MOHAMMED WAJEED KHURASHI,HYDERABAD vs. ITO., WARD-9(1), HYDERABAD
What did the Tribunal hold?
The Tribunal held that ignorance of law is not a sufficient cause for condoning delay. Citing Supreme Court judgments, the Tribunal emphasized that delay cannot be condoned on equitable grounds without a satisfactory explanation, especially when negligence and lack of diligence are evident.
What were the facts?
The assessee filed an appeal before the ITAT with a delay of 237 days. The assessee sought condonation of delay citing lack of knowledge of IT Act provisions and time taken to find a consultant. The Tribunal noted the assessee's consistent non-compliance throughout the assessment and appellate proceedings.
What were the issues?
Whether the delay in filing the appeal can be condoned based on the reasons provided by the assessee, considering the consistent non-compliance and lack of sufficient cause.
Which sections of the Income-tax Act were involved?
Section 5 of the Limitation Act
AI-generated summary — verify with the full judgment below
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Hyderabad ‘ B ‘ Bench, Hyderabad
Before: Shri Ravish SoodShri Madhusudan Sawdia
आयकर अपील�य अ�धकरण, हैदराबाद पीठ IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL Hyderabad ‘ B ‘ Bench, Hyderabad �ी रिवश सूद,�ाियक सद� एवं �ी मधुसूदन साविड़या लेखा सद� सम� | Before Shri Ravish Sood, Judicial Member A N D Shri Madhusudan Sawdia, Accountant Member आ.अपी.सं /ITA No. 495/Hyd/2025 (िनधा�रण वष�/Assessment Year: 2015-16) Shri Mohammed Wajeed Vs. Income Tax Officer Khurashi, Ward 9(1) Hyderabad Hyderabad PAN:ASKPM0420E (Appellant) (Respondent) िनधा�रती �ारा/Assessee by: NONE राज� व �ारा/Revenue by: Dr. Sachin Kumar, Sr. AR सुनवाई की तारीख/Date of hearing: 04/06/2026 घोषणा की तारीख/Pronouncement: 03/07/2026 आदेश/ORDER Per Madhusudan Sawdia, A.M.:
This appeal is filed by Shri Mohammed Wajeed Khurashi (“the assessee”), feeling aggrieved by the order passed by the Learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), National Faceless Appeal Centre (NFAC), Delhi (“Ld. CIT(A)”) dated 15.05.2024 for the A.Y.2015-16. 2. The assessee has raised the following grounds of appeal: “1. The order passed by the Ld. CIT(A) u/s 250 of the Act dated 15.05.2024 is erroneous both on facts and in law to the extent the order is prejudicial to the interest of the appellant.
The Ld. CIT(A) erred in upholding the order of assessment passed by AO on 31.03.2022 without actually appreciating the facts of the case and submissions made by the assessee which is against the provisions of law and principles of natural justice. 3. The Ld. CIT(A) erred in not considering the fact that the notice u/s 148A proceedings as against income tax act and 148 notice not served to the assessee on time as therefore the assessment order passed u/s 147 of the act is invalid. 4. The Ld. CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal filed by the assessee without considering the facts and circumstances of the case. 5. The Ld. CIT(A) erred in not considering that the notice issued u/s 148 of the Act on 30.03.2021 by the ITO, Ward-9(1) Hyderabad is not valid and is without Jurisdiction as the said ITO has no territorial Jurisdictions. 6. The Ld. CIT(A) erred in not considering the fact that the AO ought to have appreciated the fact that reasons recorded u/s 148(2) of the Act were not in accordance with the provisions of sections 147, 148 and 151 of the Act because the AO has not identified new tangible material to show that income has escaped assessment. 7. The Ld. CIT(A) ought to have appreciated the fact that the AO has reopened the assessment made u/s 147 which is purely based upon borrowed satisfaction without performing any necessary enquiries or inspection which is against the provisions of the IT Act. 8. The Ld. CIT(A) ought to have appreciated the fact that the appellant has reasonable cause for non-compliance to notices issued during the assessment proceedings and that completing the assessment by the AO by applying the provisions of Section 147 of the Act is not correct, which is liable to be quashed. 9. The Ld. CIT(A) ought to have quashed the assessment made u/s 147 of the Act and ought to have appreciated the fact that when the assessment itself is invalid, the additions made in such assessment are also invalid and are liable to be deleted. 10. The Ld. CIT(A) erred in upholding the addition of Rs. 1,18,59,100/- made towards cash deposits, which is purely based on surmises and assumptions. 11. The Ld. CIT(A) ought to have appreciated the fact that the appellant has reasonable cause for non-compliance
and that estimating the cash deposits as income is not correct in law. 12. The Ld. CIT(A) erred in considering the fact that the assessee has made sales with small traders who are not having proper banking facilities. Hence assessee have received the sales proceeds through cash and same has been deposited in bank. 13. The Ld. CIT(A) failed to consider that the assessee has discharged his onus by proving identity, creditworthiness genuineness of the impugned transaction. 14. The Ld. CIT(A) erred in upholding the addition of Rs. 1,18,59,100/- towards cash deposits without appreciating the fact that the said cash deposits are made in the normal course of business. 15. The Ld. CIT(A) erred in upholding the addition of Rs. 6,18,441/- made towards short term capital gain, which is purely based on surmises and assumptions. 16. The Ld. CIT(A) erred in considering the fact that the sale of motor vehicle is not short-term capital gain as per u/s 2(14) of income tax act. Therefore, the addition of the same as short-term capital gain is not correct as per the provisions of the Act. 17. The assessee may add, alter, or modify or substitute any other points to the grounds of appeal at any time before or at the time of hearing of the appeal.”
At the outset, it is pertinent to note that the present appeal was fixed for hearing on several occasions, namely 16.06.2025, 06.08.2025, 22.09.2025, 24.11.2025, 11.12.2025, 22.01.2026, 05.03.2026 and 06.04.2026. On each of the aforesaid dates, adjournments were sought on behalf of the assessee, which were liberally granted by the Tribunal. On the last occasion, the appeal was adjourned to 04.06.2026. However, when the matter was called for hearing on 04.06.2026, none appeared on behalf of the assessee. Further, no application seeking adjournment or explaining the absence was filed. In these circumstances, considering the repeated
adjournments sought by the assessee and the absence of any representation on the date fixed for hearing, we proceed to dispose of the appeal ex parte qua the assessee after hearing the submissions of the Learned Departmental Representative (“Ld. DR”) and on the basis of the material available on record. 4. At the outset, the Ld. DR submitted that there is a delay of 237 days in filing the present appeal before the Tribunal. It was submitted that the assessee has filed an affidavit seeking condonation of delay. Referring to the said affidavit, the Ld. DR further submitted that the assessee himself has admitted that there was a delay of 251 days in filing the appeal. The only explanation furnished by the assessee for the delay is that he lacked knowledge of the provisions of the Income-tax Act and that some time was consumed in approaching a consultant who could represent him before the Tribunal. The Ld. DR also submitted that the reasons assigned by the assessee are vague and wholly insufficient to constitute “sufficient cause” for condonation of such an inordinate delay. It was also submitted that the assessee was a non-filer and did not respond to the notices issued by the Ld. AO during the assessment proceedings. It was further submitted that the assessee remained non-compliant even during the appellate proceedings before the Ld. CIT(A). The Ld. DR pointed out that there was a delay of 257 days in filing the appeal before the Ld. CIT(A), which was condoned by the Ld. CIT(A). Despite such condonation, the assessee failed to respond to the notices issued during the appellate proceedings. Accordingly, it was submitted that there was a continuous failure on the part of the assessee to participate in the income-tax proceedings commencing from the assessment stage and continuing
through the appellate stage. Therefore, the Ld. DR prayed that the delay in filing the present appeal before the Tribunal should not be condoned and the appeal should be dismissed as barred by limitation. 5. We have considered the submissions of the Ld. DR and perused the affidavit filed by the assessee. The copy of the affidavit filed by the assessee is reproduced as under:
On perusal of the above, we find that except making a bald assertion regarding lack of knowledge of the provisions of the Income-tax Act and the time taken in approaching a tax consultant, no specific or convincing reason has been furnished explaining the delay. The assessee has not placed on record any documentary evidence whatsoever in support of the reasons stated in the affidavit. It is well settled that ignorance of law cannot, by itself, constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay. Further, the assessee has failed to explain the delay on a day-to-day basis or even broadly demonstrate that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the prescribed period. We further find that the conduct of the assessee throughout the proceedings has been marked by persistent non-compliance. The assessee did not respond to the notices issued during the assessment proceedings. Thereafter, even though the delay of 257 days in filing the appeal before the Ld. CIT(A) was condoned, the assessee again failed to participate in the appellate proceedings before the Ld. CIT(A). Thus, the record reveals a consistent pattern of negligence and lack of diligence on the part of the assessee in prosecuting the proceedings under the Act. The law of limitation is founded on sound public policy to ensure certainty and finality in litigation. Though substantial justice should ordinarily prevail over technical considerations, the provisions relating to limitation cannot be rendered redundant by condoning delay in a routine and mechanical manner. In the absence of a reasonable and convincing explanation, the discretion vested in the Tribunal for condoning delay cannot be exercised in favour of the assessee. At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the settled legal position governing condonation of delay. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in
the case of P.K. Ramachandran Vs. State of Kerala [(1997) 7 SCC 556] at last para of the order has held as under:
“Law of limitation may harshly effect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribe and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay filed in the High Court would stand rejected and the Miscellaneous First Appeal shall stand dismissed as barred by time. No costs.”
On perusal of the above, it is evident that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the law of limitation may operate harshly in a particular case, but it has to be applied with all its rigor when the statute so prescribes and Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds in the absence of a satisfactory explanation. Accordingly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering an application for condonation of delay, the Court must examine whether sufficient cause has been shown and cannot condone delay merely on sympathetic considerations. Similarly, in Basawaraj & Anr. Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer [(20para-No. 1581], the Hon’ble Supreme Court at para No.15 of the order has held as under:
“15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bonafide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to
have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamount to showing utter disregard to the legislature.”
On perusal of the above, we find that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorically held that the expression “sufficient cause” means a cause beyond the control of the party invoking the aid of the Court. It was further held that where negligence, inaction or want of bona fides is attributable to the party seeking condonation, delay cannot be condoned as a matter of course. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that the law of limitation is founded on public policy and Courts cannot extend limitation on equitable grounds where no sufficient cause is demonstrated.
The aforesaid view is further fortified by the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs. Vs. Special Deputy Collector (LA), Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.31248 of 2018 dated 08.04.2024, wherein, at para nos. 13 to 26 of the order it is held as under :
On perusal of the above, it is evident that in the above decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court comprehensively reviewed the law relating to condonation of delay and reiterated that the law of limitation is founded upon public policy and there must be finality to litigation. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that though the expression “sufficient cause” occurring in section 5 of the Limitation Act deserves liberal construction, such liberal approach cannot be stretched to defeat the substantive provisions of limitation. The Court further held that concepts such as “substantial justice”, “liberal approach” and “justice-oriented approach” cannot be employed to revive stale and dead claims. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that even where sufficient cause is shown, condonation of delay is not a matter of right and the power to condone delay remains discretionary. Negligence, inaction, lack of bona fides, absence of due diligence and inordinate delay are valid grounds for refusing condonation. The Hon’ble Supreme Court ultimately upheld the refusal to condone the delay and emphasized that Courts cannot extend limitation on equitable or sympathetic considerations alone. 11. Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, particularly the repeated non- compliance by the assessee at every stage of the proceedings and the failure to establish sufficient cause for the delay, we are of the considered opinion that the assessee has failed to make out a case warranting condonation of delay. Therefore, respectfully following the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of P.K. Ramachandran (supra),
Basawaraj (supra) and Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs. (supra), we are of the considered view that the assessee has failed to establish “sufficient cause” for condonation of the inordinate delay of 237 days. Accordingly, the petitions for condonation of delay are rejected.
Since the delay in filing the appeal is not condoned, the appeal itself is liable to be dismissed as barred by limitation. We accordingly dismiss the appeal of the assessee as time-barred, without entering into the merits of the case.
In the result, the appeal of the assessee is dismissed as barred by limitation.
Order pronounced in the Open Court on 3rd July, 2026. Sd/- Sd/- (RAVISH SOOD) (MADHUSUDAN SAWDIA) JUDICIAL MEMBER ACCOUNTANT MEMBER Hyderabad, dated 3rd July, 2026. Vinodan/sps Copy to: S.No Addresses 1 Shri MOHAMMED WAJEED KHURASHI 18-7-423/B/57 AMAN NAGAR AMAN NAGAR B ,TALABKATTA HYDERABAD 500023 2 Income Tax Officer Ward 9(1) IT Towers, Hyderabad 500004 3 Pr. CIT - Hyderabad 4 DR, ITAT Hyderabad Benches 5 Guard File
By Order TUMMALACHARLA Digitally signed by TUMMALACHARLA LAKSHMI NARAYANA DN: cn=TUMMALACHARLA LAKSHMI LAKSHMI NARAYANA, c=IN, o=INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, ou=INCOME TAX NARAYANA APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, CHENNAI BENCH Date: 2026.07.03 11:55:10 +05'30'
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