ANTHONY P. LEWIS,MUMBAI vs. ITO WARD 22(1)(1), MUMBAI

आदेश / ORDER PER BEENA PILLAI, JUDICIAL MEMBER:

Present appeal filed by the assessee is directed against the order passed by the NFAC, Delhi [hereinafter referred to as “Ld.CIT(A)”], dated 11/06/2024, for A.Y. 2017-18,

The assessee has also placed reliance upon a medical certificate dated 18/12/2025, wherein it has been certified that he was under medical treatment since May, 2024 and was advised rest for a substantial period. The averments made in the affidavit have not been controverted by any material brought on record by the Revenue.

Considering the advanced age of the assessee, the medical condition explained in the affidavit, the supporting medical evidence and the absence of any mala fide intention or deliberate inaction, we are satisfied that the assessee was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the stipulated time.

2.1.1. Having regard to the submissions by the assessee, we refer to the decision of Hon’ble Cochin Bench of this Tribunal in the case of Midas Polymer Compounds Pvt. Ltd. in ITA No. 288/Coch/2017 dated 25.6.2018, wherein the Tribunal condoned the delay of 2819 days by observing as follows: “6. We have heard the rival submissions and perused the record. There was a delay of 2819 days in filing the appeal before the Tribunal. The assessee has stated the reasons in the condonation petition accompanied by an affidavit which has been cited in the earlier para. The assessee filed an affidavit explaining the reasons and prayed for condonation of delay. The reason stated by the assessee is due to inadvertent omission on the part of Shri Unnikrishnan Nair N, CA in taking appropriate action to file the appeal. He had a mistaken belief that the appeal for this year was filed by the assessee as there was separate Counsel to take steps to file this appeal before the ITAT. Therefore, we have to consider whether the Counsel’s failure is sufficient cause for condoning the delay. The Madras High Court considered an identical issue in the case of Sreenivas Charitable Trust v. Dy. CIT (280 ITR 357) and held that mixing up of papers with other papers are sufficient cause for not filing the appeal in time. The Madras High Court further observed that the expression "sufficient cause" should be interpreted to advance substantial justice. Therefore, advancement of substantial justice is the prime factor while considering the reasons for condoning the delay.

6.1 On merit the issue is in favour of the assessee. But there is a technical defect in the appeal since the appeal was not filed within the period of limitation. The assessee filed an affidavit saying that the appeal was not filed because of the Counsel’s inability to file the appeal. The Revenue has not filed any counter affidavit to deny the allegation made by the assessee. While considering a similar issue the Apex Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji and Ors. (167 ITR 471) laid down six principles. For the purpose of convenience, the principles laid down by the Apex Court are reproduced hereunder: (1) Ordinarily, a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late (2) Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this, when delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. (3) 'Every day's delay must be explained' does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational, commonsense and pragmatic manner. (4) When substantial justice and technical consideration are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a nondeliberate delay. (5) There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk. (6) It must be grasped that the judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. 6.2 When substantial justice and technical consideration are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have vested right for injustice being done because of nondeliberate delay. In the case on our hand, the issue on merit regarding allowability of deduction u/s. 80IB of the Act was covered in favour of the assessee by the binding Judgment of the jurisdictional High Court. Moreover, no counter-affidavit was filed by the Revenue denying the allegation made by the assessee. It is not the case of the Revenue that the appeal was not filed deliberately. Therefore, we have to prefer substantial justice rather than technicality in deciding the issue. As observed by Apex Court, if the application of the assessee for condoning the delay is rejected, it would amount to legalise injustice on technical ground when the Tribunal is capable of removing injustice and to do justice. Therefore, this Tribunal is bound to remove the injustice by condoning the delay on technicalities. If the delay is not condoned, it would amount to legalising an illegal order which would result in unjust enrichment on the part of the State by retaining the tax relatable thereto. Under the scheme of Constitution, the Government cannot retain even a single pie of the individual citizen as tax, when it is not authorised by an authority of law. Therefore, if we refuse to condone the delay, that would amount to legalise an illegal and unconstitutional order passed by the lower authority. Therefore, in our opinion, by preferring the substantial justice, the delay of 2819 days has to be condoned.” 2.2. In the present facts, on examining whether the reason stated by the assessee to seek condonation of delay before this Tribunal is sufficient to condone the delay and whether, there exists sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal before this Tribunal within the period of limitation under the statute, the assessee must show that, it was diligent in taking appropriate steps and the delay was caused notwithstanding with its due diligence. It is for the party concerned to explain the reasons for delay and it is not the function of concerned authorities often to find cause for delay. The Court/authority has to examine whether the sufficient cause has been shown by the party for condoning the delay, and whether such cause is reasonable or not. 2.3. In any case, the assessee is not benefitted with the delay caused in filing appeal before this tribunal, the lapse that occurred on behalf of the representative cannot be attributed to the assessee for which assessee could be punished. In case of People Education & Economic Development Society Vs. ITO reported in 100 ITD 87 (TM) (Chen), it was held that; “when substantial justice and technical consultation are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of non-deliberate delay”. 2.4. The next question that arises is whether delay was excessive or inordinate. There is no question of any excessive or inordinate when the reason stated by the assessee was a reasonable cause for not able to file the appeals within the period of limitation. The cause for the delay therefore deserves to be considered, when there exist a reasonable cause, and therefore the period of delay may not be relevant factor. In support, we rely on the decision of Hon’ble Madras High Court in the case of CIT vs. K.S.P. Shanmugavel Nadai and Ors. (153 ITR 596) considered the condonation of delay and held that there was sufficient and reasonable cause on the part of the assessee for not filing the appeal within the period of limitation. Hon’ble Madras High Court thus condoned nearly 21 years of delay in filing the appeal. As compared to 21 years, delay of about 1000 to 2000 days cannot be considered to be inordinate or excessive. Hon’ble Madras High Court in the case of Sreenivas Charitable Trust reported in 280 ITR 357 held that, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in the matter of condonation of delay and the Court should adopt a pragmatic approach and the Court should exercise their discretion on the facts of each case keeping in mind that in construing the expression "sufficient cause" the principle of advancing substantial justice is of prime importance and the expression "sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction. Therefore, this Judgment of the Hon’ble Madras High Court (supra) clearly says that in order to advance substantial justice which is of prime importance, the expression "sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction. Therefore, for the purpose of advancing substantial justice which is of prime importance in the administration of justice, the expression "sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction. In opinion of this Tribunal, this decision of Hon’ble Madras High Court is applicable to the present facts of the case. A similar view was taken by Hon’ble Madras High Court in the case of Venkatadri Traders Ltd. v. CIT (2001) 168 CTR (Mad) 81 : (2001) 118 Taxman 622 (Mad). 2.5. Reliance is also placed on the decision of Hon’ble Mumbai Bench of this Tribunal in the case of Bajaj Hindusthan Ltd. v. Jt. CIT (AT) reported in 277 ITR 1 condoned the delay of 180 days when, the appeal was filed after the pronouncement of the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It is also to be noted that the Revenue has not filed any counter-affidavit opposing the application of the assessee for condonation of delay. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mrs. Sandhya Rani Sarkar vs. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi reported in AIR 1978 SC 537 held that, non- filing of affidavit in opposition to an application for condonation of delay may be a sufficient cause for condonation of delay. In this case, the Revenue has not filed any counter-affidavit opposing the application of the assessee, therefore, as held by Hon’ble Supreme Court, there is sufficient cause for condonation of delay. Hon’ble Supreme Court also observed that; “It does not mean that when the delay was for longer period, the delay should not be condoned even though there was sufficient cause. Condonation of delay is the discretion of the Court/Tribunal. Therefore, it would depend upon the facts of each case. In our opinion, when there is sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within the period of limitation, the delay deserves to be condoned, irrespective of the duration/period.”

2.6. After considering the contents of the affidavit and the petition for condonation of delay, we are satisfied that the delay was caused due to circumstances beyond the control of the Assessee and that there was a reasonable and bona fide cause for not filing the appeal within the stipulated period. There is nothing on record to suggest that the delay was deliberate or attributable to any mala fide intention. We, therefore, feel that the reasons assigned by the assessee for the inability to present the appeal within time before this Tribunal deserves consideration based on the principles laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Collector Land Acquisition Vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors., reported in (1987) 167 ITR 471. The relevant observation of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Collector Land Acquisition Vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors.,(supra) is as under:- “The Legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting section 51 of the Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on de merits". The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the Legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose of the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy.

And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that :

3.1. Per contra, the Ld. DR relied upon the orders of the lower authorities. However, the Ld. DR fairly left the issue to the discretion of the Bench in the event the matter was considered fit for restoration to the file of the Ld. CIT(A).

We have perused the submissions advanced by both sides in light of the record placed before us.

4.1. Accordingly, the impugned order of the Ld. CIT(A) is set aside and the matter is restored to his file with a direction to adjudicate the issues afresh on merits in accordance with law after providing adequate opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The assessee is also directed to extend full cooperation and furnish the requisite details and evidences as may be called for by the Ld. CIT(A). We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the additions/disallowances involved and all issues are left open for adjudication.

In the result, the appeal of the assessee is allowed for statistical purposes.

Order pronounced in the open court on 18/06/2026

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JAGADISH BEENA PILLAI ACCOUNTANT MEMBER JUDICIAL MEMBER

Mumbai Dated: 18/06/2026 SC. Sr. P.S. Copy to: ANTHONY P. LEWIS, PLOT E/563, NORMAN HAVEN, 10 TH ROAD, SOUTH AVENUE. DR NORMAN 1 FRANCIS LEWIS CHOWK. KHAR WEST., MUMBAI-400052, MAHARASHTRA ITO WARD 22(1)(1), ROOM NO. 319, 3 RD FLOOR, 2 PIRAMAL CHAMBER. LAL BAUG. PAREL., MUMBAI-400012, MAHARASHTRA 3 THE PCIT / CIT, 4 THE D.R., ITAT, MUMBAI BENCH 5 GUARD FILE