L P REALCON PRIVATE LIMITED,MUMBAI vs. CIRCLE 7(1)(1), MUMBAI, MUMBAI

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ITA 3117/MUM/2026Status: DisposedITAT Mumbai22 June 2026AY 2018-1911 pages
AI SummaryRemanded

What did the Tribunal hold?

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, citing reasons beyond the assessee's control and the lack of opposition from the revenue. The Tribunal also found merit in the ground regarding the denial of adequate opportunity by the CIT(A).

What were the facts?

The assessee's appeal was filed beyond the prescribed limitation period. The assessee claimed the delay was due to dormancy and lack of operational management. The Tribunal considered the principles of natural justice and the assessee's grounds of appeal.

What were the issues?

Whether the delay in filing the appeal should be condoned and whether the CIT(A) violated principles of natural justice by not providing adequate opportunity of being heard.

Which sections of the Income-tax Act were involved?

Section 250

AI-generated summary — verify with the full judgment below

Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, MUMBAI BENCHES, MUMBAI

Before: HON’BLE BEENA PILLAI & HON’BLE JAGADISH

For Respondent: Shri Manoj Kumar (CIT-DR)
Pronounced: 22/06/2026

आदेश / ORDER PER BEENA PILLAI, JUDICIAL MEMBER: Present appeal filed by assessee is directed against the order passed by NFAC, Delhi, [hereinafter referred to as “Ld.CIT(A)”] dated 10/06/2025, for A.Y. 2018-19, on the following grounds of appeal:-

1) Ground No.1: On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) has overlooked the principles of natural justice and has passed the order us. 250 without giving enough opportunities of being heard and presenting the case. 2) Ground No.2: On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. A.O. erred in making an addition of Rs. 3,14,03,613 us 45 r.w.s 50C of the Act, on account of the difference between the sale price of the property sold by the appellant and the value as per the stamp valuation authority. The appellant prays that the addition of Rs. 3,14,03,613 may kindly be deleted.” 2. At the outset, the Registry pointed out that the present appeal is barred by limitation by 223 days. In this regard, the assessee has filed an application seeking condonation of delay explaining the reasons for the delay.

2.1. The Ld.AR submitted that the assessee-company has remained dormant for several years and had no active business operations during the relevant period. It was submitted that owing to the absence of any operational management, dedicated staff or personnel to monitor statutory compliances, the order passed by the Ld. CIT(A) could not be acted upon within the prescribed period of limitation. The Ld.AR submitted that the delay was neither deliberate nor attributable to any mala fide intention but had occurred on account of bona fide circumstances beyond the control of the assessee. It was therefore prayed that, considering the reasonable cause shown, the delay of 223 days in filing the appeal be condoned and the matter be heard on merits.

2.2. The Ld. DR did not seriously object to the condonation of delay and left the issue to the discretion of the Bench.

3.

Having regard to the submissions by the assessee, we refer to the decision of Hon’ble Cochin Bench of this Tribunal in the case of Midas Polymer Compounds Pvt. Ltd. in ITA No. 288/Coch/2017 dated 25.6.2018, wherein the Tribunal condoned the delay of 2819 days by observing as follows: “6. We have heard the rival submissions and perused the record. There was a delay of 2819 days in filing the appeal before the Tribunal. The assessee has stated the reasons in the condonation petition accompanied by an affidavit which has been cited in the earlier para. The assessee filed an affidavit explaining the reasons and prayed for condonation of delay. The reason stated by the assessee is due to inadvertent omission on the part of Shri Unnikrishnan Nair N, CA in taking appropriate action to file the appeal. He had a mistaken belief that the appeal for this year was filed by the assessee as there was separate Counsel to take steps to file this appeal before the ITAT. Therefore, we have to consider whether the Counsel’s failure is sufficient cause for condoning the delay. The Madras High Court considered an identical issue in the case of Sreenivas Charitable Trust v. Dy. CIT (280 ITR 357) and held that mixing up of papers with other papers are sufficient cause for not filing the appeal in time. The Madras High Court further observed that the expression "sufficient cause" should be interpreted to advance substantial justice. Therefore, advancement of substantial justice is the prime factor while considering the reasons for condoning the delay.

6.1 On merit the issue is in favour of the assessee. But there is a technical defect in the appeal since the appeal was not filed within the period of limitation. The assessee filed an affidavit saying that the appeal was not filed because of the Counsel’s inability to file the appeal. The Revenue has not filed any counter affidavit to deny the allegation made by the assessee. While considering a similar issue the Apex Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji and Ors. (167 ITR 471) laid down six principles. For the purpose of convenience, the principles laid down by the Apex Court are reproduced hereunder: (1) Ordinarily, a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late (2) Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this, when delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. (3) 'Every day's delay must be explained' does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay?

The doctrine must be applied in a rational, commonsense and pragmatic manner. (4) When substantial justice and technical consideration are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a nondeliberate delay. (5) There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk. (6) It must be grasped that the judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. 6.2 When substantial justice and technical consideration are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have vested right for injustice being done because of nondeliberate delay. In the case on our hand, the issue on merit regarding allowability of deduction u/s. 80IB of the Act was covered in favour of the assessee by the binding Judgment of the jurisdictional High Court. Moreover, no counter-affidavit was filed by the Revenue denying the allegation made by the assessee. It is not the case of the Revenue that the appeal was not filed deliberately. Therefore, we have to prefer substantial justice rather than technicality in deciding the issue. As observed by Apex Court, if the application of the assessee for condoning the delay is rejected, it would amount to legalise injustice on technical ground when the Tribunal is capable of removing injustice and to do justice. Therefore, this Tribunal is bound to remove the injustice by condoning the delay on technicalities. If the delay is not condoned, it would amount to legalising an illegal order which would result in unjust enrichment on the part of the State by retaining the tax relatable thereto. Under the scheme of Constitution, the Government cannot retain even a single pie of the individual citizen as tax, when it is not authorised by an authority of law. Therefore, if we refuse to condone the delay, that would amount to legalise an illegal and unconstitutional order passed by the lower authority. Therefore, in our opinion, by preferring the substantial justice, the delay of 2819 days has to be condoned.”

2.2. In the present facts, on examining whether the reason stated by the assessee to seek condonation of delay before this Tribunal is sufficient to condone the delay and whether, there exists sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal before this Tribunal within the period of limitation under the statute, the assessee must show that, it was diligent in taking appropriate steps and the delay was caused notwithstanding with its due diligence. It is for the party concerned to explain the reasons for delay and it is not the function of concerned authorities often to find cause for delay. The Court/authority has to examine whether the sufficient cause has been shown by the party for condoning the delay, and whether such cause is reasonable or not. 2.3. In any case, the assessee is not benefitted with the delay caused in filing appeal before this Tribunal, the lapse that occurred on behalf of the representative cannot be attributed to the assessee for which assessee could be punished. In case of People Education & Economic Development Society Vs. ITO reported in 100 ITD 87 (TM) (Chen), it was held that; “when substantial justice and technical consultation are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of non-deliberate delay”. 2.4. The next question that arises is whether delay was excessive or inordinate. There is no question of any excessive or inordinate when the reason stated by the assessee was a reasonable cause for not able to file the appeals within the period of limitation. The cause for the delay therefore deserves to be considered, when there exists a reasonable cause, and therefore the period of delay may not be relevant factor. In support, we rely on the decision of Hon’ble Madras High Court in the case of CIT vs. K.S.P.

Shanmugavel Nadai and Ors. (153 ITR 596) considered the condonation of delay and held that there was sufficient and reasonable cause on the part of the assessee for not filing the appeal within the period of limitation. Hon’ble Madras High Court thus condoned nearly 21 years of delay in filing the appeal. As compared to 21 years, delay of about 1000 to 2000 days cannot be considered to be inordinate or excessive. 2.5. Hon’ble Madras High Court in the case of Sreenivas Charitable Trust reported in 280 ITR 357 held that, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in the matter of condonation of delay and the Court should adopt a pragmatic approach and the Court should exercise their discretion on the facts of each case keeping in mind that in construing the expression "sufficient cause" the principle of advancing substantial justice is of prime importance and the expression "sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction. Therefore, this Judgment of the Hon’ble Madras High Court (supra) clearly says that in order to advance substantial justice which is of prime importance, the expression "sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction. Therefore, for the purpose of advancing substantial justice which is of prime importance in the administration of justice, the expression "sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction. In opinion of this Tribunal, this decision of Hon’ble Madras High Court is applicable to the present facts of the case. A similar view was taken by Hon’ble Madras High Court in the case of Venkatadri Traders Ltd. v. CIT (2001) 168 CTR (Mad) 81 : (2001) 118 Taxman 622 (Mad).

2.6. Reliance is also placed on the decision of Hon’ble Mumbai Bench of this Tribunal in the case of Bajaj Hindusthan Ltd. v. Jt. CIT (AT) reported in 277 ITR 1 condoned the delay of 180 days when, the appeal was filed after the pronouncement of the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It is also to be noted that the Revenue has not filed any counter-affidavit opposing the application of the assessee for condonation of delay. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mrs. Sandhya Rani Sarkar vs. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi reported in AIR 1978 SC 537 held that, non- filing of affidavit in opposition to an application for condonation of delay may be a sufficient cause for condonation of delay. In this case, the Revenue has not filed any counter-affidavit opposing the application of the assessee, therefore, as held by Hon’ble Supreme Court, there is sufficient cause for condonation of delay. Hon’ble Supreme Court also observed that; “It does not mean that when the delay was for longer period, the delay should not be condoned even though there was sufficient cause. Condonation of delay is the discretion of the Court/Tribunal. Therefore, it would depend upon the facts of each case. In our opinion, when there is sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within the period of limitation, the delay deserves to be condoned, irrespective of the duration/period.”

2.7. After considering the contents of the affidavit and the petition for condonation of delay, we are satisfied that the delay was caused due to circumstances beyond the control of the Assessee and that there was a reasonable and bona fide cause for not filing the appeal within the stipulated period. There is nothing on record to suggest that the delay was deliberate or attributable to any mala fide intention. We, therefore, feel that the reasons assigned by the assessee for the inability to present the appeal within time before this Tribunal deserves consideration based on the principles laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Collector Land Acquisition Vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors., reported in (1987) 167 ITR 471. The relevant observation of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Collector Land Acquisition Vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors.,(supra) is as under:- “The Legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting section 51 of the Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on de merits". The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the Legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose of the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy.

And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that :

1.

Ordinarily, a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

2.

Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this, when delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. ......................................................1.Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.”

Accordingly, the delay in filing of the appeal is condoned and the appeal is admitted.

3.

Before coming to the merits of the case, we find that the assessee has raised the following Ground No. 1 before us: "On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) has overlooked the principles of natural justice and has passed the order u/s 250 without giving enough opportunities of being heard and presenting the case."

3.1. We have perused the material available on record and the impugned appellate order. We find merit in the grievance raised by the assessee that the appeal has been disposed of by the Ld. CIT(A) without providing adequate opportunity of being heard. The principles of natural justice require that a reasonable and effective opportunity should be afforded to an assessee before any adverse view is taken. Since the assessee has specifically challenged the appellate order on the ground of denial of adequate opportunity and considering the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the considered opinion that the matter requires fresh examination at the level of the first appellate authority. 3.2. Accordingly, in the interest of justice and fair play, we set aside the impugned order passed by the Ld. CIT(A) and restore the matter to his file for de novo adjudication. The Ld. CIT(A) shall afford adequate opportunity of hearing to the assessee, consider all evidences and submissions that may be placed on record and thereafter pass a speaking order in accordance with law. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the issues involved and all contentions of the assessee are left open.

3.3. Since Ground No. 1 has been allowed for statistical purposes by restoring the matter to the file of the Ld. CIT(A), the other grounds raised by the assessee are rendered academic at this stage and do not call for separate adjudication. In the result, the appeal of the assessee is allowed for statistical purposes. Order pronounced in the open court on 22/06/2026. Sd/- Sd/-

JAGADISH BEENA PILLAI ACCOUNTANT MEMBER JUDICIAL MEMBER Mumbai Dated: 22/06/2026 SC, Sr. P.S.

Copy to: L P REALCON PRIVATE LIMITED, B-101- 1ST FLR PLOT 1259 VAIBHAV CO OP HSG SOC, LTD ,OLD PRABHADEVI 1 ROAD PRABHADEVI, MUMBAI 400025 ,MAHARASHTRA, MUMBAI-400025, MAHARASHTRA

CIRCLE 7(1)(1), MUMBAI, 2 AAYAKAR BHAWAN,MUMBAI, MUMBAI-400020, MAHARASHTRA

3 THE PCIT / CIT, 4 THE D.R., ITAT, MUMBAI BENCH 5 GUARD FILE

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