VARADARAJAN RAJASEKHAR,HYDERABAD vs. ACIT, CENTRAL CIRCLE-2(3), HYDERABAD

PER VIJAY PAL RAO, VICE PRESIDENT: These two appeals by the Assessee are directed against the two separate orders of the Ld. CIT(A)-12, Hyderabad, both dated 28.10.2025, for the assessment years 2014-2015 and 2015-2016.

1) The order of the Ld. CIT (A) u/s 250 of the Act dt. 28.10.2025 for the AY 2014-15 is erroneous both on facts and in law to the extent the order is prejudicial to the interests of the appellant.

The Ld. CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal 2) without considering the facts of the case and submissions of the assessee which is not justified. 3) a. The Ld. CIT(A) erred in not considering the fact that the AO has erroneously issued notice u/s 148

3 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 of the Act on 29.07.2022 despite the assessment already being completed u/s 147 on 30.03.2022.

b. The Ld. CIT(A) ought to have appreciated that the AO has erroneously issued a notice u/s 148 of the Act on 29.07.2022, treating the earlier notice issued u/s 147 as one u/s 148A(b), based on the decision of Honourable Supreme Court of India in the case of Union of India Vs Ashish Agarwal dt. 04.05.2022. 3) c. The Ld. CIT(A) ought to have appreciated that the decision in Ashish Agarwal clearly states that notice u/s 148A(b) are applicable only for cases where the assessment is open for review or has not been completed, but in the present case, the assessment was already completed on 30.03.2022 and thus, the action of AO in treating the earlier notice as one u/s 148A(b) is in direct contradiction to the legal provisions as laid down in the Ashish Agarwal case.

d. The Ld. CIT(A) further erred in not considering that the reopening of an already completed assessment u/s 147 is a distinct process and cannot be treated as a fresh proceeding u/s 148A(b) and that the AO reliance on the Ashish Agarwal

4 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 case for reopening the assessment is, therefore, misplaced. 4) a. The Ld. CIT(A) ought to have appreciated that there should be only one assessment for one assessment year for the same issue and same addition.

b. The Ld. CIT(A) erred in not quashing the impugned assessment order even after knowing that the allegations in notice u/s 148 dt.29.07.2022 were identical to the assessment which was already completed on 30.03.2022 and that no new material was found than the material that was provoked for issuing notice u/s 148 on 08.06.2021. 5) The Ld. CIT(A) ought to have appreciated that the AO has initiated reassessment proceedings without being there any incriminating material to show that the assessee has actually escaped income for the year under consideration but only the issues that were already considered in the assessment dt. 30.03.2022.

a. The Ld. CIT(A) ought to have considered that the 6) notice issued u/s 148 on 29.07.2022 is barred by limitation of time as per section 149 of the Act keeping in view of the decision of Supreme Court of

5 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 India in the case of Union of India Vs Rajeev Bansal dt. 03.10.2024 which was passed after considering its earlier decision in the case of Ashish Agarwal dt. 04.05.2022. b. The Ld. CIT(A) ought to have quashed the notice u/s 148 dt. 29.07.2022 which is barred by limitation of time as he is having the same powers as that of the AO with regard to verifying and giving decisions in the assessment completed, by following the decision in the case of Rajeev Bansal, instead of making remarks at para no. 6.2.18 in his order dt. 28.10.2025.

The Ld. CIT(A) ought to have appreciated that the 7) notice issued u/s 148 of the Act is without jurisdiction, as the same has been issued by the Central Circle 2(3), Hyderabad, instead of the National Faceless Assessment Centre (NFAC), which is in violation to the mandatory faceless reassessment procedure, and therefore the entire reassessment proceedings are liable to be quashed. 8) The Ld. CIT(A) has erred in not appreciating that the assessment order passed by the Central Circle 2(3), Hyderabad is bad in law and without jurisdiction, as the Central Circle had no authority to assume

6 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 jurisdiction and pass the impugned assessment order in the case of the appellant. 9) The Ld. CIT(A) ought to have appreciated that the AO has erred in issuing notice u/s 148 without obtaining valid and proper approval from the specified authority as required under section 151 of the Act, rendering the reassessment proceedings void ab initio. 10) a. Without prejudice to any other grounds, the Ld. CIT(A) erred in upholding the addition of Rs. 4,25,00,000/- towards long term capital gain without appreciating the facts of the case. b. Without prejudice to any other grounds, the Ld. CIT(A) ought to have appreciated that the assessee declared capital gain of Rs.15,47,850/-in accordance with the provisions of section 48 of the Act on the sale of a property.

c. Without prejudice to any other grounds, the Ld. CIT(A) ought to have appreciated that assessee has incurred an expenditure towards cost of improvement at Rs. 6,90,413/- and Rs.62,38,584/- and accordingly claimed Indexed cost of improvement at Rs. 15,96,793/- and Rs. 3,90,53,536/- respectively, which is in order.

7 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 11) Without prejudice to any other grounds, the Ld. CIT(A) erred in upholding the addition of Rs. 7,00,000/- towards income from house property without considering that the AO has not issued defective notice u/s 139(9) of the Act to rectify the same, which is against the principles of natural justice. 12) The Appellant may, add OR alter OR amend OR modify OR substitute OR delete and/OR rescind all OR any of the grounds of appeal at any time before OR at the time of hearing of the appeal.

8 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 u/sec.148 dated 08.06.2021. Thus, the learned Authorised Representative of the Assessee has submitted that once the re-assessment orders were completed in pursuance to the notice issued u/sec.148 of the Act, the Assessing Officer cannot be allowed to revisit or re-initiate the proceedings by issuing the notice u/sec.148A(b) of the Act on 02.06.2022 by taking shelter of Judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. Ashish Agarwal [2022] 444 ITR 1 (SC). Thus, he has submitted that the second notice issued by the Assessing Officer u/sec.148 after completion fo the re- assessment in pursuance to the original notice issued u/sec.148 of the Act on 08.06.2021 cannot be considered as continuous proceedings and therefore, the said notice issued by the Assessing Officer u/sec.148A(b), order passed u/sec.148A(d) and notice issued u/sec.148 on 29.07.2022 is invalid and liable to be quashed. In support of his contention, he has relied upon the decision of this Tribunal in the case of United Infra Minerals Private Limited, Hyderabad vs. DCIT, Central Circle-1(1), Hyderabad in ITA.Nos.1659 & 1660/Hyd./2025, dated 25.03.2026.

9 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 5. On the other hand, the learned DR has submitted that the Assessing Officer has mentioned in the assessment order itself that after the completion of the assessment on 30.03.2022 which was subjected to the Order of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. Ashish Agarwal (supra), the Assessing Officer has initiated the proceedings by issuing notice u/sec.148A(b) of the Act on 02.06.2022 requiring the assessee to show cause as to why the income escaped assessment should not be brought to tax. Thereafter, the Assessing Officer also passed order u/sec.148A(d) and issued notice u/sec.148 on 29.07.2022 which is in accordance with the provisions of sec.148A as well as the Judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court. He has relied upon the Orders of the authorities below.

10 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 shall be as per the amended provisions of sec.148A as per the amendment vide Finance Act, 2021 w.e.f. 01.04.2021. Therefore, the initial notice issued by the Assessing Officer u/sec.148 dated 08.06.2021 was not valid as the Assessing Officer has not followed the provisions of sec.148A of the Act however, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. Ashish Agarwal (supra), directed to deem the notice issued u/sec.148 under the old provisions of the Act as a show cause notice u/sec.148A(b) and then to follow the procedure prescribed under the amended provisions u/sec.148A. However, in the case in hand, the Assessing Officer has not waited for the outcome of the Judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court but already passed the re- assessment order u/sec.147 r.w.s.144 of the Act on 30.03.2022. This fact is not in dispute as the assessment passed by the Assessing Officer is also placed on record and even the Assessing Officer in the second re-assessment order passed on 26.05.2023 has stated this fact in Para no.1 as under:

11 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 “The assessee is an individual. The assessee filed invalid ITR for Asst. year 2016-17 on 13.10.2017 declaring total income of Rs.22,48,360/-. On verification of the return, it is found that the assessee has admitted sale consideration of Rs.4.25 crores and claimed Rs.4,06,50,329/- as indexed cost of improvement and arrived at LTCG of Rs.15,47,850/-on account of sale of immovable property in Chennai. Since the amount of Rs.4,06,50,329/-claimed as indexed cost of improvement is unsubstantiated, the same has escaped assessment within the meaning of provisions of section 147 of the Act. Accordingly, notice u/s.148 of the Act dated 08.06.2021 was issued and assessment u/s.147 r.w.s.144 was completed on 30.03.2022 by assessing the total income of the assessee at Rs.4,25,00,000/-by bringing to tax the Long Term Capital Gains of Rs.4,25,00,000/-.”

6.1. Thus, once the proceedings initiated by the Assessing Officer in pursuance to the notice u/sec.148 dated 02.06.2022 come to an end when the assessment was completed on 30.03.2022 then, the re-assessment proceedings would not be treated as continuous proceedings or pending proceedings so as to deem the original notice issued u/sec.148 dated 02.06.2022 as show cause notice u/sec.148A(b) after the Judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. Rajeev Bansal [2024] 469 ITR 46 (SC). An identical issue has been considered by this Tribunal in the case of United Infra Minerals Private

12 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 Limited, Hyderabad vs. DCIT, Central Circle-1(1), Hyderabad (supra), vide Order dated 25.03.2026 in para nos.8 to 9.3 held as under:

“8. We have considered the rival submissions as well as relevant material on record. The first notice was issued by the Assessing Officer u/sec.148 of the Act on 23.06.2021 which reads as under: xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx

8.1. Thus, it is clear that the notice dated 23.06.2021 was issued by the Assessing Officer u/sec.148 of the Act without following the procedure as laid down u/sec.148A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 introduced by the Finance Act, 2021 w.e.f. 01.04.2021. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. Ashish Agarwal (supra) has affirmed the view of the Hon’ble High Courts on this point that after amendment by Finance Act, 2021, the substituted provisions of reopening of the assessments would be applicable as observed in para-7 of the said Judgment as under:

“7. Thus, the new provisions substituted by the Finance Act, 2021 being remedial and benevolent in nature and substituted with a specific aim and object to protect the rights and interest of the assessee as well as and the same being in public interest, the respective High Courts have rightly held that the benefit of new provisions shall be made available even in respect of the proceedings relating to past assessment years, provided section 148 notice has been issued on or after 1st April, 2021. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the various High Courts in holding so.”

13 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 8.2. Even otherwise, now it is the settled proposition of law that the reopening of the assessment after 01.04.2021 has to be in accordance with the provisions of sec.148A of the Act. Further, it is also pertinent to note that the first notice u/sec.148 of the Act dated 23.06.2021 was issued after obtaining the approval/sanction of Addl. CIT where, as per sec.151 of the Act the Competent Authority to accord the sanction for reopening of the assessment is the Pr. Commissioner or CIT where the notice issued on 23.06.2021 is come in relaxation of limitation under TOLA. There is no dispute that in the case of the assessee notice issued on 23.06.2021 is after lapse of more than 03 years from the end of the assessment year under consideration but due to the benefit of TOLA it is considered as within 03 years. Hence, the notice issued without valid sanction u/sec.151 of the Act is not valid and consequently vitiates the re-assessment order passed u/sec.143(3) r.w.s.147 of the Act dated 31.03.2022. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. Rajeev Bansal (supra) has also considered this issue in Para nos.75 to 81 as under:

“75. After 1 April 2021, the new regime has specified different authorities for granting sanctions under section 151. The new regime is beneficial to the assessee because it specifies a higher level of authority for the grant of sanctions in comparison to the old regime. Therefore, in terms of Ashish Agarwal (supra), after 1 April 2021, the prior approval must be obtained from the appropriate authorities specified under section 151 of the new regime. The effect of Section 151 of the new regime is thus:

(i) If income escaping assessment is less than Rupees fifty lakhs: (a) a reassessment notice could be issued within three years after obtaining the prior approval of the Principal

14 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 Commissioner, or Principal Director or Commissioner or Director; and (b) no notice could be issued after the expiry of three years; and

(ii) If income escaping assessment is more than Rupees fifty lakhs: (a) a reassessment notice could be issued within three years after obtaining the prior approval of the Principal Commissioner, or Principal Director or Commissioner or Director; and (b) after three years after obtaining the prior approval of the Principal Chief Commissioner or Principal Director General or Chief Commissioner or Director General.

15 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 to Section 151 of the new regime is this: if the time limit of three years from the end of an assessment year falls between 20 March 2020 and 31 March 2021, then the specified authority under section 151(i) has an extended time till 30 June 2021 to grant approval. In the case of Section 151 of the old regime, the test is: if the time limit of four years from the end of an assessment year falls between 20 March 2020 and 31 March 2021, then the specified authority under section 151(2) has time till 31 March 2021 to grant approval. The time limit for Section 151 of the old regime expires on 31 March 2021 because the new regime comes into effect on 1 April 2021.

a. Section 148A(a) - to conduct any enquiry, if required, with respect to the information which suggests that the income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment; b. Section 148A(b) - to provide an opportunity of hearing to the assessee by serving upon them a show cause notice as to why a notice under section 148 should not be issued based on the information that suggests that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. It must be noted that this requirement has been deleted by the Finance Act 2022;

16 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 c. Section 148A(d) - to pass an order deciding whether or not it is a fit case for issuing a notice under section 148; and d. Section 148 - to issue a reassessment notice.

17 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 under section 148. These notices ought to have been issued following the time limits specified under section 151 of the new regime read with TOLA, where applicable.”

9.1. Thus, the Assessing Officer has issued the second notice after completion of the re-assessment based on the same reasons and earlier notice issued u/sec.148 of the Act dated 23.06.2021. We find merit and substance in the contention of the learned Authorised Representative of the Assessee challenging the validity of the second notice issued by the Assessing Officer for reopening of the assessment after completion of the re-assessment proceedings and as the notice issued u/sec.148 of the Act comes to an end when the re-assessment is completed based on such notice and therefore, the proceedings initiated by the said notice could not continue thereafter. The Assessing Officer, therefore, cannot deem the earlier notice issued u/sec.148 of the Act as notice issued u/sec.148A(b) of the Act after completion of the re- assessment order. In other words, a single notice cannot initiate

18 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 two proceedings of re-assessments and therefore, the same cannot be extended or deemed to be issued u/sec.148A(b) of the Act once the said notice was acted upon and culminated into re-assessment order. The Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of Anindita Sengupta vs. ACIT (supra) has considered an identical issue in Para nos.22 to 25 as under:

“22. As is manifest from a reading of the aforesaid passages forming part of the decision in Ashish Agarwal, the Supreme Court was essentially concerned with the imperatives of striking a just balance between the right of the respondents to undertake and conclude a reassessment that may have been initiated while at the same time according due protection to the interest of the assessees. The Supreme Court held that although the High Courts were correct in taking the view that after the amendments in the Act, coming to be enforced with effect from 01 April 2021, notices could have been issued only in terms of the substituted provisions, the Department appeared to have proceeded under the mistaken yet bona fide belief that those amendments were yet to be enforced. It was in the aforesaid background that it found that the ends of justice would warrant the notices issued with reference to the erstwhile provisions being saved and being read as referable to Section 148A(b). It was to subserve the aforesaid primary objective that Ashish Agarwal proceeded to hold that the impugned Section 148 notices would be deemed to have been issued under section 148A and treated to be show cause notices referable to clause (b) thereof.

19 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 23. As we read the penultimate directions which came to be framed, the procedure laid out in Ashish Agarwal clearly stood confined to matters where although notices may have been issued, proceedings were yet to have attained finality. This clearly flows from the impugned notices being ordained to be treated as show cause notices under Section 148A(b) and the concomitant liberty being accorded to AOs' to proceed further in accordance with Section 148A(d). As we read that decision, we find ourselves unable to construe those directions as either warranting or mandating a reopening of proceedings which had come to be rendered a quietus in the meanwhile. The judgment was primarily concerned with the validity of various notices which had been promulgated and proceedings drawn in accordance with the statutory procedure which stood in place prior to 01 April 2021. It also becomes pertinent to note that the decision rendered by our Court in Man Mohan Kohli perhaps constituted the solitary exception in the sense of having left a window open to the respondents to draw proceedings afresh. A majority of the High Courts', however, do not appear to have made such a provision or provide the Revenue with a right of recourse. The Supreme Court was thus faced with a peculiar and an unprecedented situation where the Revenue was rendered remediless to assess escaped income even though material may have merited such an action being pursued solely on account of a misinterpretation of the correct legal position. It was these factors which clearly appear to have weighed upon the Supreme Court to mould and sculpt a procedure which would strike a just balance between competing interests.

20 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 24. In order to carve out an equitable solution which would redress the deadlock, the Supreme Court invoked its powers conferred by Article 142 of the Constitution and ordained that all such notices would be treated as being under Section 148A(b) and for proceedings to be taken forward in accordance with law thereafter. The direction so framed thus enabled the assessee to question the assumption of jurisdiction under Section 148 and take advantage of the beneficial measures embodied in Section 148 A. The assessee thus derived a right to assail the initiation of reassessment proceedings on jurisdictional grounds by preferring objections which the AO was statutorily obliged to take into consideration before issuing notices under Section 148 of the Act. The Revenue on the other hand, and notwithstanding its folly of having erroneously proceeded under the erstwhile regime, was enabled to continue proceedings in accordance with the amended procedure as introduced by virtue of Finance Act, 2021 and thus avoid the specter of a fait accompli which it faced on account of some of the High Court decisions. This is apparent from the Supreme Court observing that the judgments rendered by some of the High Courts' had left the Revenue remediless and resulting in "no reassessment proceedings at all, even if the same are permissible under the Finance Act, 2021 and as per substituted sections 147."

21 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 follow. Firstly, Ashish Agarwal was principally concerned with judgments rendered by various High Courts' striking down Section 148 notices holding that the respondents had erred in proceeding on the basis of the unamended family of provisions relating to reassessment. They had essentially held that it was the procedure constructed in terms of the amendments introduced by Finance Act, 2021 which would apply. None of those judgements were primarily concerned with concluded assessments. It is this indubitable position which constrained the Supreme Court to frame directions requiring those notices to be treated as being under Section 148A(b) and for the AO proceeding thereafter to frame an order as contemplated by Section 148A(d) of the Act. The Supreme Court significantly observed that the High Courts' instead of quashing the impugned notices should have framed directions for those notices being construed and deemed to have been issued under Section 148A. Ashish Agarwal proceeded further to observe that the Revenue should have been "permitted to proceed further with the reassessment proceedings as per the substituted provisions......". Our view of the judgement being confined to proceedings at the stage of notice is further fortified from the Supreme Court providing in para 8 of the report that "The respective impugned Section 148 notices issued to the respective assessees shall be deemed to have been issued under section 148A of the Income Tax Act as substituted by Finance Act, 2021 and treated to be show cause notices in terms of Section 1484(b)." As would be manifest from the aforesaid extract, the emphasis clearly was on the notices which formed the subject matter of challenge before various High Courts' and the aim of the Supreme Court being to

22 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 salvage the process of reassessment. This is further evident from the Supreme Court observing that the AO would thereafter proceed to pass orders referable to Section 148A(d). We consequently find ourselves unable to construe Ashish Agarwal as an edict which required completed assessments to be invalidated and reopened. Ashish Agarwal cannot possibly be read as mandating the hands of the clock being rewound and reversing final decisions which may have come to be rendered in the interregnum.”

9.2. Thus, the Hon’ble Delhi High Court has held that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. Ashish Agarwal (supra) has permitted the Revenue to proceed further with the re-assessment proceedings as per the substituted provisions and therefore, the said Judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court is confined to the proceedings at the stage of notice and is not applicable in the cases where the re-assessment is already completed and proceedings were not pending. This view has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of Satish Chand Jain vs. ACIT (supra) in Para nos.10 and 11 as under:

“10. Notice under Section 02.06.2022 under Section 148-A(b) proceeds on the premise that the judgment of Supreme Court in Ashish Agarwal (supra) requires all notices issued under Section 148 of the Act between the period commencing from 01.04.2021 and ending on 30.06.2021 to be treated as SCNs referrable to Section 148- A(b) of the Act. Dealing with an identical question of the right of the respondents to reopen the concluded assessment, based on perceived reading of the decision of the Supreme Court in Ashish Agarwal (supra) was the question which

23 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 directly fell for our consideration in Anindita Sengupta vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle 61 (1) New Delhi & Ors. 2024 SCC On Line Del. 2296, the Court observed as follows:- “21. It was in the aforesaid backdrop that the Supreme Court proceeded to frame the following operative directions: 28. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present appeals are allowed in part. The impugned common judgments and orders [Ashok Kumar Agarwal v. Union of India, 2021 SCC OnLine All 799] passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in WT No.524 of 2021 and other allied tax appeals/petitions, is/are hereby modified and substituted as under: 28.1. The impugned Section 148 notices issued to the respective assessees which were issued under unamended Section 148 of the IT Act, which were the subject-matter of writ petitions before the various respective High Courts shall be deemed to have been issued under Section 148-A of the IT Act as substituted by the Finance Act, 2021 and construed or treated to be show-cause notices in terms of Section 148-A(b). The assessing officer shall, within thirty days from today provide to the respective assesses information and material relied upon by the Revenue, so that the assessees can reply to the show-cause notices within two weeks thereafter. 28.2. The requirement of conducting any enquiry, if required, with the prior approval of specified authority under Section 148- A(a) is hereby dispensed with as a one-time measure vis-à-vis those notices which have been issued under Section 148 of the unamended Act from 1-4-2021 till date, including those which have been quashed by the High Courts.

24 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025

28.3. Even otherwise as observed hereinabove holding any enquiry with the prior approval of specified authority is not mandatory but it is for the assessing officers concerned to hold any enquiry, if required. 28.4. The assessing officers shall thereafter pass orders in terms of Section 148-A(d) in respect of each of the assessees concerned; Thereafter after following the procedure as required under Section 148-A may issue notice under Section 148 (as substituted). 28.5. All defences which may be available to the assessees including those available under Section 149 of the IT Act and all rights and contentions which may be available to the assessees concerned and Revenue under the Finance Act, 2021 and in law shall continue to be available. The assessing officers shall thereafter pass orders in terms of Section 148-A(d) in respect of each of the assessees concerned; Thereafter after following the procedure as required under Section 148-A may issue notice under Section 148 (as substituted). 29. The present order shall be applicable PAN INDIA and all judgments and orders passed by the different High Courts on the issue and under which similar notices which were issued after 1- 4-2021 issued under Section 148 of the Act are set aside and shall be governed by the present order and shall stand modified to the aforesaid extent. The present order is passed in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India so as to avoid any further appeals by the Revenue on the very issue by challenging similar judgments and orders, with a view not to

25 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 burden this Court with approximately 9000 appeals. We also observe that the present order shall also govern the pending writ petitions, pending before various the High Courts in which similar notices under Section 148 of the Act issued after 1-4-2021 are under challenge.

“22. As is manifest from a reading of the aforesaid passages forming part of the decision in Ashish Agarwal, the Supreme Court was essentially concerned with the imperatives of striking a just balance between the right of the respondents to undertake and conclude a reassessment that may have been initiated while at the same time according due protection to the interest of the assessees. The Supreme Court held that although the High Courts were correct in taking the view that after the amendments in the Act, coming to be enforced with effect from 01 April 2021, notices could have been issued only in terms of the substituted provisions, the Department appeared to have proceeded under the mistaken yet bona fide belief that those amendments were yet to be enforced. It was in the aforesaid background that it found that the ends of justice would warrant the notices issued with reference to the erstwhile provisions being saved and being read as referable to Section 148A(b). It was to subserve the aforesaid primary objective that Ashish Agarwal proceeded to hold that the impugned Section 148 notices would be deemed to have been issued under section 148A and treated to be show cause notices referable to clause (b) thereof.

26 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 being ordained to be treated as show cause notices under Section 148A(b) and the concomitant liberty being accorded to AOs' to proceed further in accordance with Section 148A(d). As we read that decision, we find ourselves unable to construe those directions as either warranting or mandating a reopening of proceedings which had come to be rendered a quietus in the meanwhile. The judgment was primarily concerned with the validity of various notices which had been promulgated and proceedings drawn in accordance with the statutory procedure which stood in place prior to 01 April 2021. It also becomes pertinent to note that the decision rendered by our Court in Man Mohan Kohli perhaps constituted the solitary exception in the sense of having left a window open to the respondents to draw proceedings afresh. A majority of the High Courts', however, do not appear to have made such a provision or provide the Revenue with a right of recourse. The Supreme Court was thus faced with a peculiar and an unprecedented situation where the Revenue was rendered remediless to assess escaped income even though material may have merited such an action being pursued solely on account of a misinterpretation of the correct legal position. It was these factors which clearly appear to have weighed upon the Supreme Court to mould and sculpt a procedure which would strike a just balance between competing interests.

27 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 Section 148 and take advantage of the beneficial measures embodied in Section 148 A. The assessee thus derived a right to assail the initiation of reassessment proceedings on jurisdictional grounds by preferring objections which the AO was statutorily obliged to take into consideration before issuing notices under Section 148 of the Act. The Revenue on the other hand, and notwithstanding its folly of having erroneously proceeded under the erstwhile regime, was enabled to continue proceedings in accordance with the amended procedure as introduced by virtue of Finance Act, 2021 and thus avoid the specter of a fait accompli which it faced on account of some of the High Court decisions. This is apparent from the Supreme Court observing that the judgments rendered by some of the High Courts' had left the Revenue remediless and resulting in "no reassessment proceedings at all, even if the same are permissible under the Finance Act, 2021 and as per substituted sections 147."

28 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 as being under Section 148A(b) and for the AO proceeding thereafter to frame an order as contemplated by Section 148A(d) of the Act. The Supreme Court significantly observed that the High Courts' instead of quashing the impugned notices should have framed directions for those notices being construed and deemed to have been issued under Section 148A. Ashish Agarwal proceeded further to observe that the Revenue should have been "permitted to proceed further with the reassessment proceedings as per the substituted provisions......". Our view of the judgement being confined to proceedings at the stage of notice is further fortified from the Supreme Court providing in para 8 of the report that "The respective impugned Section 148 notices issued to the respective assessees shall be deemed to have been issued under section 148A of the Income Tax Act as substituted by Finance Act, 2021 and treated to be show cause notices in terms of Section 1484(b)." As would be manifest from the aforesaid extract, the emphasis clearly was on the notices which formed the subject matter of challenge before various High Courts' and the aim of the Supreme Court being to salvage the process of reassessment. This is further evident from the Supreme Court observing that the AO would thereafter proceed to pass orders referable to Section 148A(d). We consequently find ourselves unable to construe Ashish Agarwal as an edict which required completed assessments to be invalidated and reopened. Ashish Agarwal cannot possibly be read as mandating the hands of the clock being rewound and reversing final decisions which may have come to be rendered in the interregnum. 26. Regard must also be had to the undisputed fact that the petitioner never questioned the validity of the original notices on grounds which were urged before the various High Courts and where assessees had questioned the invocation of the unamended

29 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 provisions. The petitioner chose to contest the reassessment proceedings on merits. It is also admitted before us that the petitioner was also not a party to the Man Mohan Kohli batch of matters. There was therefore no justification for the respondent to have issued notices afresh seeking to reopen proceedings which had been rendered a closure prior to the judgment rendered in Ashish Agarwal. At the cost of being repetitive we deem it appropriate to observe that the Ashish Agarwal judgment neither spoke of completed assessments nor did it embody any direction that could be legitimately or justifiably construed as mandating completed assessments being reopened and more so where the assessee had raised no objection to the initiation of proceedings.” 11. Undisputedly and as admitted, the assessment proceedings in this case were already concluded on 30.03.2022 and reassessment action was re-initiated on the same set of reasons vide SCN dated 02.06.2022 under Section 148-A(b) leading to passing of an order Section 148-A(d) and notice under Section 148 of the Act dated 19.07.2022. In view of the position of law as enunciated in the case of Anindita Sengupta (supra), we find that there was no justification for the respondents to issue notices afresh seeking to reopen the proceedings which had been concluded prior to the judgment passed in Ashish Agarwal. The judgment passed in Ashish Agarwal does not mandate the completed assessment being reopened. We are therefore unable to sustain the impugned action for reassessment.” 9.3. No contrary Judgment has been brought to our notice by the Revenue and therefore, by following the Judgments of Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the cases of Anindita Sengupta vs. ACIT (supra) as well as in the case of Satish Chand Jain vs.

30 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 ACIT (supra),we hold that the second notice issued by the Assessing Officer u/sec.148 of the Act dated 28.07.2022 is not valid in law and consequently, vitiates the second re-assessment order passed by the Assessing Officer dated 31.05.2023. Since we have quashed the initiation of re-assessment proceedings as well as consequential assessment orders therefore, the other grounds raised by the assessee become infructuous and the same are neither argued nor taken up for adjudication.”

6.2. Thus, the Tribunal has held that the original notice issued under the old provisions of sec.148 of the Act after 01.04.2021 is invalid being not in accordance with the amended provisions u/sec.148A of the Act and further even the sanction of the Competent Authority was also not taken by the Assessing Officer as per the new amended provisions of sec.151 of the Act. Further the Tribunal has also considered the issue that the second notice issued by the Assessing Officer after completion of the re-assessment based on the earlier notice issued u/sec.148 is also not valid as the initiation of proceedings of re-assessment by initial notice issued by the Assessing Officer under the old provisions of the Act come to an end when the assessment was completed and the same cannot be extended or deemed to be a notice

31 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 issued u/sec.148(b) once the notice was acted upon and culminated into the re-assessment order. The Tribunal has relied upon couple of decisions of Hon’ble Delhi High Court on this point. Accordingly, by following the Judgment of Hon’ble Delhi High Court as well as Order of this Tribunal in the case of United Infra Minerals Private Limited, Hyderabad vs. DCIT, Central Circle-1(1), Hyderabad (supra), we hold that the second notice issued by the Assessing Officer u/sec.148 of the Act on 29.07.2022 is not valid in law and consequently vitiates the second re-assessment order passed by the Assessing Officer dated 26.05.2022.

32 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 9. We have considered the rival submissions as well as relevant material on record. Having held that the second notice issued by the Assessing Officer u/sec.148 is not in continuation of the re-assessment proceedings initiated by the Assessing Officer u/sec.148 of the Act dated 08.06.2021 the said notice on the face of it is barred by limitation being beyond 06 years from the end of the assessment year under consideration. At the outset, we note that an identical issue has been considered by this Tribunal in the case of Sudheer Parimala, Hyderabad vs. ITO, Ward-10(1), Hyderabad in ITA.No.758/Hyd./2025, Order dated 17.04.2026 in Para nos.9 to 9.4 as under: “9. We have considered the rival submissions as well as relevant material on record. In the case in hand, the Assessing Officer has issued show cause notice u/sec.148A(b) of the Act on 19.03.2022 as under: xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx 9.1. Thereafter, the Assessing Officer has passed an Order u/sec.148A(d) of the Act on 15.04.2022 and issued notice u/sec.148 of the Act dated 15.04.2022 as under:

xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx 9.2. Thus, the notice u/sec.148 of the Act was issued by the Assessing Officer on 15.04.2022 which is undisputedly beyond

33 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 the period of 06 years from the end of the assessment year under consideration i.e., A.Y. 2015-2016. As per the unamended provisions of sec.148 of the Act, the notice u/sec.148 of the Act could be issued within the period of 06 years from the end of the assessment year under consideration. However, as per the amended provisions for reopening u/sec.148A and 148 r.w.s.149 of the Act, the limitation for reopening of the assessment has been reduced from 06 years to 03 years in cases where the income which is escaped assessment is less than Rs.50 lakhs; but the limitation for reopening of the assessment is increased from 06 years to 10 years in the cases where the amount of income escaped assessment is Rs.50 lakhs or more. The learned DR has submitted that as per the new provision of reopening u/sec.148A and 149 of the Act the limitation available to the Assessing Officer is 10 years from the end of the assessment year in the cases where the income escaped assessment is Rs.50 lakhs or more. In the case of the assessee, the income escaped assessment was more than Rs.50 lakhs and therefore, the 1st proviso to sec.149(1) would not apply to the case of the assessee. This contention of the learned DR is not acceptable in view of the plain language of the proviso to sec.149(1) of the Act which has been considered and interpreted by the Hon’ble Jurisdictional Telangana High Court in the case of Cyberabad Citizens Health Services Private Limited vs. DCIT (supra) in Para nos.10 to 21 as under:

“10. This, we say so for the following reasons: In the case of Rajeev Bansal (supra), the position of law stands clear as regards the operation of amended Section 149(1) of the Act. The relevant paragraphs 49 and 53 thereof are extracted hereunder:

34 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 “49. The first proviso to Section 149(1)(b) requires the determination of whether the time limit prescribed under Section 149(1xb) of the old regime continues to exist for the assessment year 2021-2022 and before. Resultantly, a notice under Section 148 of the new regime cannot be issued if the period of six years from the end of the relevant assessment year has expired at the time of issuance of the

(a) if three years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year unless the case falls under clause (b), (b) if three years, that not more than ten years, have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment yes unless the Assessing Officer has it his possession books of account or other documents or evidence which reveal that the income chargeable to tax, represented in the form of- (i) an asset (ii) expenditure in respect of a transaction or in relation to an event of occasion; or (iii) an entry or entries in the books of account, Which has escaped assessment amounts to or in likely to amount to fifty lakh rupees or more; Provided that no notice under section 148 shall be issued at any time in a case for the relevant assessment year beginning on or before 1 day of April, 2021, if a notice under section 148 or section 153A or section 153C could not have been issued at that time on account of being beyond the time limit specified under the provisions of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of this section or section

35 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 153A or section 153C. as the case may be, as they stood immediately before the commencement of the Finance Act, 2021; Provided also that for the purposes of computing the period of limitation as per this section, the time or extended time allowed to the assessee, as per show-cause notice issued under clause (b) of section 148A or the period during which the proceeding under section 148A is stayed by an order er injunction of any court, shall be excluded: Provided also that where immediately after the exclusion of the period referred to in the Immediately preceding proviso, the period of limitation available to the Assessing Officer for passing an order under clause (d) of section 148A does not exceed seven days, such remaining period shall be extended to seven days and the period of limitation under this sub-section shall be deemed to be extended accordingly.

notice. This also ensures that the new time limit of ten years prescribed under Section 149(1)(b) of the new regime applies prospectively. For example, for the assessment year 2012-2013, the ten year period would have expired on 31 March 2023, while the six year period expired on 31 March 2019 Without the proviso to Section 149(1)(b) of the new regime, the Revenue could have had the power to reopen assessments for the year 2012-2013 if the escaped assessment amounted to Rupees fifty lakhs or more. The proviso limits the retrospective operation of Section 149(1)(b) to protect the interests of the assessees.”

36 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 “53. The position of law which can be derived based on the above discussion may be summarized thus (1) Section 140(1) of the new regime is not prospective. It also applies to past assessment years; (4) The time limit of four years is now reduced to three years for all situations. The Revenue can issue notices under Section 148 of the new regime only if three years or less have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year, (iii) the proviso to Section 149(1)(b) of the new regime stipulates that the Revenue can issue reassessment notices for past assessment years only if the tune limit survives according to Section 149(1)(b) of the old regime, that is, six years from the end of the relevant assessment year, and (iv) all notices issued invoking the time limit under Section 149(1)(b) of the old regime will have to be dropped if the income chargeable to tax which has escaped assessment is less than Rupees fifty lakhs.”

37 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 Time limit for notice. 149. (1) No notice under section 148 shall be issued for the relevant assessment year; (a) if four years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year, unless the case falls under clause (b) or clause (c); (b) if four years, but nor more than six years, have elapsed trees the end of the relevant assessment year unless the chargeable to tax which has escaped assessment amounts or is likely to amount to one lakh rupees or more for that year. (c) if four years, but not more than sixteen years, have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year unless the income in relation to any asset (including financial interest in any city) located outside India, chargeable to tax, has escaped assessment. Explanation in determining income chargeable to tax which has escaped assessment for the purposes of this sub-section, the provisions of Explanation 2 of section 147 shall apply as they apply for the purposes of that section.

(2) The provisions of sub-section (1) as to the issue of notice shall be subject to the provisions of section 151. (3) If the person on whom a notice under section 148 is to be treated as the agent of a non-resident under section 163 and the assessment, reassessment or re-computation to be made in pursuance of the notice is to be made on him as the agent of such non-resident, the notice shall not be issued

38 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 after the expiry of a period of six years from the end of the relevant assessment year.

Explanation for the removal of doubt, it is hereby clarified that the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (3), as amended by the Finance Act, 2012, shall also be applicable for any assessment year beginning on or before the 1 day of April, 2012. ---------------- 12. Apparently, the fifth and sixth provisos of the amended Section 149 of the Act extracted hereinabove provide for excluding certain periods while computing the period of limitation as per the amended Section. It prescribes the time or extended time allowed to the assessee as per the show cause notice under clause (b) of Section 148 of the Act or the period during which the proceeding under Section 148A of the Act is stayed shall be excluded. The sixth proviso to the amended Section 149 of the Act also deals with exclusion of the period referred to in the fifth proviso i.e., the period of limitation available to the Assessing Officer for passing an order under clause (d) of Section 148A of the Act if it does not exceed seven days. In that event, such remaining period shall be extended to seven days and the period of limitation under this sub-section shall be deemed to be extended. Accordingly, both the fifth and sixth provisos in the first place do not amount to clarification of the first proviso. These two provisos qualify the substantive amended Section 149 of the Act and do not relate to the un-amended Section 149 of the Act for which the first proviso takes care of. The contention of the learned counsel for the Revenue that the time spent from the issuance of notice under Section 148A(b) of the Act up to the passing of the order under Section 148A(d) of the Act in terms of the fifth and sixth provisos stands excluded for reckoning the limitation period for issuance of notice under Section 148 of the

39 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 Act is not worth acceptance. Section 148A of the Act lays down the procedure for issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act whereas Section 149 of the Act prescribes strict time limit within which notice under Section 148 of the Act can be issued in the prescribed circumstances. The Revenue is therefore obliged to adhere to the timeline prescribed under Section 149 of the Act for issuance of such notice and undertake the procedure before issuance of notice under Section 148A of the Act. 13. In this regard, it is apposite to refer to opinion of the Delhi High Court. Paragraphs 15 and 16 of Godrej Industries Ltd., (supra) are extracted hereunder: “15. The validity of a notice must be judged on the basis of the law existing as on the date on which the notice is issued under Section 148 of the Act, which in the present case is 31st July 2022, by which time the Finance Act, 2021 is already on the statute and in terms thereof, no notice under Section 148 of the Act for AY 2014-15 could be issued on or after" April 2021 based on the first proviso to Section 149 of the Act. Therefore, the fifth proviso cannot apply in a case where the first proviso applies because, if a notice under Section 148 of the Act could not be issued beyond the time period provided in the first proviso, then the fifth proviso could not save such notices The fifth proviso can only apply where one has to determine whether the time limit of three years and ten years in Section 149(1) of the Act are breached. 16. The sixth proviso to Section 149 of the Act has no impact as it only provides a situation where after exclusion of the time period referred to in the fifth proviso, the time available with the Assessing Officer for passing an order under Section 148A(d) of

40 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 the Act is less than 7 days, then the remaining time frame shall be extended to 7 days and limitation also stands extended by 7 days”

"12. In this case, as it pertains to Assessment Year 2017-18, six years period would have expired on 31 March 2024 whereas notice under Section 148 of the Act itself came to be issued on 1 May 2024. Mr. Siddharth Bapna, counsel for Revenue, made an attempt to argue that fifth and sixth provisos to Section 149(1)(b) of the Act would save the period of limitation for issuing notice under Section 148 of the Act. We are afraid we do not agree with him. Same argument was raised in Hexaware Technologies Lid (supra) and was rejected. The Court held, with respect to applicability of fifth and sixth provisos to Section 149(1)(b) of the Act for extension of limitation for issuing notice under Section 148 of the Act, fifth and sixth provisos are only applicable with respect to the period of limitation prescribed under Section 149(1) of the Act ie, three years or ten years, as the case may be. The Court also held that fifth and sixth provisos extend limitation for issuing notice under Section 149 of the Act, however, first proviso is an exception to the period of limitation and provides for a restriction on the notices under Section 148 of the Act being issued for assessment years up to 2021-22 (in thes case, it is Assessment Year 2017-18) beyond a certain date. Therefore, the way the section would operate, is to first decide whether a notice issued under Section 148 of the Net is within the period of limitation under Section 149(1)(2 (b) of the Act. To decide whether the notice is within the period of

41 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 limitation under Section 149(1)(a) or (b) of the Act, the extension of time as prescribed in fifth and/or sixth proviso would be considered. The Court further held once, the notice is otherwise within the period of limitation. thereafter one has to see whether the said limit is within the prescribed restriction provided in first proviso or not. If the netice is beyond the restriction period, the notice is invalid, and the fifth and/or the sixth proviso cannot apply at this stage to extend the period of restriction as per first proviso. Hence, if a notice is not within the time prescribed under first proviso to Section 149(1) of the Act, then such period cannot be extended by fifth or sixth proviso. In Hexaware Technologies Ltd. (supra), the Court had relied upon another judgment of Bombay High Court in Godrej Industries Lid. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax (2024) 160 tasmann.com 13 (Bombay)/(2024) 338 CTR (Bom) 25, which was also authored by one of us (the Chief Justice), where paragraph No.15 reads as under:

“15 The validity of a notice must be judged on the basis of the law existing as on the date on which the notice is issued under Section 148 of the Act, which in the present case is 31" July 2022, by which time the Finance Act, 2021 is already on the statute and in terms thereof, no notice under Section 148 of the Act for AY 2014-15 could be issued on or after 1" April 2021 based on the first proviso to Section 149 of the Act. Therefore, the fifth proviso cannot apply in case where the first proviso applies because, if a notice under Section 148 of the Act could not be issued beyond the time period provided in the first proviso, then the fifth proviso

42 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 could not save such notices. The fifth proviso can only apply where one has to determine whether the time limit of three years and ten years in Section 149(1) of the Act are breached." 15. The reliance placed by the Revenue on the decision rendered by Patna High Court in the case of Chandra Shekhar (supra) is distinguishable as it relates to the Assessment Year 2020-21 in respect of which the notice under Section 148A(b) of the Act was issued on 28.03.2024. The petitioner therein had assailed the notice on the ground that the Assessing Officer had no jurisdiction to undertake the assessment for the Assessment Year 2020-21 after 31.03.2024 with reference to the second notice issued on 22.04.2024 as it was beyond the time limit stipulated under Section 149(1)(a) of the Act. In the aforesaid facts, the learned Court held that the combined reading of the fifth and sixth provisos meant that the first notice dated 28.03.2024 was issued well within the time limit stipulated. Therefore, the Assessment Officer has jurisdiction.

43 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 pertinent to refer to the grounds taken in the rectification notice under Section 154 of the Act which are extracted hereunder: "1. On perusal of the assessment order u/s 143(3), it is seen that addition made of Rs.40,00,00,000/- on unexplained cash credits with regard to shares allotment to M/s. Cancer Treatment Services Hyderabad Pvt. Ltd. However, AO added only Rs.40,00,000/- instead of Rs.40,00,00,000/- in the computation of total income. This amounts to short addition made of Rs.39,60,00,000/- having tax effect of Rs.30,59,10,000/- excluding interest. 2. From the tax audit report in Farm 3CD, it is observed that the assessee's company has not paid employees contribution to PF within the due dates prescribed under the acts. In view of the same, the same has to be disallowed u/s 36(1)(va) of the Act. The AO has not made any disallowance u/s 35(1)(va). Hence, an amount of Rs.6,35,949/- shall be disallowed u/s 36(1)(va). Tax effect (excluding interest) of disallowance u/s 36(1)(va) is Rs.2.20,089/- 3. As verified from 3CD report, assessee was shown the an amount of Rs. 78,26,412/- additions to the block of assets. During the assessment proceedings, assessee has not given details and supporting evidences about additions to the block of assets. Hence, the AO has not verified the genuineness of the additions to the block of assets. Hence, the depreciation claimed of Rs. 78,26,412/- is not allowable and the same has to be added to the total income of the assessee. The tax effect of disallowing depreciation is Rs.27,08,565/-" 18. The reasons mentioned in the order passed under Section 148A(d) of the Act are also extracted hereunder:

44 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 “5.1. The assessee requested that the claim of the assessee is found to be in order towards belated payments of ESVEPF amounting to Rs.6,35,949, However, in recent judgement passed by Apex court in the case of Mis Checkmate Services (P) Ltd Vs CIT (791 SC 2022) hell that it is an essential condition for the deduction of employees contribution that such amounts are deposited on or before the due dates defined by the respective statues Therefore contention of the assessee is not in order. 5.2. Further, the assessee furnished partial bills/vouchers towards additions made to fixed assets for the Y 2016-17 relevant to A.Y 2017-18. Since the volumes of the information furnished the same needs to be verified further with third party confirmations, Therefore, the depreciation claimed by the assessee amounting to Rs. 78,26,412 is still stand unexplained with proper evidence." 19. The Revenue has not disclosed as to whether the proceedings under Section 154 of the Act had ended up in passing of an order. Even then, the reopening of assessment proceedings under Section 148 of the Act would amount to a change in opinion which is not permissible in law. Reliance has also been placed upon the decision of the Apex Court in S.M. Overseas (P.) Ltd., (supra) on the proposition that parallel proceedings cannot be initiated for reopening of the assessment during pendency of the proceedings under Section 154 of the Act. Paras 4 and 5 of the said decision are also quoted hereunder:

"4. Having heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respective parties and having gone through the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, we are of the

45 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 opinion that the High Court has committed serious error in observing and holding that the notice under section 154 was invalid as the same was beyond the period of limitation as prescribed/provided under section 154(7) of the Act. It is required to be noted that the proceedings under section 154 of the Act were not the subject-matter before the High Court. Nothing was on record that, in fact, the notice under section 154 of the Act was withdrawn on the ground that the same was beyond the period of limitation prescribed under section 154(7) of the Act. In the absence of any specific order of withdrawal of the proceedings under section 154 of the Act, the proceedings initiated under section 154 of the Act can be said to have been pending. 5. In that view of the matter, during the pendency of the proceedings under section 154 of the Act, it was not permissible on the part of the Revenue to initiate the proceedings under section 147/148 of the Act pending the proceedings under section 154 of the Act. The High Court has erred in presuming and observing that the proceedings under section 154 were invalid because the same were beyond the period of limitation." 20. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are satisfied that the second issue raised by the petitioner is also required to be answered in the affirmative. 21. Therefore, for the reasons recorded hereinabove, the proceedings initiated under Section 148 of the Act for reopening of the assessment relating to the Assessment Year 2017-18 are barred by limitation and accordingly, set aside.”

46 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 9.3. Thus, the Hon’ble Jurisdictional Telangana High Court has held that the notice issued by the Assessing Officer u/sec.148 of the Act dated 22.04.2024 was beyond the time limit stipulated u/sec.149(1)(a) of the Act though the show cause notice dated 28.03.2024 was well within the time limit. In the case in hand also the show cause notice u/sec.148A(b) of the Act was issued on 19.03.2022 which is well within the time limit, however, the Assessing Officer has not issued the notice u/sec.148 of the Act within the period of limitation as prescribed u/sec.149(1) read with proviso to the said section and therefore, the notice u/sec.148 was issued after 06 years from the end of the assessment year even after availing the time period given to the assessee for reply to the said show cause notice. An identical issue has been considered by this Tribunal in the case of Peda Subbarao Unnam vs. ITO (supra) in Para nos.17 to 20 as under:

“17. We have heard both the parties, perused the material available on record and had gone through the orders of the authorities below. We have also carefully considered the relevant notice issued by the A.O. under Section 148 of the Act dated 09.04.2022 in the light of the first proviso to Section 149(1)(b) of the Act. The first proviso to Section 149(1)(b) of the Act states that, no notice under Section 148 of the Act shall be issued at any time in a case for the relevant assessment year beginning on or before 01.04.2021 if a notice under Section 148 of the Act could not have been issued at that time on account of being beyond the time limit specified under the provisions of clause (b) of Section 149 of the Act, as it stood immediately before the commencement of the Finance Act, 2021.

47 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 18. In the present case, the assessment year involved is 2015- 16 and as per the unamended provisions of Section 149, if the income escaped assessment is more than Rs. 1 lakh, then the assessment can be reopened up to six years from the end of the relevant assessment year. Accordingly, for the assessment year 2015-16, the assessment could have been reopened on or before 31.03.2022. Since the time limit available for issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act, as per the old regime of reassessment, was up to 31.03.2022, in our considered view, the A.O. cannot issue reassessment notice under Section 148 of the Act for the assessment year 2015-16 on or after 01.04.2022. In the present case, it is an undisputed fact that the A.O. has issued notice under Section 148 of the Act on 09.04.2022, which is beyond six years from the end of the relevant assessment year. Therefore, the notice issued by the A.O. under Section 148 of the Act dated 09.04.2022 is barred by limitation in view of the first proviso to Section 149(1)(b) of the Act and consequently the impugned assessment order passed by the A.O. dated 28.11.2023 is bad in law and liable to be quashed. 19. This legal proposition is supported by the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Telangana in the case of Cyberabad Citizens Health Services Private Limited Vs. D.C.I.T. (supra). A similar view has been taken by the Coordinate Bench in the case of A.C.I.T. Vs. Manish Financial in ITA No. 5055/Mum/2024 (supra), wherein the coordinate Bench, after considering the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Rajeev Bansal, held as under: "6. We heard the parties and perused the material on record. In assessee's case, the AO issued the original notice under section 148 dated 29.06.2021 for AY 2015-16 and consequent to the directions

48 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ashish Agrawal (supra), the said notice was deemed as notice issued under section 148A(b). The Assessing Officer after passing the order under section 148A(d) issued the notice under section 148 dated 29.07.2022. The contention of the assessee is that the said notice is barred by limitation as per the first proviso to the un-amended provisions of section 149(1) as has been confirmed by the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajeev Bansal (Supra). The relevant observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reads as under- 19. Mr N Venkataraman, learned Additional Solicitor General of India, made the following submissions on behalf of the Revenue: (a) to (c)**** (f). The Revenue concedes that for the assessment year 2015-16, all notices issued on or after 1 April 2021 will have to be dropped as they will not fall for completion during the period prescribed under TOLA; 46. The ingredients of the proviso could be broken down for analysis as follows: (i) no notice under section 148 of the new regime can be issued at any time for an assessment year beginning on or before 1 April 2021; (ii) if it is barred at the time when the notice is sought to be issued because of the "time limits specified under the provisions of 149(1)(b) of the old regime.

49 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 Thus, a notice could be issued under section 148 of the new regime for assessment year 2021-2022 and before only if the time limit for issuance of such notice continued to exist under section 149(1)(b) of the old regime. 49. The first proviso to Section 149(1)(b) requires the determination of whether the time limit prescribed under section 149(1)(b) of the old regime continues to exist for the assessment year 2021-2022 and before. Resultantly, a notice under Section 148 of the new regime cannot be issued if the period of six years from the end of the relevant assessment year has expired at the time of issuance of the notice. This also ensures that the new time limit of ten years prescribed under section 149(1)(b) of the new regime applies prospectively. For example, for the assessment year 2012- 2013, the ten year period would have expired on 31 March 2023, while the six year period expired on 31 March 2019. Without the proviso to Section 149(1)(b) of the new regime, the Revenue could have had the power to reopen assessments for the year 2012-2013 if the escaped assessment amounted to Rupees fifty lakhs or more. The proviso limits the retrospective operation of Section 149(1)(b) to protect the interests of the assesses. 7. This issue of notice under section 148 issued for 2015-16 being time barred is considered by the coordinate bench in the case of Pushpak Realities Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and it is held that *****For the A.Y.2015-16, the Revenue itself has contended before the Hon'ble Supreme Court as noted above, all the notices issued on or after 01/04/2021 will have to be

50 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 dropped as they will not fall for completion during the period prescribed under TOLA. Here notice w/s. 148 for the A.Y. 2015-16 has been issued on 28/07/2022 which is admittedly barred by limitation under the new provision of Section 149(1) and it is not covered under TOLA. Accordingly, all the notices are quashed being barred by limitation on the reasons given above and we are not going on the reasons given by the Id. CIT (A) for quashing the notice." 8. A combined reading of the above observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the findings of coordinate bench makes it clear that the test for checking the validity of notices issued under section 148 under new regime for AYs 2021-22 or prior years is whether the period of six years has expired at the time of issue of such notice and in that case the notice under section 148 becomes invalid. These observations also makes it clear that the time limit of ten years as per the amended provisions of section 149(1)(b) can be applied only prospectively. In assessee's case when we apply this test for AY 2015-16, the period of six years has expired on 31.03.2022 and therefore the notice dated 29.07.2022 under section 148 of the Act for AY 2015-16 is invalid since it is barred by limitation. Accordingly the assessment completed under section 147 of the Act is liable to be quashed. 9. Since we have already quashed the order under section 147 based on the legal contention of notice being time barred the other legal contentions raised by the assessee in the CO have become academic not warranting any adjudication. Accordingly the CO is partly allowed.

51 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 10. We have quashed the order of re-assessment for AY 2015-16 considering the legal contentions raised by the assessee in the C.O. therefore the appeals of the revenue for AY 2015-16 contending the relief granted by the CIT(A) on the merits of the issues have become infructuous. Accordingly, the appeals of the revenue are dismissed.” 20. In view of the above discussion and respectfully following the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble High Court of Telangana, we hold that the notice issued under Section 148 of the Act dated 09.04.2022 is barred by limitation and therefore the consequent assessment order passed by the A.O. under Section 147 r.w.s. Section 144 of the Act dated 28.11.2023 is bad in law and liable to be quashed. Accordingly, we quash the assessment order passed by the A.O.

9.4. Accordingly, in the facts and circumstances of the case and by following the binding precedent of Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court (supra), we hold that the notice issued by the Assessing Officer u/sec.148 of the Act dated 15.04.2022 is barred by limitation and the same is liable to be quashed. We Order accordingly. Since we have quashed the notice issued u/sec.148 of the Act being invalid which also vitiates the re- assessment order passed by the Assessing Officer, therefore, the other grounds raised by the assessee becomes infructuous.”

9.1. Accordingly, the second notice issued by the Assessing Officer u/sec.148 of the Act on 29.07.2022 is invalid being barred by limitation. Further, the said notice

52 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 dated 29.07.2022 is also beyond the surviving period under the new provisions of the Act. The Assessing Officer has issued the initial notice u/sec.148 of the Act on 08.06.2021 by giving the benefit of TOLA the limitation would be extended up-to 30.06.2021 and therefore, the Assessing Officer was having surviving period of 22 days for completing the process u/sec.148A of the Act and issuing notice u/sec.148 as per the new provisions of the Act however, the Assessing Officer has issued the second notice u/sec.148 of the Act on 29.07.2022 whereas the 22 days would expire on 08.07.2022. The assessee has given the details of the surviving period and timeline of the various notices issued by the Assessing Officer as under:

53 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 9.2. These facts are not disputed as it is also emerging from the assessment record. An identical issue has been considered by this Tribunal in the case of Brijesh Chandwani, Hyderabad vs. DCIT, Circle-6(1), Hyderabad in ITA.Nos.1527 & 1528/Hyd./2025, vide Order dated 28.11.2025 in Para nos.8 to 15 as under:

54 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 India vs. Ashish Agrawal (supra) has observed in Paras 108 to 111 as under :

“108. The Income-tax Act read with TOLA extended the time limit for issuing reassessment notices under section 148, which fell for completion from 20 March 2020 to 31 March 2021, till 30 June 2021. All the reassessment notices under challenge in the present appeals were issued from 1 April 2021 to 30 June 2021 under the old regime. Ashish Agarwal (supra) deemed these reassessment notices under the old regime as show cause notices under the new regime with effect from the date of issuance of the reassessment notices. The effect of creating the legal fiction is that this Court has to imagine as real all the consequences and incidents that will inevitably flow from the fiction. East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council [1952] AC 109. [Lord Asquith, in his concurring opinion, observed: "If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which, if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it."] Therefore, the logical effect of the creation of the legal fiction by Ashish Agarwal (supra) is that the time surviving under the Income-tax Act read with TOLA will be available to the Revenue to complete the remaining proceedings in furtherance of the deemed notices, including issuance of reassessment notices under section 148 of the new regime. The surviving or balance time limit can be calculated by computing the number of days between the date of issuance of the deemed notice and 30 June 2021.

55 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 109. If this Court had not created the legal fiction and the original reassessment notices were validly issued according to the provisions of the new regime, the notices under section 148 of the new regime would have to be issued within the time limits extended by TOLA. As a corollary, the reassessment notices to be issued in pursuance of the deemed notices must also be within the time limit surviving under the Income-tax Act read with TOLA. This construction gives full effect to the legal fiction created in Ashish Agarwal (supra) and enables both the assesses and the Revenue to obtain the benefit of all consequences flowing from the fiction. See State of A P v. A P Pensioners Association [2005] 13 SCC 161. [This Court observed that the "legal fiction undoubtedly is to be construed in such a manner so as to enable a person, for whose benefit such legal fiction has been created, to obtain all consequences flowing therefrom."] 110. The effect of the creation of the legal fiction in Ashish Agarwal (supra) was that it stopped the clock of limitation with effect from the date of issuance of Section 148 notices under the old regime [which is also the date of issuance of the deemed notices]. As discussed in the preceding segments of this judgment, the period from the date of the issuance of the deemed notices till the supply of relevant information and material by the assessing officers to the assesses in terms of the directions issued by this Court in Ashish Agarwal (supra) has to be excluded from the computation of the period of limitation. Moreover, the period of two weeks granted to

56 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 the assesses to reply to the show cause notices must also be excluded in terms of the third proviso to Section 149. 111. The clock started ticking for the Revenue only after it received the response of the assesses to the show causes notices. After the receipt of the reply, the assessing officer had to perform the following responsibilities: (i) consider the reply of the assessee under section 149A(c); (ii) take a decision under section 149A(d) based on the available material and the reply of the assessee; and (iii) issue a notice under section 148 if it was a fit case for reassessment. Once the clock started ticking, the assessing officer was required to complete these procedures within the surviving time limit. The surviving time limit, as prescribed under the Income-tax Act read with TOLA, was available to the assessing officers to issue the reassessment notices under section 148 of the new regime.” 10. Thus, the effect of creation of legal friction by Ashish Agrawal Judgment was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and held that the time/surviving period under the Income Tax Act read with TOLA will be available to the Revenue to complete remaining proceedings in- furtherance of the deemed notice including issuance of re-assessment notice u/sec.148 under new regime. The surviving or balance time limit can be calculated by computing the number of days between date of issuance of the deemed notice and 30.06.2021. In the case of the assessee, the deemed notice itself was issued on 30.06.2021 and, therefore, there was a zero days surviving period with the Assessing Officer, which means, the Assessing Officer was not having any surplus time period to complete the further proceedings up-to the issuance of notice u/sec.148 of

57 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 the Act under new regime. The period of two weeks was granted to the assessee to reply the show cause notice and that must be excluded in terms of third proviso to sec.149. Therefore, zero period was available with Assessing Officer after two weeks to pass the order u/sec.148(d) as well as issue notice u/sec.148. However, as per 4th proviso to sec.149(1), the minimum days available with the Assessing Officer shall not be less than 7 days. Therefore, the Assessing Officer was having 7 days as a surviving period + 14 days on account of the reply to be filed by the assessee to the notice issued u/sec.148A(b) of the Act. The due date of filing the reply in the case of the assessee after allowing the 14 days/2 weeks as per third proviso to sec.149 comes to 07.06.2022 because the Assessing Officer issued the show cause notice u/sec.148A(b) on 25.05.2022. The minimum 7 days available with the Assessing Officer as per 4th proviso to sec.149(1) is added to this time limit for issue of notice u/sec.148 would be extended up-to 14.06.2022. However, the Assessing Officer has issued notice u/sec.148 on 29.07.2022 which is beyond the surviving period and time limit. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. Rajeev Bansal (supra), has finally concluded in Para Nos.113 and 114 as under:

“113. In Ashish Agarwal (supra), this Court allowed the assesses to avail all the defences, including the defence of expiry of the time limit specified under section 149(1). In the instant appeals, the reassessment notices pertain to the assessment years 2013-2014, 2014-2015, 2015-2016, 2016- 2017, and 2017-2018. To assume jurisdiction to issue notices under section 148 with respect to the relevant assessment years, an assessing officer has to: (i) issue the notices within the period prescribed under section 149(1) of the new regime

58 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 read with TOLA; and (ii) obtain the previous approval of the authority specified under section 151. A notice issued without complying with the preconditions is invalid as it affects the jurisdiction of the assessing officer. Therefore, the reassessment notices issued under section 148 of the new regime, which are in pursuance of the deemed notices, ought to be issued within the time limit surviving under the Income- tax Act read with TOLA. A reassessment notice issued beyond the surviving time limit will be time-barred.

G. Conclusions 114. In view of the above discussion, we conclude that: a. After 1 April 2021, the Income-tax Act has to be read along with the substituted provisions; b. TOLA will continue to apply to the Income-tax Act after 1 April 2021 if any action or proceeding specified under the substituted provisions of the Income-tax Act falls for completion between 20 March 2020 and 31 March 2021; c. Section 3(1) of TOLA overrides Section 149 of the Income- tax Act only to the extent of relaxing the time limit for issuance of a reassessment notice under section 148; d. TOLA will extend the time limit for the grant of sanction by the authority specified under section 151. The test to determine whether TOLA will apply to Section 151 of the new regime is this: if the time limit of three years from the end of an assessment year falls between 20 March 2020 and 31 March 2021, then the specified authority under section 151(i) has extended time till 30 June 2021 to grant approval;

59 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025

e. In the case of Section 151 of the old regime, the test is: if the time limit of four years from the end of an assessment year falls between 20 March 2020 and 31 March 2021, then the specified authority under section 151(2) has extended time till 31 March 2021 to grant approval; f. The directions in Ashish Agarwal (supra) will extend to all the ninety thousand reassessment notices issued under the old regime during the period 1 April 2021 and 30 June 2021; g. The time during which the show cause notices were deemed to be stayed is from the date of issuance of the deemed notice between 1 April 2021 and 30 June 2021 till the supply of relevant information and material by the assessing officers to the assesses in terms of the directions issued by this Court in Ashish Agarwal (supra), and the period of two weeks allowed to the assesses to respond to the show cause notices; and h. The assessing officers were required to issue the reassessment notice under section 148 of the new regime within the time limit surviving under the Income-tax Act read with TOLA. All notices issued beyond the surviving period are time barred and liable to be set aside;” 11. Thus, after 01.04.2021 the Income Tax Act has to be read along with substituted provisions including application of TOLA if action or proceedings specified under the substituted provisions of the Act falls for completion between March, 2020 and 31.03.2021. In the case of the assessee, there is no dispute that the time limit for issuing the notice u/sec.148 was expired within this period. It is specifically concluded by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the Assessing Officer required to issue

60 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 re-assessment notice u/sec.148 of the new regime within the time limit surviving under the Act read with TOLA and the notice issued beyond the surviving period is time barred and liable to be set-aside. Therefore, the notice issued beyond the surviving period is time barred and liable to be set-aside. The Hon’ble Madras High Court in the case of Thulasidass Prabavathi vs. ITO (supra), while considering an identical issue has held in Paras-16 to 18 as under : “16. However, the first proviso to Section 149 prohibits issuance of a reassessment notice under the new regime if such notices have become time-barred under the old regime. Therefore, the last date for issuance of Notice under Section 148 of the Act would have expired on 30.06.2021, as per the third Proviso 149(1)(b) of the Act as in force with effect from 01.04.2021. The time during which stay was in operation or the time during which, the assessee took time to file the reply, the Notice issued under Section 148 (A)(b) of the Act stands expelled. In this case, the reply itself was filed by the petitioner only on 31.05.2022, pursuant to which the Impugned Order was passed on 30.06.2022 under Section 148(A)(d) of the Act and Notice under Section 148 of the Act was issued. Though the limitation for issuance of a Notice under Section 148 of the Act under the old regime would have expired on 31.03.2024, a reading of conclusion in Paragraph 114 of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2693 however indicates that the Impugned Notice dated 30.06.2022 has to be treated as having been issued beyond the limitation period. Relevant paragraph of the aforesaid Judgment reads as under:-

61 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025

"114. In view of the above discussion, we conclude that: a. ..... ..... b. c. ..... ..... d. e. ..... f. ..... g. The time during which the show cause notices were deemed to be stayed is from the date of issuance of the deemed notice between 1 April 2021 and 30 June 2021 till the supply of relevant information and material by the assessing officers to the assessees in terms of the directions issued by this Court in Ashish Agarwal (supra), and the period of two weeks allowed to the assessees to respond to the show cause notices; and

h. The assessing officers were required to issue the reassessment notice under Section 148 of the new regime within the time limit surviving under the Income-tax Act read with TOLA. All notices issued beyond the surviving period are time barred and liable to be set aside." 17. Dealing with almost an identical situation pursuant to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2693, the Delhi High Court quashed the notice dated 31.03.2021 issued to the assessee under Section 148 of the Act and the proceedings. Since the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2693 is a settled law, it is binding on this Court. I am therefore unable to take a contra view in the light of the aforesaid decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal, 2024 SCC On Line SC 2693.

62 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 18. Therefore, this Writ Petition deserves to be allowed and is accordingly allowed. No costs. Connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.” 12. Thus, by following Judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. Rajeev Bansal (supra), the Hon’ble Madras High Court has held that notice issued u/sec.148 beyond the surviving period is invalid and liable to be set-aside. The Hon’ble Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Kulwant Singh vs. Union of India (supra) while disposing of batch of 152 writ petitions vide Judgment dated 19.10.2024 has held In Paras-7 and 8 as under : “7. While examining the cases, the example as mentioned by the Apex Court in its judgment in Rajeev Bansal's case (supra) in paragraph No. 112 and observations made in paragraph Nos. 110 and 111, shall also be taken into consideration. Cases, which fall less than the value of Rs.50,00,000/- would have to be dropped keeping in view the stand taken by the revenue before the Apex Court, as observed in paragraph No.53.

If any of the petitioner/assessee is still aggrieved of the order passed, remedy in terms of the provision of the Act can be availed by him.

With the aforementioned observations, the writ petitions are disposed of.”

63 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 13. Accordingly, the Hon’ble High Court held that the notice issued u/sec.148 on 30.07.2022 is invalid, being barred by limitation and accordingly set-aside.

64 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025

Analysis - in the factual context

65 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 to the notice under Section 148A(b) of the Act on 13.06.2022. Thus, the period of limitation began running from that date.

66 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 order under Section 148A(d) of the Act was in excess of the seven days.

9.3. Accordingly, in the facts and circumstances of the case and by following the earlier Order of this Tribunal in the case of Brijesh Chandwani, Hyderabad vs. DCIT, Circle- 6(1), Hyderabad vide Order dated 28.11.2025 (supra), we hold that the notice u/sec.148 of the Act dated 29.07.2022 is otherwise invalid being beyond the surviving period as per the amended provisions of sec.148A r.w.s.149 of the Act. Our

67 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025 findings are applicable mutatis mutandis for both the assessment years i.e., 2014-2015 and 2015-2016 as the facts are common and identical for both the assessment years. Since we have quashed the notice u/sec.148 which also vitiates the re-assessment orders passed by the Assessing Officer. Therefore, we do not adjudicate the other grounds which are also not pressed by the learned Counsel for the Assessee.

Order pronounced in the open court on .07.2026

Sd/- Sd/- MANJUNATHA G VIJAY PAL RAO ACCOUNTANT MEMBER VICE PRESIDENT Hyderabad, Dated day of July, 2026 VBP

68 ITA.Nos.2422 & 2423/Hyd./2025

Copy to: VARADARAJAN RAJASEKHAR, C/O., P. MURALI & CO., CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS, 1 6-3-655/2/3, SOMAJIGUDA, HYDERABAD-500082, TELANGANA 2 ACIT, CENTRAL CIRCLE-2(3), OFFICE OF ACIT CENTRAL CIRCLE-2(3), HYDERABAD-, TELANGANA 3 THE Pr. CIT-(CENTRAL), HYDERABAD. 4 THE D.R., ITAT, HYDERABAD B-BENCH, HYDERABAD. 5 GUARD FILE TRUE COPY Digitally signed VADREVU by VADREVU PRASADA RAO PRASADA Date: RAO ASSISTANT REGISTRAR / 2026.07.03 I.T.A.T., HYDERABAD 10:56:03 +05'30'