ediga Tayanna Gouda, Raichur Page 45 of 46 on the notice under section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, was a mere irregularity or a clerical mistake. Dealing with this question, Datta J. Observed as follows (p. 119) : "In the present case, there was more than a mere irregularity or a clerical mistake, for, in my view, a notice without the signature lacks an essential and/or an integral and /or an inseparable vital part or requirement of a notice under section 34, a notice the terms of which are a condition precedent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the Income-tax Officer. It is notice with a body but without a soul. Hence, it is an invalid notice and consequently, equivalent to no notice." We respectfully agree with the aforesaid observations. The Tribunal distinguished the decision in [1966] 62 ITR 109 on the ground that the provisions of section 292B of the Act were introduced after that decision. But, that provision, in our opinion, is intended to ensure that an inconsequential technicality does not defeat justice. But, the signing of a notice under section 271(1)(a) of the Act is not merely an inconsequential technicality. It is a requirement of the provisions of O. 5, rule 1(3) of the CPC, which are applicable by virtue of section 282 of the Act. Under the circumstances, the provisions of section 292B of the Act would not be attracted in the instant case and the Tribunal, in our opinion, was not right in holding that the notice issued under section 271(1)(a) of the Act was a valid notice in the eye of law.

In view of our answer to the first question, our answer to the second question is that the Tribunal was not right in holding that the absence of the signature on the notice simply constituted a mistake or omission within the meaning of section 292B of the Act. In view of the fact that no valid notice was served on the assessee before levying penalty, our answer to the third question is that, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the penalty levied under section 271(1)(a) of the Act was not valid. Thus, our answers to all the three questions referred to this court are in the negative and in favour of the assessee.”

13.6 Thus, respectfully following the decision of the Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court as well as other Hon’ble High Courts and considering the present facts of the case, we are of the considered opinion that unless the prescribed Authority under section 151 of the Act records his satisfaction on application of mind and under his signature, there cannot be valid satisfaction empowering the AO to assume jurisdiction to issue notice under section 148 of the Act. In the present case there was no valid satisfaction accorded by the Prescribed Authority under section 151 of the Act when the AO issued notice to the assessee under section 148 of the Act dated 30/03/2021. Therefore, the point of time when the AO issued

ITA Nos.2450 to 2452/Bang/2025 Ediga Tayanna Gouda, Raichur Page 46 of 46 notice u/s 148 of the Act, he was having no jurisdiction to issue the impugned notice u/s 148 of the Act. Consequently, the impugned notice issued by the AO u/s 148 of the Act dated 31/03/2021 was without jurisdiction and accordingly the notice u/s 148 of the Act dated 31/03/2021 and the consequential reassessment order dated 18/03/2022 for the AY 2015-16 is set-aside and hereby quashed.

13.7 Since we have adjudicated the case in favour of the assessee on the additional legal grounds raised by the assessee, all the other grounds related to the merits of the case are kept open. Further, since the assessee has raised common additional legal ground in all the three appeals in ITA Nos. 2450-2452/Bang/2025, the findings & decisions in ITA No. 2450/Bang/2025 will apply mutatis mutandis to appeal in ITA No. 2451/Bang/2025 as well as ITA No. 2451/Bang/2025.

Sd/- Sd/- (Prashant Maharishi) (Keshav Dubey) Vice President Judicial Member

Bangalore, Dated 29th Apr,2026. VG/SPS

Copy to: 1. The Applicant 2. The Respondent 3. The CIT 4. The DR, ITAT, Bangalore. 5 Guard file By order

Asst. Registrar, ITAT, Bangalore.