KETAN VINOD SHAH,MUMBAI vs. INCOME TAX WARD 19(2)(4) MUMBAI, PIRAMAL CHAMBERS

आदेश / ORDER

PER SANDEEP GOSAIN, JUDICIAL MEMBER: These appeals are filed by the Assessee against the order of Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax Appeals dated 11-Nov-2025 for the Assessment Year 2018-19.

The Assessee has raised the following grounds of appeal:

a. Without appreciating the fact that the Appellant delay in filing in appeal was neither deliberate nor due to negligence or mala fide intent, and he had acted in good faith under unavoidable and compelling circumstances.

b. Without appreciating the fact that the income chargeable to tax u/s 56(2)(x) of the act without appreciating that the said provisions do not apply in the present case

c. The penalty levied under section 270A is bad in law as the addition under section 56(2xx) is purely notional and based on stamp duty valuation, without any finding of misrepresentation or suppression of facts,

d. The leamed authorthes ered in treating the case as one of "misreporting of income under section 2700(9), whereas at heat it is a case of difference of oproton, not warranting penalty.

e The Appeal for the additions ngainst the order was also passed on the same day and all penalty orders were also pussed on the same day.

In this regard the reason for delay had been provided by the appellant, which is reproduced as below:

"Please find attached herewith the condonation of delay application along with affidavit duly affirmed by the appellant providing a detailed explanation of the circumstances and bona fide reasons which led to the delay in filing the appeal within the prescribed time limit The said affidavit has also been uploaded under Serial Number 11 of Form 35 alongwith Statement of facts and grounds of appeal due to a technical issue on the portal the application and affidavit is not reflecting or is being automatically removed from the system despite being uploaded. It is therefore requested that the application and affidavit may kindly be taken on record".

The contention of the appellant has been perused. The reason furnished by the appellant are general in nature and are not supported by any documentary evidences regarding the alleged medical issues. Further, no document has been submitted during the course of appeal proceedings in support of the grounds of appeal or the statement of facts filed by the appellant. Hence, the appellant has failed to substantiate the genuineness of the reason for delay in filing the appeal. Therefore, the contention of the appellant is not acceptable. The appellant has failed to furnish a valid reason for not filling the appeal within prescribed time. When an appeal is filed beyond the statutory time limit, the Appellant need to provide a valid reason or demonstrate exceptional circumstances for the delay. The appellant must be able to demonstrate that there was "sufficient cause" which obstructed his action to file Appeal beyond the prescribed time limit. Thus, the condonation of delay is not automatic but is based upon on the facts of the case.

The sufficient cause within the contemplation of the limitation provision must be a cause which is beyond the control of the party invoking the aid of the provisions

The appellant ought to have filed the appeal within the prescribed time limit of 30 days from date of service as per section 249(2) of the Act and any delay therein may be condoned only subject to the satisfaction that the appellant had sufficient cause for not presenting it within that period, as evident from the plain language of section 249 extracted as under:

"249(2) the appeal shall be presented within thirty days of the following date, that is to say,-

(a) Where the appeal is under section 248, the date of payment of the tax, or

(b) Where the appeal relates to any assessment or penalty, the date of service of the notice of demand relating to the assessment or penalty:

Provided that, where an application has been made under section 146 for reopening an assessment, the period from the date on which the application is made to the date on which the order passed on the application is served on the assessee shall be excluded: Provided further that where an application has been made under sub- section (1) of section 270AA, the period beginning from the date on which the application is made, to the date on which the order rejecting the application is served on the assessee, shall be excluded, or

(1) In any other case, the date on which intimation of the order sought to be appealed against is served.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2), where an order has been made under section 201 on or after the 1st day of October, 1998 but before the 1st day of June, 2000 and the assessee in default has not presented any appeal within the time specified in that sub-section, he may present such appeal before the 1st day of July, 2000.

(3) The Commissioner (Appeals) may admit an appeal after the expiration of the said period if he is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not presenting it within that period."

It is pertinent to note that the delay may be condoned and the appeal may be admitted u/s249(3) only if the appellant could successfully demonstrate that it had sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal within the period of 30 days. The exercise of discretion in condonation of delay in matters of limitation, such as in the present case u/s 249(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 has to be carried out within the meaning of "Sufficient Cause" as envisaged in Section 5 of Limitation Act. Hence, the general rule of law of limitation is that an extension shall not be granted under Section 5 if there is no sufficient cause or cogent ground for the condonation of delay, the onus of proving which lies on the appellant/applicant as clearly laid down in the judicial pronouncements by the Highest Courts of Law.

In the case of PerumonBhagvathy Devaswom, Perinadu Village v. BhargaviAmma (Dead) by LRs, (2008)8 SCC 321, It was observed by the Hon'ble Court that:

"13.... The words "sufficient cause for not making the application within the period of limitation" should be understood and applied in a reasonable, pragmatic, practical and liberal manner, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, and the type of case. The words "sufficient cause" in Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, when the delay is not on account of any dilatory tactics, want of bona fides, deliberate inaction or negligence on the part of the appellant." (Emphasis supplied)".

The aforesaid view was reiterated in the case of Balwant Singh (Dead) v. Jagdish Singh, (2010) 8 SCC 685, where in the Court held that:

"25. We may state that even if the term "sufficient cause" has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of "reasonableness" as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly."

The Courts in the abovementioned cases, highlighted upon the importance introducing the concept of "reasonableness" while giving the clause "sufficient cause" a liberal interpretation. In furtherance of the same, the Courts has cautioned regarding the necessity of distinguishing cases where delay is of few days, as against the cases where the delay is inordinate as it might accrue to the prejudice of the rights of the other party. In such cases, where there exists inordinate delay and the same is attributable to the party's inaction and negligence, the Courts have to take a strict approach so as to protect the substantial rights of the parties.

Apart from the above there are various judgments laying down such position of rejection, which are brought out in following paragraphs.

The delay should not be condoned simply because the appellant's case is hard and calls for sympathy or merely out of benevolence to the party seeking relief. In granting the indulgence and condoning the delay it must be proved beyond the shadow of doubt that the appellant was diligent and was not guilty of negligence whatsoever. The sufficient cause within the contemplation of the limitation provision must be a cause which is beyond the control of the party invoking the aid of the provisions. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramlal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 361 has held that the cause for the delay in filing the appeal which by due care and attention could have been avoided cannot be a sufficient cause within the meaning of the limitation provision. Where no negligence, nor inaction, or want of bona fides can be imputed to the appellant a liberal construction of the provisions has to be made in order to advance substantial justice. Seekers of justice must come with clean hands. [JCIT Vs Tractors & Farm Equipment Ltd. (ITAT, Chennai) 104 ITD 149 followed].

Thus, there exists no sufficient and good reason for the delay of 319 Days. Such delay cannot be condoned as condonation in the present case would not be in accordance with the exposition emanating out of the Hon'ble apex Court and Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court decisions. It will rather be grave prejudice to the Department I therefore decline to condone the delay of 319 Days, and dismiss this appeal of the appellant as barred by limitation.

In view of the above discussion appeal is rendered as inadmissible. Hence stand dismissed.

ITA 249/MUM/2026 and ITA 250/MUM/2026 (AY: 2018- 19

Sd/- Sd/- BIJAYANANDA PRUSETH SANDEEP GOSAIN ACCOUNTANT MEMBER JUDICIAL MEMBER Mumbai Dated: 30.04.2026 RY, Sr. P.S.

Copy to:

KETAN VINOD SHAH, 8 LNHNO BLDG NO.1 7 K M MUNSHI 1 MARG CHOWPATTY, MUMBAI-400007, MAHARASHTRA INCOME TAX WARD 19(2)(4), 2 PIRAMAL CHAMBERS PAREL MUMBAI, MUMBAI-400012, MAHARASHTRA 3 THE PCIT / CIT, 4 THE D.R., ITAT, MUMBAI BENCH 5 GUARD FILE