TUMMALA PRASHANT KUMAR,HYDERABAD vs. ITO, WARD- 9(1), HYDERABAD

आयकर अपील�य अ�धकरण, हैदराबाद पीठ IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL Hyderabad ‘B‘ Bench, Hyderabad �ी रिवश सूद,�ाियक सद� एवं �ी मधुसूदन साविड़या लेखा सद� सम� | Before Shri Ravish Sood, Judicial Member A N D Shri Madhusudan Sawdia, Accountant Member आ.अपी.सं /ITA Nos.2345 & 2346/Hyd/2025 (िनधा�रण वष�/Assessment Years: 2013-14 & 2014-15) Shri Tummala Prashant Vs. ITO Kumar, Hyderabad Ward 9(1) PAN: ABTPT7368N Hyderabad (Appellant) (Respondent) िनधा�रती �ारा/Assessee by: CA Srikanth Srigadi राज� व �ारा/Revenue by: Smt. Uppaluri Meena, Sr. AR सुनवाई की तारीख/Date of hearing: 09/06/2026 घोषणा की तारीख/Pronouncement: 17/06/2026 आदेश/ORDER Per Madhusudan Sawdia, A.M.:

These two appeal are filed by Shri Tummala Prashant Kumar (“the assessee”), feeling aggrieved by the order passed by the Learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), National Faceless Appeal Centre (NFAC) (“Ld. CIT(A)”) both dated 29.06.2024 for the A.Ys. 2013-14 & 2014-15 respectively. Since the assessee is same and the issues raised in these appeals are identical, for the sake of convenience, these were heard together and are being disposed of by the common and consolidated order. 2. At the outset, it is observed that there is a substantial delay of 480 days in filing both the appeals before the Tribunal. The assessee has filed petitions for condonation

2 of delay supported by affidavits explaining the reasons for such delay separately for both the appeals. The Learned Authorised Representative (“Ld. AR”) submitted that though the Ld. CIT(A) had issued notices during the appellate proceedings, none of the notices were served physically upon the assessee. Consequently, the assessee remained unaware of the notices issued by the Ld. CIT(A) as well as the appellate orders passed by him. It was submitted that only after receiving a communication from the Learned Assessing Officer (“Ld. AO”) regarding payment of outstanding demand did the assessee come to know about the passing of the appellate orders. Thereafter, the assessee took immediate steps for filing the present appeals and, in the process, a delay of 480 days occurred. According to the Ld. AR, the delay was neither deliberate nor attributable to any mala fide intention and had occurred due to circumstances beyond the control of the assessee. Relying upon the decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vedabai Alias Vaijayantabai Baburao Patil Vs. Shantaram Baburao Patil Alyas (2022) 122 Taxmann.com 114 (SC) and Collector, Land Acquisition Vs. Mst. Katiji (1987) 1987 Taxmann.com 1072 (S.C), it was pleaded that the delay be condoned and the appeals be admitted for adjudication on merits. 3. Per contra, the Learned Departmental Representative (“Ld. DR”) strongly opposed the condonation petitions. She submitted that the delay of 480 days is substantial and the assessee has failed to furnish any sufficient cause warranting condonation. Inviting our attention to para nos. 4 and 5 of the orders passed by the Ld. CIT(A), the Ld. DR submitted that notices were issued by the Ld. CIT(A) on four occasions through the e-mail address furnished by the

3 assessee himself in Form No.35. However, the assessee failed to comply with any of such notices. The Ld. DR further invited our attention to Form No.35 and submitted that the assessee himself had provided the e-mail address for communication and it is not the assessee’s case that the notices or appellate orders were transmitted to any incorrect e-mail address. The Ld. DR further invited our attention to para no. 2 of the assessment order and submitted that even during the reassessment proceedings the assessee neither filed any return of income in response to notice issued under section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (“the Act”) nor complied with any of the notices issued by the Ld. AO. According to the Ld. DR, the conduct of the assessee before both the lower authorities clearly demonstrates a casual and indifferent approach towards statutory proceedings. Therefore, no sufficient cause has been shown for condonation of the extraordinary delay. It was further submitted that the judicial precedents relied upon by the assessee are distinguishable on facts and have no application to the present case. Relying on the following judicial precedents, the Ld. DR prayed before the Bench to dismiss the appeals of the assessee on the ground of limitation: i) Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of P.K. Ramachandran Vs. State of Kerala & Anr. AIR 1998 S.C.2276, dated 19th September, 1997. ii) Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of Puneet Rastogi Vs. PCIT (Intl. Taxation) (2023) 148 Taxmann.com 362 (Delhi), dated 30.08.2022. iii) Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of PCIT Vs. PNB Housing Finance Ltd (2023) 157 Taxmann.com 465 (S.C) dated 14.12.2023 iv) Hon'ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of CIT Vs. Ram Mohan Kabra, (2003) 132 Taxman 516 (P&H) dated 12.01.1999

4 v) Coordinate Bench of the Delhi Tribunal in the case of Mewat GRIT Udyog Vs. PCIT in ITA No.1802/Del/2016, dated 11.04.2017. vi) Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in the case of Calicut Trading Co. Vs. Dy. Commissioner of Commercial (AIR 1999 KAR 2320 (1998), 110 STC 195 (KAR) dated 25.04.1995. vii) Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Brij Lal Prabhu Dayal & Ors (AIR 1999RAJ216 (1998) 110 STC 195 (KAR) dated 25.04.1995. viii) Hon'ble Kolkata High Court in the case of Bhaktipada Majhi Vs. SDO Kalna & Ors. (AIR1971CAL204, 75CWN555, AIR 1971 CALCUTTA 204, dated 16.12.1970. ix) Hon'ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Classic Ispat Pvt. Ltd Vs. Janak Steel Tubes Ltd (1998) 93COMPCAS165(P&H), 119 PLR 681 dated 26.03.1998. x) Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of J.B Advani & Co. (P) Ltd Vs. CIT (1969) 72 ITR 395 (S.C), dated 22.08.1968.

6 served physically upon him. In this regard, we have gone through personal information section of Form No.35 filed by the assessee, which is to the following effect:

8 form of an electronic record as provided in Chapter IV of the Information Technology Act, 2000. In this regard, we have also gone through Rule 127 of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 (“the Rules”), which is to the following effect:

9 furnished by the assessee himself, the requirement of law stood duly complied with. We also find merit in the contention of the Ld. DR that the conduct of the assessee throughout the proceedings does not inspire confidence. On perusal of the assessment order, it is evident that during the reassessment proceedings also the assessee neither filed any return of income in response to notice issued under section 148 of the Act nor complied with any of the subsequent notices issued by the Ld. AO. Thus, the non-compliance before the Ld. CIT(A) cannot be viewed in isolation but forms part of a consistent pattern of non-cooperation on the part of the assessee. Further, at this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the settled legal position governing condonation of delay. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of P.K. Ramachandran Vs. State of Kerala [(1997) 7 SCC 556] at last para of the order has held as under:

“Law of limitation may harshly effect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribe and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay filed in the High Court would stand rejected and the Miscellaneous First Appeal shall stand dismissed as barred by time. No costs.” 10. On perusal of the above, it is evident that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the law of limitation may operate harshly in a particular case, but it has to be applied with all its rigor when the statute so prescribes and Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds in the absence of a satisfactory explanation. Accordingly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering an application for condonation of delay, the Court must examine whether sufficient cause has been shown

10 and cannot condone delay merely on sympathetic considerations. Similarly, in Basawaraj & Anr. Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14 SCC 81], the Hon’ble Supreme Court at para No. 5 of the order has held as under:

“15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bonafide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamount to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” 11. On perusal of the above, we find that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorically held that the expression “sufficient cause” means a cause beyond the control of the party invoking the aid of the Court. It was further held that where negligence, inaction or want of bona fides is attributable to the party seeking condonation, delay cannot be condoned as a matter of course. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that the law of limitation is founded on public policy and Courts cannot extend limitation on equitable grounds where no sufficient cause is demonstrated.

11 08.04.2024, wherein, at para nos. 13 to 26 of the order it is held as under :

“13. It is very elementary and well understood that courts should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in dealing with the applications for condonation of the delay in filing appeals and rather follow a pragmatic line to advance substantial justice. 14. It may also be important to point out that though on one hand, Section 5 of the Limitation Act is to be construed liberally, but on the other hand, Section 3 of the Limitation Act, being a substantive law of mandatory nature has to be interpreted in a strict sense. In Bhag Mal alias Ram Bux 8|22 and Ors. vs. Munshi (Dead) by LRs. and Ors.1, it has been observed that different provisions of Limitation Act may require different construction, as for example, the court exercises its power in a given case liberally in condoning the delay in filing the appeal under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, however, the same may not be true while construing Section 3 of the Limitation Act. It, therefore, follows that though liberal interpretation has to be given in construing Section 5 of the Limitation Act but not in applying Section 3 of the Limitation Act, which has to be construed strictly. 15. It is in the light of the public policy upon which law of limitation is based, the object behind the law of limitation and the mandatory and the directory nature of Section 3 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act that we have to examine and strike a balance between Section 3 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the matters of condoning the delay. 16. Generally, the courts have adopted a very liberal approach in construing the phrase ‘sufficient cause’ used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act in order to condone the delay to enable the courts to do substantial justice and to apply law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Ors. vs. Katiji and Ors.2, this Court in advocating the liberal approach in condoning the delay for ‘sufficient cause’ held that ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late; it is not necessary to explain every day’s delay in filing the appeal; and since sometimes refusal to condone delay may result in throwing out a meritorious matter, it is necessary in the interest of justice that cause of substantial justice should be allowed to prevail upon technical considerations and if the delay is not deliberate, it ought to be condoned. Notwithstanding the above, howsoever, liberal approach is adopted in condoning the delay, existence of ‘sufficient cause’ for not filing the appeal in time, is a condition precedent for exercising the discretionary power to condone the

12 delay. The phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice- oriented approach’ and cause for the advancement of ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re- opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 17. It must always be borne in mind that while construing ‘sufficient cause’ in deciding application under Section 5 of the Act, that on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal, substantive right in favour of a decree-holder accrues and this right ought not to be lightly disturbed. The decree-holder treats the decree to be binding with the lapse of time and may proceed on such assumption creating new rights. 18. This Court as far back in 1962 in the case of Ramlal, Motilal And Chhotelal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd3 has emphasized that even after sufficient cause has been shown by a party for not filing an appeal within time, the said party is not entitled to the condonation of delay as excusing the delay is the discretionary jurisdiction vested with the court. The court, despite establishment of a ‘sufficient cause’ for various reasons, may refuse to condone the delay depending upon the bona fides of the party. 19. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and Ors.4, it had been held that the court cannot grant an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. The court has time and again repeated that when mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone. 20. In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh Kumar and Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors.5 wherein while observing, as above, this Court further laid down that if some person has obtained a relief approaching the court just or immediately when the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take the benefit of the same approaching the court at a belated stage simply on the ground of parity, equity, sympathy and compassion. 21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.6, where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High Court should have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the

13 concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. 22. It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar Chokhani & Ors.7, that the merits of the (2011) 4 SCC 363 AIR 2009 SC 1927 13 | 2 2 case cannot be considered while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer8, this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds. 24. It would be beneficial to quote paragraph 12 of the aforesaid decision which clinches the issue of the manner in which equilibrium has to be maintained between adopting liberal approach and in implementing the statute as it stands. Paragraph 12 reads as under “12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.” 25. This Court in the same breath in the same very decision vide paragraph 15 went on to observe as under: “15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on

14 his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” (emphasis supplied) 26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the

15 delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.” 13. On perusal of the above, it is evident that in the above decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court comprehensively reviewed the law relating to condonation of delay and reiterated that the law of limitation is founded upon public policy and there must be finality to litigation. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that though the expression “sufficient cause” occurring in section 5 of the Limitation Act deserves liberal construction, such liberal approach cannot be stretched to defeat the substantive provisions of limitation. The Court further held that concepts such as “substantial justice”, “liberal approach” and “justice-oriented approach” cannot be employed to revive stale and dead claims. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that even where sufficient cause is shown, condonation of delay is not a matter of right and the power to condone delay remains discretionary. Negligence, inaction, lack of bona fides, absence of due diligence and inordinate delay are valid grounds for refusing condonation. The Hon’ble Supreme Court ultimately upheld the refusal to condone the delay and emphasized that Courts cannot extend limitation on equitable or sympathetic considerations alone. 14. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, we find that the assessee has failed to furnish any cogent, convincing and bona fide explanation covering the entire period of delay of 480 days. The sole explanation furnished by the assessee is that no physical notices were served by the Ld. CIT(A). However, as discussed hereinabove, the notices as well as the appellate orders were transmitted to the e-mail address furnished by the assessee himself in Form No.35 and such service is in conformity with section 282 of the Act read with Rule 127 of the Rules. It is not the case of the

16 assessee that the communications were transmitted to an incorrect e-mail address. We further find that the conduct of the assessee throughout the proceedings demonstrates lack of due diligence in pursuing the statutory remedies available under the Act. The assessee neither filed a return of income in response to notice issued under section 148 of the Act nor complied with the notices issued during the assessment proceedings. Similarly, despite repeated notices issued by the Ld. CIT(A), the assessee failed to participate in the appellate proceedings. Such conduct reflects negligence and inaction rather than circumstances beyond the control of the assessee. Therefore, respectfully following the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of P.K. Ramachandran (supra), Basawaraj (supra) and Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs. (supra), we are of the considered view that the assessee has failed to establish “sufficient cause” for condonation of the inordinate delay of 480 days. Accordingly, the petitions for condonation of delay are rejected. 15. We further observe that the judicial precedents relied upon by the assessee are distinguishable on facts and have no application to the present case. In those cases, the Hon’ble Courts found the reason for the delay as sufficient to condone the delay. However, in the present case we do not find the reason submitted by the assessee as sufficient to condone the delay. 16. Since the delay is not condoned, both the appeals filed by the assessee are dismissed in limine as barred by limitation.

17 17. In the result, both the appeals of the assessee are dismissed. Order pronounced in the Open Court on 17th June, 2026. Sd/- Sd/- (RAVISH SOOD) (MADHUSUDAN SAWDIA) JUDICIAL MEMBER ACCOUNTANT MEMBER Hyderabad, dated 17th June, 2026. Vinodan/sps Copy to: S.No Addresses 1 Shri TUMMALA PRASHANT KUMAR 17-1-462/10 SHANKESHWAR BAZAR DILSUKH NAGAR HYDERABAD 500060 ,Telangana 2 Income Tax Officer Ward-9(1), Prof. Elyas Burney Rolad, AC Guards, Masab Tank, Hyderabad 500028 3 Pr. CIT –, Hyderabad 4 DR, ITAT Hyderabad Benches 5 Guard File By Order VADREVU Digitally signed by VADREVU PRASADA PRASADA RAO Date: 2026.06.17 RAO 17:19:36 +05'30'