ANAS MOHAMMED ASIF TELI,MUMBAI vs. DY CIT CC 4(2), MUMBAI

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ITA 8585/MUM/2025Status: DisposedITAT Mumbai09 July 2026AY 2019-2020 pages

In favour of the assessee: the assessee's appeal was allowed. From the AI summary of this appeal.

AI SummaryAllowed

What did the Tribunal hold?

The Tribunal held that additions made solely on the basis of third-party statements and uncorroborated data, without providing the assessee an effective opportunity for cross-examination, are unsustainable. Suspicion cannot substitute for proof.

What were the facts?

The assessee purchased a shop with an agreement value of Rs. 15,69,750/-. The Assessing Officer added Rs. 8,71,700/- to the assessee's income under Section 69 of the Act, alleging this amount was paid in cash for the purchase. This addition was based on statements recorded during a search in a different group case and data from an Excel sheet.

What were the issues?

Whether additions made based on third-party information and without cross-examination are valid. Whether the principles of natural justice were violated by not allowing cross-examination of witnesses whose statements formed the basis of the addition.

Which sections of the Income-tax Act were involved?

Section 69,Section 153C,Section 144,Section 132,Section 250

AI-generated summary — verify with the full judgment below

Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, MUMBAI

Before: SHRI ANIKESH BANERJEE & SHRI BIJAYANANDA PRUSETH

INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, MUMBAI BENCHES, MUMBAI BENCH: A BEFORE SHRI ANIKESH BANERJEE, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND SHRI BIJAYANANDA PRUSETH, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER ITA 8585/MUM/2025 िनधा�रणवष�/Assessment Year: 2019-20) ANAS MOHAMMED ASIF TELI Dy CIT CC 4(2), Mumbai Plot No 1329, 1330 Bi Flat No Dy CIT CC 4(2) Kautilya 1701, 17th Floor, Mumbai Central Bhavan, BKC, Bandra East. Vs. Nagpada., Mumbai-400008, Mumbai-400051, Maharashtra Maharashtra अपीलाथ�Appellant ��थ� Respondent

Permanent Account Number of Assessee: BYLPT3376A

अपीलाथ��ारा/Appellant represented by: Shri Hiten Anil Raut, Adv. ��थ��ारा/Respondent represented by: Shri Manoj Kumar- CIT DR. सुनवाईकीतारीख/Date of conclusion of hearing: 07-Jul-2026 घोषणाकीतारीख/Date of pronouncement: 09-Jul-2026 आदेश / ORDER

PER: ANIKESH BANERJEE, (JM): The instant appeal of the assessee filed against the order of the Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-52, Mumbai [for brevity “Ld. CIT(A)], order passed under Section 250 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for brevity ‘the Act’), for the Assessment Year 2019-20, date of order 11.10.2025. The impugned order emanated from the order of Ld. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax- C.C.4(2), Mumbai (for brevity ‘Ld. AO’), order passed under Section 153C r.w.s. 144 of the Act, date of order 21.03.2024. 2. The brief facts of the case is that the assessee has not filed the original return. A search and seizure action u/sec. 132 of the Act was conducted on 17.03.2021 in Rubberwala Group and other. During the search action, it is gathered that the assessee has purchased the shop located in Platinum Mall building, Girgaon Mumbai with agreement value of Rs.15,69,750/- where as the stamp duty value determined by the stamp duty authority amount to Rs.13,32,648/-. The investigating authority found that the amount of Rs.13,87,750/- was paid in cash on acquisition of property in three installments for AY 2019-20 to AY 2021-22 amount to Rs.8,71,700/-, Rs.5,00,000/- and Rs.16,050/- respectively. Finally the assessment was completed exparte u/sec. 153C r.w.s. 144 of the Act. In the assessment proceeding the Ld. AO found that the premises was developed by M/s Rubberwala Housing and Infrastructure Ltd. (RHIL), its promoter and director and Shri Tabrez Shaikh and key employee of the RHIL Shri Imran Ansari who was handling sale and registration of shop in Platinum Mall Project of RHIL were covered. On statement of oath, Shri Imran Ansari had admitted that total price of the shops contained cash component and banking channel component and these components are decided by Shri Tabrez Shaikh. He further admitted that the said data maintained by him in excel sheet are related to sale of shops in Platinum Mall. The Ld. AO found that the assessee for purchase of shops had paid the cash Assessment Years 2019- 20 to 2021-22 total amount to Rs.13,87,750/- out of that in impugned A.Y. 2019-20 assessee paid Rs.8,71,700/-. Accordingly, the amount of Rs.8,71,700/- was added back u/sec. 69 of the Act. The aggrieved assessee filed an appeal before the Ld. CIT(A). The Ld. CIT(A) upheld the observations of the Ld. AO and rejected the appeal for the assessee. Being aggrieved the assessee filed an appeal before us.

3.

The Ld. AR filed a paper book containing pages 1 to 171, which has been placed on record. The Ld. AR contended that the assessee has categorically denied having made any cash payment to RHIL in connection with the purchase of the said commercial property. It was further submitted that no opportunity of cross-verification was granted to the assessee in respect of the additions made by the Ld. AO. The Ld. AR respectfully placed reliance on the order of the Coordinate Bench of the ITAT, Mumbai, in the case of Ankit Jems (P.) Ltd. vs. ITO reported in (2025) 178 taxmann.com 454 (Mum-Trib), wherein it was held that an addition under section 69, made solely on the basis of information received from investigation proceedings in another group case, could not be sustained in the absence of any cogent evidence against the assessee, particularly when the assessee had denied the transactions and the purchase records did not reflect any such entries.

4.

He further respectfully relied on the order of the Coordinate Bench of ITAT Mumbai in the case of Bharat Solanki vs. DCIT reported in [2026] 182 taxmann.com 68 (Mumbai-Trib.). Observations of the bench in contended in following paragraphs are reproduced as below:- “8.12 It is well settled that mere furnishing of copies of statements or documents does not, by itself, satisfy the requirement of natural justice, where such material is sought to be used adversely against an assessee and the assessee specifically disputes its correctness. The learned Commissioner (Appeals) has proceeded on the assumption that since extracts of statements, Excel data, and pendrive contents were supplied through the show-cause notice, the principles of natural justice stood fully complied with. This approach conflates disclosure of material with testing of material, which are legally distinct concepts. The reliance placed by the learned Commissioner (Appeals) on Andaman Timber Industries is, with respect, misconceived and internally contradictory. The said decision has been cited to suggest that cross-examination is necessary only where the third-party statement is the "sole basis" of the addition. This reading is incorrect. In the present case, the Excel sheets and the pen-drive data have no independent evidentiary value de hors the explanation and interpretation supplied by Shri Imran Ansari. The alleged cash component, the attribution of entries to specific buyers, and the linkage of the assessee to such entries emanate entirely from his statement. The digital material does not speak for itself. Consequently, the statement is not collateral or incidental evidence but the very foundation of the addition. Much emphasis has been placed by the lower authorities on the proposition that income-tax proceedings are not governed by the strict provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. There can be no quarrel with this settled proposition. However, it is equally settled that relaxation of evidentiary rules does not imply abrogation of natural justice. Even material which is otherwise admissible must still satisfy the minimum requirement of fairness when used against an assessee. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kishinchand Chellaram v. CIT [1980] 4 Taxman 29/125 ITR 713 (SC) has unequivocally held that any material collected behind the back of the assessee, if proposed to be used against him, must be subjected to an opportunity of rebuttal in a meaningful manner, which necessarily includes cross-examination where facts are disputed. 8.13 Considerable reliance has been placed on the alleged admission by the Rubberwala Group that it received on-money and offered the same to tax. This, however, cannot be determinative of the assessee's liability. It is trite law that an admission by one party cannot be used as conclusive evidence against another, unless the latter is afforded an opportunity to test and rebut such admission. The assessee is not estopped from disputing the correctness or applicability of such admission to his case, particularly when the alleged payment is denied and no independent corroboration exists. 8.14 The learned Commissioner (Appeals) has sought to distinguish the coordinate Bench decision in Rajesh Jain primarily on the ground that the assessee therein was subjected to search, whereas the present assessee was not. This distinction is wholly irrelevant to the core issue of evidentiary reliance on third-party material without cross-examination. Considerable reliance has been placed on the alleged admission by the Rubberwala Group that it received on-money and offered the same to tax. This, however, cannot be determinative of the assessee's liability. The ratio of Rajesh Jain rests squarely on two pillars:

1.

absence of corroborative material against the assessee, and 2. denial of cross-examination despite specific request. 8.15 Both these features are present in the case before us. Judicial discipline mandates that a coordinate Bench decision on identical facts be followed unless shown to be per incuriam, which is not the case here. 8.16 The ld CIT(A) relied on various decisions to contend that providing cross examination of sh Ansari was not required. These authorities do not lay down a blanket proposition dispensing with cross-examination. On the contrary, they consistently hold that the requirement depends on the nature of evidence, its role in the adjudication, and the prejudice caused. In the present case: • the assessee has categorically denied having made any cash payment; • no cash, diary, or corroborative document was found from the assessee; • the alleged diary, though repeatedly referred to in statements, was never recovered; and • the entire edifice of the addition rests on third-party statements and electronic data interpreted by those very persons. 8.17 In such circumstances, denial of cross-examination causes manifest prejudice and cannot be brushed aside as a mere procedural irregularity. 8.18 We find that, in identical factual circumstances relating to alleged cash "on-money" payments for purchase of shops in Platinum Mall from the Rubberwala Group, the Co- ordinate Bench of the Tribunal in Praveen Khetaramm Purohit v. Dy. CIT [IT Appeal Nos. 4742 to 4744/Mum/2025, dated 15.10.2025] has deleted similar additions. The learned also placed reliance upon another decision of the Co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal in Akhraj Pukhraaj Chopra v. Dy. CIT [IT Appeal Nos. 5553 and 5554/Mum/2025, dated 12-11-2025], wherein similar addition was made on the basis of search and seizure action on Rubberwala Group. Reliance in this regard has been also placed on the decision in case of Heena Dashrath Jhanglani v. ITO [IT Appeal No.1665/Mum./2018, dated 11.01.2019] (Assessment Year : 2007–08) wherein the Coordinate Bench of ITAT had decided the issue in favour of assessee and the relevant portion is being reproduced herein below: 10. I have considered rival submissions and perused material on record. Undisputedly, the genesis of the addition made of 42 lakh on account of alleged payment of on–money in cash towards purchase of a flat lies in a search and seizure operation conducted in case of Hiranandani Group and related persons. Though, in the assessment order the Assessing Officer has not discussed in detail the nature of incriminating material/ evidence available on record to indicate payment of on–money in cash by the assessee to M/s. Crescendo Associates, however, from the show cause notice dated 4th March 2015, which is reproduced by the Assessing Officer in the assessment order, it appears that the incriminating materials are in the form of pen drive found and seized from the residence of one of the employees of Hiranandani Group and a statement recorded under section 132(4) of the Act from Shri Niranjan Hiranandani, Director and Promoter of the Group, wherein, the details of on– money paid by buyers / prospective buyers to Hiranandani Group concerns are mentioned and further, in the statement recorded under section 132(4) of the Act on 14th March 2014, Shri Niranjan Hiranandani, has admitted receipt of on–money in cash towards sale of flats / shops. Thus, it is clear that except these two pieces of evidences the Assessing Officer had no other evidence on record which demonstrates that the assessee had paid on–money in cash for purchase of the flat. It is further relevant to observe, from the assessment stage itself the assessee has requested the Assessing Officer to provide him with all adverse materials and full text of the statement recorded under section 132(4) of the Act from Shri Niranjan Hiranandani. The assessee had also requested the Assessing Officer for allowing her to cross– examine Shri Niranjan Hiranandani and other parties whose statements were relied upon. Apparently, this request of the assessee was not acceded to by the Assessing Officer. When the assessee took up the aforesaid issue before the first appellate authority, the learned Commissioner (Appeals) in letter dated 18th July 2016, had clearly directed the Assessing Officer to provide the assessee all adverse materials / documentary evidences available with him indicating payment of on–money. However, on a perusal of the remand report dated 23th June 2017, a copy of which is at Page–53 of the paper book, it is very much clear that the Assessing Officer has completely avoided the issue and there is no mention whether the assessee was provided with all the adverse material and if, not so, whether he has provided them to the assessee as per the directions of the learned Commissioner (Appeals). Thus, from the aforesaid facts, it is patent and obvious that the addition of Rs. 42 lakh made on account of on–money payment in cash is without complying with the primary and fundamental requirement of rules of natural justice. It is well settled proposition of law that if the Assessing Officer intends to utilize any adverse material for deciding an issue against the assessee he is required to not only confront such adverse materials to the assessee but also offer him a reasonable opportunity to rebut / contradict the contents of the adverse material. Further, the assessment order reveals that the Assessing Officer has heavily relied upon the statement recorded from Shri Niranjan Hiranandani, for making the disputed addition. However, it is the allegation of the assessee, which prima–facie appears to be correct, that the Assessing Officer has not provided the full text of such statement recorded and has also not allowed the assessee an opportunity to cross– examine Shri Niranjan Hiranandani, and other persons whose statements were relied upon. This, in my view, is in gross violation of rules of natural justice and against the basic principle of law. In this context, I may refer to the decision of the Tribunal, Mumbai Bench, in Nikhil Vinod Agarwal (supra). Thus, for the aforesaid reason, the addition made cannot be sustained. 11. Even otherwise also, the addition made is unsustainable because of the following reasons. As discussed earlier in the order, the basis for addition on account of on–money is the information contained in the pen drive found during the search and seizure operation and the statement recorded under section 132(4) of the Act. As regards the information contained in the pen drive, it is the contention of the assessee that the said pen drive was not found from the possession of the assessee but in course of search and seizure operation conducted in case of a third party. Therefore, in absence of further corroborative evidence to establish that the contents of the pen drive are correct and authentic to the extent that the assessee paid on– money in cash, no addition can be made under section 69B of the Act. Further contention of the assessee is that in the statement recorded under section 132(4) of the Act, Shi Niranjan Hirandani has not made any reference to the assessee, therefore, in absence of any other corroborative evidence to establish that assessee has paid on–money in cash, no addition can be made. I find substantial merit in the aforesaid submissions of the assessee. In my view, neither the information contained in the pen drive nor the statement recorded under section 132(4) of the Act from Shri Niranjan Hiranandani are enough to conclusively establish the factum of payment of on–money by the assessee. At best, they can raise a doubt or suspicion against the conduct of the assessee triggering further enquiry / investigation to find out and bring on record the relevant fact and material to conclusively prove the payment of on–money by the assessee over and above the declared sale consideration. Apparently, the Assessing Officer has failed to bring any such evidence / material on record to prove the payment of on–money by the assessee. More so, when the assessee from the very beginning has stoutly denied payment of on–money in cash. Notably, while dealing with a case involving similar nature of dispute concerning similar transaction with another concern of Hiranandani Group, the Tribunal in case of Shri Anil Jaggi v/s ACIT (supra) has held as under:– ……. 8.19 The consistent factual matrix emerging from above decisions is that the additions were made solely on the basis of (i) statements of Shri Imran Ansari, an employee of the Rubberwala Group, recorded during the course of search, and (ii) data contained in an Excel sheet retrieved from a pen drive found from his possession. No incriminating material was found from the assessee. The assessee, from the inception, categorically denied having paid any cash over and above the documented consideration. 8.20 The Co-ordinate Bench, after an exhaustive examination of the facts, has held that such third-party statements and electronic records, uncorroborated by any independent evidence and not directly linking the assessee to the alleged cash payment, do not constitute credible evidence for sustaining an addition under section 69 of the Act. The Bench further noted that, despite specific requests, the assessee was neither confronted with the complete adverse material nor afforded an opportunity to cross-examine Shri Imran Ansari or any other person whose statements were relied upon. 8.21 It is well settled that while the rigours of the Evidence Act do not strictly apply to income-tax proceedings, additions must nevertheless be founded on material which is reliable, cogent, and has a direct nexus with the assessee. Third-party statements, cannot be treated as conclusive unless supported by independent corroborative evidence. At best, such material may give rise to suspicion, but suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof. 8.22 Equally well settled is the principle that if the Assessing Officer proposes to rely upon any adverse material to the detriment of the assessee, such material must be confronted to the assessee, and a reasonable opportunity must be granted to rebut or contradict the same. Where the addition rests substantially on a third-party statement, denial of cross- examination strikes at the very root of the matter and amounts to a serious breach of the principles of natural justice. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Andaman Timber Industries (supra) has categorically held that failure to grant such opportunity renders the order a nullity. 8.23 In the present case, it is undisputed that:

• no incriminating document or diary evidencing cash payment was found from the assessee; • the alleged electronic data was found from the possession of a third party; • the statements relied upon do not specifically record any admission by the assessee; and • the assessee was not provided copies of the complete statements or electronic data, nor was cross-examination permitted. 8.24 In the absence of any independent corroborative evidence establishing that the assessee had, in fact, paid cash "on-money", the evidentiary threshold required for sustaining an addition under section 69 or 69C of the Act remains unmet. 8.25 During the hearing before us, the learned Departmental Representative could not bring on record any distinguishing fact or fresh material to persuade us to take a view different from that consistently adopted by the Co-ordinate Benches of the Tribunal in identical matters arising from the same search action. Judicial discipline requires that, in the absence of distinguishing features, such co-ordinate decisions be respectfully followed. 8.26 On a holistic consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, we hold that the impugned addition has been made solely on the basis of uncorroborated third-party material and statements, without affording the assessee an effective opportunity to confront or rebut the same, and in violation of the principles of natural justice. Such an addition cannot be sustained in law. 8.27 Accordingly, the addition of Rs. 1,00,000/- made under section 69C of the Act for the assessment year under consideration is deleted. 9. Since, we allowed the grounds raised on merit, therefore, the remaining grounds are rendered merely academic. 10. Since the facts and circumstances in the remaining two years are also identical and therefore addition made in those appeal are also deleted and grounds raised are accordingly decided mutasis mutandis. 11. In the result, all the three appeals of the assessee are allowed.”

5.

The Ld. AR further contended that an identical factual issue had already been adjudicated by the Coordinate Bench of the ITAT, Mumbai, in cases arising out of the search conducted in the Rubberwala Group. The Coordinate Bench has consistently held that additions relating to alleged cash payments for the purchase of commercial properties, based solely on third-party statements, cannot be sustained. In support, reliance was placed on the decisions in Bhavana Vikram Jain vs. ACIT (ITA Nos. 6363 & 6364/Mum/2025, order dated 10.12.2025), Akhraj Pukhraj Chopra vs. DCIT (ITA Nos. 5553 & 5555/Mum/2025, order dated 12.11.2025), and Kulsum Aaqib Memon vs. DCIT (ITA No. 6540/Mum/2025, order pronounced on 06.01.2026). In all these cases, the Coordinate Bench of the ITAT has taken a consistent view that, in the absence of any cogent incriminating material, additions made merely on the basis of excel sheets or third-party statements are unsustainable.

6.

The Ld. AR respectfully relied on the order of the Coordinate Bench of ITAT Mumbai in case of Pravin Khetaram Purohit vs. DCIT in ITA Nos. 4742 to 4744/Mum/2025 date of pronouncement 15/10/2025. The identical fact is adjudicated by the Bench & relevant observations are reproduced as below:- “11. From the above we find that the Coordinate bench has consider the same facts and rightly decided the issue in favour of the assessee and since the facts of the present case are also identical with the facts of Rajesh Jain's (supra) case, therefore the said decision will be application on the facts of the present case as well. Moreover, the assessee categorically denied having paid any amount in cash over and above the agreement value. The AO has neither confronted assessee with any of the material found during the search on Rubberwala group and even no evidence or seized document has been referred to where any name of the assessee has been explicitly mentioned on account of paying any 'on-money.

12.

Although it has been claimed in the order of assessment that the assessee had paid on money, but again no such statement has been confronted, neither the seized material/documents/pendrive was confronted to the assessee nor the copy of statement of Key person was confronted.

13.

Therefore, in our view, the information if any found in the pendrive etc., cannot be considered as 'credible evidence', unless they have been corroborated with any other evidence. Since the assessee was not provided with the adverse material, if any, based on which notice u/s 153 of the Act, was issued, in our view, it hampers the primary and fundamental requirement of natural justice. 14. As far as the information claimed in pendrive is concerned, the same was not found from the possession of the assessee but was found as per order of assessment, during the search and seizure conducted in the case of third party therefore, in the absence of corroborative evidence to establish that the contents of pendrive are correct and authenticated to the extent assessee paid 'on-money' in cash, no addition can be made and even otherwise during the entire reassessment proceedings the veracity and reliability of the data recorded in the pendrive was not checked or tested. Therefore, in such a scenario no addition is warranted in the case of assessee. Reliance in this regard has been placed on the decision in case of HeenaDashrathJhanglani ITA no.1665/Mum./2018 (Assessment Year: 2007-08) wherein the Coordinate Bench of ITAT had decided the issue in favour of assessee and the relevant portion is being reproduced herein below:”

7.

The Ld.AR advanced his argument and relied on the order of the Coordinate Bench of ITAT Mumbai ‘D’ Bench in the case of Dimple Shailesh Jain vs DCIT, in ITA No.6732 and 6733/Mum/2025 date of order 01.09.2025. The relevant paragraph no.12 of the said order is reproduced as below: “12. Having heard the parties and perusing the material available on record and giving thoughtful consideration to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and rival claims of the parties, it is observed that from the assessment order that it clearly appears that the Assessing Officer made the addition mainly on the basis of the excel sheet retrieved from pen drive recovered from the premises of Mr. Ansari, the statement of Mr. Ansari, wherein he admitted receipt of the cash component by the company, and the statement of the Director of the RHIL Group, wherein he admitted statement made and the Excel sheet prepared by Mr. Ansari, as true and offered income 8% of the cash amounts/component, as unaccounted receipts.”

8.

The Ld. DR argued and contended that the RHIL group had accepted the cash transactions with the parties. So, the cash transactions are duly accepted on basis of the recorded statement. Though the RHIL declared the cash component during the search action and declared net profit @8% and paid the tax. So, the Ld. DR supported and relied upon the orders of the revenue authorities. He respectfully relied on the order of the Hon’ble Gujrat High Court in case of Kamleshbhai Dharamshibhai Patel vs. CIT reported in [2013] 31 taxmann.com 50 (Guj). The Ld. DR invited our attention in relevant paragraphs of the impugned appellate order which are reproduced as below:- “8.29. In the present case, the AO has clearly provided the necessary material through the show cause notice and granted the appellant sufficient opportunity to submit a response. Therefore, the argument that there was non-supply of material or not providing opportunity of cross-examination is devoid of merit and does not hold ground. 8.30. In the case of Chairman Mining Board v. Ramjee 1977 AIR 965 SC, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under: - "Natural justice is no unruly horse, no lurking landmine, nor a judicial cure-all. If fairness is shown by the decision-maker to the man proceeded against, the form, features and the fundamentals of such essential procedural propriety being conditioned by the facts and circumstances of each situation, no breach of natural justice can be complained of. Unnatural expansion of natural justice without reference to the administrative realities and other factors of a given case can be exasperating. Courts cannot look at law in the abstract or natural justice as a mere artifact... If the totality of circumstances from denial of reasonable opportunity the Court will decline to be punctilious or fanatical as if the rules of natural justice were sacred scriptures."

8.31. Duties and obligations go hand in hand and the appellant cannot merely harp on technicalities even while failing to discharge the onus laid on him.

8.32. In the case of Hersh W Chadah V. DDIT, 43 SOT 544, the Hon'ble ITAT has held that:- "6.14 It will also be worthwhile to consider the nature of burden of proof on the Assessing Officer for proving a fact or circumstance in the income-tax proceedings. The questions raised about the tax liability by the Assessing Officer are to be answered by the assessee by furnishing reasonable and plausible explanations. If assessee is not forthcoming with proper or complete facts or hía statement or explanation is contradictory, drawing of suitable inferences and estimation of facts is inevitable. Courts generally will not interfere with such estimate of facts, unless the inferences or estimates are perverse or capricious."

8.33. In the above case of Hersh W Chadhavs DDIT, ITA No.3088 to 3098 & 3107/Del/2005, the Hon'ble ITAT held as follows: "The tax liability in the cases of suspicious transactions, is to be assessed on the basis of the material available on record, surrounding circumstances, human conduct, preponderance of probabilities and nature of incriminating information/ evidence available with AO." It was further held as "6.3 Rules of evidence do not govern the income-tax proceedings, as the proceedings under the Income-tax Act are not judicial proceedings in the sense in which the phrase "judicial proceedings" is ordinarily used. The Assessing Officer is not fettered or bound by technical rules about evidence contained in the Indian Evidence Act, and he is entitled to act on material which may not be accepted as evidence in a court of law." 8.34. The Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Addl. CIT v. Jay Engg. Works Ltd. [1978] 113 ITR 389 (Delhi) held that the Assessing Officer has, no doubt, to hear "evidence", but such evidence may consist of material which would be wholly inadmissible in a court of law. 8.35.In CIT v. Metal Products of India [1984] 150 ITR 714 (Punj. &Har.), it was held that the Assessing Officer may gather information in any manner he likes, behind the back of the assessee and utilize the same against the assessee, even if it does not, in all respects satisfy the requirements of the Indian Evidence Act. What is necessary is that he should have material upon which to base the assessment; "material" as distinguished from "evidence" which includes direct and circumstantial evidence. 8.36.In ITC Classic Finance Ltd vs DCIT, 264 ITR 154, the Hon'ble Bombay HC has held that where the transaction does not appear to be overboard, the addition is to be sustained. 8.37.In State Bank of Patiala v. K Sharma [1996] 3 SCC 364, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows: "Justice means justice between both the parties. The interests of justice equally demand that the guilty should be punished and that technicalities and irregularities which do not occasion failure of justice are not allowed to defeat the ends of justice. Principles of natural justice are but the means to achieve the ends of justice. They cannot be perverted to achieve the very opposite end. That would be a counter-productive exercise." The Hon'ble Court further held that "(6) While applying the rule of audialterampartem [the primary principle of natural justice] the Court/ Tribunal/Authority must always bear in mind the ultimate and over-riding objective underlying the said rule, viz., to ensure a fair hearing and to ensure that there is no failure of justice. It is this objective which should guide them in applying the rule to varying situations that arise before them." 8.38.Right to Cross-examination as held in various decisions, is not absolute in nature. (i) The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in the case of State of J&K Vs. Bakshi Gulam Mohd. AIR 1967 (SC) 122 and in the case of Nath International Sales Vs. UOI AIR 1992 Del 295 that the right of hearing does not include a right to cross-examine. The right to cross examine must depend upon the circumstances of each case and also on the statue concerned. (ii) In the case of GTC Industries Ltd. V. Asstt. CIT (1998) 60 TTJ (Bom.Trib) 308, it was held that under the dictum of 'Audi AlteramPartem', the right to cross-examine the witness who made adverse report is not an invariable attribute of the requirement of the said dictum. The principles of natural justice do not require formal cross- examination. Formal cross-examination is a part of procedural justice. It is governed by the rules of evidence, and is the creation of Court. It is part of legal and statutory justice, and not a part of natural justice, therefore, it cannot be laid down as a general proposition of law that the revenue could not rely on any evidence which had not been subjected to cross- examination. However, if a witness has given directly incriminating statement and the addition in the assessment is based solely or mainly on such statement, in that eventuality it is incumbent on the Assessing Officer to allow cross-examination. Adverse evidence and material, relied upon in the order, to reach the finality, should be disclosed to the assessee. But this rule is not applicable where the material or evidence used is of collateral nature. (ii) In Kanungo & Company vs Collector of Customs And Ors. on 7 February,1972, AIR 1972 SC 2136, a 3 judge bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court held that "We may first deal with the question of breach of natural justice. On the material on record, in our opinion, there has been no such breach. In the show-cause notice issued on August 21, 1961, all the material on which the Customs Authorities have relied was set out and it was then for the appellant to give a suitable explanation. The complaint of the appellant now is that all the persons from whom enquiries were alleged to have been made by the authorities should have been produced to enable it to cross-examine them. In our- opinion, the principles of natural justice do not require that in matters like this the persons who have given information should be examined in the presence of the appellant or should be allowed to be cross-examined by them on the statements made before the Customs Authorities. Accordingly, we hold that there is no force in the third contention of the appellant." It was further held in para 13 as "What the impugned order does is that it refers to the evidence on the record which militates against the version of the appellant and then states that the appellant had not been able to meet the inferences arising there from. In our opinion, the High Court was right in holding that the burden of proof had shifted on to the appellant after the Customs Authorities had informed the appellant of the results of the enquiries and investigations.". (iv) In Surjeet Singh Chhabravs Union of India & Ors on 25 October, 1996, the Hon'ble SC held that cross-examination was not an absolute right. This case was cited by Hon'ble Andhra Pradesh High Court in its order dated 31.10.2017 in M/s Manidhari Stainless Wire Private Limited Vs. Union of India, (Writ Petition No. 5917 of 2017), wherein it held "25. In Surjeet Singh Chhabra v. Union of India, the Supreme Court was concerned with a case arising under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and the Customs Act. Though the decision in Surjeet Singh Chhabra was a very brief order, the Supreme Court rejected the contention that the denial of cross-examination tantamounted to the violation of the principles of natural justice." (v) In the case of Telestar Travels Pvt. Ltd vs Special Director of Enforcement dated 13.02.2013 in Civil Appeal Nos. 1306-1309 of 2013(arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 15546- 15549 of 2008), "18. The question, however, is whether failure to permit the party to cross examine has resulted in any prejudice so as to call for reversal of the orders and a de novo enquiry into the matter. The answer to that question would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case". It was further held in para 20 as "the refusal of the Adjudicating Authority to permit cross examination of the witnesses producing the documents cannot even on the principles of Evidence Act be found fault with. At any rate, the disclosure of the documents to the appellants and the opportunity given to them to rebut and explain the same was a substantial compliance with the principles of natural justice. That being so, there was and could be no prejudice to the appellants nor was any demonstrated by the appellants before us or before the Courts below". 8.39. Further, proposition of law laid down discussed in this appellate order was not placed before the Hon'ble ITAT, which clearly establish that when statements are relied upon by the Department as secondary evidence in collaboration with other evidences, then the denial of right to cross-examination cannot be taken as plea to not make the addition. 8.40. Based on the above discussion, the grounds raised by the appellant is hereby dismissed in entirety. 9. In the Ground no 5 the appellant has contended that the AO has erred in initiating the penalty proceedings u/s 271AAC of the act based on addition made under section 69 of the act. 9.1 The contention of the appellant is considered and found not tenable as the initiation of the penalty proceeding is a procedural part in the assessment proceedings. The appellant can avail the opportunity of being heard as and when the penalty was levied before the appropriate authorities. Therefore, this ground of appeal is premature and hence it is dismissed. 10.It is seen from the assessment order and the submission filed by the appellant that the appellant is minor. Therefore, the addition must be made keeping in mind the provision of clubbing i.e. the income of parents whose income is higher for that particular year. 11. In result, the appeal for AY 2019-20 stands DISMISSED.”

9.

Per Contra, the Ld.AR contended that the identical fact was duly considered by the Hon’ble Gujrat High Court in the case of PCIT vs Kaushik Nanubhai Majithia in R/Tax Appeal No.20 of 2024 date 06.03.2024. The relevant paragraphs 2 and 3 are reproduced as below: “2. The excel sheet, according to the learned Counsel for the Revenue, contained the details of payment made by the assessee to the developer, with respect to which tax had been paid by the developer before the Settlement Commissioner. The findings returned by the CITA and ITAT on the issue is sought to be assailed on the ground that the payment of tax by the developer, in whose premises search was conducted, before the Settlement Commissioner, with respect to the amount entered in the excel sheet found from the possession of the assistant working with the developer, is sufficient proof of the transaction between the assessee and the developer. 3. We find inherent fallacy in this submission, inasmuch as, there is no basis for conducting proceedings against the assessee merely for the fact that the developer had paid tax on the amount shown in the excel-sheet. There is no adjudication with regard to the payment, which was shown in the excel-sheet to the effect that the same was actually paid by the assessee to the developer. Even otherwise, the concurrent findings returned by the CITA and ITAT are that the document found from the premises of the third party namely excel-sheet, which is the basis of the proceedings was without any signature and there is no corroborative material to substantiate the said document. The nature of the document has not been explained by the Assessing Officer while proceeding against the assessee. The statements of the persons recorded during search with reference to the alleged, seized material, was not provided to the assessee and hence, the entire proceedings under Section 153C of the IT Act of 1961 stood vitiated.”

10.

We have heard the rival submissions and perused the material available on record. The issue involved in the present appeal relates to the addition of Rs.8,71,700/- made under section 69 of the Act on account of alleged cash payment towards purchase of a shop in Platinum Mall, Girgaon, Mumbai. The addition has been made primarily on the basis of statements recorded during search proceedings in the case of Rubberwala Group and certain data allegedly contained in an Excel sheet/pen drive recovered from a third party. It is an admitted position that no incriminating material, cash, diary, document or any other direct evidence was found from the possession or control of the assessee to establish that the assessee had paid any cash over and above the registered consideration. The assessee has consistently denied having made any such cash payment. Further, the material relied upon by the 17 Assessing Officer emanates from third-party proceedings and the statements of persons connected with the developer group. However, the assessee was neither afforded an effective opportunity to cross-examine such persons nor was any independent corroborative evidence brought on record to directly link the assessee with the alleged cash payment.

11.

We find that the identical issue arising out of the very same search action in the case of Rubberwala Group and relating to alleged on-money payments in respect of Platinum Mall has already been considered by the Coordinate Benches of the Tribunal in several cases, including Bharat Solanki (supra), Pravin Khetaram Purohit (supra), Akhraj Pukhraj Chopra (supra), Bhavana Vikram Jain (supra), Kulsum Aaqib Memon (supra) and Dimple Shailesh Jain (supra). In those cases, the Coordinate Benches have consistently held that additions made merely on the basis of third-party statements, Excel sheets or pen-drive data, without any independent corroborative material and without granting an opportunity of effective cross-examination, cannot be sustained in law.

12.

The reliance placed by the Revenue on the alleged admission of the Rubberwala Group and the fact that the developer may have offered income on the alleged cash component cannot, by itself, be determinative of the liability of the present assessee. An admission by a third party cannot be used as conclusive evidence against the assessee unless the assessee is granted an effective opportunity to test and rebut such material. The Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in Kaushik Nanubhai Majithia (supra) has also held that proceedings against an assessee cannot be sustained merely on the basis of an unsigned Excel sheet found from a third party and the fact that the developer had paid tax on such amount, in the absence of corroborative material establishing actual payment by the assessee.

13.

In the present case, the revenue has not brought any distinguishing feature or fresh material on record to justify a view different from the consistent view already taken by the Coordinate Benches on identical facts. The addition is founded on uncorroborated third-party material and statements, without any direct nexus with the assessee and without compliance with the principles of natural justice. Suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof. Accordingly, respectfully following the consistent view taken by the Coordinate Benches of the Tribunal in identical matters arising out of the same search action, we hold that the addition of Rs.8,71,700/- made under section 69 of the Act is unsustainable. The same is, therefore, deleted.

14.

In the result, the appeal of the assessee bearing ITA No.8585/Mum/2025 is allowed Order pronounced in the open court on 09th day of July 2026 Sd/- Sd/-

(BIJAYANANDA PRUSETH) (ANIKESH BANERJEE) ACCOUNTANT MEMBER JUDICIAL MEMBER Mumbai,िदनांक/Dated: 09/07/2026 SAUMYA Sr.PS Copy of the Order forwarded to: 1. अपीलाथ�/The Appellant , 2. �ितवादी/ The Respondent. 3. आयकरआयु� CIT 4. िवभागीय�ितिनिध, आय.अपी.अिध., मुंबई/DR, ITAT, Mumbai

5.

गाड�फाइल/Guard file. BY ORDER, //True Copy// (Asstt. Registrar), ITAT, MUMBAI

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