CHAUDHARY PAWAN SINGH SHIKHSA SAMITI,NOIDA vs. ITO EXEMPTION WARD , GHAZIABAD

ITA Nos. 8219 & 8220/Del/2025 CHAUDHARY PAWAN SINGH SHIKSHA SAMITI, NOIDA IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL DELHI BENCH “F” NEW DELHI BEFORE SHRI MAHAVIR SINGH, VICE PRESIDENT AND SHRI SANJAY AWASTHI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER ITA No.8219/Del/2025 Assessment Year: 2010-11 M/S CHAUDHARY PAWAN SINGH Vs. INCOME TAX OFFICER, SHIKSHA SAMIT, Exemption Ward, G-88, 1st Floor, Sector 63, Noida, Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh 201301. Uttar Pradesh 201301. PAN No. AAAJC0616Q Appellant Respondent & ITA No.8220/Del/2025 Assessment Year: 2010-11 M/S CHAUDHARY PAWAN SINGH Vs. INCOME TAX OFFICER, SHIKSHA SAMIT, Exemption Ward, G-88, 1st Floor, Sector 63, Noida, Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh 201301. Uttar Pradesh 201301. PAN No. AAAJC0616Q Appellant Respondent Assessee by Shri Tarandeep Singh, Adv. Revenue by Ms. Harpreet Kaur Hansra, Sr. DR Date of hearing: 04.06.2026 Pronouncement on 04.06.2026 O R D E R PER SANJAY AWASTHI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER:

ITA Nos. 8219 & 8220/Del/2025 CHAUDHARY PAWAN SINGH SHIKSHA SAMITI, NOIDA which was rejected and the said rejection was also confirmed at first appellate stage.

“that I am the Manager of Chaudhary Pawan Singh Shiksha Samiti at Noida under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the “Society”). The assessee is a Charitable Society having members agricultural taxes from rural areas of U.P. who are not conversant with the finer points of income tax laws. It would caused financial hardship of delay is not condoned and the assessee is not heard in appeal. That I have read the contents of the enclosed application for condonation of delay which is true to the best of my knowledge and belief” The Ld. AR has also filed a detailed background explaining the delay vide his letter dated 20.05.2026, whereby it is stated that due to wrong advice rendered to the assessee it was felt that the proceedings u/s 154 of the Act would be sufficient to afford relief and thereafter it was only later with the change of tax consultant that it was deemed fit to file an appeal before the ITAT.

2.1 A perusal of the affidavit extracted (supra) reveals that a very substantial delay of around 11 years has been attributed to

ITA Nos. 8219 & 8220/Del/2025 CHAUDHARY PAWAN SINGH SHIKSHA SAMITI, NOIDA essentially lack of knowledge about tax procedures. It is rather difficult to understand that an aggrieved appellant has allowed the matter of timely filing of appeal to transpire in such a manner that the said substantial delay has occurred. While a judicial forum like the ITAT is bound by the time tested dictum of not allowing technical matters to interfere with the issue of deciding matters on the basis of the principle of “substantive justice”, but the discretionary powers for allowing condonation of delay are not such that every delay would deserve to be condoned on the ground that the principle of “substantive justice” would override any or all considerations surrounding the fact of delayed filing of appeal. 2.2 The Hon’ble Apex Court in catena of decisions has held that the law of limitation being substantive, the power of discretion to condone the delay is to be exercised judiciously and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. The parties are expected to approach the Court in adherence to this general principle. Thus, filing an appeal is the rule and condoning the delay is the exception, wherein the Courts have to exercise their discretionary power judiciously and by recording reasons. Excessive delay, as in this case, cannot be simply wished away by casually mentioning that the assessee was wrongly advised. Such casually explained delay is to be construed as an un-condonable delay. Once there is a delay, the person who is

ITA Nos. 8219 & 8220/Del/2025 CHAUDHARY PAWAN SINGH SHIKSHA SAMITI, NOIDA filing the condonation petition is expected to furnish the reason which must be acceptable to this Bench.

2.3 Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji, reported in 1987 taxmann.com 1072/28 ELT 185, has observed that it is for the assessee to explain each and every day of delay in filing of appeal. Before us in the present case, no such petition/prayer/application for condonation of delay is filed much less a sufficient and satisfactory explanation to prove that there is a reasonable cause for the said delay.

2.4 Furthermore, in this case, it is evident that the appellant has conveniently decided not to justify the delay in filing by informing this Bench on the detailed reasons, even on day-to-day basis, for which the appeal could not be filed in time. At this juncture, it is necessary to delve into the genesis of limitation and how a judicial forum needs to deal with matters pertaining to condonation of delay.

2.5 Almost all the tax laws, whether they relate to direct taxes or Indirect taxes, contain provisions for condonation of delay in filing appeals, if the appellant (whether it is the taxpayer or the revenue) proves to the satisfaction of the appellate authority that he had sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within time. The

ITA Nos. 8219 & 8220/Del/2025 CHAUDHARY PAWAN SINGH SHIKSHA SAMITI, NOIDA genesis for such provisions can be traced to section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which reads as follows:

"Extension of prescribed period in certain cases. — Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the Court that he has sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Explanation: The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section." 2.6 The two essential ingredients for condoning delays are: (i) the existence of 'sufficient cause', and (ii) the satisfaction of the competent authority that such sufficient cause was proved as existing. Thus, the first issue about the existence of sufficient cause covers the factual matrix in respect of which the onus to prove is squarely on the litigant, while the second issue about 'satisfaction' covers the discretionary area in which the competent authority, in this case this Bench, is expected to act. It is by now well settled that the expression 'sufficient cause' has to be understood to mean a cause beyond the control of the appellant or one which the appellant, even with the exercise of due care and attention, could not avoid. The expression is required to be interpreted liberally so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the appellant. Further, it is a general principle of law that whenever a Court is vested with a

ITA Nos. 8219 & 8220/Del/2025 CHAUDHARY PAWAN SINGH SHIKSHA SAMITI, NOIDA discretionary power, such a discretion must be exercised not in an arbitrary, vague or fanciful manner but on judicial principles. The fundamental principle, which has been universally recognized as the true rule of guidance for the exercise of discretion to condone delays is to see whether the party claiming indulgence has been reasonably diligent in prosecuting his appeal. In the case of State of Gujarat v. Sayed Mohd. Baquir E1 Edross AIR 1981 SC 1921, the Supreme Court laid down the following principles that should govern the exercise of powers of condonation under section 5:

(i) The party seeking relief has to satisfy the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal, etc., within the prescribed time. (ii) The explanation has to cover the entire period of delay. (iii) A litigant should not be permitted to take away a right which has accrued to his adversary by lapse of time. (iv) The proof of sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court under section 5. After sufficient cause is shown, the Court is to inquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. (v)The discretion conferred on the Court is a judicial discretion and must be exercised to advance substantial justice. (vi) No liberal view should be taken merely because the defaulting party is a Government. (vii) Even if there was a strong case for acceptance of the appeal on merits that could not be a ground for condonation of delay. (viii) When there is remiss on the part of the advocate, the question that comes up for consideration is whether the mistake was bona fide or was merely a device to cover the ulterior purpose such as latches on the part of the litigant or an attempt to save limitation in an underhand way.

ITA Nos. 8219 & 8220/Del/2025 CHAUDHARY PAWAN SINGH SHIKSHA SAMITI, NOIDA 2.7 It was also held in an earlier decision in the case of Ramlal Motilal v. Rewa Coalfields AIR 1962 SC 361, that 'every day's delay must be explained'. Another important requirement is that the 'cause' for the delay must have arisen before the expiry of the limitation period, and, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Ajit Singh Thakur Singh v. State of Gujarat AIR 1981 SC 733, "no event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation period can constitute sufficient cause".

2.8 The Ld. DR filed detailed written submissions challenging the condonation petition of the assessee and relied on several authorities to canvass the point that there was no reason why the delay of about 11 years should be condoned. Some of the authorities relied on may be mentioned as under: -

i. Baroda Ryon Corporation reported in Gujarat 87 STC 266; ii. M Loganathan reported in 302 ITR 139 (Mad.); iii. Surinder Kumar Boveja reported in 287 ITR 52 (Del.); iv. Baswaraj & Ors. Reported in AIR 2014 SC 746.

2.9 Considering the detailed discussion above, it is our considered opinion that the appellant has not been able to demonstrate any reasonable cause to allow condonation of delay in the matter. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed on the point of limitation, without any decision on the merits of the case.

ITA Nos. 8219 & 8220/Del/2025 CHAUDHARY PAWAN SINGH SHIKSHA SAMITI, NOIDA 3. Regarding ITA No.8219/Del/2025 the facts in brief are that for AY 2010-11 (being the year under consideration) the assessee surrendered an amount of Rs.94,00,000/- on account of unexplained general fund, donation and corpus fund as on 31.03.2009. Subsequently, the earlier assessment years for AY 2007-08, 2008-09 and 2009-10 were reopened and additions of Rs.38,28,036/-, Rs.5,42,030/- and Rs.2,04,917/- were where made in these years totaling to Rs.94,52,953/-. The assessee filed a rectification application before the Ld. AO requesting to rectify the assessment order passed for AY 2010-11 on the ground that while the surrendered amount of Rs.94,00,000/- was added in AY 2010-11 on account of a voluntary surrender by the assessee, this amount was also added over a period of three years from AY 2007-08 to 2009-10. It was the prayer that there was a substantial addition in the hands of the assessee and there should be no addition again on that account for AY 2010-11. However, the Ld. AO rejected this application on the ground that this was not a mistake apparent from record and thus, there could be no relief to the assessee u/s 154 of the Act. The assessee narrated the entire sequence of events before the Ld. Addl./JCIT(Appeals) but could not succeed there also on the ground that a rectification was not possible u/s 154 of the Act since the matter did not, apparently, pertain to any patent error of fact.

ITA Nos. 8219 & 8220/Del/2025 CHAUDHARY PAWAN SINGH SHIKSHA SAMITI, NOIDA 3.1 The aggrieved assessee has approached the ITAT with four grounds challenging the impugned action as under: -

“1. That on facts and in law the impugned order dated 17th October 2025 passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) (hereinafter referred to as the "CIT(A)") is bad in law and void ab initio. 2. That on facts and in law the CIT(A) has erred in upholding that there is mistake apparent in the assessment order dated 23-07-2014 passed by the AO u/s 143(3) of the Act. 3. That on facts and in law the CIT(A) has erred in upholding rejection of application filed u/s 154 of the Act. 4. That on facts and in law the CIT(A) has erred in upholding addition to total income of Rs.94,00,000/-. That the appellant craves leave to add, amend, modify or alter the grounds of appeal.” 4. Before us the Ld. AR narrated the facts of the case, as having already been captured in the discussion above, and stated that the assessee out of ignorance and with a desire to buy peace of mind had deemed it fit to surrender Rs.94,00,000/- before the Ld. AO during AY 2010-11. Thereafter, the three earlier years cases were reopened and this amount was again added. For this purpose, the Ld.AR relied on the case of R. Natarajan Vs. ACIT reported in 135 ITD 55 (Chennai). The Ld. AR read out para 20 of the Hon’ble Third Member’s order wherein it is stated that if an item of income was assessed for AY 2008-09 then the assessment of the same amount for AY 2007-08 was a mistake apparent from record. The exact language deserves to be extracted as under: -

“20. When, under these circumstances, levy of tax on the sum of Rs.4,28,750/- is altogether impermissible for the assessment

ITA Nos. 8219 & 8220/Del/2025 CHAUDHARY PAWAN SINGH SHIKSHA SAMITI, NOIDA year 2007-08, how the prayer of the assessee could be brushed aside? If the Income-tax Act authorizes a designated authority to collect tax for State, the same Act always permits the said authority to rectify any proceedings, which has resulted in double taxation. When the income of Rs.4,28,750/- has been assessed for the assessment year 2008-09, the assessment of the same amount for the impugned assessment year 2007-08 is a mistake apparent from the records. The assessing authority could have corrected it and if not, the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) could have given a direction to rectify such a mistake apparent from the records. There is no great question of law involved in this.” The Ld. AR also relied on an old circular of CBDT [Circular no.71 dated 20.12.1971] in his support. The contents of the circular deserve to be extracted as under: -

“SECTION 154 OF THE INCOME-TAX ACT, 1961-RECTIFICATION OF MISTAKE - APPARENT FROM RECORDS-BOARD'S AUTHORISATION FOR TAKING ACTION UNDER SECTION 154 BEYOND TIME LIMIT SPECIFIED UNDER SECTION 154(7) IN CASES OF PROTECTIVE ASSESSMENTS REQUIRING TO BE CANCELLED ORDER UNDER SECTION 119(2)(B) CIRCULAR NO. 71 [F.NO. 246/25/71-A & PAC), DATED 20-12-1971 A copy of the order dated 20-12-1971 passed by the Board on the subject is enclosed for information and guidance. ANNEX-ORDER REFERRED TO IN CLARIFICATION 1. Where the same income was assessed, as a protective measure, in the hands or more than one assessee or as the income of more than one assessment year, and one or more of these protective assessments needs to be cancelled as a result of some of the relevant assessments having become final and conclusive, it has been the practice of the Income-tax Department to cancel the redundant assessments under section 154, treating these as involving mistakes apparent from the records. This is being done by the Income-tax Officers either suo-motu or on applications made by assessees. Sometimes, it is not possible to take action under section 154 in such cases because of the operation of the time limit laid down in sub-section (7) of section 154. Since the operation of this time limit causes genuine hardship to the affected assessees, the Central Board of Direct Taxes, in exercise of the powers vested in them under clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 119, hereby authorizes the Income-tax Officer to take action under section 154, or to admit or dispose of on merits

ITA Nos. 8219 & 8220/Del/2025 CHAUDHARY PAWAN SINGH SHIKSHA SAMITI, NOIDA applications under section 154 filed by assessees seeking relief, for cancelling such protective assessments as have become redundant by waiving, if necessary, the time limit fixed under sub-section (7) of section 154. 2. Every case of the relaxation of the time limit on the authority of this order shall be reported by the Income-tax Officer to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, in whose jurisdiction he is functioning within one month of the passing of such order.” The Ld. AR concluded his argument by stating that it was clear that the same amount has been added twice over in the case of the assessee and he deserves relief on that account.

4.1 The Ld. DR also relied on several orders of coordinate benches of ITAT in support of her argument that no action u/s 154 was possible in this case. The Ld. DR argued that the matter could not be settled in favour of the assessee u/s 154 of the Act. It was also pointed out that Circular 71 (supra) dealt with substantive and protective assessments and would not apply to the facts of the present case. It was also pointed out that the Natarajan case (supra) was not on section 154 but was adjudicated on a different premise altogether.

ITA Nos. 8219 & 8220/Del/2025 CHAUDHARY PAWAN SINGH SHIKSHA SAMITI, NOIDA the Natarajan case to consider that a particular piece of income has to be taxed only once and not more than once, we are also fortified by the CBDT Circular no.71 (supra) where also the basic consideration that comes across is that an item of income should be added only once. Accordingly, considering the totality of facts and circumstances of the case and the fact that there is apparently a double addition of the same amount, we direct that the addition of Rs.94,00,000/-, as surrendered by the assessee, for the year under consideration should be deleted. However, the Ld. AO must, at the time of giving effect to this order ascertain that the amount surrendered (Rs.94 lakhs) is the same as has been considered for the previous three years where the assessment were reopened u/s 147/148 of the Act. It is directed that the surrendered amount only has to be considered as relief.

Order pronounced in the open court on 04.06.2026

Sd/- Sd/- (MAHAVIR SINGH) (SANJAY AWASTHI) VICE PRESIDENT ACCOUNTANT MEMBER Dated: 08.06.2026 *Kavita Arora, Sr. P.S. Copy forwarded to:

ITA Nos. 8219 & 8220/Del/2025 CHAUDHARY PAWAN SINGH SHIKSHA SAMITI, NOIDA 1. Appellant 2. Respondent 3. CIT 4. CIT(Appeals) 5. DR: ITAT ASSISTANT REGISTRAR ITAT, NEW DELHI

Sr. No. Particulars Date 1 Date of dictation of Tribunal Order 05.06.2026 2 Date on which typed draft Tribunal Order is placed before the 08.06.2026 Dictation Member 3 Date on which typed draft Tribunal Order is placed before the 08.06.2026 other Member (in the case of DB) 4 Date on which the approved draft Tribunal Order comes to the 08.06.2026 Sr. P.S. /P.S. 5 Date on which the fair Tribunal Order is placed before the 08.06.2026 Dictating Member for sign 6 Date on which the fair Order is placed before the other Member 08.06.2026 for sign (in the case of DB) 7 Date on which the signed order comes back to the Sr. P.S. /P.S 08.06.2026 for uploading on ITAT website 8 Date of uploading, if not, reason for not uploading 09.06.2026 9 Date on which the file goes to the Bench Clerk 09.06.2026 10 Date on which order goes for xerox 11 Date on which the file goes for endorsement 12 Date on which the file goes to the Superintendent/O.S. for checking 13 Date on which the file goes to the Assistant Registrar for signature on the order 14 Date on which the file goes to dispatch section for dispatch the Tribunal Order 15 Date of dispatch of order 16 Date on which file goes to Record Room after dispatch the order