RAJESH RAMCHANDRA DAKE ,PANVEL vs. CENTRAL CIRCLE - 1, THANE , THANE

आदेश / ORDER

PER SANDEEP GOSAIN, JM:

The present appeals have been filed by the assessee challenging the different impugned order dated 06.08.2025, 05.04.2024 and 05.04.2024 passed u/s 250 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’), by the Office of The Commissioner Of Income Tax, Appeal [ CIT (A)], Pune- 11 for the Assessment Years 2016-17, 2013-14 and 2013-14. 1.1 Since all the issues involved in these appeals are common and identical and belongs to the same assesse, therefore, they have been clubbed, heard together and consolidated order is being passed for the sake of convenience and brevity. Firstly, we shall take ITA No. 4956/Mum/2025, A.Y 2013-14 as lead case and facts narrated therein. 2. At the very outset we noticed that there is a delay of approximately 402 days in filing of present appeal and in this regard assessee has filed an affidavit thereby explaining the delay and the same is reproduced herein below:

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2.1 On the other hand, ld. DR submitted that there is no sufficient cause for condoning the delay therefore the appeal be dismissed.

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In the case of State of Gujarat v. Sayed Mohd. Baquir El Edross [AIR 1981 SC 1921], the Supreme Court laid down the following principles that should govern the exercise of powers of condonation under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963:

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3.1 It was also held in an earlier decision in the case of Ramlal Motilal v. Rewa Coalfields [AIR 1962 SC 361], that 'every day's delay must be explained' The appellant is also required to demonstrate that the 'cause' for the delay must have arisen before the expiry of the limitation period, and, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Ajit Singh Thakur Singh v State of Gujarat (MR 1981 SC 733], "no event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation period can constitute sufficient cause"

3.2 At the same time, the Hon. Apex Court has, in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition Mst. Katiji [1987] 66 STC 228 (SC), advised for a balanced and pragmatic approach:

i. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. ii. Refusing to condone the delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. iii. 'Every day's delay must be explained does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. iv. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice

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deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non- deliberate delay.

v. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.

vi. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so." (p. 229)

3.3 The onus of proving which lies on the assessee/applicant as clearly laid down in the judicial pronouncements by the Highest Courts of law. In the case of Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom, perinadu village v. hargavi Amma (Dead) by LRs. (2008) 8 SCC 321, the Hon'ble Court observed thus:

"13...the words "sufficient cause for not making the application within the period of limitation should be understood and applied in a reasonable, pragmatic, practical and liberal manner, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, and the type of case. The words "sufficient cause" in Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, when the delay is not on account of any dilatory tactics, want of bona fides, deliberate inaction or negligence on the part of the appellant."

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3.4 Thus in this way, when an appeal is filed beyond the statutory time limit, the assessee needs to provide a valid reason or demonstrate exceptional circumstances for the delay. It is the duty of the assessee to file the appeal within the stipulated time provided under the Act unless the assessee is prevented by a reasonable cause from filing of the appeal in time. 3.5 Moreover, it needs to be kept in view that the language used in section 249(3) is "sufficient cause" and not reasonable cause. 'Sufficient cause' is much more stringent that the term 'reasonable cause and even if a cause is reasonable, it has to be ascertained whether it was a sufficient cause or not. 3.6 Hon’ble Courts have cautioned regarding the necessity of distinguishing cases where delay is of few days, as against the cases where the delay is inordinate as it might accrue to the prejudice of the rights of the other party. In such cases, where there exists inordinate delay and the same is attributable to the party's inaction and negligence, the Courts have to take a strict approach. The expression 'sufficient cause' has relevancy to reasonableness and actions, which can be condoned by the Court and it should fall within realm of normal human conduct or normal conduct of a litigant; pre-occupation of an officer or officials can be a reasonable excuse, but for a short period and nothing justifies

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inaction for a pretty long period running into months, as has been held in Omate Traders (P.) Ltd. v. ITO [2008] [2009] 312 ITR 193 (Bom.). 3.7 The laws of limitation are found upon the maxims "Interest Reipublicae Ut Sit Finis Litium" that litigation must come to an end in the interest of society as a whole and "vigilantibus non dormientibus Jura subveniunt that the law assists those that are vigilant with their rights, and not those that sleep thereupon. The law of limitation in India identifies the need for limiting litigation by striking a balance between the interests of the state and the litigant. 4. Therefore, the delay should not be condoned simply because the assessee's case is hard and calls for sympathy or merely out of benevolence to the party seeking relief. In granting the indulgence and condoning the delay it must be proved beyond the shadow of doubt that the assessee was diligent and was not guilty of negligence whatsoever. Sufficient cause within the contemplation of the limitation provision must be a cause which is beyond the control of the party invoking the aid of the provisions. In this regard the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramlal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 361 has held that the cause for the delay in filing the appeal which by due care and attention could have been avoided cannot be a sufficient cause within the meaning of the limitation provision.

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explanation as noted above, depicts the casual approach unmindful of the law of limitation despite being aware of the position of law. That apart when there is such a long delay and there is no proper explanation, laches would also come into play while noticing as to the manner in which a party has proceeded before filing an appeal. In the matter of condonation of delay and laches, the well accepted position is also that the accrued right of the opposite party cannot be lightly dealt with. It was, therefore, held that the appeal had been filed beyond the prescribed time limit of section 249(2) of the Act, hence the delay could not be condoned. 8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of R.B. Ramlingam Petitioner vs R.B. Bhavaneshwari vide order dated 13.1.2009 (2009) (SC2) GJX 106 (SC), held as under

"Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not lay down any standard or objective test. The test of "sufficient cause" is purely an individualistic test. It is not an objective test. Therefore, no two cases can be treated alike. The statute of Limitation has left the concept of "sufficient cause" delightfully undefined, thereby leaving to the Court a well- intentioned discretion to decide the individual cases whether circumstances exist establishing sufficient cause. There are no categories of sufficient cause. The categories of sufficient cause are never exhausted. Each case spells out a unique experience to be dealt with by the Court as such."

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delay was caused notwithstanding his due diligence; and if he appears to be guilty of lapses or negligence, then he must be prepared to have his remedy barred without expecting condonation. 10. Causes which show negligence, callousness, inaction, want of bona fide, irresponsibility, dilatory tactics, recklessness or ruse, oversight or inexcusable indifference, or waiting for favourable judgments cannot treated as sufficient for condoning delays. 11. In light of the above, it is found that there is no merit in the reasons mentioned in affidavit filed for condonation of delay. The assessee has not been able to demonstrate that sufficient cause existed for non-filing the appeal within due time. Delay of 402 days is unjustified for a person who is vigilant about his affairs. The assessee has neglected/omitted to assert his rights of appeal in a timely manner Hence the request for condonation of delay is rejected. 12. Therefore, the present appeal is not maintainable on this issue alone. In view of the above discussion appeal is rendered inadmissible. Before parting, it is deemed necessary to mention that it is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute

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so prescribes. A court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law" stands attracted in such a situation. 13. In the result present is dismissed in limine. ITA No. 4954/Mum/2025 (Assessment Year: 2016-17) and ITA No. 4955/Mum/2025 (Assessment Year: 2013-14) 14. As the facts and circumstances in these appeal are identical to ITA No 4956/Mum/2025 for the A.Y 2013-14 (except variance in days of delay) therefore, the decision rendered in above paragraphs would apply mutatis mutandis for these appeal also.

Order pronounced in the open court on 30.04.2026

Sd/- Sd/- (BIJAYANANDA PURUSETH) (SANDEEP GOSAIN) JUDICIAL MEMBER ACCOUNTANT MEMBER

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Mumbai, Dated 30/04/2026 RY. Sr. PS.

आदेश की प्रतितिति अग्रेतिि/Copy of the Order forwarded to : अपीलार्थी / The Assessee 1. प्रत्यर्थी / The Respondent. 2. संबंधित आयकर आयुक्त / The CIT(A) 3. 4. आयकर आयुक्त(अपील) / Concerned CIT धिभागीय प्रधतधिधि, आयकर अपीलीय अधिकरण,मुम्बई/ DR, ITAT, Mumbai 5. 6. गार्ड फाईल / Guard file. आदेशानुसार/BY ORDER, सत्याधपत प्रधत //True Copy//

उि/सहायक िंजीकार ( Asst. Registrar) आयकर अिीिीय अतिकरण, मुम्बई / ITAT, Mumbai