SANJAY JAGDISHCHNADRA SOOD HUF,MUMBAI vs. INCOME TAX OFFICER, WD-41(1)(4), MUMBAI

INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, MUMBAI BENCHES, MUMBAI BENCH: SMC BEFORE HON’BLESHRI PAWAN SINGH, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND HON’BLE SHRI GIRISH AGRAWAL, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER ITA 6814/MUM/2025 निर्धारणवर्ा/Assmt. Year:2008-09) Permanent Account Number: AAKHS9084E INCOME TAX OFFICER, SANJAY JAGDISH SOOD HUF WD-41(1)(4) A-101, SAI SANSKAR, OPP KAUTILYA BHAVAN, SARAS BAUG, SION TROMBAY BANDRA KURLA COMPLEX, Vs. ROAD, DEONAR, MUMBAI, MUMBAI, MAHARASHTRA MAHARASHTRA 400088 400051 (अपीलार्थीAppellant) (प्रत्यर्थीRespondent)

निर्धाऩितीद्वधिध/Assessee represented by: Shri Saiprasad Ghosh, CA िधजस्विद्वधिध/Revenue represented by: Shri Ujjwal Kumar, Sr. DR

सुिवधईकीतधिीख/Date of conclusion of hearing: 09.03.2026 घोषणधकीतधिीख/Date of pronouncement: 04.06.2026 आदेश / ORDER PER GIRISH AGRAWAL, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER: This appeal is filed by the assesseeis against the order of Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax, Appeal(A)-2, Visakhapatnam vide DIN: ITBA/APL/S/250/2025-26/1081036467(1) dated 23.09.2025passed against the intimation issued by the Centralized Processing Centre of the Department (CPC), Bengaluru, u/s 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”), dated 19.06.2023for the Assessment Year 2008-09.

i. On facts and circumstances of the case and in Law, Ld. Addl/ JCIT (Appeal) erred in not admitting the appeal on holding the delay in filing of 1" appeal of 5277 days, on ignoring the fact that there is no delay in filing the 1" appeal since the disputed order had been served to the appellant on 10/09/2024; ii. Without prejudice to Ground no.1, Ld. Addl/ JCIT (Appeal) ought to have condoned the delay in filing of 1* appeal, being occurred under the bonafide reasons and compelling circumstances beyond control of the appellant; iii. On facts and circumstances of the case and in Law, Ld. Addl/ JCIT (Appeal), ought to have deleted the adjustments made in intimation u/s 143(1) of Rs. 33,240/-; iv. On facts and circumstances of the case and in Law, Ld. Addl/ JCIT (Appeal) ought to have allowed the appellant's claim of rebate u/s 88E of Rs.3,07,262/-. 3. At the outset ld. Counsel for the assessee submitted that the appeal by ld. CIT(A) has been deposed of in limine, treating it as non- est on account of failure on the part of the assessee to provide “sufficient cause” for delay in filing first appeal as required under section 249 of the Act. Merits of the case have not been dealt at the first appellate stage.

3.1. In Form no. 35 filed by the assessee for filing of first appeal, at row number 2 requiring details of the order appealed against, assessee has furnished the date of order as 24.03.2010. For the date of service of order/notice of demand, the date mentioned is 10.09.2024. At row no. 14 requiring details for appeal filing, assessee has furnished „no‟ against whether there is delay in filing appeal. On this factual matrix, ld. CIT(A) referred to ITBA portal of the department to take note of the

fact that intimation under section 143(1) was served on the assessee on 03.04.2010. The impugned intimation under section 143(1) is dated 24.03.2010 which gave rise to a demand of Rs. 4,64,890/-. He also took note of one notice issued by ITO Ward-41(1)(4), Mumbai under section 221(1) dated 19.06.2023in respect of the aforesaid demand outstanding and requiring the assessee to deposit the same or produce relevant challan ifit has already deposited.Based on this notice, ld. CIT(A) presumed that assessee must have received the intimation under section 143(1) much before the date of receipt as claimed by the assessee i.e. 10.09.2024. He thus, held that there is no sufficient cause explained by the assessee for the delay caused in filing the first appeal and held it as not maintainable and dismissed the same in limine.

4.1. Enquiries were made in this regard on the portal which reflected outstanding demand for the year under consideration,based on which ld. AO was approached for obtaining the copies of intimation under section 143(1).On 10.09.2024,ld. AO through an email dated 10.09.2024 supplied the required document to the assessee which has been considered as the date of service for the purpose of filing the first appeal before the ld. CIT(A). Email communication in this regard by the ld. AO to the assessee and its tax counsel is reproduced for ready reference.

5. On these factual matrices, a specific query was raised by the Bench to understand whether any adjustment of refund was made as proposed in respect of refund due for A.Y. 2024-25 and any other subsequent assessment years. In this regard, ld. Counsel submitted with documentary evidence to demonstrate that no adjustment has been made for the refund due to the assessee for A.Y. 2024-25 and A.Y. 2025-26. He referred to bank statement highlighting the receipt of refund amounts as claimed by the assessee in its return for the two said assessment years without making any adjustment thereof against the outstanding demands for the year under consideration. He also referred to the intimations issued under section 143(1) for the two assessment years wherein the refund to the assessee had crystallized, amounting to Rs. 26,740/- for A.Y. 2024-25 and Rs. 30,790/- for A.Y. 2025-26,both of which have been credited to the assessee‟s bank account with the same amount.

6.1. There is a delay of 5277 days if the date of service of impugned intimation under section 143(1) is considered as 03.04.2010. If the date of service of intimation is considered as 19.06.2023 which is the date of notice issued under section 221(1) by which the assessee came to know about the demand outstanding against it for the year under consideration, then there is a delay of 449 days.

7.1. We may make reference to the following observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court from the decision in the case of Collector Land Acquisition Vs. Mst. Katiji& Others, 1987 AIR 1353:

"1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so." 7.2. Similarly, we would like to make reference to authoritative pronouncement of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy (supra). It reads as under:

"Rule of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life-span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim Interest reipublicae up sit finislitium (it is for the general welfare that a period be putt to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek theirremedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi lain Vs. Kuntal Kumari [AIR 1969 SC 575] and State of West Bengal Vs. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality [AIR 1972 SC 749]. It must be remembered that in every case of delay there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain

time then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning delay the Could should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a looser and he too would have incurred quiet a large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss."

8.1. Taking into account the above deliberation on the circumstances which prevailed, we find that assessee has explained the sufficient cause for the delay in filing first appeal.In light of the above and for the just decision of the controversy, it is incumbent upon us to condone the delay. Thus, taking the circumstances holistically, we condone the delay of 5277 days in filing the first appeal before the ld. CIT(A).

8.2. Since, ld. CIT(A) has dismissed the appeal in limine, without adjudicating on the merits of the case, find it appropriate to remit the matter back to the file of ld. CIT(A) for de novo meritorious of the grounds raised by the assessee at the first appellate stage.Needless to say, assessee be given reasonable opportunity of being heard and to make all relevant submissions as required to substantiate the claim made by it. We also direct the assessee to be diligent in making all its submissions, so as to comply with the notices for hearing for effective and expeditious disposal of the first appeal proceedings. Accordingly,

the impugned order passed by the ld. CIT(A) is set aside. Grounds raised by the assessee are allowed for statistical purposes.

Order pronounced in the open court on 04.06.2026

Sd/- Sd/- (Pawan Singh) (Girish Agrawal) Judicial Member Accountant Member Ankit, PS Mumbai Dated: 04.06.2026 Copy to: SANJAY JAGDISH SOOD HUF A-101, SAI SANSKAR, OPP SARAS 1 BAUG, SION TROMBAY ROAD, DEONAR, MUMBAI, MAHARASHTRA 400088 INCOME TAX OFFICER, WD-41(1)(4) KAUTILYA BHAVAN, BANDRA KURLA 2 COMPLEX, MUMBAI, MAHARASHTRA 400051 3 THE PCIT / CIT, 4 THE D.R., ITAT, MUMBAIBENCH 5 GUARD FILE