PATHARE-PRABHU CHS,MUMBAI vs. ITO 22(2)(1), MUMBAI

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ITA 9108/MUM/2025Status: DisposedITAT Mumbai20 April 2026AY 2020-217 pages
AI SummaryRemanded

What did the Tribunal hold?

The Tribunal held that the assessee had demonstrated sufficient cause for the delay, citing a bona fide misunderstanding, lack of technical staff, and reliance on external consultants. The delay was condoned, and the matter was restored to the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits.

What were the facts?

The assessee, a co-operative housing society, filed an appeal before the CIT(A) with a delay of 197 days. The CIT(A) dismissed the appeal in limine due to the delay without condoning it. The assessee's claim for deduction under section 80P(2)(d) on interest income from co-operative banks was disallowed by the AO.

What were the issues?

Whether the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) was sufficiently explained to warrant condonation. Whether the interest income earned by the co-operative society from co-operative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d).

Which sections of the Income-tax Act were involved?

Section 80P(2)(d),Section 143(3)

AI-generated summary — verify with the full judgment below

Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, ‘C’ BENCH

For Appellant: Shri Anil Sathe, CA
For Respondent: Shri Virabhadra S. Mahajan
Hearing: 18/03/2026Pronounced: 20/04/2026

आदेश / O R D E R PER AMIT SHUKLA (J.M): This appeal has been preferred by the assessee against the order dated 26.08.2025 passed by the National Faceless Appeal Centre (NFAC), Delhi, arising out of the assessment framed under section 143(3) of the Income Tax Act for the assessment year 2020–21. The grievance of the assessee lies in a narrow yet significant compass, inasmuch as the learned CIT(A) has dismissed the appeal in limine on the ground of

2 ITA No. 9108/Mum/2025 Pathare-Prabhu CHS delay of 197 days without condoning the same, thereby foreclosing adjudication on merits, and secondly, on the merits of the addition itself, being the denial of deduction under section 80P(2)(d) in respect of interest income earned from co-operative banks. The controversy, therefore, essentially pivots on whether the explanation tendered by the assessee constitutes a sufficient cause for condonation of delay, so as to warrant restoration of the matter for adjudication on merits.

2.

The factual matrix, as borne out from the record, reveals that the assessee is a co-operative housing society engaged in the maintenance of common facilities for its members and is not carrying on any business activity in the commercial sense. The return of income was filed declaring a total income of Rs. 3,09,980 after claiming deduction under section 80P. During the course of assessment proceedings, the learned Assessing Officer observed that the assessee had earned interest income from co-operative banks and, taking a restrictive view of the provisions of section 80P(2)(d), held that such income was not eligible for deduction, thereby disallowing the entire claim amounting to Rs. 56,71,060. Aggrieved by the said disallowance, the assessee preferred an appeal before the learned CIT(A), albeit with a delay of 197 days, which came to be dismissed at the threshold without examination of merits.

3 ITA No. 9108/Mum/2025 Pathare-Prabhu CHS

3.

The explanation for the delay, as articulated before the authorities below and reiterated before us, discloses a chain of circumstances which, when viewed holistically, reflects not a case of indifference or inaction, but one of bona fide misunderstanding compounded by structural limitations inherent in the functioning of the assessee-society. It has been submitted that the assessee does not have any full-time accountant or technically qualified staff conversant with the intricacies of tax laws, and all matters relating to taxation are handled through external auditors and consultants. The office bearers of the society, who function in an honorary capacity, are not equipped with the technical acumen required to independently navigate the procedural rigours of tax litigation.

4.

It has further been brought on record that the assessee was under a bona fide impression, founded upon past experience, that the issue relating to deduction under section 80P(2)(d) could be resolved or rectified without resorting to appellate proceedings. This impression stemmed from earlier appellate orders and intimations wherein similar deductions had been allowed, thereby creating a legitimate expectation in the mind of the assessee that the matter did not necessitate immediate appellate recourse. It was only during the course of year-end deliberations with the auditors, when the tax

4 ITA No. 9108/Mum/2025 Pathare-Prabhu CHS litigation status was comprehensively reviewed, that the necessity of filing an appeal against the impugned order was realized. This subsequent clarification from the auditors, coupled with the earlier misunderstanding, culminated in the delay in filing the appeal.

5.

The explanation, therefore, is not one of mere casualness or routine neglect, but is rooted in a bona fide belief and subsequent corrective action taken upon professional advice. It is also of significance that the assessee is not a business entity driven by commercial considerations, but a co-operative housing society engaged solely in maintenance of common amenities, and the denial of condonation would entail a substantial financial burden in the form of tax demand of Rs. 23,17,718, thereby causing undue hardship. The delay, thus, has to be examined in the backdrop of these peculiar facts and the practical realities in which such societies operate.

6.

On the other hand, the learned Departmental Representative has placed reliance upon the order of the learned CIT(A) and contended that the delay being substantial, the assessee ought to have exercised due diligence and the explanation furnished does not meet the threshold of “sufficient cause”.

5 ITA No. 9108/Mum/2025 Pathare-Prabhu CHS 7. We have carefully considered the rival submissions and have perused the material placed before us. At the outset, it is trite law that the expression “sufficient cause” occurring in the context of condonation of delay is to be construed liberally so as to advance the cause of substantial justice. The jurisprudential undercurrent governing such matters is that technicalities of limitation should not be permitted to defeat substantive rights, particularly where the delay is not actuated by mala fides or deliberate inaction. The courts have consistently emphasized that a pragmatic and justice-oriented approach must be adopted, and unless the conduct of the party is tainted with gross negligence or deliberate disregard, the matter should ordinarily be decided on merits.

8.

In the present case, when the explanation furnished by the assessee is appreciated in its entirety, what emerges is a consistent and plausible narrative explaining the delay. The assessee’s belief that the issue could be rectified, the absence of technical staff, the reliance on external consultants, and the eventual realization upon professional advice collectively constitute a chain of events which cannot be said to be either implausible or lacking in bona fides. The delay, though not insignificant in terms of days, stands sufficiently explained in terms of cause, and it would be unjust to attribute any element of deliberate or contumacious conduct to the assessee.

6 ITA No. 9108/Mum/2025 Pathare-Prabhu CHS 9. It is equally important to bear in mind that the learned CIT(A), by dismissing the appeal in limine, has deprived the assessee of an opportunity to have the issue adjudicated on merits, which, in the realm of tax jurisprudence, carries considerable significance, especially where recurring issues like eligibility of deduction under section 80P(2)(d) are involved. Denial of such opportunity, in the face of a plausible explanation, would amount to elevating procedural technicalities above substantive justice, which is neither warranted nor desirable.

10.

In this conspectus of facts and the settled legal position, we are persuaded to hold that the assessee has demonstrated sufficient and reasonable cause for the delay in filing the appeal before the learned CIT(A). Accordingly, the delay of 197 days is condoned. Consequentially, the delay, if any, in filing the present appeal before the Tribunal also stands condoned in the interest of justice.

11.

Since the learned CIT(A) has not adjudicated the grounds on merits and has dismissed the appeal at the threshold, we deem it appropriate to set aside the impugned order and restore the matter to the file of the learned CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. The learned CIT(A) shall examine the issue on merits, including the claim of deduction under section 80P(2)(d) in accordance with law, after affording

7 ITA No. 9108/Mum/2025 Pathare-Prabhu CHS adequate opportunity of being heard to the assessee. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the addition, and all contentions are left open.

12.

In the result, the appeal of the assessee is allowed for statistical purposes.

Order pronounced on 20th April, 2026.

Sd/- Sd/- (ARUN KHODPIA) (AMIT SHUKLA) ACCOUNTANT MEMBER JUDICIAL MEMBER Mumbai; Dated 20/04/2026 KARUNA, sr.ps

Copy of the Order forwarded to : 1. The Appellant 2. The Respondent. 3. CIT 4. DR, ITAT, Mumbai 5. Guard file. //True Copy// BY ORDER,

(Asstt. Registrar) ITAT, Mumbai

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