GANPAT AMRARAMJI PRAJAPATI ,MUMBAI vs. INCOME TAX OFFICER 19(1)(1), MUMBAI

At the very outset I noticed that there is a delay of 2904 days in filing of present appeals and in this regard assessee has filed an affidavit thereby explaining the delay and the content of the same is reproduced herein below: I, Ganpat Amraramji Prajapati (PAN: ACTPP7381E) S/O Amraramji Prajapati, Resident at Room No 210, 2nd Floor, Kumbharwada, Mumbai-400004. do hereby take oath and state on solemn affirmation as under: 1

I have considered the rival submissions, perused the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay, the documents placed on record, and the material available on record.

The expression "sufficient cause" has not been defined under the Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji (1987) 167 ITR 471 (SC), Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom v. Bhargavi Amma (2008) 8 SCC 321, and R.B. Ramlingam v. R.B. Bhavaneshwari (2009) 2 SCC 689 has consistently held that the expression should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. At the same time, the discretion to condone delay is not automatic. The applicant must satisfactorily explain the delay and demonstrate that the delay was occasioned by circumstances beyond his control and not due to negligence, inaction, or lack of bona fides.

It is equally well settled that where the delay is extraordinarily long or inordinate, the explanation must be reasonably satisfactory for the entire period of delay. The Court or Tribunal must examine whether the conduct of the litigant demonstrates due diligence and whether the explanation inspires confidence. While a liberal approach is warranted, such an approach cannot be stretched to condone every inordinate delay irrespective of the facts and circumstances of the case.

In the present case, the explanation offered by the assessee is that he is an uneducated person having studied only up to the 5th standard and has been carrying on the business of trading in ferrous and non-ferrous metals since 2007. According to the affidavit, he had entrusted all income-tax compliances to his tax consultant, Late Shri Anand Pandey, and remained under the bona fide belief that the consultant had taken all necessary steps in relation to the appellate proceedings and that no tax demand was outstanding. The assessee has attributed the delay to his educational background, lack of legal awareness, and bona fide reliance upon the professional advice of his tax consultant.

I have carefully considered the explanation furnished in the affidavit. However, in my considered opinion, the assessee has failed to establish sufficient cause for condoning the extraordinary delay of 2,904 days. Apart from the general assertion that he bona fide relied upon his tax consultant, no material has been placed on record to show what transpired after the order of the learned CIT(A) or to establish that the assessee made any effort, at any point of time after the disposal of the first appeal, to ascertain the status of his case either from the office of the learned Commissioner of Income- tax (Appeals), the Income-tax Department, or through any other professional. The affidavit is completely silent as to the steps, if any, taken by the assessee during the long intervening period to pursue his statutory remedy.

he explanation also does not satisfactorily account for the entire period of delay. The appeal before the Tribunal ought to have been filed on or before 27.02.2018, whereas the present appeal has been instituted only on 10.02.2026. The affidavit does not explain what prevented the assessee from taking appropriate steps for nearly eight years after the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation, nor does it furnish any contemporaneous material explaining the delay for the entire intervening period. It is well settled that while courts and tribunals adopt a liberal approach in matters of condonation of delay, such discretion cannot be exercised in a routine manner where the explanation lacks particulars and remains unsupported by any contemporaneous material. A bald assertion in an affidavit, without corroborative material and without a satisfactory explanation covering the entire period of delay, cannot by itself constitute "sufficient cause" within the meaning of section 253(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

In view of the foregoing discussion and having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the considered opinion that the assessee has failed to show sufficient and reasonable cause for condonation of the inordinate delay of 2,904 days in filing the present appeal.

Further, in the case of State of Gujarat v. Sayed Mohd. Baquir El Edross AIR 1981 SC 1921, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down the following principles governing the exercise of powers under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963:

It was also held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 361 that every day's delay must be explained. The assessee is also required to demonstrate that the cause for the delay arose before the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation. As held in Ajit Singh Thakur Singh v. State of Gujarat AIR 1981 SC 733, no event or circumstance arising after the expiry of the limitation period can ordinarily constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay.

he law of limitation is founded upon the well-settled maxims Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium, meaning that litigation must attain finality in the interest of society, and Vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt, meaning that the law assists those who are vigilant and not those who sleep over their rights. The law of limitation strikes a balance between the rights of the litigant and the larger public interest in ensuring certainty and finality in legal proceedings.

Therefore, delay cannot be condoned merely because the assessee's case appears to be hard or calls for sympathy. Before granting such indulgence, it must be satisfactorily established that the assessee acted diligently and that the delay occurred due to circumstances beyond his control and not because of negligence or inaction. In this regard, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 361 held that a cause for delay which could have been avoided by exercising due care and attention cannot constitute sufficient cause within the meaning of the limitation provisions.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in R.B. Ramlingam v. R.B. Bhavaneshwari (2009) 2 SCC 689 held as under:

The Hon'ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that although a liberal approach should ordinarily be adopted while considering applications for condonation of delay, the discretion must nevertheless be exercised on sound judicial principles. Mere assertion of hardship, illness, or professional lapse, unsupported by adequate material explaining the entire period of delay, cannot by itself constitute sufficient cause.

I am conscious that refusal to condone the delay may result in dismissal of the appeal without adjudication on merits. Equally, the law of limitation is founded upon sound public policy requiring finality to litigation. Once the prescribed period expires, a valuable right accrues in favour of the opposite party, and such right cannot be lightly disturbed in the absence of a satisfactory explanation.

On an overall appreciation of the facts, I find that the explanation offered by the assessee is general in nature and lacks necessary particulars. The affidavit does not satisfactorily explain the entire period of delay. No documentary evidence has been produced to substantiate the circumstances stated in the affidavit or to explain why the assessee could not ascertain the status of the appeal during the entire intervening period despite the lapse of nearly eight years.

In light of the above discussion, I find no merit in the reasons stated in the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay. The assessee has failed to demonstrate that sufficient cause existed for not filing the appeal within the prescribed period. A delay of 2,904 days remains unexplained and cannot be regarded as having been occasioned by sufficient cause. The conduct of the assessee does not demonstrate the degree of diligence expected of a litigant seeking discretionary relief under section 253(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Consequently, the present appeal is liable to be dismissed as barred by limitation. Before parting, it is necessary to observe that it is a settled principle of law that the law of limitation may operate harshly in a particular case, but it must nevertheless be applied with full rigour when the statute so prescribes. Courts and Tribunals do not possess the power to extend the prescribed period of limitation merely on equitable considerations. A consequence flowing from a statutory provision cannot be ignored merely because it may result in hardship in a given case. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex—meaning "the law is hard, but it is the law"—squarely applies in such circumstances.

Having regard to the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, I am unable to hold that the assessee has discharged the burden of establishing sufficient cause within the meaning of section 253(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Consequently, the application seeking condonation of delay is rejected. Since the delay in filing the appeal is not condoned, the appeal itself is barred by limitation and is liable to be dismissed in limine.

In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee is dismissed as barred by limitation.