BHAVATARINI REFRIGERATION,SODEPUR vs. I.T.O., WARD - 23(2),, HOOGHLY

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ITA 2648/KOL/2025Status: DisposedITAT Kolkata14 May 2026AY 2014-201511 pages
AI SummaryDismissed

What did the Tribunal hold?

The Tribunal upheld the disallowance of employees' PF/ESIC contributions, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Checkmate Services (P.) Ltd. It also confirmed the disallowance of excess partner remuneration as the revised partnership deed was not produced before the lower authorities.

What were the facts?

The assessee appealed against an order that upheld additions made by the Assessing Officer (AO) regarding employees' PF/ESIC contributions and excess partner remuneration. The CIT(A) had initially passed a flawed order which was later rectified.

What were the issues?

Whether delayed deposit of employees' PF/ESIC contributions beyond the statutory due dates is allowable as a deduction. Whether excess partner remuneration paid beyond the partnership deed's limits is deductible.

Which sections of the Income-tax Act were involved?

Section 36(1)(va),Section 2(24)(x),Section 40(b),Section 43B

AI-generated summary — verify with the full judgment below

Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, KOLKATA ‘SMC’ BENCH AT KOLKATA

Before: SHRI SONJOY SARMA & SHRI RAKESH MISHRA

PER RAKESH MISHRA, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER:

This appeal filed by the assessee is against the order of the Addl/JCIT(A)-11, Delhi [hereinafter referred to as Ld. ‘Addl/JCIT(A)'] passed u/s 250 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) for AY 2014-15 dated 28.08.2025 which in fact is an order u/s 154 r.w.s. 250 of the Act and the rectification of the order dated 11.12.2023 u/s 250 of the Act has been carried out by the Ld. CIT(A). Along with the appeal memo, the assessee has also included an order u/s 250 of the Act dated 11.12.2023 which has been passed against the order u/s 143(3) of the Act dated 06.12.2016. 2. The assessee is in appeal before the Tribunal raising the following grounds of appeal:

“1. That the Ld Assessing officer has erred in considering the employees' contribution to PF in considering the addition under section 36(1)(va).

2.

That the Ld Assessing officer has erred in adding excess remuneration of Rs.240000 as partners remuneration since the same was paid as per the partnership deed.

3.

For that the assessee craves leave to add, alter or withdraw any ground/s of appeal before or at the time of hearing.”

3.

Brief facts of the case are that the assessee had e-filed the return of income for AY 2014-15 on 25.11.2014 showing total income of ₹2,56,470/- which was selected for scrutiny and statutory notices were issued. The additions were made on account of employees' contribution to PF and ESIC for ₹5,52,932/- and ₹84,129/- respectively and a sum of ₹2.40 Lakh was also disallowed on account of partners’ remuneration as per section 40(b) of the Act and the total income was computed at ₹11,33,530/-. Aggrieved with the assessment order, the assessee filed an appeal before the Ld. Addl/JCIT(A) who initially passed an order dated 11.12.2023 but in the body of the order instead of the facts related to the firm the facts related to a retired employee of Nagpur Municipal Corporation were mentioned in which addition of ₹3,02,000/- made by the CPC was deleted and the grounds of appeal were allowed. Since the facts were erroneous, the Ld. Addl/JCIT(A) accordingly passed a rectification order u/s 154 r.w.s. 250 of the Act and rectified the order u/s 250 of the Act dated 11.12.2023 which was on the basis of the rectification application filed by the assessee. The addition of ₹6,37,061/- on account of ESIC and EPFO and the addition of excess remuneration paid to partners beyond the limits prescribed in the partnership deed at ₹2.40 Lakh was upheld.

4.

Aggrieved with the order of the Ld. Addl/JCIT(A), the assessee has filed the appeal before the Tribunal.

5.

None appeared on behalf of the assessee and the case was heard with the assistance of the Ld. DR.

6.

Ground No. 1 relates to the disallowance of employees' contribution to PF added u/s 36(1)(va) of the Act. The findings of the Ld. CIT(A) in this regard are as under:

“1. Issue of delayed payment of ESIC and EPFO: The AO has disallowed an amount of Rs. 5,52,932/- and Rs 84,129/- on account of no explanation offered by the assessee and payment of the above amount is made after due dates and is not allowable as a deduction as per the provisions of the section 36(1)(va) of the Act and treated it as income of the assessee under the provisions of the 2(24)(x) of the Act. During the appeal proceedings, the appellant through its AR has submitted that the above payments have been made before the due date of filing of the ITR which was 30.11.20214. The A.R. has also relied upon two case laws namely: (i) CIT Vs Sabari Enterprises [2008] 298 ITR 41 (Karnatka), (ii) CIT Udaipur vs M/s Udaipur Dugdh Utpadak Sahakari Sangh Limited, Udaipur [2013] 35 taxmann.com 616 (Rajasthan). The submissions have been perused. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in its judgment dated 12.10.2022 in the case of Checkmate Services (P.) Ltd. v. CIT [2022] 143 taxmann.com 178 (SC) held that: Employees' contribution is deemed income under section 2(24)(x) when received by the employer. Deduction under section 36(1)(va) is available only if such contribution is deposited within the due date prescribed under the relevant Acts. Section 43B, which allows certain deductions on actual payment before the due date of filing the return, applies to employer's contribution, not to employees' contribution. Payments made after the statutory due date under the EPF/ESI Acts are not allowable, even if made before the due date under section 139(1). In the present case, the employees' contribution to EPF/ESI was deposited after the statutory due dates under the respective Acts. The appellant's contention that payment made before the due date of filing the return under section 139(1) suffices is squarely covered against it by the binding decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Checkmate Services (P) Ltd. Accordingly, the Assessing Officer was justified in making the disallowance under section 36(1)(va) of the Act treating the amount (Rs. 5,52,932/- +Rs.

84,129/- Rs. 6,37,061) as income of the assessee under the provisions of section 2(24)(x) of the I.T. Act, 1961. In view of the above discussion and respectfully following the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the disallowance of Rs. 6,37,061/- made by the Assessing Officer is upheld. The grounds raised by the appellant are dismissed.”

7.

This issue is no longer res integra in view of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Checkmate Services (P.) Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income-tax-1 [2022] 143 taxmann.com 178 (SC)/[2023] 290 Taxman 19 (SC)/[2022] 448 ITR 518 (SC)[12-10- 2022] in which it has been held as under: “■ Section 43B falls in Part-V of the IT Act. What is apparent is that the scheme of the Act is such that sections 28 to 38 deal with different kinds of deductions, whereas sections 40 to 43B spell out special provisions, laying out the mechanism for assessments and expressly prescribing conditions for disallowances. In terms of this scheme, section 40 (which too starts with a non obstante clause overriding sections 30-38), deals with what cannot be deducted in computing income under the head "Profits and Gains of Business and Profession". Likewise, section 40A(2) opens with a non obstante clause and spells out what expenses and payments are not deductible in certain circumstances. Section 41 elaborates conditions which apply with respect to certain deductions which are otherwise allowed in respect of loss, expenditure or trading liability etc. If this scheme is considered, sections 40- 43B, are concerned with and enact different conditions, that the tax adjudicator has to enforce, and the assessee has to comply with, to secure a valid deduction. [Para 31] ■ The scheme of the provisions relating to deductions, such as sections 32- 37, on the other hand, deal primarily with business, commercial or professional expenditure, under various heads (including depreciation). Each of these deductions, has its contours, depending upon the expressions used, and the conditions that are to be met. It is therefore necessary to bear in mind that specific enumeration of deductions, dependent upon fulfilment of particular conditions, would qualify as allowable deductions: failure by the assessee to comply with those conditions, would render the claim vulnerable to rejection. In this scheme the deduction made by employers to approved provident fund schemes, is the subject matter of section 36(iv). It is noteworthy, that this provision was part of the original IT Act; it has largely remained unaltered. On the other hand, section 36(1)(va) was ITA No(s). 2648/KOL/2025 Assessment Year(s) 2014-15 specifically inserted by the Finance Act, 1987, with effect from 1-4-1988. Through the same amendment, by section 3(b), section 2(24) - which defines various kinds of "income" - inserted clause (x). This is a significant amendment, because Parliament intended that amounts not earned by the assessee, but received by it, - whether in the form of deductions, or otherwise, as receipts, were to be treated as income. The inclusion of a class of receipt, i.e., amounts received (or deducted from the employees) were to be part of the employer/assessee's income. Since these amounts were not receipts that belonged to the assessee, but were held by it, as trustees, as it were, section 36(1)(va) was inserted specifically to ensure that if these receipts were deposited in the EPF/ESI accounts of the employees concerned, they could be treated as deductions. Section 36(1)(va) was hedged with the condition that the amounts/receipts had to be deposited by the employer, with the EPF/ESI, on or before the due date. The last expression "due date" was dealt with in the explanation as the date by which such amounts had to be credited by the employer, in the concerned enactments such as EPF/ESI Acts. Importantly, such a condition (i.e., depositing the amount on or before the due date) has not been enacted in relation to the employer's contribution (i.e., section 36(1)(iv)). [Para 32] ■ The significance of this is that Parliament treated contributions under section 36(1)(va) differently from those under section 36(1)(iv). The latter (hereinafter, "employers' contribution") is described as "sum paid by the assessee as an employer by way of contribution towards a recognized provident fund". However, the phraseology of section 36(1)(va) differs from section 36(1)(iv), it enacts that "any sum received by the assessee from any of his employees to which the provisions of sub-clause (x) of clause (24) of section 2 apply, if such sum is credited by the assessee to the employee's account in the relevant fund or funds on or before the due date." The essential character of an employees' contribution, i.e., that it is part of the employees' income, held in trust by the employer is underlined by the condition that it has to be deposited on or before the due date. [Para 33] ■ It is therefore, manifest that the definition of contribution in section 2(c) is used in entirely different senses, in the relevant deduction clauses. The differentiation is also evident from the fact that each of these contributions is separately dealt with in different clauses of section 36(1). All these establish that Parliament, while introducing section 36(1)(va) along with section 2(24)(x), was aware of the distinction between the two types of contributions. There was a statutory classification, under the IT Act, between the two. [Para 34] ■ It is evident that the intent of the lawmakers was clear that sums referred to in clause (b) of section 43B, i.e., "sum payable as an employer, by way of ITA No(s). 2648/KOL/2025 Assessment Year(s) 2014-15 contribution" refers to the contribution by the employer. The reference to "due date" in the second proviso to section 43B was to have the same meaning as provided in the explanation to section 36(1)(va). Parliament therefore, through this amendment, sought to provide for identity in treatment of the two kinds of payments: those made as contributions, by the employers, and those amounts credited by the employers, into the provident fund account of employees, received from the latter, as their contribution. Both these contributions had to necessarily be made on or before the due date. [Para 37] ■ When Parliament introduced section 43B, what was on the statute book, was only employer's contribution (Section 34(1)(iv)). At that point in time, there was no question of employee's contribution being considered as part of the employer's earning. On the application of the original principles of law it could have been treated only as receipts not amounting to income. When Parliament introduced the amendments in 1988-89, inserting section 36(1)(va) and simultaneously inserting the second proviso of section 43B, its intention was not to treat the disparate nature of the amounts, similarly. The memorandum introducing the Finance Bill clearly stated that the provisions - especially second proviso to section 43B - was introduced to ensure timely payments were made by the employer to the concerned fund (EPF, ESI, etc.) and avoid the mischief of employers retaining amounts for long periods. That Parliament intended to retain the separate character of these two amounts, is evident from the use of different language. Section 2(24)(x) too, deems amount received from the employees (whether the amount is received from the employee or by way of deduction authorized by the statute) as income - it is the character of the amount that is important, i.e., not income earned. Thus, amounts retained by the employer from out of the employee's income by way of deduction etc. were treated as income in the hands of the employer. The significance of this provision is that on the one hand it brought into the fold of "income" amounts that were receipts or deductions from employees income; at the time, payment within the prescribed time - by way of contribution of the employees' share to their credit with the relevant fund is to be treated as deduction (Section 36(1)(va)). The other important feature is that this distinction between the employers' contribution (Section 36(1)(iv)) and employees' contribution required to be deposited by the employer (Section 36(1)(va)) was maintained - and continues to be maintained. On the other hand, section 43B covers all deductions that are permissible as expenditures, or out-goings forming part of the assessees' liability. These include liabilities such as tax liability, cess duties etc. or interest liability having regard to the terms of the contract. Thus, timely payment of these alone entitle an assessee to the benefit of deduction from the total income. The essential objective of section 43B is to ITA No(s). 2648/KOL/2025 Assessment Year(s) 2014-15 ensure that if assessees are following the mercantile method of accounting, nevertheless, the deduction of such liabilities, based only on book entries, would not be given. To pass muster, actual payments were a necessary pre- condition for allowing the expenditure. [Para 52] ■ The distinction between an employer's contribution which is its primary liability under law - in terms of section 36(1)(iv), and its liability to deposit amounts received by it or deducted by it (Section 36(1)(va)) is, thus crucial. The former forms part of the employers' income, and the later retains its character as an income (albeit deemed), by virtue of section 2(24)(x) - unless the conditions spelt by Explanation to section 36(1)(va) are satisfied i.e., depositing such amount received or deducted from the employee on or before the due date. In other words, there is a marked distinction between the nature and character of the two amounts - the employer's liability is to be paid out of its income whereas the second is deemed an income, by definition, since it is the deduction from the employees' income and held in trust by the employer. This marked distinction has to be borne while interpreting the obligation of every assessee under section 43B. [Para 53] ■ The reasoning in the impugned judgment that the non obstante clause would not in any manner dilute or override the employer's obligation to deposit the amounts retained by it or deducted by it from the employee's income, unless the condition that it is deposited on or before the due date, is correct and justified. The non obstante clause has to be understood in the context of the entire provision of section 43B which is to ensure timely payment before the returns are filed, of certain liabilities which are to be borne by the assessee in the form of tax, interest payment and other statutory liability. In the case of these liabilities, what constitutes the due date is defined by the statute. Nevertheless, the assessees are given some leeway in that as long as deposits are made beyond the due date, but before the date of filing the return, the deduction is allowed. That, however, cannot apply in the case of amounts which are held in trust, as it is in the case of employees' contributions- which are deducted from their income. They are not part of the assessee employer's income, nor are they heads of deduction per se in the form of statutory pay out. They are others' income, monies, only deemed to be income, with the object of ensuring that they are paid within the due date specified in the particular law. They have to be deposited in terms of such welfare enactments. It is upon deposit, in terms of those enactments and on or before the due dates mandated by such concerned law, that the amount which is otherwise retained, and deemed an income, is treated as a deduction. Thus, it is an essential condition for the deduction that such amounts are deposited on or before the due date. If such interpretation were to be adopted, the non obstante clause under section 43B or anything contained in that provision would not absolve the assessee from its liability to deposit the employee's contribution on or before the due date as a condition for deduction. [Para 54]”

8.

The Ld. AR in the course of hearing dated 26.03.2026 had not pressed this ground, so Ground No. 1 is dismissed as ‘not pressed’ and in view of the decision in Checkmate Services (P.) Ltd. (supra) also, Ground No. 1 of the appeal is dismissed.

9.

Ground No. 2 is relating to the excess remuneration to the partner amounting to ₹2.40 Lakh disallowed. The Ld. AO noted on going through the partnership deed dated 13.02.2007 at clause (vi) that each of the partners were eligible for a remuneration of ₹5,000/- per month and as per the modified partnership deed dated 13.02.2009 submitted by the assessee, it was further observed that only two partners namely Mrs. Jayanti Bhattacharjee and Mr. Swarnendu Bhattacharjee were eligible for getting remuneration of ₹10,000/- per month but the assessee had paid remuneration to the other two partners at ₹1.80 Lakh mentioned as each per month in the assessment order but apparently for the whole year to each of the partners. Therefore, the excess remuneration of ₹2.40 Lakh was proposed to be disallowed and the assessee was required to show cause as to why the same should not be disallowed. Since no satisfactory explanation could be furnished therefore, the disallowance of ₹2.40 Lakh was made and added to the income. The Ld. CIT(A) confirmed the addition by his findings as under:

“2. Issue of Excess Remuneration Paid to Partners Beyond Limits Prescribed in Partnership Deed: The Assessing Officer has made an addition of Rs. 2,40,000/- on account of excess remuneration paid to the partners, which was found to exceed the limits stipulated in the partnership deed. The Appellant contends that the remuneration paid to the partners was within the ceiling prescribed under Section 40(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and therefore, the disallowance is unwarranted.

Upon careful examination of the records and the terms of the partnership deed, it is evident that the remuneration paid to the partners exceeds the amount contractually agreed upon in the deed. While Section 40(b) prescribes the maximum allowable deduction for partner remuneration, it does not override the binding contractual terms of the partnership deed. The provision under Section 40(b) operates as a statutory cap, and any payment in excess of the deed's stipulation, even if within the statutory limit, is not deductible unless authorized by the deed itself. In the present case, the excess payment of Rs. 2,40,000/- made to the partners is not supported by the partnership deed. Accordingly, the disallowance made by the Assessing Officer is found to be in accordance with law and is hereby upheld.”

10.

On 26.03.2026 during the course of that hearing before us, the Ld. AR had argued that the assessee had revised the partnership deed which was notarized but was not filed before any authority. Our attention was drawn to para 3 of the assessment order and it was submitted that the certificate dated 22.05.2013 of the notary was available with the assessee. The assessee was required to file a copy of the partnership deed and also to explain why if the same were available with the assessee, it could not be filed before finalisation of the assessment order dated 06.12.2016 as the revised partnership deed dated 13.02.2009 only was filed. The assessee was required to file the revised partnership deed which was not filed before any authority. On 15.04.2026, instead of filing the partnership deed the assessee wanted further time but as the required power of attorney was not available and the Ld. AR being a Chartered Accountant had filed a Vakalatnama dated 01.01.2026, the adjournment sought was denied and the appeal was heard.

11.

The Ld. DR submitted that the disallowance had been made as per the partnership deed in which only two partners were eligible for the extra remuneration.

12.

We have considered the submissions made, gone through the facts of the case and perused the record and the order of the Ld. Addl/JCIT(A). Since the assessee had filed the revised partnership deed dated 13.02.2009 as per which only two of the partners were eligible for enhanced remuneration and the revised partnership deed prepared subsequently which was allegedly notarized on 22.05.2013 was not filed before the Ld. AO before the assessment order was made on 06.12.2016 nor even before the Ld. CIT(A). Therefore, there is no justified reason to interfere with the findings of the Ld. Addl/JCIT(A) whose decision on this issue is confirmed and Ground No. 2 of the appeal is dismissed.

13.

Ground No. 3 being general in nature does not require any separate adjudication.

14.

In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee is dismissed. Order pronounced in the open Court on 14th May, 2026. [Sonjoy Sarma] [Rakesh Mishra] Judicial Member Accountant Member Dated: 14.05.2026 Bidhan (Sr. P.S.)

Copy of the order forwarded to:

1.

Bhavatarini Refrigeration, 37, Dakshin Pally, Sodepur S.O. Barrackpur-II, Kolkata, West Bengal, 700110. 2. I.T.O., Ward-23(2), Hooghly.

3.

Addl/JCIT(A)-11, Delhi.

4.

CIT-

5.

CIT(DR), Kolkata Benches, Kolkata.

6.

Guard File. //// By order

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