MAYUR HIRABHAI MALDHARI,RAJKOT vs. INCOME TAX OFFICER, WARD 1(1)(1), RAJKOT

The assessment order under section 144 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 is bad in law. 2. The ld. CIT(A) has erred in law as well as on facts in dismissing the appeal as non-maintainable without condoning the delay in filing the appeal. 3. The learned Assessing Officer has erred in law as well as on facts in making the addition of total agricultural income of Rs.33,20,450/-by treating the same as income from undisclosed sources.

It was only recently, during the process of selling my agricultural land, that I came to know about the attachment of the said land by the Income Tax Department. When this issue arose, I immediately approached the Income Tax Department and the office of the Tax Recovery Officer (TRO) concerned. Upon verification, the TRO informed me about the outstanding demands reflected on the e-filing portal for Assessment Years 2014-15, 2015-16, 2016-17 and 2020-21. Upon requesting the remedial actions available to me for the said issue, I was advised to consult a senior chartered accountant or an advocate. Acting upon such advice, I approached a senior Chartered Accountant firm, who, upon examining my case, advised me to file an appeal with a prayer for condonation of delay. Accordingly, under their guidance, this appeal is being filed by me. 5. I understand the appeal is belated by more than 2 years. However, I respectfully submit that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly laid down the legal position that in the matter of condonation of delay, the cause of the delay and not the length of delay should be considered. In this regard, I rely upon the relevant portion of the Hon'ble Supreme Court judgment in the case of Mool Chandra Vs. Union of India & ANR. (Civil Appeal Nos. 8435-8436 Of 2024) wherein it was held as under: "It is not the length of delay that would be required to be considered while examining the plea for condonation of delay, it is the cause for delay which has been propounded will have to be examined. If the cause for delay would fall within the four corners of "sufficient cause", irrespective of the length of delay same deserves to be condoned." 6. The delay was neither willful nor due to any negligence on our part. It was purely unintentional and arose due to circumstances beyond our control, as detailed above. I, therefore, pray that my case deserves sympathetical consideration as I am an illiterate farmer. 7. I humbly submit that substantial justice should prevail over procedural technicalities. I therefore earnestly pray Your Honour to kindly condone the delay in filing the appeal in the interest of justice. 8. The courts and tribunals have consistently held that in the matter of condonation of delay, a pragmatic and liberal approach should be taken. The Supreme Court also held the same in the case of Investment Trust v. Ujagarsingh that unless mala fides or gross negligence is evident, delays should be condoned, and appeals should not be dismissed solely on technical grounds of delay and they should be ordinarily decided on merits. 9. I may humbly submit that the rejection of the appeal on the ground of delay would be very harsh as the delay was on account of reason beyond my control. I have taken utmost care in ensuring that the period of delay is reduced to the maximum possible extent. In this regard, I may quote the following observation of M. P. High Court in the case of Steel Ingots (86) Taxmann 440).

Revocation of attachment, order in case of co-owner is reproduced below:

Then after, the assessee, wrote a letter dated 08.09.2025, to the Income Tax Officer, to provide him copy of appellate order under section 250 of the Act and assessment orders for assessment years 2011–12 and assessment year 2012–13, the said letter is reproduced below:

From the events narrated above, in the assessee`s case under consideration, it is abundantly clear that delay of 3092 days in filing the appeal, was not on account of negligent approach of the assessee, but due to circumstances beyond his control, as mentioned above. The words "sufficient cause", as appearing in Section 5 of Limitation Act, should receive a liberal construction when the, delay is not on account of any dilatory tactics, want of bona fides, deliberate inaction or negligence on the part of the applicant, in order to advance substantial justice. The words "sufficient cause” for not making the application within the period of limitation" should be understood and applied in a reasonable, pragmatic, practical and liberal manner, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case. In Ramlal, & Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. [(1962) 2 SCR 762], it was laid down that in showing sufficient cause to condone the delay, it is not necessary that the applicant has to explain whole of the period between the date of the judgment till the date of filing the appeal. It is sufficient that the applicant would explain the delay caused by the period between the last of the dates of limitation and the date on which the appeal/application is actually filed. What constitute sufficient cause cannot be laid down by hard and fast rules. 10. In New India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Smt. Shanti Misra [AIR 1976 SC 237], Supreme Court held that discretion given by Section 5 should not be defined or crystalized so as to convert a discretionary matter into a rigid rule of law. The expression "sufficient cause' should receive a liberal construction. In Inder Singh v. Kanshi Ram (AIR 1917 PC 156] it was observed that true guide for a court to exercise the discretion under Section 5 is whether the assessee acted with reasonable diligence in prosecuting the appeal. From the petition for condonation of delay, reproduced above, we find that a part delay in filing, the appeal has occurred due to mistake committed by the Advocate/CA of the assessee, for which the assessee should not be penalised. Reliance is also placed on the decision of I.T.A.T., 'C' Bench, Kolkata in the case of M/s. Garg Bros. Pvt. Ltd. & Others vs. DCIT [ITA Nos.2519 to 2521/Kol/2017, order dated 18.04.2018], wherein under similar set of facts and reasons, the Hon'ble Tribunal was pleased to condone the delay of 211 days by holding as under: "3. We have heard both the parties on this preliminary issue. Having regard to the reasons given in the application for condonation of delay, we are of the considered opinion that assessee was under a bona fide belief that the impugned order of Pr. CIT was not appealable before this Tribunal since they were not advised by their Tax Consultants about this legal right. Later on, when a Senior Lawyer advised them to file an appeal, the assessees immediately took steps to file the appeals. Therefore, the delay caused. We note that delay was occurred because of the wrong advice of the Tax Professional for which assessees cannot be penalized. For the ends of justice, we condone the delay and admit the appeal for hearing. 11. We are of the view that provisions of law have to be adhered strictly and that one cannot be allowed to act in leisure and make a mockery of enacted law, because law & provisions are laid down to benefit both sides of litigation. Be that as it may, we have to do justice and the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition vs Mst. Katiji and others , reported in 167 ITR 471, (1988 SC 897) (7) observes .... “4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non- deliberate delay.” When we weigh these two aspects then the side of justice becomes heavier and casts a duty on us to deliver justice. We note that the reasons given in the affidavit for condonation of delay were convincing and these reasons would constitute reasonable and sufficient cause for the delay in filing these two appeals. Having heard both the parties and after having gone through the affidavit as well the delay condonation, application, we are of the considered opinion that in the interest of justice, the delay deserves to be condoned. We, accordingly, condone the delay, in both these appeals.”