PRIYANKA SANTOSH PURO,MUMBAI vs. ASSESSMENT UNIT INCOME TAX DEPARTMENT, NFAC

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ITA 3871/MUM/2026Status: DisposedITAT Mumbai24 June 2026AY 2016-177 pages
AI SummaryRemanded

What did the Tribunal hold?

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the first appeal, emphasizing a liberal interpretation of 'sufficient cause' and the importance of substantial justice over technical lapses, especially in the context of the new faceless regime. The matter was then remitted back to the Assessing Officer for a fresh decision.

What were the facts?

The assessee's first appeal was dismissed by the CIT(A) for a delay of 145 days in filing. The assessee cited personal and family medical issues, as well as her husband's job loss, as reasons for the delay. The assessee had not filed a return of income for the assessment year, and her case was reopened under section 147.

What were the issues?

Whether the delay in filing the first appeal before the CIT(A) was sufficiently explained to warrant condonation, and whether the matter should be remanded for fresh adjudication.

Which sections of the Income-tax Act were involved?

Section 147,Section 148,Section 144B,Section 249(3)

AI-generated summary — verify with the full judgment below

Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, MUMBAI BENCHES, MUMBAI

Before: HON’BLE SHRI AMIT SHUKLA & HON’BLE SHRI GIRISH AGRAWAL

INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, MUMBAI BENCHES, MUMBAI BENCH: E BEFORE HON’BLE SHRI AMIT SHUKLA, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND HON’BLE SHRI GIRISH AGRAWAL, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER ITA 3871/MUM/2026 िनधा�रणवष�/Assmt. Year: 2016-17) Permanent Account Number: ALZPP3672P Priyanka Santosh Puro A 791 Lilavati Hospital Assessment Unit ITO Bandra Reclamation NFAC, Delhi Vs. Bandra West, Mumbai 400 050. (��थ� Respondent) (अपीलाथ� Appellant)

िनधा�रती�ारा/Assessee represented by: Shri Ravindra Naik, CA राज� व�ारा/Revenue represented Smt. Sujatha Iyyanger, Sr. by: DR

सुनवाईकीतारीख/Date of conclusion of hearing: 18-June-2026 घोषणाकीतारीख/Date of pronouncement: 24-June-2026 आदेश / ORDER PER GIRISH AGRAWAL, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER: This appeal is filed by the assessee against the order of CIT(A), National Faceless Appeal Centre vide DIN & Order No.: ITBA/NFAC/S/250/2025-26/1085530052(1) dated 03.02.2026 passed against the assessment order by the Assessment Unit of the Income-tax Department, u/s 147 read with section 144B of the Income-tax Act (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”), dated 01.03.2024 for the Assessment Year 2016-17.

2.

Through ground no. 2, assessee is contesting that the first appeal has been dismissed for the reasons of delay in its filing and the explanations given by the assessee are vague not acceptable for the purpose of condoning the same. In this regard, it is noted that there is delay of 145 days in filing the first appeal. Assessee is an employee of Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical Trust, working there since 1998. No return of income was filed for the year under consideration. Case of the assessee was taken up by initiating proceedings under section 147 read with section 148 of the Act, seeking explanation regarding transaction of purchase of an immovable property. Notice under section 148 of the Act was issued on 28.03.2023, in response to which the assessee filed her return on 12.04.2023, reporting total income at Rs. 3,26,420/-.

3.

The explanation given by the assessee in respect of transaction of purchase of immovable property is that the residential property was purchased for total consideration of Rs. 86,23,000/- jointly with her husband Mr. Santosh Jaywant Puro. The total amount of Rs. 22,36,701/- was paid against the said agreed total consideration. Her husband had paid Rs. 9,29,059/-. The amount of Rs. 12,58,171/- was paid by obtaining housing loan from Punjab National Bank. Assessee had paid only Rs. 49,471/- out of her savings. Subsequently, owing to financial difficulties arising from loss of employment of her husband, the remaining amount could not be paid and thus, purchase of transaction of property was cancelled and the assessee could never acquire the same. According to her, since the said transaction was cancelled, it was not reported in the return of income. Since there was no capital asset, which was transferred unto the assessee, there could not be any capital gain thereon.

4.

At the first appellate stage, on account of several traumatic events including loss of job of her spouse and death of her sister and father, hospitalization of mother and several other medical issues, the delay of 145 days occurred in filing the said appeal. Ld. CIT(A) has dismissed the appeal in limine as not maintainable on account of delay in filing the first appeal since assessee could not demonstrate “sufficient cause” in terms of section 249(3) of the Act.

5.

To address the issue in hand before us, we need to delve into the understanding of the expression "sufficient cause". Sub-section 3 of Section 249 contemplates that ld. CIT(A) may admit an appeal after expiry of relevant period, if he is satisfied that there was a "sufficient cause" for not presenting it within that period. Similarly, it has been used in section 5 of Indian Limitation Act, 1963. Whenever interpretation and construction of this expression has fallen for consideration before Hon'ble High Court as well as before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, then, Hon'ble Court were unanimous in their conclusion that this expression is to be used liberally.

5.1. We may make reference to the following observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court from the decision in the case of Collector Land Acquisition Vs. Mst. Katiji & Others, 1987 AIR 1353: "1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non- deliberate delay.

5.

There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so." 5.2. Similarly, we would like to make reference to authoritative pronouncement of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy (supra). It reads as under:

"Rule of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life- span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim Interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be putt to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi lain Vs. Kuntal Kumari [AIR 1969 SC 575] and State of West Bengal Vs. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality [AIR 1972 SC 749]. It must be remembered that in every case of delay there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning delay the Could should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a looser and he too would have incurred quiet a large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss." 5.3. We do not deem it necessary to re-cite or recapitulate the proposition laid down in other decisions. It is suffice to say that the Hon'ble Courts are unanimous in their approach to propound that whenever the reasons assigned by an applicant for explaining the delay, then such reasons are to be construed with a justice-oriented approach.

6.

We have considered the submissions made before us. Ld. Sr. DR objected on the submissions made by the assessee by contending that the assessee has defaulted before the authorities below in complying with the requirements. We have perused the material placed on record and gone through the orders of the authorities below. The facts of the case have already been narrated in the above paragraph.

7.

Considering the submissions made by the assessee before the ld. CIT(A) as well as contentions raised through ground no. 2 in the present appeal, we do take note of the fact that faceless regime is a new technological phenomenon going through teething phase. Hence, it requires lenient and pragmatic approach to handle certain lapses which are unintended. Transition to a faceless and digital appellate regime is intended to enhance efficiency, but it must not become a barrier to justice for those who lack the technical proficiency to navigate such systems. Reiterating Hon'ble Supreme Court's repeated emphasis on the view that "substantial justice" must prevail over technical lapses, we emphasize that the merits should not be stifled due to a failure to respond to electronic notices, provided such failure is not mala fide.

8.

In the light of the above, if we examine the facts, then it would reveal that there is delay of 145 days in filing of first appeal. For the just decision of the controversy, considering the explanation furnished by 5 the assessee, we find it appropriate to condone the delay in filing the appeal before ld. CIT(A).

9.

Having condoned the delay, in the given set of facts and circumstances, we find it appropriate to remit the matter back to the file of ld. Assessing Officer with a direction to decide the issue afresh and in accordance with law after affording due and effective opportunity of hearing to the assessee. Needless to say, assessee be given reasonable opportunity of being heard and to make all the relevant submissions as required to substantiate the claim made by him. We also direct the assessee to be diligent in making all its submissions so as to comply with the notices issued for fixing the date of hearing for effective and expeditious disposal of the proceedings. Accordingly, grounds raised by the assessee in this regard is allowed for statistical purposes.

10.

In the result, appeal of the assessee is allowed for statistical purposes.

Order pronounced in the open court on 24 June, 2026.

Sd/- Sd/- (Amit Shukla) (Girish Agrawal) Judicial Member Accountant Member Dated: 24.06.2026 Copy of the order forwarded to : 1. The appellant 2. The respondent 3. CIT-concerned 4. DR, ITAT, Mumbai 5. Guard file

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