BHUPINDER SINGH,RUDRAPUR vs. ITO, WARD-2(1) (4) RUDRAPUR, RUDRAPUR

ITA Nos.313 & 314/DDN/2026 BHUPINDER SINGH IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL DELHI BENCH “DB” NEW DELHI BEFORE SHRI RAJ KUMAR CHAUHAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND SHRI SANJAY AWASTHI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER ITA No.313/DDN/2026 Assessment Year: 2017-18 BHUPINDER SINGH, Vs. INCOME TAX OFFICER, EBRO H 301, Omaxe Rivera, Income Tax Office, Rudrapur, Uttarakhand 263153. Ward 2(1)(4), Rudrapur, PAN No. AVTPS0823P Uttarakhand 263139. Appellant Respondent & ITA No.314/DDN/2026 Assessment Year: BHUPINDER SINGH, Vs. INCOME TAX OFFICER, EBRO H 301, Omaxe Rivera, Income Tax Office, Rudrapur, Uttarakhand 263153. Ward 2(1)(4), Rudrapur, PAN No. AVTPS0823P Uttarakhand 263139. Appellant Respondent Assessee by Shri Rajiv Sahni, CA Revenue by Shri Mohan Lal Joshi, Sr. DR Date of hearing: 23.07.2026 Pronouncement on 05.08.2026 O R D E R PER SANJAY AWASTHI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER: 1. This is a batch of two appeals pertaining to the same assessee. ITA No.313/DDN/2026 pertains to the quantum matter and ITA No.314/DDN/2026 pertains to a penalty u/s 271AAC(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereafter as “the Act”). The quantum matter arises from order dated 17.03.2026 passed by Ld. CIT, NFAC u/s 250 of the Act. ITA

ITA Nos.313 & 314/DDN/2026 BHUPINDER SINGH No. 314 arises from order dated 17.03.2026, passed u/s 250 by NFAC, Delhi.

1.1 Both these appeals are delayed by one day for which the Ld. AR made a statement at the Bar that the assessee was not conversant with the procedure required for filing appeals and hence a short delay of one day may be condoned. Considering the shortness of delay and the averments of the Ld. AR, the delay in filing of both the appeals is hereby condoned and the appeals are admitted for adjudication.

“In reference to the delay in filing the present appeal beyond the prescribed time limit u/s 249(2), I wish to respectfully submit as hereunder: 1. That I am filing the appeal for the captioned year through online portal against order passed u/s 144 by the Ld. AO. 2. The impugned order was passed on 16th November, 2019 and Notice of Demand u/s 156 was also served online.

ITA Nos.313 & 314/DDN/2026 BHUPINDER SINGH 3. The appellant is an agriculturist and the only source of income of the appellant during the year under consideration was from Agriculture Activities, exempt u/s 10(1) of the Act and compensation for compulsory acquisition of agricultural land by NHAI which is also exempt under circular 36/2016. No ROI for AY 2017-18 was filed by the appellant since the other income i.e., from interest etc. was less than the taxable limit. The notices enquiring about the cash deposits in the bank accounts amounting to Rs.7,79,000/- were issued but not received since the notices were sent on a email of the then tax consultant. The appellant is an illiterate farmer and is not conversant with the online proceedings. The appellant also shifted his house from P 80, Dashmesh Nagar, Awas Vikas, Rudrapur to Ebro H, 301, Omaxe Rivera, Rudrapur and therefore no notices were received at the new address. The then tax consultant neither informed about passing of order u/s 144 nor filed any appeal in the matter within the informed about passing of order u/s 144 nor filed any appeal in the matter within the prescribed time and the appellant came to know about the pending proceedings in his case only when the bank accounts were attached. Later penalty order u/s 271AAC(1) and 271F were also passed ex-parte order and penalty orders passed in his case. Now the appellant is filing this appeal along with a request for condonation of delay in filing appeal. The order passed u/s 144 is impugned in the present appeal. Due to these reasons the appellant could not prefer the present appeal within the time allowable u/s 249(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Now the appellant is filing this appeal along with a request for condonation of delay in filing appeal. In view of the above the appellant humbly request for condonation of delay in filing the present appeal against the order u/s 144.” A similar set of reasons have been advanced in the second matter also. Thereafter, the Ld. CIT(A) dismissed both these matters inlimine.

2.1 It is also noticed that the Ld. AOs have also passed ex parte orders in both cases since the assessee did not make any compliance whatsoever to the opportunities given at that stage.

ITA Nos.313 & 314/DDN/2026 BHUPINDER SINGH 3. The Ld. AR prayed that since the facts have not been thrashed out at the lower stages, and also considering that the assessee could not appear before the Ld. AO and further due to ignorance of procedure he filed the appeals before Ld. CIT(A) with considerable delay. It was the submission that the assessee deserves another chance to present the facts before the authorities below in the interest of justice. The Ld. AR also drew our attention to certain written submissions filed before this Bench through which the assessee’s claim of being an agriculturist having agricultural income, was attempted to be demonstrated. However, it was fairly mentioned by the Ld. AR that the documents pertaining to agricultural land holdings etc. were never presented before the Ld. AO. The Ld. AR prayed for remitting this matter back to the file of Ld. AO for fresh assessment.

3.1 The Ld. DR relied on the orders of the authorities below and stated that the new documents and evidences filed in the shape of land holding papers cannot be examined at this stage but rather be examined by lower authorities.

ITA Nos.313 & 314/DDN/2026 BHUPINDER SINGH manner. The parties are expected to approach the Court in adherence to this general principle. Thus, filing an appeal is the rule and condoning the delay is the exception, wherein the Courts have to exercise their discretionary power judiciously and by recording reasons. Excessive delay, as in this case, cannot be simply missed away by casually mentioning that the assessee was ignorant of law. Once there is a delay, the person who is filing the condonation petition is expected to furnish the reason which must be acceptable to this Bench. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji 1987 taxmann.com 1072/28 ELT 185, has observed that it is for the assessee to explain each and every day of delay in filing of appeal. At this juncture, it is necessary to delve into the genesis of limitation and how a judicial forum needs to deal with matters pertaining to condonation of delay. Almost all the tax laws, whether they relate to direct taxes or indirect taxes, contain provisions for condonation of delay in filing appeals, if the appellant (whether it is the taxpayer or the revenue) proves to the satisfaction of the appellate authority that he had sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within time. The genesis for such provisions can be traced to section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which reads as follows:

"Extension of prescribed period in certain cases. - Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the Court that he has sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.

ITA Nos.313 & 314/DDN/2026 BHUPINDER SINGH Explanation: The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section." The two essential ingredients for condoning delays are: (i) the existence of 'sufficient cause, and (ii) the satisfaction of the competent authority that such sufficient cause was proved as existing. Thus, the first issue about the existence of sufficient cause covers the factual matrix in respect of which the onus to prove is squarely on the litigant, while the second issue about 'satisfaction' covers the discretionary area in which the competent authority, this Bench, is expected to act. It is by now well settled that the expression 'sufficient cause' has to be understood to mean a cause beyond the control of the appellant or one which the appellant, even with the exercise of due care and attention, could not avoid. The expression is required to be interpreted liberally so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the appellant. Further, it is a general principle of law that whenever a Court is vested with a discretionary power, such a discretion must be exercised not in an arbitrary, vague or fanciful manner but on judicial principles. The fundamental principle, which has been universally recognized as the true rule of guidance for the exercise of discretion to condone delays is to see whether the party claiming indulgence has been reasonably diligent in prosecuting his appeal. In the case of State of Gujarat v. Sayed Mohd. Baquir E1 Edross AIR 1981 SC

ITA Nos.313 & 314/DDN/2026 BHUPINDER SINGH 1921, the Supreme Court laid down the following principles that should govern the exercise of powers of condonation under section 5:

(i) The party seeking relief has to satisfy the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal, etc., within the prescribed time. (ii) The explanation has to cover the entire period of delay. (iii) A litigant should not be permitted to take away a right which has accrued to his adversary by lapse of time. (iv) The proof of sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court under section 5. After sufficient cause is shown, the Court is to inquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. (v) The discretion conferred on the Court is a judicial discretion and must be exercised to advance substantial justice. (vi) No liberal view should be taken merely because the defaulting party is a Government. (vii) Even if there was a strong case for acceptance of the appeal on merits that could not be a ground for condonation of delay. (viii) When there is remiss on the part of the advocate, the question that comes up for consideration is whether the mistake was bona fide or was merely a device to cover the ulterior purpose such as latches on the part of the litigant or an attempt to save limitation in an underhand way. It was also held in an earlier decision in the case of Ramlal Motilal v. Rewa Coalfields AIR 1962 SC 361, that 'every day's delay must be explained'. Another important requirement is that the 'cause' for the delay must have arisen before the expiry of the limitation period, and, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Ajit Singh Thakur Singh v. State of Gujarat AIR 1981 SC 733, "no event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation period can constitute sufficient cause.

ITA Nos.313 & 314/DDN/2026 BHUPINDER SINGH Considering the detailed discussion above, it is our considered opinion that the appellant has been able to demonstrate reasonable cause to allow condonation of delay in the matter.

Order pronounced in the open court on 05.08.2026

Sd/- Sd/- (RAJ KUMAR CHAUHAN) (SANJAY AWASTHI) JUDICIAL MEMBER ACCOUNTANT MEMBER Dated: 05.08.2026 *Kavita Arora, Sr. P.S. Copy forwarded to: 1. Appellant 2. Respondent 3. CIT 4. CIT(Appeals) 5. DR: ITAT ASSISTANT REGISTRAR ITAT, NEW DELHI