SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE TELECOMMUNICATION HARYANA PANCHKULA,PANCHKULA vs. INCOME TAX OFFICER, WARD-1(3), PANCHKULA, PANCHKULA

ITA 621/CHANDI/2025Status: DisposedITAT Chandigarh06 July 2026AY 2017-186 pages

AI SummaryDismissed

What did the Tribunal hold?

The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to provide specific particulars and documentary evidence to substantiate the reasons for the extraordinary delay. Vague and general assertions were deemed insufficient to establish 'sufficient cause'.

What were the facts?

The assessee, a Government Department, filed appeals before the ITAT after an inordinate delay of 1,063 days. The assessee sought condonation of delay citing administrative circumstances, frequent transfers of officers, and procedural delays.

What were the issues?

Whether the administrative circumstances and procedural delays cited by the assessee constitute 'sufficient cause' for condoning an inordinate delay of 1,063 days in filing appeals.

Which sections of the Income-tax Act were involved?

Section 253(5)

AI-generated summary — verify with the full judgment below

आयकर अपीलीय अिधकरण,च�ीगढ़ �ायपीठ “बी” , च�ीगढ़ IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, CHANDIGARH BENCH “B”, CHANDIGARH HEARING THROUGH: HYBRID MODE �ी लिलत कुमार, �ाियक सद� एवं �ी मनोज कुमार अ�वाल, लेखा सद� BEFORE: SHRI. LALIET KUMAR, JM & SHRI. MANOJ KUMAR AGGARWAL, AM आयकर अपील सं./ ITA No. 621 To 624 /Chd/ 2025 िनधा�रण वष� / Assessment Year : 2017-18 To 2018-19 Superintendent of Police बनाम The ITO, Telecommunication Haryana Ward-1(3) Panchkula Panchkula C/o Tejmohan Singh, Advocate # 527, Sector-10D, Chandigarh �ायी लेखा सं./PAN NO: AAAGS6569M अपीलाथ�/Appellant ��थ�/Respondent िनधा�रती की ओर से/Assessee by : Shri Tejmohan Singh, Advocate राज� की ओर से/ Revenue by : Dr. Ranjit Kaur, Addl. CIT, Sr. DR (Virtual) सुनवाई की तारीख/Date of Hearing : 02/07/2026 उदघोषणा की तारीख/Date of Pronouncement : 06/07/2026 आदेश/Order PER BENCH: At the outset, it is noticed that the present appeals have been preferred by the assessee against the orders passed by the Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), National Faceless Appeal Centre (NFAC), Delhi, all dated 15.03.2022, relating to Assessment Years 2017-18 and 2018-19.

The Registry has pointed out that the appeals have been instituted after an inordinate delay of 1,063 days beyond the period prescribed under the Income-tax Act, 1961. Along with the memorandum of appeals, the assessee has filed a common application supported by an affidavit seeking condonation of the aforesaid delay.

The Ld. AR submitted that since the facts giving rise to the delay are identical in all the appeals, a common application has been filed. It was argued that the delay is neither deliberate nor intentional but has occurred due to bona fide administrative circumstances beyond the control of the assessee. It was submitted that the assessee is a Government Department

2 where decisions relating to litigation are taken institutionally after the matter is processed through various administrative levels and approval is obtained from the competent authority before filing an appeal.

3.1 It was further submitted that during the relevant period there were frequent transfers of the officers and officials dealing with income-tax matters. Consequently, the charge relating to pending litigation and official records was handed over from one incumbent to another on several occasions. Owing to these repeated transfers, the present matters inadvertently escaped attention and the appeals could not be instituted within the statutory period of limitation.

3.2 The Ld. AR further submitted that the delay occurred because of administrative exigencies arising from repeated changes in the officers handling litigation, movement of official records, the time consumed in tracing the relevant files, examining the issues involved and completing the necessary departmental formalities. According to the Ld. AR, the delay was purely procedural and institutional in nature and was neither attributable to deliberate inaction nor to any negligence on the part of the assessee.

3.3 It was also submitted that subsequently, during a review of pending tax litigation by the present incumbent, it came to notice that the appeals against the impugned orders had not been filed before the Tribunal. Immediately thereafter, the relevant records were collected and examined, legal opinion was obtained, approval from the competent authority was sought and, thereafter, the present appeals were filed without any further avoidable delay.

3.4 It was further contended that the assessee has acted throughout in a bona fide manner and has not derived any advantage by filing the appeals belatedly. The delay, according to the Ld. AR, occurred solely because of the administrative functioning of the Department and not because of any intention to disregard the statutory period of limitation. It was, therefore, submitted that sufficient cause exists within the meaning of section 253(5) of

3 the Act and, in the interest of substantial justice, the delay deserves to be condoned so that the controversy regarding levy of fee under section 234E of the Act may be decided on merits.

Per contra, the Ld. DR vehemently opposed the application for condonation of delay. It was submitted that the delay of 1,063 days is extraordinary and has not been satisfactorily explained. According to the Ld. DR, the assessee is a statutory Government Department having an established administrative hierarchy and cannot seek condonation merely by making vague and omnibus allegations regarding administrative approvals, transfer of officers and movement of files. It was argued that the application does not disclose the dates on which approval was initiated or granted, the names of the officers who dealt with the matter, the dates on which transfers took place or any documentary evidence showing movement of the file. The explanation, therefore, does not constitute "sufficient cause" within the meaning of section 253(5) of the Act. Reliance was placed upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., and other judicial precedents to contend that while a liberal approach may be adopted, gross negligence, inaction and vague explanations cannot be accepted for condonation of such an inordinate delay.

We have heard the rival submissions and carefully perused the application for condonation of delay, the affidavit filed in support thereof and the material available on record. There is no dispute that the appeals have been instituted after an extraordinary delay of 1,063 days. The only issue requiring consideration is whether the assessee has established "sufficient cause" for not presenting the appeals within the prescribed period as contemplated under section 253(5) of the Act.

5.1 We have carefully examined each of the reasons assigned by the assessee in support of the application. The principal grounds urged are that the assessee, being a Government Department, was required to obtain approval from the competent authority, that there were repeated transfers of

4 officers dealing with income-tax matters, that official records changed hands on several occasions, that time was consumed in tracing the relevant files and obtaining legal opinion and that ultimately the omission came to light during a review conducted by the present incumbent.

5.2 In our considered opinion, none of the aforesaid explanations has been supported by any contemporaneous record or documentary evidence. The application merely contains broad and general assertions without disclosing the necessary particulars. No date has been mentioned indicating when the proposal for filing the appeals was initiated, before whom the proposal remained pending, when approval was sought, when the competent authority granted approval or how much time was consumed at each administrative stage. Likewise, although repeated transfers of officers have been cited as the principal reason for delay, neither the names nor the designations of such officers, nor the dates of their transfers or assumption of charge, have been brought on record.

5.3 Similarly, the plea regarding movement of official records and the time consumed in tracing the files is also unsupported by any documentary evidence. No record relating to movement of the files, correspondence between officers, internal office noting or any administrative order has been produced before us. Even the averment that the omission was detected during a review conducted by the present incumbent does not specify when such review was undertaken or the date on which the lapse came to notice. Likewise, though it has been stated that legal opinion was obtained and approval was thereafter processed, neither the date of obtaining such opinion nor the date of grant of approval has been disclosed.

5.4 Thus, the entire explanation is couched in broad and general expressions without furnishing any specific particulars explaining the delay of 1,063 days. It is now well settled that although the expression "sufficient cause" deserves a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, such liberal approach cannot be extended to cases where the explanation is vague, lacks bona fides or remains unsupported by material evidence.

5.5 The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy [(2013) 12 SCC 649] has held that while adopting a justice-oriented approach, courts cannot condone delay where negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is evident. The Court has further held that the concept of liberal interpretation of "sufficient cause" cannot be employed to jettison the law of limitation itself.

5.6 Likewise, in Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that Government departments do not enjoy a separate limitation period and are equally bound to explain the delay with cogent, satisfactory and acceptable reasons. Mere bureaucratic procedures or administrative delays, in the absence of specific particulars and supporting material, cannot by themselves constitute sufficient cause.

5.7 We are conscious that ordinarily litigation should be decided on merits. However, the law of limitation is founded upon public policy and cannot be rendered otiose merely because the appellant happens to be a Government Department. The discretion vested in the Tribunal under section 253(5) of the Act has to be exercised judicially and only when the appellant demonstrates sufficient cause covering the entire period of delay. In the present case, the assessee has failed to explain the delay day-to-day or even stage-wise. The explanation remains wholly general, unsupported by evidence and falls short of the standard required for condonation of an extraordinary delay exceeding three years.

5.8 In view of the foregoing discussion, we are unable to hold that the assessee has established sufficient cause for condonation of the delay of 1,063 days in filing the present appeals. Consequently, the application seeking condonation of delay is rejected.

5.9 Since the delay is not condoned, the accompanying appeals are barred by limitation and are accordingly dismissed in limine without entering into the merits of the issues raised therein.

6 6. In the result, the applications for condonation of delay are dismissed and consequently all the appeals filed by the assessee stand dismissed as time barred.

Order pronounced on 06/07/2026 Sd/- Sd/- मनोज कुमार अ�वाल लिलत कुमार (MANOJ KUMAR AGGARWAL) (LALIET KUMAR) लेखा सद�/ ACCOUNTANT MEMBER �ाियक सद� /JUDICIAL MEMBER AG आदेश की �ितिलिप अ�ेिषत/ Copy of the order forwarded to : 1. अपीलाथ�/ The Appellant 2. ��थ�/ The Respondent 3. आयकर आयु�/ CIT 4. आयकर आयु� (अपील)/ The CIT(A) 5. िवभागीय �ितिनिध, आयकर अपीलीय आिधकरण, च�ीगढ़/ DR, ITAT, CHANDIGARH 6. गाड� फाईल/ Guard File

BY ORDER, ASSISTANT REGISTRAR INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL KENDRIYA SADAN, SECTOR-9A CHANDIGARH

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