RATHINAM VISWANATHAN,TRICHY vs. DCIT, TRICHY, TRICHY
In favour of the assessee: the assessee's appeal was allowed. From the AI summary of this appeal.
What did the Tribunal hold?
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were invalid due to the improper approval for the notice under Section 148. Consequently, the penalty levied under Section 271E, which was based on the invalid reassessment order, was also quashed.
What were the facts?
The assessee repaid a loan in cash exceeding the prescribed limit, leading to a penalty under Section 271E. The reassessment proceedings, which formed the basis for the penalty, were initiated by a notice issued beyond three years without proper approval from the higher authority as required by Section 151.
What were the issues?
Whether the penalty under Section 271E is valid when the reassessment proceedings initiating it are vitiated due to non-compliance with Section 151 regarding prior approval for issuing a notice under Section 148 beyond the prescribed time limit.
Which sections of the Income-tax Act were involved?
Section 271E,Section 269T,Section 148,Section 147,Section 151
AI-generated summary — verify with the full judgment below
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, ‘D’ BENCH: CHENNAI
Before: SHRI ABY T. VARKEY & MS. PADMAVATHY. S
आदेश / O R D E R PER ABY T. VARKEY, JM: This is an appeal preferred by the assessee against the order of the Learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)/NFAC, (hereinafter referred to as ‘Ld.CIT(A)‘), Delhi, dated 01.07.2025 whereby the Ld.CIT(A) confirmed the levy of penalty amounting to ₹22,57,000/- u/s.271E of the Income Tax Act, 1961 [hereinafter referred to as "the Act"].
ITA No.2125/Chny/2025 (AY 2018-19) Rathinam Viswanathan :: 2 :: 2. Brief facts are that the assessee an individual, filed his Return of Income (RoI) for the Assessment Year 2018-19 on 18.01.2019 with total income of ₹2,88,74,900/- including agricultural income of ₹57,96,400/-. The case was selected for scrutiny under CASS on the issue of Agricultural Income and details of Assets & Liabilities and the assessment was completed on 10.03.2021 under section 143(3) of the Act, and the total income was assessed to ₹3,46,71,300/-. Based on information flagged under the “risk management strategy” formulated by the CBDT that the assessee had indulged in “high risk transaction” (huge cash deposits and withdrawals in various bank accounts of the assessee), the AO reopened the assessment of the assessee by issuing notice u/s.148 of the Act on 20.04.2022 and in response, the assessee filed his return of income electronically on 09.11.2022. The AO is noted to have passed the reassessment order u/s.147/144B of the Act on 27.03.2024 by reiterating the original assessed income of ₹3,46,71,300/-. In other words, no addition was made while passing the reassessment order on 27.03.2024. However, the AO noted from perusal of the audit report filed by the assessee that assessee had repaid loan in cash exceeding the limit specified u/s.269T to Shri. R.V. Balamurgan in mode other than by cheque or bank draft or use of electronic clearing system through a bank account. Therefore, according to the AO the assessee has violated the provisions of Section 269T of the Act and hence liable for penalty
ITA No.2125/Chny/2025 (AY 2018-19) Rathinam Viswanathan :: 3 :: u/s.271E for failure to comply with the provisions of Section 269T; and consequently, initiated penalty u/s.271E for non-compliance of provisions of Section 269T and issued notice u/s.274 r.w.s. 271E of the Act on 27.03.2024, calling upon the assessee to explain why penalty u/s.271E of the Act shouldn’t be imposed. Pursuant to the notice, the assessee filed his reply that sum of ₹22,57,000/- was re-paid to his son and therefore, such an action between family members, returning this amount doesn’t fall within the ambit of receipts contemplated u/s.269T of the Act. Thus, it was contended that no penalty is exigible u/s.271E of the Act in respect of the said amount of ₹22,57,000/- and requested dropping of the proposed penalty. However, the Income Tax Authority not convinced, levied penalty of ₹22,57,000/- u/s.271E of the Act.
Aggrieved by the impugned order levying penalty u/s.271E of the Act, the assessee preferred appeal before the Ld.CIT(A), who was pleased to dismiss the same.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid action of the Ld.CIT(A) confirming the levy of penalty of ₹22,57,000/- u/s.271E of the Act, the assessee is in appeal before us and has raised following grounds of appeal which are reproduced as under:
ITA No.2125/Chny/2025 (AY 2018-19) Rathinam Viswanathan :: 4 :: “ Grounds of Appeal: 1. The order of the Ld.Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) is contrary to law, weight of evidence and circumstances of the case. 2. The Ld.Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) erred in not appreciating that the transaction between family members will not attract provisions of section 269T. 3. The Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) failed to appreciate the decisions cited before him and instead dismissed them without distinguishing them. 4. The Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) failed to appreciate that disputes within the family cannot be substantiated by any documentary evidence. 5. The Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) failed to appreciate that genuine transaction without any intention to evade tax do not attract penalty under section 271E - Kamal Jeet Kaur Gill vs JCIT (344 CTR 737). 6. The Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) overlooked the fact that no notice under section 274 had been issued by the designated authority. 7. The Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) failed to appreciate that it shall be duty of the department to demonstrate that the act was done by the empowered person and presumption relied upon by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) is not applicable in this case. 8. The Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) failed to appreciate that the transactions where only between the appellant and hid son and all other transactions without outsiders had been made only through banking channels. 9. The appellant carves leave to amend or alter the grounds raised and raise fresh grounds.”
Without prejudice to the above grounds of appeal, the assessee has raised a legal issue challenging the levy of penalty which reads as under:-
The Ld. AR submitted that the notice under section 148 of the Act which is dated 20.04.2022 is beyond the period of 3 years and therefore as per the provisions of Section 151 of the Act, the AO should have obtained the approval from Principle Chief Commissioner of Income Tax (in short ‘PCCIT’). The Ld. AR further submitted that in the present case the AO has obtained approval from Principle Commissioner of Income Tax (in short ‘PCIT’) while issuing notice under section 148 and therefore the notice is invalid by citing the decision of the coordinate bench of this Tribunal in the case of Meganapuram Primary Agricultural cooperative Credit Society vs PCIT (ITA No.895/Chny/2025 dated 19.09.2025 and hence, the assessment order u/s.147 r.w.s.143(3) dated 27.03.2024 is non-est in the eyes of law. Consequently, the impugned penalty levied u/s.271E of the Act, levy penalty of ₹22,57,000/- is invalid and bad in law.
ITA No.2125/Chny/2025 (AY 2018-19) Rathinam Viswanathan :: 5 ::
On the legal issue, supra, the Ld.AR submitted that the impugned 5. penalty is admittedly pursuant to reassessment for AY 2018-19, which was in-turn initiated by issuance of notice on 20.04.2022 u/s. 148 of the Act, by the AO/DCIT, Circle-1, Trichy, which impugned notice, according to him is beyond the period of three (3) years, and therefore, as per the provisions of Section 151 of the Act, the AO ought to have obtained the approval from Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax (in short ‘PCCIT’). However, in this case, the AO has obtained approval from Principal Commissioner of Income Tax (in short ‘PCIT’) while issuing notice u/s.148 of the Act. Hence according to him, the reopening notice u/s.148 is invalid and bad in law. Consequently, it was contented that the assessment framed by order dated 27.03.2024 passed u/s.147 of the Act is null in the eyes of law. Therefore, according to the Ld.AR, since there is no assessment order of 27.03.2024 in the eyes of law, and the penalty proceedings is pursuant to assessment order, there can’t be any penal action. Hence, according to him, the impugned penalty order dated 18.09.2024 passed u/s.271E of the Act, levying penalty of ₹22,57,000/-, is invalid and bad in law.
According to Ld. A.R., when the very event of reopening of the assessment by the AO for the assessment year 2018-19 was itself invalid for want of jurisdiction, consequent action of the AO is vitiated and the
ITA No.2125/Chny/2025 (AY 2018-19) Rathinam Viswanathan :: 6 :: assessment order is a nullity. Therefore, according to him, such an invalid order of the AO couldn’t have been the foundation for the Income Tax Authority to levy the impugned penalty by order dated 18.09.2024. Hence, impugned penalty order also is null in eyes of law. In other words, since the assessment order of the AO dated 27.03.2024 is non-est in the eyes of law, the Income Tax Authority couldn’t have levied penalty u/s.271E of the Act, so the impugned penalty order u/s.271E of the Act is also a nullity or non-est in the eyes of law.
Per contra, the Ld.DR vehemently supports the impugned action of the Ld. CIT(A) and submitted that assessee cannot challenge the assessment order, while assailing the penalty action confirmed by the Ld.CIT(A), hence he wants us to dismiss the legal issue.
In his rejoinder, the Ld. AR submitted that the assessee has raised the legal issue which assessee is entitled to do because it is settled law that the jurisdiction can be challenged at any stage/proceedings and even that it can be raised before the Hon’ble Apex Court for the first time. And according to Ld. A.R, in this case, the primary proceedings is the AO’s action of re-opening the assessment by issuance of notice u/s.148 of the Act, which action is invalid in the absence of sanction from the PCCIT, which he didn’t obtain, instead he got sanction only from PCIT. Hence, the AO undisputedly couldn’t have exercised his power to issue notice
ITA No.2125/Chny/2025 (AY 2018-19) Rathinam Viswanathan :: 7 :: after 01.04.2021 after the new regime came in to force, thereby, invalidating the assessment order passed u/s 147 on 28.03.2023. Hence, according to him, such an illegal action of the AO can be challenged in collateral proceedings u/s.271E of the Act as held by the Pune Tribunal in M/s.Karia Brothers v. ITO in ITA No.2401/Pune/2024 dated 23.07.2025 wherein several decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been cited. The Ld AR also referred to other decisions of this Tribunal which are also noted as under:
a) Supersonic Technologies (P) Ltd. vs. PCIT in ITA No. 2269/D/2017 dated 10.12.2018 (ITAT, Delhi Bench) ITA. No.3009 to 3012/DEL/2017 “6.1………….It is well settled Law that assessee can challenge the validity of the reassessment proceedings in the collateral proceedings (relating to examination of validity of Order passed) under section 263 of the I.T. Act. We rely upon the Order of ITAT, Mumbai Bench in the case of Westlife Development Ltd., vs. PCIT 49 ITR (Tribu.) 406 in which it was held “allowing the appeal (i) that jurisdiction aspect of the Order passed in the primary proceedings can be examined in collateral proceedings also. Thus, the assessee could be permitted to challenge the validity of the Order passed under section 263 on the ground that the assessment order was non-est.” Since the reassessment order itself is bad in law, therefore, Learned Counsel for the Assessee, rightly contended that the same cannot be revised under section 263 of the I.T. Act. Only valid re-assessment order can be revised under section 263 of the I.T. Act. On this ground itself the proceedings under section 263 of the I.T. Act are bad in law and liable to be quashed. We, accordingly, set aside the Order of Ld. Pr. CIT passed under section 263 of the I.T. Act and quash the same.” b) M/s CharbhujaMarmo (India) (P) Ltd. vs. PCIT in ITA No. 4749/D/2019 dated 31.12.2019 (ITAT, Delhi) “6. We have considered the rival submissions. It is well settled Law that since reassessment proceedings are invalid and bad in law, therefore, such proceedings could not be revised under section 263 of the I.T. Act. It is also well settled Law that validity of the re- assessment proceedings are to be judged on the basis of the reasons recorded for reopening of the assessment.” 9. He further placed reliance upon the following decision: -
ITA No.2125/Chny/2025 (AY 2018-19) Rathinam Viswanathan :: 8 :: c) M/s Westlife Development Ltd. vs. PCIT in ITA No. 688/Mum/2016 dated24.06.2016 (ITAT, Mumbai) d) Krishna Kumar Saraf vs. CIT in ITA No. 4562/Del/2011 dated 24.09.2015 (ITAT, Delhi) e) M/s Classic Flour & Food Processing (P) Ltd. vs. CIT in ITA No. 764 to 766/Kol/2014 dated 05.04.2017 (ITAT, Kolkata)”
In the light of the aforesaid averments, and other decisions discussed infra, the Ld AR wants us to adjudicate this legal issue.
Having heard both parties, the first aspect which needs to be examined is whether in the present proceedings wherein assessee has challenged the levy of penalty, the assessee is entitled to challenge the validity of initiation of reopening proceedings as well as the validity of the assessment order framed pursuant thereto u/s.147 of the Act. The Ld.AR for the assessee submitted before us that it is open to an assessee in an appeal against the penalty order u/s.271E of the Act, to challenge the validity of the order passed u/s.147 of the Act as well as initiation of proceedings u/s.147 of the Act. In this regard other than the case laws cited supra, the Ld.AR for the assessee placed before us two decisions one rendered by Lucknow Bench of Tribunal in the case of Inder Kumar Bachani (HUF) v. ITO 99 ITD 621 (Luck) and the Mumbai Tribunal ‘ G ‘ Bench in the case of M/s. Westlife Development Ltd. v. Principal C.I.T. in ITA No.688/Mum/2016. In both the decisions a view has been taken by the Tribunal that when an Assessment order passed u/s 147 of the Act
ITA No.2125/Chny/2025 (AY 2018-19) Rathinam Viswanathan :: 9 :: was without jurisdiction, the Ld. PCIT cannot invoke the jurisdiction u/s 263 of the Act against such void or non-est order. In the second decision cited, the Mumbai bench of the Tribunal has specifically framed the following questions :-
“ 1. Whether the assessee can challenge the validity of an assessment order during the appellate proceedings pertaining to examination of validity of order passed u/s 263? 2. Whether the impugned assessment order passed u/s 143(3) dated 24-10-2013 was valid in the eyes of law or a nullity as has been claimed by the assessee? 3. If the impugned assessment order passed u/s 143(3) was illegal or nullity in the eyes of law, then, whether the CIT had a valid jurisdiction to pass the impugned order u/s.263 to revise the non-est assessment order?”
On question No. 1 & 3, the Mumbai bench of the Tribunal in the aforesaid case of M/s.Westlife Development Ltd. (supra) has taken the view that when the original assessment proceedings are null and void in the eyes of law for want of assumption of jurisdiction, then such validity can be challenged even in collateral proceedings. We note that the Mumbai bench took the view that the proceedings before AO u/s.147 of the Act are primary proceedings and proceedings before Ld.PCIT u/s.263 of the Act are collateral proceedings and in such collateral proceedings, the validity of initiation of the re-opening u/s 147 of the Act can be challenged. The Mumbai bench of the Tribunal in this regard has placed reliance on several decisions, the main decision being that of the Hon’ble
ITA No.2125/Chny/2025 (AY 2018-19) Rathinam Viswanathan :: 10 :: Supreme Court in the case of Kiran Singh & Ors. V. Chaman Paswan & Ors. [1955] 1 SCR 117 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows (relevant portion):-
“ It is a fundamental principle well-established that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject-matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties."
The Mumbai bench of this Tribunal made a reference to another decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra, (1990) 1 SCC 193 and the decisions in the case of Indian Bank v. Manilal Govindji Khona (2015) 3 SCC 712. The Mumbai bench also held that if order of assessment passed u/s 147 of the Act was nullity in the eyes of law then that order cannot be revised by invoking powers u/s 263 of the Act by CIT. The Mumbai Bench has in this regard placed reliance on the decision of Delhi bench of the Tribunal in the case of Krishna Kumar Saraf v. CIT in ITA NO.4562/Del/2007 order dated 24.09.2015 wherein it was held as follows (relevant portion):-
“ 17. There is no quarrel with the proposition advanced by Id. DR that the proceedings u/s 263 are for the benefit of revenue and not for assessee. 18. However, u/s 263 the Id. Commissioner cannot revise a non est order in the eye of law. Since the assessment order was passed in pursuance to the notice U/S 143(2), which was beyond time, therefore, the assessment order passed in pursuance to the barred notice had no legs to stand as the same was non est in the eyes of law. All proceedings subsequent to the said notice are of no consequence. Further, the decision of Hon’ble Madras High Court in the case of CIT Vs. Gitsons Engineering Co. 370 ITR 87 (Mad) clearly holds that the objection in relation to non service of notice could be raised for the first
ITA No.2125/Chny/2025 (AY 2018-19) Rathinam Viswanathan :: 11 :: time before the Tribunal as the same was legal, which went to the root of the matter. 19. While exercising powers u/s 263 Id. Commissioner cannot revise an assessment order which is non est in the eye of law because it would prejudice the right of assessee which has accrued in favour of assessee on account of its income being determined. If Id. Commissioner revises such an assessment order, then it would imply extending/ granting fresh limitation for passing fresh assessment order. It is settled law that by the action of the authorities the limitation cannot be extended. Because the provisions of limitation are provided in the same 20. In view of above discussion ground no.3 is allowed and revision order passed u/s 263 is quashed.”
The Lucknow Bench of the Tribunal in DCIT v. B.J.D. Paper Products [2012] 20 taxmann.com 314 (Lucknow) has held as under (relevant portion): -
“8.6 We have already discussed hereinabove that the decision of Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court in the case of Deep Chand Kothari v. CIT (supra ) is also in favour of the assessee and therefore we are of the view that the validity of assessment proceedings can be looked into during the penalty proceedings even though the assessment itself has not been challenged by the assessee. In that view of the matter, we do not see any merit in this submission of the learned Departmental Representative that validity of assessment order cannot be challenged in appeal against the order of penalty.”
In the context of appeal against penalty order passed u/s.271(1)(c) of the Act, it is noted the Pune Bench of the Tribunal in Tushar R. Jagtap v. ACIT [ITA Nos.725 to 725/Pun/2015 dated 09.02.2018] has held that assessee is entitled to challenge the validity of assessment order as under (relevant portion): -
“25. However, in view of the ratio laid down by the jurisdictional High Court in CIT Vs. Lalitkumar Bardia (supra) in turn, relying on the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Kanwar Singh Saini Vs. High Court of Delhi (supra), wherein it has been held that conferment of jurisdiction was a legislative function and the same neither conferred with the consent of parties nor by superior court and where the Court passes an order / decree having no jurisdiction over the matter, it would amount to nullity as the same goes to the roots of the issue. Applying the said principle, we hold that the assessee can challenge the jurisdiction of Assessing Officer in passing the assessment order while
ITA No.2125/Chny/2025 (AY 2018-19) Rathinam Viswanathan :: 12 :: challenging levy of penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Act. In case the re- assessment proceedings have been completed without proper jurisdiction entrusted upon the Assessing Officer, then the consequent penalty proceedings are also affected as basic issue of conferment of jurisdiction upon the Assessing Officer is under challenge. Accordingly, we hold so.”
In the context of appeal against penalty order passed u/s.271D of the Act, it is noted that Pune Bench of this Tribunal in M/s.Karia Brothers v. ITO in ITA No.2401/Pun/2024 dated 23.07.2025 has held that assessee is entitled to challenge the validity of assessment order as under (relevant portion):- “29. Since the assessee can always challenge the validity of assessment proceedings during the penalty proceedings as per the decision of Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of B.R. Bamasi vs. CIT (supra) and the decision of the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in the case of P.V. Doshi vs. CIT (supra) and the various other decisions relied on by the Ld. Counsel for the assessee in the paper book and since we have already held that the re-assessment proceedings are not in accordance with law on account of not obtaining the approval from the competent authority as per the provisions of section 151 of the Act, therefore, the penalty proceedings initiated u/s 271D of the Act do not survive. In view of the above discussion, the penalty proceedings initiated by the Assessing Officer and sustained by the Ld. CIT(A) / NFAC are not in accordance with law and are liable to be quashed. We, therefore, hold that the penalty levied by the Assessing Officer and sustained by the Ld. CIT(A) / NFAC being not in accordance with law is liable to be deleted. We accordingly direct the Assessing Officer to cancel the penalty levied u/s 271D of the Act. The original grounds and the additional grounds raised by the assessee are accordingly allowed.”
After having considered the judicial precedent on the issue, we are of the view that the validity of the 147 order passed by the AO can be assailed before us, even if for any reason, the assessee didn’t challenge the validity of proceedings u/s.147 of the Act by filing appeal [i.e. against the order framed u/s.147 of the Act]. However, it can be challenged in the collateral proceedings, i.e. even in an appeal against penalty order passed u/s.271D/271E of the Act. In the present case, the AO after
ITA No.2125/Chny/2025 (AY 2018-19) Rathinam Viswanathan :: 13 :: reopening the assessment has concluded the same by passing the reassessment order on 27.03.2024 by accepting the return of income filed by the assessee. Hence, the assessee did not challenge the reassessment order passed on 27.03.2024, which is the foundation for levy of impugned penalty. As noted this issue has been analyzed by the Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal in the case of M/s.Westlife Development Ltd. (supra) wherein the Tribunal has equated the reopening assessment u/s.147 to primary proceedings and the subsequent proceedings by Ld. PCIT u/s.263 passed to be collateral proceedings. In this order the Tribunal has taken note of several ratios of the Hon’ble Supreme Court wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that if the primary proceedings are non-est in law or void on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, then the validity of such proceedings can be challenged even in an appeal arising out of collateral proceedings. Since we have already set out the ratio/operating portions of these decisions we do not wish to repeat the same for the sake of brevity. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the view that the invalidity of the primary proceedings for lack of jurisdiction can be challenged even in appellate proceedings arising out of a collateral proceeding. In view of the aforesaid legal position, we will now examine the legal issue. For doing that first of all we have to examine whether the AO in the present case could have validly reopened the assessment of the assessee of
ITA No.2125/Chny/2025 (AY 2018-19) Rathinam Viswanathan :: 14 :: issuance of notice dated 20.04.2022 u/s.148 of the Act which resulted in framing of re-assessment order u/s.147/143(3) dated 27.03.2024.
We find that the AO had issued the statutory reopening notice u/s.148 of the Act on 20.04.2022 after obtaining the prior approval of the PCIT, Madras-1 which impugned action we find is not in consonance with the Section 151 of the Act read with Section 148A/148 of the Act relevant provision as it stood at that point of time (as on 01.04.2022) reads as under : - “151. Specified authority for the purposes of section 148 and section 148A be,- (i) Principal Commissioner or Principal Director or Commissioner or director, if three years or less than three years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year; (ii) Principal Chief Commissioner or Principal Director General or where there is no Principal Chief Commissioner or Principal Director General, Chief Commissioner or Director General, if more than three years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year.]” Conducting inquiry, providing opportunity before issue of notice under section 148. 148A. The Assessing Officer shall, before issuing any notice under section 148,- (a) conduct any enquiry, if required, with the prior approval of specified authority, with respect to the information which suggests that the income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment; (b) provide an opportunity of being heard to the assessee, 26[***] by serving upon him a notice to show cause within such time, as may be specified in the notice, being not less than seven days and but not exceeding thirty days from the date on which such notice is issued, or such time, as may be extended by him on the basis of an application in this behalf, as to why a notice under section 148 should not be issued on the basis of information which suggests that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment in his case for the relevant assessment year and results of enquiry conducted, if any, as per clause (a);
ITA No.2125/Chny/2025 (AY 2018-19) Rathinam Viswanathan
:: 15 :: (c) consider the reply of assessee furnished, if any, in response to the show-cause notice referred to in clause (b); (d) decide, on the basis of material erial available on record including reply of the assessee, whether or not it is a fit case to issue a notice under section 148, by passing an order, with the prior approval of specified authority, within one month from the end of the month in which the reply referred to in clause (c) is received by him, or where no such reply is furnished, within one month from the end of the month in which time or extended time allowed to furnish a reply as per clause (b) expires: [Prior approval for assessment, reassessment or recomputation in certain cases. 148B. No order of assessment or reassessment or recomputation under this Act shall be passed by an Assessing Officer below the rank of Joint Commissioner, in respect of an assessment year to which clause (1) or clause (ii) or clause (iii) or clause (iv) of Explanation 2 to section 148 apply except with the prior approval of the Additional Commissioner or Additional Director or Joint Commissioner or Joint Director. Time limit for notice. 149. (1) No notice under section 148 shall be issued for the relevant assessment year,- (a) if three years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year, unless the case falls under clause (b); (b) if three years, but not more than ten years, have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year unless the Assessing Officer has in his possession books of account or other documents or evidence which reveal that the income chargeable to tax, represented in the form of - (1) an asset; (ii) expenditure in respect of a transaction or in relation to an event or occasion; or (iii) an entry or entries in the books of account, which has escaped assessment amounts to or is likely to amount to fifty lakh rupees or more:] Issue of notice where income has escaped assessment. 148. Before making the assessment, reassessment or recomputation under section 147, and subject to the provisions of section 148A, the Assessing Officer shall serve on the assessee a notice, along with a copy of the order passed, if required, under clause (d) of section 148A, requiring him to furnish within such period, as may be specified in such notice, a return of his income or the income of any other person in respect of which he is assessable under this Act during the previous year corresponding to the relevant assessment year, in the prescribed form and verified in the prescribed manner and setting forth such other particulars as may be prescribed; and the provisions of this Act shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly as if such return were a return required to be furnished under section 139:
ITA No.2125/Chny/2025 (AY 2018-19) Rathinam Viswanathan :: 16 ::
Provided that no notice under this section shall be issued unless there is information with the Assessing Officer which suggests that the income charge- able to tax has escaped assessment in the case of the assessee for the relevant assessment year and the Assessing Officer has obtained prior approval of the specified authority to issue such notice: [Provided further that no such approval shall be required where the Assessing Officer, with the prior approval of the specified authority, has passed an order under clause (d) of section 148A to the effect that it is a fit case to issue a notice under this section.]
Section 151 specifies the competent authority who has been authorized to grant prior approval for conduct of enquiry contemplated under Clause (a), (b) & (d) of Section 148A; and also specifies the competent authority for the issuance of notice u/s.148 of the Act. Depending on the time-line given therein Section 151, if the AO desires to take action as contemplated u/s.148A or 148 has to seek prior approval of the specified authority as given therein under Clause (i) or (ii) of Section 151 of the Act. If the AO is taking action u/s.148A/148, within three (3) years from the end of the relevant assessment year, then prior-approval of the authority specified under Clause (i) is necessary, and if the AO is desirous of taking action either under 148A or 148 after three (3) years from the end of the relevant AY, then he has to obtain prior approval from the specified-authority given in clause (ii) of Section 151 of the Act. Hence, coming to the case in hand, the relevant assessment year being AY 2018-19, the AO issuing notice dated 25.03.2022 u/s.148A(b) of the Act, after prior approval of the PCIT, Madurai-I is legally valid. However,
ITA No.2125/Chny/2025 (AY 2018-19) Rathinam Viswanathan :: 17 :: the action of the AO obtaining appeal after 31.03.2022, [i.e. after three (3) years from the end of the relevant assessment year] from the PCIT- Madurai-I, to issue notice on 14.04.2022 & 20.04.2022 u/s.148A(d) and issue of notice u/s.148 on 20.04.2022 is invalid. Undisputedly, the notice u/s.148 of the Act is dated 20.04.2022, which is an event after three (3) years from the end of the relevant AY 2018-19; hence, the AO ought to have taken prior-approval from the PCCIT and not from the PCIT as taken in this case. Various contentions raised by the Ld.DR justifying the issue of notice u/s.148 of the Act with the approval of the PCIT-Madurai, is noted to have been dealt with by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Tribunal in the case of Meganapuram Primary Agricultural cooperative Credit Society v. PCIT (ITA No.895/Chny/2025 dated 19.09.2025), and hence, for the sake of brevity it is not repeated. In, Meganapuram Primary Agricultural cooperative Credit Society supra this Tribunal while adjudicating similar legal issue is noted to have held as under: “40. We find that the Show Cause Notice u/s.148A(b) of the Act came to be issued on 23.03.2022 in proposing to issue notice u/s.148 of the Act and as a consequence proposing to assumption of jurisdiction in terms of Section 147 of the Act. The assessee had filed its response to the said notice on 29.03.2022 and the AO had issued a letter dated 04.04.2022 in seeking further details in support of the submissions of the assessee and ultimately the order u/s.148A(d) of the Act came to be passed on 19.04.2022 by the AO, wherein the AO deemed it fit to issue notice u/s.148 of the Act. Thus, the notice u/s.148 of the Act came to be issued on 19.04.2022 for the A.Y. 2018-19. 41. The provisions of Section 151 defines the sanctioning authority and the relevant provisions as it stood at that point in time reads as under: “151. Specified authority for the purposes of section 148 and section 148A be,—
ITA No.2125/Chny/2025 (AY 2018-19) Rathinam Viswanathan :: 18 :: (i) Principal Commissioner or Principal Director or Commissioner or Director, if three years or less than three years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year; (ii) Principal Chief Commissioner or Principal Director General or where there is no Principal Chief Commissioner or Principal Director General, Chief Commissioner or Director General, if more than three years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year.]” From a plain reading of the above provisions, the competent authority to grant / accord sanction in terms of Section 151 of the Act is determined based on the date of issuing of sanction and in the event of issuing the sanction beyond the period of three years from the end of the relevant assessment year, the same would be covered by clause (ii) to Section 151 of the Act. 42. If the notice u/s.148 of the Act / order u/s.148A(d) of the Act is issued / passed within 3 years from the end of the relevant assessment year, the competent authority for the purpose of granting sanction in terms of Section 151 of the Act is either Principal Commissioner or Principal Director or Commissioner or Director, as the case may be. 43. On the other hand, if the same is issued / passed after the expiry of the 3 years from the end of the relevant A.Y., the competent authority in this regard should be Principal Chief Commissioner or Principal Director General or where there is no Principal Chief Commissioner or Principal Director General, Chief Commissioner or Director General 44. Now, let us examine the facts of the present case by keeping in mind the above legal position. The Show Cause Notice in terms of Section 148A(b) of the Act came to issue on 23.03.2022 after obtaining prior approval from the office of the PCIT, Madurai – 1 and thereafter the order in terms of Section 148A(d) of the Act came to be passed on 19.04.2022 along with the notice u/s.148 of the Act being issued on the same day, i.e. 19.04.2022. We find that both the order passed u/s.148A(d) of the Act as well as the notice u/s.148 of the Act dated 19.04.2022 was issued after getting approval from the office of the PCIT, Madurai – 1. The assessment year under consideration being A.Y.2018-19, the notice u/s.148 of the Act / order passed u/s.148A(d) of the Act being issued / passed on 19.04.2022, it can be said that same were passed / issued after the expiry of 3 years from the end of the A.Y under consideration. 45. Hence, it can be said that the notice u/s.148 of the Act was issued / order in terms of Section 148A(d) of the Act was passed without obtaining proper sanction from the competent authority as prescribed in terms of Section 151(1)(ii) of the Act. 46. It is pertinent to note that the proviso to Section 151 of the Act contemplates exclusion of time provided to the tax payer to response to Show Cause Notice u/s.148A(b) of the Act to the date of actual passing of
ITA No.2125/Chny/2025 (AY 2018-19) Rathinam Viswanathan :: 19 :: the order u/s.148A(d) of the Act / notice u/s.148 of the Act, which proviso reads as follows: “Provided that the period of three years for the purposes of clause (i) shall be computed after taking into account the period of limitation as excluded by the third or fourth or fifth provisos or extended by the sixth proviso to sub-section (1) of section 149.” 47. However, we find that the proviso to Section 151 of the Act was only introduced by way of Finance Act, 2023, with effect from 01.04.2023, i.e. the said amendment was introduced only after the sanction was granted on the present case / not available at the time of recording of sanction in terms of Section 151 of the Act in the case of the appellant herein. 48. The Ld. AR took us through the Finance Bill, 2023, wherein clause 71, proposing the said amendment to Section 151 as well the notes of clauses to Finance Bill, 2023, wherein relevant note to the said amendment reads as follows: Clause 71 of the Bill seeks to amend the section 151 of the Income-tax Act relating to sanction for issue of notice. It is proposed to amend clause (ii) of the said section to provide that the specified authority for the purposes of section 148 and section 148A shall be the Principal Chief Commissioner or Principal Director General or Chief Commissioner or Director General, if more than three years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year. It is further proposed to insert a proviso in the said section so as to provide that the period of three years for the purposes of clause (i) shall be computed after taking into account the period of limitation as excluded by the third or fourth or fifth provisos or extended by the sixth proviso to sub-section (1) of section 149. These amendments will take effect from 1st April, 2023. 49. Thus, it is an irrefutable fact that the amendment brought in by Finance Act, 2023 in introducing the proviso to Section 151 of the Act by giving effect to the exclusion of time limit by operation of 3rd to 5th proviso to Section 149(1) of the Act would take effect only from 01.04.2023. 50. Hence, it can be said that the said amendment would not come to the rescue of the revenue on the facts of the present case in view of the fact that the notice u/s.148 as well the order u/s.148A(d) of the Act being issued / passed well prior to the introduction of the said amendment, i.e. on 19.04.2022. 51. Before us, the Ld.DR argued that the said amendment introduced by Finance Act, 2023 ought to be reckoned as clarificatory and would have retrospective applicability, thereby validating the sanction accorded by the PCIT, Madurai – 1 on the facts of the present case. He further relied on the judgement of the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in the case of Giriraj Commercial (P.) Ltd. v. Union of India reported in 169 taxmann.com 168 in support of his contentions.
ITA No.2125/Chny/2025 (AY 2018-19) Rathinam Viswanathan :: 20 ::
This argument of the ld.DR is unable to be countenanced by us for the simple reason that the said amendment was introduced specifically with effect from 01.04.2023 and the plain reading of the notes on clauses as well as the memorandum to Finance Act, 2023 leave no room whatsoever to interpret it otherwise. Moreover, we are not inclined to accept the argument of the Department since the AO could not have foreseen such an amendment while passing the order u/s.148A(d) of the Act / issuing the notice u/s.148 of the Act nor the PCIT, Madurai – 1 could have foreseen such amendment while according sanction in terms of Section 151 of the Act. 53. Hence for the reasons discussed above, we hold that the amendment to Section 151 of the Act, introduced by Finance Act, 2023, with effect from 01.04.2023 cannot be reckoned to have retrospective applicability and on this ground we reject the argument put forth by the ld.DR. 54. It was further argued by the ld.DR, that the approval granted by the competent authority, i.e. PCIT, Madurai – 1 to the AO for issuing the notice u/s.148A(b) of the Act vide approval dated 23.03.2022 as mandated by 1st proviso to Section 148 of the Act would suffice the requirement as per the Section 151 of the Act and as such there was no requirement for the AO to obtain approval / sanction once again by the competent authority for issuing the notice u/s.148 of the Act / passing of the order u/s.148A(d) of the Act. 55. We find that the 1st proviso to Section 148 of the Act as per Finance Act, 2021 reads as follows: “Provided that no notice under this section shall be issued unless there is information with the Assessing Officer which suggests that the income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment in the case of the assessee for the relevant assessment year and the Assessing Officer has obtained prior approval of the specified authority to issue such notice.” Thus, on the facts of the present case, the Show Cause Notice u/s.148A(b) of the Act was issued upon the assessee herein only upon prior approval of the competent authority, PCIT, Madurai – 1. But whether this sanction would also be available / extended to the issuance of notice u/s.148 of the Act / passing of the order u/s.148A(d) of the Act by the AO by reckoning it was a fit case for issuance of such notice u/s.148 of the Act ? 56. We are unable to further accept this argument of the ld.DR, because if it were to be accepted, it would result in a scenario wherein the competent authority was according sanction / approval in terms of Section 151 of the Act for issuing notice u/s.148 of the Act even prior to reply of the assessee to the Show Cause Notice u/s.148A(b) of the Act and even prior the decision of the AO in reckoning whether it was a fit case or not for issuing notice u/s.148 of the Act. 57. Furthermore, if the said argument were to be accepted, then the very purpose behind introduction of provisions in Section 148A of the Act by way of Finance Act, 2021 to grant an opportunity to the tax payer to
ITA No.2125/Chny/2025 (AY 2018-19) Rathinam Viswanathan :: 21 :: demonstrate his case for dropping the proceedings before issuing notice u/s.148 of the Act would stand defeated. 58. Thus, on the facts of the present case, we find that although the sanction was granted to the AO for issuing the Show Cause Notice u/s.148A(b) of the Act, a separate sanction is to be granted for the purpose of issuance notice u/s.148 of the Act as well as the passing of the order u/s.148A(d) of the Act, in the event of the AO finding it fit to do so. Hence, we reject this argument of the ld.DR also. 59. We further find that the Hon’ble Madras High Court in the case of Core Logistic Company v. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, reported in 175 taxmann.com 453, had proceeded to quash the reassessment order passed in terms of Section 147 of the Act on account of grant of sanction by the improper authority. The Hon’ble Madras High Court while quashing the said re-assessment order had held as follows: “9. A perusal of Section 151(i) would show that, the specified authority for the purpose of issuing notice under Section 148 within a period of three years from the end of the relevant assessment year is, the Principal Commissioner or Principal Director or Commissioner or Director. Further, in terms of provision of Section 149, three year time period is fixed for issuance of 148 notice, in the event of the amount is below 50 lakhs. In the present case, the amount involved is Rs.3,65,09,748/-, which is more than 50 lakhs. 148 notice was issued on 25.07.2022, which is beyond the period of three years. So admittedly, the approval has to be obtained from the Principal Chief Commissioner or Principal Director General or Chief Commissioner or Director General as defined under Section 151(ii). But, in the present case, the approval was obtained from the Principal Commissioner in terms of Section 151(i) and no approval was obtained before issuance of 148 notice in terms of provision of Section 151(ii), which is mandatory. Therefore, the notice under Section 148 was issued in the present case in violation of provision of Section 151(ii) of the Income Tax Act. In view thereof, the initiation of proceedings itself is without any jurisdiction. Hence, the same is liable to be quashed.” 60. Thus, respectfully following the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Core Logistic Company (supra) we hold that the sanction accorded by the authorities prescribed u/s.151(i) of the Act on the facts of the case, i.e. PCIT, Madurai – 1 for the notice issued u/s.148 of the Act dated 19.04.2022 and the order u/s.148A(d) of the Act after the expiry of 3 years from the end of the relevant assessment year as against the correct sanction to have been granted by the authorities prescribed u/s.151(ii) of the Act would vitiate the entire re-assessment proceedings initiated and completed in terms of Section 147 of the Act. The PCIT by assuming revisionary jurisdiction in terms of Section 263 of the Act could not have set aside a non-est re-assessment order and further could not have directed the AO to pass a fresh assessment order.”
ITA No.2125/Chny/2025 (AY 2018-19) Rathinam Viswanathan :: 22 :: 20. In the light of the discussion of this Tribunal (supra), we find that separate sanction prior-approval is sine-qua-non before issue of notice u/s.148 of the Act from the specified authority u/s.151 of the Act. It is clarified that even if the AO sought prior-approval of the specified Authority before issuance of notice u/s.148A(b) of the Act, if the time-limit elapses as given in Section 151 of the Act, then it is incumbent upon the AO to obtain the prior-approval from the specified authority as specified u/s.151 of the Act before issuance of notice u/s.148A(d) or 148 of the Act. In this regard, we rely on the decision of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the case of M/s. Vodafone Idea Limited Vs DCIT (WP No. 2768 of 2022 dated 06.02.2024) wherein it was held that even in cases where the notice u/s. 148A(b) was issued before completion of 3 years, if the notice u/s. 148 is issued beyond three (3) years the approval needs to be obtained from PCCIT as per Section 151(ii) of the Act.
In assessee's case though the notice under section 148A(b) was issued on 25.03.2022, the notice u/s.148 is issued on 20.04.2022. On perusal of the notice u/s. 148 we notice that the prior-approval has been obtained from PCIT Madurai-1. The relevant extract of the notice u/s. 148 is as under:
ITA No.2125/Chny/2025 (AY 2018-19) Rathinam Viswanathan :: 23 ::
From a perusal of notice issued u/s.148 of the Act, it is clear that the AO obtained prior-approval for PCIT, Madurai, which is not in consonance with the mandate given in Section 151(ii) of the Act. In this case, since the notice has been issued by the AO u/s.148 beyond three (3) years on 20.04.2022 with the approval of the PCIT instead of the PCCIT as per the provisions of section 151(ii) it is held to be illegal/invalid. Consequently,
ITA No.2125/Chny/2025 (AY 2018-19) Rathinam Viswanathan :: 24 :: the assessment completed on 27.03.2024 based on the invalid notice is held to be non-est in the eyes of law, so it is a nullity.
Having held that the re-assessment order dated 27.03.2024 in the assessee case for AY 2018-19 as void in the eyes of law, the impugned action of the NFAC to initiate & levy penalty u/s.271E of the Act by order dated 18.09.2024 is also null in the eyes of law, because the action of the AO to initiate penalty u/s.271E of the Act, is pursuant to the findings recorded by the AO in the assessment order dated 27.03.2024, which forms the foundation for initiating penalty u/s.271E in the hands of the assessee [refer, Hon’ble Apex Court order in CIT vs Jai Laxmi Rice Mills [379 ITR 521(SC)]. Hence, according to Ld AR, since assessment order dated 27.03.2024 is nullity, subsequent action of levying penalty any way can’t survive. We find considerable force in it and hold that since assessment order is non-est in eyes of law, subsequent action of levying penalty is also non est. For such a proposition, we rely on the legal maxim “sublato Fundmento Credit opus” meaning in case a foundation is removed, the super-structure falls. In Badarinath v. Tamil Nadu AIR 2000 SC 3243, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that once the basis of proceedings is gone, all consequential orders & acts would fall on the ground automatically which is applicable to judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. Therefore, it is held that the impugned order of NFAC passed
ITA No.2125/Chny/2025 (AY 2018-19) Rathinam Viswanathan :: 25 :: u/s.271E dated 18.09.2024 is also null/non-est in the eyes of law. Therefore, we quash the impugned order of penalty u/s.271E of the Act.
In the result, appeal filed by the assessee is allowed.
Order pronounced on the 05th day of June, 2026, in Chennai.
Sd/- Sd/- (प�ावती .एस) (एबी टी. वक�) (PADMAVATHY. S) (ABY T. VARKEY) लेखा सद�य/ACCOUNTANT MEMBER �या�यक सद�य/JUDICIAL MEMBER चे�नई/Chennai, �दनांक/Dated: 05th June, 2026. YS आदेश क� ��त�ल�प अ�े�षत/Copy to: 1. अपीलाथ�/Appellant 2. ��थ�/Respondent 3. आयकरआयु�/CIT, Chennai / Madurai / Salem / Coimbatore. 4. िवभागीय�ितिनिध/DR 5. गाड�फाईल/GF
Digitally signed YASHVI by YASHVIR SINGH R SINGH Date: 2026.06.20 16:57:09 +05'30'
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