MAMTA KUMARI BHRIGUNATH PANDEY,MUMBAI SUBURBAN vs. DCIT41(4)(1), MUMBAI SUBURBAN

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ITA 4522/MUM/2026Status: DisposedITAT Mumbai25 June 2026AY 2015-166 pages
AI SummaryRemanded

What did the Tribunal hold?

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, citing the liberal interpretation of 'sufficient cause' and the transition to a faceless regime. The matter was remitted back to the Assessing Officer for a fresh adjudication.

What were the facts?

The assessee's appeal was dismissed by the CIT(A) due to a 142-day delay in filing, as the notices were sent to an old email address of a former tax consultant. The assessee claimed the new email address provided had a spelling mistake, leading to non-receipt of notices.

What were the issues?

Whether the delay in filing the first appeal can be condoned due to technical glitches in the faceless regime and whether the matter should be remanded for fresh adjudication.

Which sections of the Income-tax Act were involved?

Section 249(3),Section 147,Section 144,Section 144B

AI-generated summary — verify with the full judgment below

Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, MUMBAI BENCHES, MUMBAI

Before: HON’BLE SHRI AMIT SHUKLA & HON’BLE SHRI GIRISH AGRAWAL

For Respondent: Smt. Sujatha Iyyanger, Sr. DR

INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, MUMBAI BENCHES, MUMBAI BENCH: E BEFORE HON’BLE SHRI AMIT SHUKLA, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND HON’BLE SHRI GIRISH AGRAWAL, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER ITA 4522/MUM/2026 िनधा�रणवष�/Assmt. Year: 2015-16 Permanent Account Number: BCFPP0251A Mamta Kumari Bhrigunath Pandey 903, 9 th Floor, DCIT-41(4)(1), Empire CHSL, Azad Nagar, Mumbai Vs. Andheri West, Mumbai – 400057 Maharashtra (अपीलाथ� Appellant) (��थ� Respondent)

िनधा�रती�ारा/Assessee represented by: Shri Rajesh Athavale, CA राज� व�ारा/Revenue represented by: Smt. Sujatha Iyyanger, Sr. DR

सुनवाईकीतारीख/Date of conclusion of hearing: 23-June-2026 घोषणाकीतारीख/Date of pronouncement: 25-June-2026 आदेश / ORDER PER GIRISH AGRAWAL, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER: This appeal is filed by the assessee against the order of CIT(A), National Faceless Appeal Centre vide No. ITBA/NFAC/S/250/2025- 26/1086202303(1) dated 18.02.2026 passed against the assessment order by the Assessment Unit of the Income-tax Department, u/s 147 r.w.s. 144 read with section 144B of the Income-tax Act (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”), dated 05.03.2024 for the Assessment Year 2015-16.

2.

We note that the impugned assessment order is an ex parte order. In this regard, assessee submitted that the email address placed on record was that of one tax consultant, Shri Rajesh Tripathi, i.e., rajeshtripathitax@gmail.com, on which the notices were sent but the said person never communicated about the notices to the assessee and therefore, the situation arose of non-compliance. At the first appellate stage, there was a delay of 142 days in filing the appeal. While filing the said appeal, a new email address was created with the name of the assessee, however, in the same, a spelling mistake was made with the email ID mamtapandeey@gmail.com. This new email address was filled in Form-35, with simultaneous change in the profile of the assessee on the portal of the Department. However, the notices fixing the date of hearing continued to be sent on the erstwhile email ID of Shri Rajesh Tripathi and therefore, assessee had no occasion to explain her case both, on account of seeking condonation of delay and on the merits of the case which resulted into rejection of prayer for condonation of delay of 142 days as well as ex parte dismissal on the merits of the case. In this regard, assessee has placed on record an affidavit explaining the entire sequence of events which took place.

3.

At the first appellate stage, the delay of 142 days occurred in filing the said appeal. Ld. CIT(A) has dismissed the appeal in limine as not maintainable on account of delay in filing the first appeal since assessee could not demonstrate “sufficient cause” in terms of section 249(3) of the Act.

4.

To address the issue in hand before us, we need to delve into the understanding of the expression "sufficient cause". Sub-section 3 of Section 249 contemplates that ld. CIT(A) may admit an appeal after expiry of relevant period, if he is satisfied that there was a "sufficient cause" for not presenting it within that period. Similarly, it has been used in section 5 of Indian Limitation Act, 1963. Whenever interpretation and construction of this expression has fallen for consideration before Hon'ble High Court as well as before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, then, Hon'ble Court were unanimous in their conclusion that this expression is to be used liberally.

4.1. We may make reference to the following observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court from the decision in the case of Collector Land Acquisition Vs. Mst. Katiji & Others, 1987 AIR 1353: "1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non- deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so."

4.2. Similarly, we would like to make reference to authoritative pronouncement of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy (supra). It reads as under:

"Rule of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life- span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim Interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be putt to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi lain Vs. Kuntal Kumari [AIR 1969 SC 575] and State of West Bengal Vs. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality [AIR 1972 SC 749]. It must be remembered that in every case of delay there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning delay the Could should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a looser and he too would have incurred quiet a large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss." 4.3. We do not deem it necessary to re-cite or recapitulate the proposition laid down in other decisions. It is suffice to say that the Hon'ble Courts are unanimous in their approach to propound that whenever the reasons assigned by an applicant for explaining the delay, then such reasons are to be construed with a justice-oriented approach.

5.

We have considered the submissions made before us. Ld. Sr. DR objected on the submissions made by the assessee by contending that the assessee has defaulted before the authorities below in complying with the requirements. We have perused the material placed on record and gone through the orders of the authorities below. The facts of the case have already been narrated in the above paragraph.

6.

Considering the submissions made by the assessee before the ld. CIT(A) as well as contentions raised through ground no. 1 in the present appeal, we do take note of the fact that faceless regime is a new technological phenomenon going through teething phase. Hence, it requires lenient and pragmatic approach to handle certain lapses which are unintended. Transition to a faceless and digital appellate regime is intended to enhance efficiency, but it must not become a barrier to justice for those who lack the technical proficiency to navigate such systems. Reiterating Hon'ble Supreme Court's repeated emphasis on the view that "substantial justice" must prevail over technical lapses, we emphasize that the merits should not be stifled due to a failure to respond to electronic notices, provided such failure is not mala fide.

7.

In the light of the above, if we examine the facts, then it would reveal that there is delay of 142 days in filing of first appeal. For the just decision of the controversy, considering the explanation furnished by the assessee, we find it appropriate to condone the delay in filing the appeal before ld. CIT(A).

8.

Having condoned the delay, in the given set of facts and circumstances, we find it appropriate to remit the matter back to the file of ld. Assessing Officer instead of ld. CIT(A), in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings as even ld. CIT(A) would be required to call for remand report from the ld. Assessing Officer. Needless to say, assessee be given reasonable opportunity of being heard and to make all the relevant submissions as required to substantiate the claim made by him. We also direct the assessee to be diligent in making all its submissions so as to comply with the notices issued for fixing the date of hearing for effective and expeditious disposal of the proceedings. Accordingly, ground raised by the assessee in this regard is allowed for statistical purposes.

9.

In the result, appeal of the assessee is allowed for statistical purposes.

Order pronounced in the open court on 25 June, 2026.

Sd/- Sd/- (Amit Shukla) (Girish Agrawal) Judicial Member Accountant Member Dated: 25.06.2026 MP, Sr. PS Copy of the order forwarded to : 1. The appellant 2. The respondent 3. CIT-concerned 4. DR, ITAT, Mumbai 5. Guard file

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