MUSTAQUE AHMED MERCHANT ,MUMBAI vs. INCOME TAX OFFICE WARD 23(2)(6), MUMBAI

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ITA 182/MUM/2026Status: DisposedITAT Mumbai02 June 2026AY 2015-169 pages
AI SummaryRemanded

What did the Tribunal hold?

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 294 days, citing the liberal interpretation of 'sufficient cause' and the need to advance substantial justice. The matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication on merits.

What were the facts?

The assessee filed an appeal before the CIT(A) with a delay of 294 days due to a mistake in uploading Form 35 and personal reasons including medical exigency and demise of his father. The CIT(A) dismissed the appeal as barred by limitation.

What were the issues?

Whether the delay in filing the first appeal before the CIT(A) can be condoned on the grounds of sufficient cause, and if so, whether the matter should be adjudicated on merits.

Which sections of the Income-tax Act were involved?

Section 249,Section 147,Section 144B

AI-generated summary — verify with the full judgment below

Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, MUMBAI BENCHES, MUMBAI

Before: HON’BLE SHRI PAWAN SINGH & HON’BLE SHRI GIRISH AGRAWAL

Pronounced: 02.06.2026

INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, MUMBAI BENCHES, MUMBAI BENCH: A BEFORE HON’BLE SHRI PAWAN SINGH, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND HON’BLE SHRI GIRISH AGRAWAL, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER ITA 182/MUM/2026 िनधा�रणवष�/Assmt. Year: 2015-16) Permanent Account Number: AAEPM1199G Mustaque Ahmed Merchant ITO Ward 23(2)(6) 15, Old Hanuman Lane 1st X Lane, Kalbadevi Road Mumbai Vs. Mumbai-400 002. (��थ� Respondent) (अपीलाथ� Appellant)

िनधा�रती�ारा/Assessee represented Shri K. Gopal and Ms. Neha by: Paranjpe, Advocates राज� व�ारा/Revenue represented Shri Surendra Mohan, Sr. by: DR

सुनवाईकीतारीख/Date of conclusion of hearing: 21-May-2026 घोषणाकीतारीख/Date of pronouncement: 02.06.2026 आदेश / ORDER PER GIRISH AGRAWAL, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER: This appeal is filed by the assessee is against the order of ld. National Faceless Appeal Centre vide DIN: ITBA/NFAC/S/250/2025- 26/1082483695(1) dated 11.11.2025 passed against the assessment order by the Assessment Unit of the Income Tax Department, u/s 147 read with section 144B of the Income-tax Act (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”), dated 01.02.2024, for the Assessment Year 2015-16.

2.

Assessee has raised the following grounds of appeal:

3.

At the outset, ld. Counsel for the assessee brought to the knowledge of the Bench that the first appeal has been dismissed by CIT(A) on account of being barred by limitation and therefore, not admitted. There is a delay of 294 days in filing the first appeal before the CIT(A). Ld. Counsel for the assessee candidly apprised the Bench about the error committed while uploading Form 35 for the purpose of filing the first appeal before CIT(A), wherein against point no. 14 of Form 35, assessee remarked “No” for the question relating to whether any delay in filing the appeal. Also, no explanation was furnished at the first appellate stage for explaining the delay by furnishing a petition for condonation of delay.

4.

In order to make good the error so committed while complying with the filing the procedure at the first appellate stage, ld. Counsel has placed on record an affidavit by the assessee duly notarized, explaining the reasons which led to the delay of 294 days in filing the appeal before CIT(A) along with corroborative documentary evidence. Ld. Counsel pleaded on strength of this affidavit, to condone the delay at the first appellate stage and remit the matter back to the file of ld. CIT(A) for meritorious de novo adjudication on the grounds raised at the first appellate stage. On confrontation of these submissions before the ld. Sr. DR, he with all his humility left the matter to be decided at the discretion of the Bench in its own wisdom.

5.

We have heard both the parties and perused the material on record. Admittedly, it is a fact that there is a mistake committed by the assessee while filling Form 35 for the purpose of appeal before ld. CIT(A) as narrated in the above paragraphs. In respect of delay of 294 days, we have carefully gone through the affidavit of the assessee, explaining the delay so caused. Primarily, reasons relate to certain medical exigency and demise of father of the assessee which brought chaos into functioning at his in meeting necessary compliance. Contents of the affidavit furnished by the assessee are extracted below for ready reference:-

6.

Averments made by the assessee in the above affidavit are duly corroborated by relevant documentary evidence placed along with it, forming part of the record which includes copy of adhar card, copy of death certificate of the father of the assessee, copy of certain medical reports and prescriptions.

7.

In the present case before us, ld. CIT(A) has held appeal not maintainable and did not admit under the provisions of section 249 of the Act for want of “sufficient cause” as assessee has not discharged his onus in this regard.

8.

To address the issue in hand before us, we need to delve into the understanding of the expression "sufficient cause". Sub-section 3 of Section 249 contemplates that the CIT(A) may admit an appeal after expiry of relevant period, if he is satisfied that there was a "sufficient cause" for not presenting it within that period. Similarly, it has been used in section 5 of Indian Limitation Act, 1963. Whenever interpretation and construction of this expression have fallen for consideration before Hon'ble High Court as well as before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, then, Hon'ble Court were unanimous in their conclusion that this expression is to be used liberally.

9.

We may make reference to the following observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court from the decision in the case of Collector Land Acquisition Vs. Mst. Katiji & Others, 1987 AIR 1353:

"1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non- deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so." 10. Similarly, we would like to make reference to authoritative pronouncement of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy (supra). It reads as under:

"Rule of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life- span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim Interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be putt to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi lain Vs. Kuntal Kumari [AIR 1969 SC 575] and State of West Bengal Vs. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality [AIR 1972 SC 749]. It must be remembered that in every case of delay there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning delay the Could should forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a looser and he too would have incurred quiet a large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss."

11.

We do not deem it necessary to re-cite or recapitulate the proposition laid down in other decisions. It is sufficed to say that the Hon'ble Courts are unanimous in their approach to propound that whenever the reasons assigned by an applicant for explaining the delay, then such reasons are to be construed with a justice-oriented approach.

12.

In the light of the above and in the present case whether there is a delay of 294 days in filing of first appeal by the assessee before the ld. CIT(A), we note that the assessee has explained the reasons which prevented him in filing the present appeal within prescribed limitation. Therefore, just decision of the controversy it is incumbent upon us to condone the delay. Accordingly taking circumstances holistically, we condone the delay of 294 days in filing the first appeal before the ld. CIT(A).

13.

Since grounds raised at the first appeal had not been adjudicated upon on their merits, in the given set of facts and circumstances, we find it appropriate to remit the matter back to the file of ld. CIT(A) for de novo meritorious adjudication on the grounds so raised by the assessee by passing a speaking order. Needless to say, assessee be given reasonable opportunity of being heard and to make all relevant submissions as required to substantiate the claim made by him. We also direct the assessee to be diligent in making all his submissions, so as to comply with the notices for hearing for effective and expeditious disposal of the first appeal proceedings. Accordingly, grounds raised by the assessee are allowed for statistical purposes.

14.

In the result, the appeal of the assessee is allowed for statistical purposes.

Order pronounced in the open court on 02.06.2026.

Sd/- Sd/- (Pawan Singh) (Girish Agrawal) Judicial Member Accountant Member Mumbai Dated: 02.06.2026 Copy to:

Mustaque Ahmed Merchant 15, Old Hanuman Lane 1st 1 X Lane, Kalbadevi Road Mumbai-400 002.

NATIONAL FACELESS ASSESSMENT CENTER (NFAC), DELHI 2 ITO-WARD 23(2)(6), Piramal Chambers, Lalbaug, Mumbai-400012. 3 THE PCIT / CIT, 4 THE D.R., ITAT, MUMBAIBENCH 5 GUARD FILE

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