ANISHKA THAKUR,HYDERABAD vs. ITO, WARD -14(1), HYDERABAD

आयकर अपीलीय अिधकरण, हैदराबाद पीठ IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL Hyderabad ‘B’ Bench, Hyderabad Before Shri Manjunatha G., Accountant Member and Shri Ravish Sood, Judicial Member आ.अपी.सं /ITA No.2395/Hyd/2025 (िनधा�रण वष�/Assessment Year:2015-16) Anishka Thakur, Vs. Income Tax Officer, Hyderabad. Ward-14(1), PAN: AMXPT0679F Hyderabad. (Appellant) (Respondent) िनधा�रती �ारा/Assessee by: Shri Deepak N Maheswari, CA राज� व �ारा/Revenue by: Shri K Prasad, Sr-AR सुनवाई की तारीख/Date of 17/06/2026 Hearing: घोषणा की तारीख/Date of 19/06/2026 Pronouncement: आदेश / ORDER PER RAVISH SOOD, J.M: The present appeal filed by the assessee is directed against the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), National Faceless Appeal Centre, Delhi (for short, “CIT(A)”), dated 14/11/2025, which in turn arises from the order passed by the Assessing Officer (for short, “AO”) under section 147 r.w.s 144 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short, “the Act”), dated 23/03/2024. The assessee has assailed the impugned order of the CIT(A) on the following grounds of appeal:

2 ITA No.2395/Hyd/2025 Anishka Thakur vs. ITO 1. “On the facts and circumstances of the case as well as in law, the Learned CIT(A) has erred in confirming the action of the Learned Assessing Officer in reopening the case u/s.147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, without considering the facts and circumstances of the case. 2. On the facts and circumstances of the case as well as in law, the Learned CIT(A) has erred in confirming the action of the Learned Assessing Officer in considering sale of immovable property for Rs. 1,14,19,000/- as short term capital gain and brought to tax for A.Y 2015-16, without considering the facts and circumstances of the case. 3. On the facts and circumstances of the case as well as in law, the Learned CIT(A) has erred in confirming the action of the 3 Learned Assessing Officer in making an addition of Rs. 21,134/-towards interest of securities, without considering the facts and circumstances of the case. 4. The appellant craves leave to add, amend alter or delete the said ground of appeal.”

3 ITA No.2395/Hyd/2025 Anishka Thakur vs. ITO comply and did not file her return of income for the year under consideration.

4 ITA No.2395/Hyd/2025 Anishka Thakur vs. ITO an addition of the interest on securities as gathered from the insight portal of the Income Tax Department amounting to Rs.21,134/-. The AO based on his aforesaid observations vide his order passed under section 147 r.w.s 144 of the Act, dated 23/03/2024 determined the income of the assessee at Rs.1,14,40,134/-.

5 ITA No.2395/Hyd/2025 Anishka Thakur vs. ITO length. The Ld. AR submitted that the assessee had remained unaware of the fact that the assessment order was passed in her case and had gathered about the same only a few days prior to filing of the appeal before the CIT(A). The Ld. AR submitted that as the address mentioned by the AO in the assessment order, i.e., 8-1-305/A1, Puran Bagh, Near Shaikpet Nala, Toli Chowki, Hyderabad was vacated by the assessee way back in the year 2018, thus neither the notices that would have been forwarded by the AO in the course of the assessment proceedings nor the assessment order sought to be served on the said address was in the assessee’s knowledge. Apart from that, it was stated by the Ld. AR that the assessee being a semi-literate lady who did not have any email Id had gathered about the framing of the assessment in her case only when she had engaged a Chartered Accountant who after checking her income tax records on the e-filing portal intimated her about the framing of an ex-parte assessment order in her case vide an order passed under section 147 r.w.s 144 of the Act, dated 23/03/2024, which, thus had resulted to the impugned delay in filing of the appeal before the CIT(A). Elaborating further on his contention, the Ld. AR submitted that the assessee on gathering about the framing of the assessment vide an ex- parte order in her case wherein the AO had, inter alia, subjected the entire amount of sale proceeds of the immovable property to tax under the head “Short term capital gains” (STCG), filed the appeal before the

6 ITA No.2395/Hyd/2025 Anishka Thakur vs. ITO CIT(A) involving no further loss of time. The Ld. AR further submitted that as the assessee is a widow who has been saddled with tax liability by the AO in a most arbitrary manner, i.e., by assessing the entire amount of the sale proceeds as short term capital gains in her hands, the CIT(A) in all fairness and in the interest of justice considering the totality of the circumstances leading to the delay in filing of the appeal ought to have condoned the same, instead of summarily dismissing the appeal in limine.

7 ITA No.2395/Hyd/2025 Anishka Thakur vs. ITO beyond the time limit specified under the provisions of clause (b) of sub- section (1) of section 149 of the Act as they stood immediately before the commencement of the Finance Act, 2021, the Ld. Sr-DR was confronted with the said material defect in the assumption of jurisdiction by the AO for framing the impugned assessment. However, the Ld. Sr- DR failed to come forth with any reply.

8 ITA No.2395/Hyd/2025 Anishka Thakur vs. ITO section 147 r.w.s 144 of the Act, dated 23/03/2024. Although, we find that the AO had also carried out service of notice issued under section 148 of the Act, dated 12/04/2022 by way of affixture at the aforementioned address on 29/04/2022, but going by the claim of the assessee that she had vacated the said property in the year 2018, the said substituted service of notice was meaningless and devoid and bereft any force of law. At the same time, we may herein observe that the assessee while shifting her address ought to have brought the said fact to the notice of the Department, which we find she had failed to do. 10. Be that as it may, in the totality of the facts leading to the delay in filing of the appeal before the CIT(A), we find that there are justifiable reasons leading to the same as was explained by the assessee at Column No.15 of Form-35 filed by her. Our aforesaid view that a liberal approach ought to have been adopted by the CIT(A) while considering the application filed by the assessee appellant seeking condonation of delay is supported by the recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vidya Shankar Jaiswal vs. The Income Tax Officer, Ward-2, Ambikapur in Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 26310- 26311/2024, dated 31st January, 2025. The Hon'ble Apex Court, while setting aside the order of the Hon'ble High Court of Chhattisgarh, which had approved the declining of the condonation of the delay of 166 days by the Income-Tax Appellate Tribunal, Raipur Bench, had observed that

9 ITA No.2395/Hyd/2025 Anishka Thakur vs. ITO a justice-oriented and liberal approach should be adopted while considering the application filed by an appellant seeking condonation of the delay involved in filing the appeal. We, thus, in terms of our aforesaid deliberations set aside the CIT(A) order wherein he has declined to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal in limine.

10 ITA No.2395/Hyd/2025 Anishka Thakur vs. ITO clear mandate of the “first proviso” to section 149 of the Act as had been made available on the statute by the Finance Act, 2021. Also, we are of firm conviction that the period sought to be excluded for the purpose of computing the period of limitation as contemplated in the “fifth proviso” of section 149(1) of the Act (post amended) and also the extension of time limit to seven days in a case where after the exclusion of the time limit contemplated in the “fifth proviso” to seven days (as per the “sixth proviso”) of section 149(1) of the Act cannot be read into for the purpose of computing the period of limitation for issuance of notice under section 148 of the Act as contemplated in the “first proviso” of post amended section 149(1) of the Act. Our aforesaid view is fortified by the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Telangana in the case of Cyberabad Citizens Health Services Private Limited vs. DCIT (supra), wherein based on exhaustive deliberations, it was observed as under:- “6. According to the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, notice under Section 148 of the Act is barred by limitation. As per the first proviso to the amended Section 149 of the Act, the impugned notice is beyond the period of six years from the Assessment Year 2017-18. The reopening of assessment proceedings have also been challenged on the ground that during pendency of the proceedings under Section 154 of the Act on the same issue, it cannot be made. The attention of this Court has been drawn to the notice dated 20.01.2022 issued for rectification of mistake and the order under Section l48A(d) of the Act passed on 22.04.2024. Reliance has been placed on the following decisions rendered by the Apex Court in Union of India v. Rajiv Bansal; High Court of Delhi in Sheetal international (P) Ltd v. Chief Commissioner of Income-tax, Central-2z; High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in Tarish Investment and Trading Company (P) Ltd., v. Union of India3; High Court of Rajasthan in

11 ITA No.2395/Hyd/2025 Anishka Thakur vs. ITO Shree Cement Ltd., v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax; High Court of Bombay in Godrej Industries Ltd., v. The Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle 14(1X2), Mumbai, and by a coordinate Bench of this Court in M/s. Sri Sai Dhurga Balaji Health and Educational Welfare Society v. the Income Tax Officer6. All these decisions relate to the Assessment Year 2017- 18 except the case of Godrej Industries Ltd., (supra) which relates to the Assessment Year 2014-15. 7. On the second issue, reliance has been placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of S.M. Overseas (P) Ltd., v. Commissioner of Income-tax. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has distinguished the decision rendered by the High Court of Patna in Chandra Shekhar v. Principal Commissioner of Income-tax as it relates to the Assessment Year 2020-21 where the application of the first proviso to the amended Section 149 of the Act introduced with effect from 01.04.2021 cannot be applied. Based on the said submissions, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has prayed that the impugned notice under Section 148 of the Act may be quashed and the order passed under Section 148A(d) of the Act may also be set aside. 8. On behalf of the Revenue, learned Senior Counsel for the Department has taken us to the chronology of dates and events as referred to hereinabove and thereby drawn the attention of this Court to the notice under Section 148A(b) of the Act dated 26.03.2024. It is submitted that the instant notice was issued prior to the expiry of six years period for reopening the assessment proceedings under the un-amended Section 149 of the Act for the Assessment Year 2017-18. The order under Section 148A(d) of the Act was passed on 22.04.2024. Further, the petitioner took time to file its reply on the date fixed as 10.04.2024. It is submitted that therefore, the benefit of the fifth and sixth provisos to amended Section 149 of the Act come into play. Therefore, the impugned notice under Section 148 of the Act dated 22.04.2024 is not barred by limitation. 9. Upon consideration of the rival submissions and the materials referred to hereinabove placed on record, we are of the considered view that the impugned notice under Section 148 of the Act dated 22.04.2024 relating to the Assessment Year 2017- 18 is barred by limitation as per the first proviso to Section 149 of the Act brought into effect from 01.04.2021. The relevant part of amended Section 149 and the first, fifth and sixth provisos are extracted in the footnote”. 10. This, we say so for the following reasons: In the case of Rajeev Bansal (supra), the position of law stands clear as regards the operation of amended Section 149(1) of the

12 ITA No.2395/Hyd/2025 Anishka Thakur vs. ITO Act. The relevant paragraphs 49 and 53 thereof are extracted hereunder: “49 The first proviso to Section 149(1)(b) requires the determination of whether the time limit prescribed under Section 149(1)(b) of the old regime continues to exist for the assessment year 2021-2022 and before. Resultantly, a notice under Section 148 of the new regime cannot be issued if the period of six years from the end of the relevant assessment year has expired at the time of issuance of the (a) if three years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year, unless the case falls under clause (b); (b) if three years, but not more than ten years, have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year unless the Assessing Officer has in his possession books of account or other documents or evidence which reveal that the income chargeable to tax, represented in the form of- (i) an asset; (ii) expenditure in respect of a transction or in relation to an event or occasion; or (iii) an entry or entries in the books of account, Which has escaped assessment amounts to or in likely to amount to fifty lakh rupees or more: Provided that no notice under section 148 shall be issued at any time in a case for the relevant assessment year beginning on or before 1” day of April, 2021, if a notice under section 148 or section 153A or section 153C could not have been issued at that time on account of being beyond the time limit specified under the provisions of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of this section or section 153A or section 153C, as the case may be, as they stood immediately before the commencement of the Finance Act, 2021: Provided also that for the purposes of computing the period of limitation as per this section, the time or extended time allowed to the assessee, as per show-cause notice issued under clause (b) of section 148A or the period during which the proceeding under section 148A is stayed by an order or injunction of any court, shall be excluded: Provided also that where immediately after the exclusion of the period referred to in the immediately preceding proviso, the period of limitation available to the Assessing Officer for passing an order under clause (d) of section 148A does not exceed seven days, such remaining period shall be extended to seven days and the period of limitation under this sub-section shall be deemed to be extended accordingly. Notice. This also ensures that the new time limit of ten years prescribed under Section 149(1)(b) of the new regime applies

13 ITA No.2395/Hyd/2025 Anishka Thakur vs. ITO prospectively. For example, for the assessment year 2012-2013, the ten year period would have expired on 31 March 2023, while the six year period expired on 31 March 2019. Without the proviso to Section 149(1)(b) of the new regime, the Revenue could have had the power to reopen assessments for the year 2012-2013 if the escaped assessment amounted to Rupees fifty lakhs or more. The proviso limits the retrospective operation of Section 149(1)(b) to protect the interests of the assessees.” “53 The position of law which can be derived based on the above discussion may be summarized thus: (10) Section 149(1) of the new regime is not prospective. It also applies to past assessment years; (ii) The time limit of four years is now reduced to three years for all situations. The Revenue can issue notices under Section 148 of the new regime only if three years or less have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year, (iii) the proviso to Section 149(1)(b) of the new regime stipulates that the Revenue can issue reassessment notices for past assessment years only if the time limit survives according to Section 149(1)(b) of the old regime, that is, six years from the end of the relevant assessment year; and (iv) all notices issued invoking the time limit under Section 149(1)(b) of the old regime will have to be dropped if the income chargeable to tax which has escaped assessment is less than Rupees fifty lakhs.” 11. The first proviso) to the amended Section 149 of the Act prescribes that no notice under Section 148 of the Act shall be issued at any time in a case for the relevant assessment year beginning on or before 01.04.2021, if a notice under Section148 of the Act could not have been issued at that time on account of being beyond the time limit specified under the provisions of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 149 of the Act or as they stood immediately before the commencement of the Finance Act, 2021. For the purposes of appreciating the first proviso, the un-amended Section 149 of the Act is also extracted in the foot note10 Time limit for notice. 149. (1) No notice under section 148 shall be issued for the relevant assessment year, (a) if four years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year, unless the case falls under clause (b) or clause (c); (b) if four years, but not more than six years, have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year unless the income chargeable to tax which has escaped assessment amounts to or is likely to amount to one lakh rupees or more for that year. I if four years, but not more than sixteen years, have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year unless the income

14 ITA No.2395/Hyd/2025 Anishka Thakur vs. ITO in relation to any asset (including financial interest in any entity) located outside India, chargeable to tax, has escaped assessment. Explanation In determining income chargeable to tax which has escaped assessment for the purposes of this sub-section, the provisions of Explanation 2 of section 147 shall apply as they apply for the purposes of that section (2) The provisions of sub-section (1) as to the issue of notice shall be subject to the provisions of section 151. (3) If the person on whom a notice under section 148 is to be served is a person treated as the agent of a non-resident under section 163 and the assessment, reassessment or recomputation to be made in pursuance of the notice is to be made on him as the agent of such non-resident, the notice shall not be issued after the expiry of a period of six years from the end of the relevant assessment year. Explanation For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (3), as amended by the Finance Act, 2012, shall also be applicable for any assessment year beginning on or before the 1 day of April, 2012. 12. Apparently, the fifth and sixth provisos of the amended Section 149 of the Act extracted hereinabove provide for excluding certain periods while computing the period of limitation as per the amended Section. It prescribes the time or extended time allowed to the assessee as per the show cause notice under clause (b) of Section 148 of the Act or the period during which the proceeding under Section 148A of the Act is stayed shall be excluded. The sixth proviso to the amended Section 149 of the Act also deals with exclusion of the period referred to in the fifth proviso i.e., the period of limitation available to the Assessing Officer for passing an order under clause (d) of Section 148A of the Act if it does not exceed seven days. In that event, such remaining period shall be extended to seven days and the period of limitation under this sub-section shall be deemed to be extended. Accordingly, both the fifth and sixth provisos in the first place do not amount to clarification of the first proviso. These two provisos qualify the substantive amended Section 149 of the Act and do not relate to the un-amended Section 149 of the Act for which the first proviso takes care of. The contention of the learned counsel for the Revenue that the time spent from the issuance of notice under Section 148A(b) of the Act up to the passing of the order under Section 148A(d) of the Act in terms of the fifth and sixth provisos stands excluded for reckoning the limitation period for issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act is not worth acceptance. Section 148A of the Act lays down the procedure for issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act

15 ITA No.2395/Hyd/2025 Anishka Thakur vs. ITO whereas Section 149 of the Act prescribes strict time limit within which notice under Section 148 of the Act can be issued in the prescribed circumstances. The Revenue is therefore obliged to adhere to the timeline prescribed under Section 149 of the Act for issuance of such notice and undertake the procedure before issuance of notice under Section 148A of the Act. 13. In this regard, it is apposite to refer to opinion of the Delhi High Court. Paragraphs 15 and 16 of Godrej Industries Ltd., (supra) are extracted hereunder: “15. The validity of a notice must be judged on the basis of the law existing as on the date on which the notice is issued under Section 148 of the Act, which in the present case is 31 July 2022, by which time the Finance Act, 2021 is already on the statute and in terms thereof, no notice under Section 148 of the Act for AY 2014-15 could be issued on or after 1” April 2021 based on the first proviso to Section 149 of the Act. Therefore, the fifth proviso cannot apply in a case where the first proviso applies because, if a notice under Section 148 of the Act could not be issued beyond the time period provided in the first proviso, then the fifth proviso could not save such notices. The fifth proviso can only apply where one has to determine whether the time limit of three years and ten years in Section 149(1) of the Act are breached. 16. The sixth proviso to Section 149 of the Act has no impact as it only provides a situation where after exclusion of the time period referred to in the fifth proviso, the time available with the Assessing Officer for passing an order under Section 148A(d) of the Act is less than 7 days, then the remaining time frame shall be extended to 7 days and limitation also stands extended by 7 days.” 14. Paragraph 12 of Shree Cement Ltd., (supra) is also extracted hereunder. “12. In this case, as it pertains to Assessment Year 2017-18, six years period would have expired on 31” March 2024. Whereas notice under Section 148 of the Act itself came to be issued on 1” May 2024. Mr. Siddharth Bapna, counsel for Revenue, made an attempt to argue that fifth and sixth provisos to Section 149(1)(b) of the Act would save the period of limitation for issuing notice under Section 148 of the Act. We are afraid we do not agree with him. Same argument was raised in Hexaware Technologies Ltd. (supra) and was rejected. The Court held, with respect to applicability of fifth and sixth provisos to Section 149(1)(b) of the Act for extension of limitation for issuing notice under Section 148 of the Act, fifth and sixth provisos are only applicable with respect to the period of limitation prescribed under Section 149(1) of the Act ie, three years or ten years, as the case may be. The Court also held that fifth and sixth provisos

16 ITA No.2395/Hyd/2025 Anishka Thakur vs. ITO extend limitation for issuing notice under Section 149 of the Act, however, first proviso is an exception to the period of limitation and provides for a restriction on the notices under Section 148 of the Act being issued for assessment years up to 2021-22 (in this case, it is Assessment Year 2017-18) beyond a certain date. Therefore, the way the section would operate, is to fira decide whether a notice issued under Section 148 of the Vet is within the period of limitation under Section 149(1)(2) or (b) of the Act. To decide whether the notice is within the period of limitation under Section 149(1)(a) or (b) of the Act, the extension of time as prescribed in fifth and/or sixth proviso would be considered. The Court further held once. The notice is otherwise within the period of limitation, thereafter one has to see whether the said limit is within the prescribed restriction provided in first proviso or not. If the notice is beyond the restriction period, the notice is invalid, and the fifth and/or the sixth proviso cannot apply at this stage to extend the period of restriction as per first proviso. Hence, if a notice is not within the time prescribed under first proviso to Section 149(1) of the Act, then such period cannot be extended by fifth or sixth proviso. In Hexaware Technologies Ltd. (supra), the Court had relied upon another judgment of Bombay High Court in Godrej Industries Ltd. V. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax [2024] 160 taxmann.com 13 (Bombay)/(2024) 338 CTR (Bom) 25, which was also authored by one of us (the Chief Justice), where paragraph No.15 reads as under: “15. The validity of a notice must be judged on the basis of the law existing as on the date on which the notice is issued under Section 148 of the Act, which in the present case is 31” July 2022, by which time the Finance Act, 2021 is already on the statute and in terms thereof, no notice under Section 148 of the Act for AY 2014-15 could be issued on or after 1 April 2021 based on the first proviso to Section 149 of the Act. Therefore, the fifth proviso cannot apply in a case where the first proviso applies because, if a notice under Section 148 of the Act could not be issued beyond the time period provided in the first proviso, then the fifth proviso could not save such notices. The fifth proviso can only apply where one has to determine whether the time limit of three years and ten years in Section 149(1) of the Act are breached.” 15. The reliance placed by the Revenue on the decision rendered by Patna High Court in the case of Chandra Shekhar (supra) is distinguishable as it relates to the Assessment Year 2020-21 in respect of which the notice under Section 148A(b) of the Act was issued on 28.03.2024. The petitioner therein had assailed the notice on the ground that the Assessing Officer had no jurisdiction to undertake the assessment for the Assessment

17 ITA No.2395/Hyd/2025 Anishka Thakur vs. ITO Year 2020-21 after 31.03.2024 with reference to the second notice issued on 22.04.2024 as it was beyond the time limit stipulated under Section 149(1)(a) of the Act. In the aforesaid facts, the learned Court held that the combined reading of the fifth and sixth provisos meant that the first notice dated 28.03.2024 was issued well within the time limit stipulated. Therefore, the Assessment Officer has jurisdiction. 16. In view of the above discussion, the initiation of reopening of assessment by the impugned notice dated 22.04.2024 is barred by limitation being beyond the period of six (6) years reckoned from the relevant Assessment Year 2017-18 as per the un- amended Section 149 of the Act read with the first proviso thereof brought into effect from 01.04.2021.”

18 ITA No.2395/Hyd/2025 Anishka Thakur vs. ITO limitation therefore, no useful purpose would be served in setting aside the matter to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.

Order pronounced in the open court on 19th June, 2026.

Sd/- Sd/- (MANJUNATHA G.) (RAVISH SOOD) ACCOUNTANT MEMBER JUDICIAL MEMBER Hyderabad, Dated 19th June, 2026. OKK / SPS

Copy to: S.No Addresses 1 Anishka Thakur 604 17LH Lanco Hills, Manikonda, Puppallaguda, K.V. Rangareddy, Hyderabad, Telangana-500089 2 Income Tax Officer, Ward 14(1), Hyderabad IT Tower, AC Guards, Masab Tank, Hyderabad, Hyderabad, Telangana-500004 3 The Pr.CIT, Hyderabad 4 The DR, ITAT Hyderabad Benches 5 Guard File

19 ITA No.2395/Hyd/2025 Anishka Thakur vs. ITO

By Order Digitally signed by KAMALA KAMALA KUMAR KUMAR ORUGANTI ORUGANTI Date: 2026.06.19 12:18:16 +05'30' Sr. Private Secretary, ITAT, Hyderabad.