BHARAT KUMAR RAJPUROHIT,HYDERABAD vs. DCIT., CENTRAL CIRCLE-3(4), HYDERABAD

आदेश / O R D E R PER MADHUSUDAN SAWDIA, AM:

This appeal is filed by Shri Bharat Kumar Rajpurohit (“the

assessee”), feeling aggrieved by the order passed by the Learned

Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), Hyderabad-11, (“Ld. CIT(A)”)

dated 24.12.2024 for the A.Y. 2021-22.

present appeal before this Tribunal. The assessee has filed a petition :: 2 :: seeking condonation of delay in the form of an affidavit explaining the

reasons for the delay. The Learned Authorised Representative (“Ld. AR”)

submitted that the assessee had studied only up to the 9th standard and

is not familiar with the functioning of the Income-tax portal. It was

submitted that the assessee is entirely dependent upon his income-tax

practitioner for tax compliances. According to the Ld. AR, the assessee

remained unaware that the appeal filed before the Ld. CIT(A) had been

dismissed and came to know about the same only when the Department

contacted him for payment of the outstanding tax demand. It was,

therefore, submitted that there was no deliberate or intentional delay on

the part of the assessee in filing the present appeal. Accordingly, the Ld.

AR prayed that the delay of 38 days may be condoned, and the appeal

may be admitted for adjudication on merits.

strongly opposed the condonation of delay. It was submitted that the

assessee is a habitual defaulter in filing appeals beyond the prescribed

period of limitation. Inviting our attention to the impugned order of the

Ld. CIT(A), the Ld. DR submitted that the appeal before the Ld. CIT(A)

itself had been filed with a substantial delay of 513 days, which the Ld.

CIT(A) declined to condone. Referring to para nos. 7.2 and 7.3 of the

impugned order, the Ld. DR submitted that the Ld. CIT(A) had elaborately

examined the explanation furnished by the assessee and recorded

detailed reasons for rejecting the condonation petition. The Ld. DR further submitted that the explanation furnished before this Tribunal is

substantially the same as the explanation furnished before the Ld. CIT(A),

namely that due to the negligence or failure of the tax consultant, the

assessee could not file the appeals within the prescribed time. However,

no documentary evidence has been produced by the assessee to

substantiate such allegation. According to the Ld. DR, when the assessee

could not satisfactorily explain the enormous delay of 513 days before the

Ld. CIT(A), the subsequent delay before this Tribunal also deserves no

indulgence. Accordingly, the Ld. DR prayed that the condonation petition

be rejected and the appeal be dismissed as barred by limitation.

material available on record. We have also gone through the condonation

petition in the form of the affidavit filed by the assessee before us, which

is to the following effect:

AFFIDAVIT FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY I, Bharat Kumar Rajpurohit son of Sri, Ashaji Rajpurohit, aged about 35 years resident of 5-5-526/2, Pent House, Sayed Jung Lane, Troop Bazar, Hyderabad-500095, do solemnly affirm and state as under: In my case, for the AY 2021-22, the assessment completed u/s 144 on 30-09-2022 wherein the taxable income was determined at Rs. 1,49,53,087/-by making an addition of Rs. 1,39,10,000/- u/s 69A of the Income Tax Act and consequently an amount of Rs. 1,34,55,485/- was determined as payable.

The appeal filed before CIT(A), NFAC, Delhi was dismissed as there was delay of seven months in filing the appeal. I submit that I studied only up to 9th class. I am not familiar with the working of the ITBA portal and had to depend on a small time ITP for all matters relating to tax compliances. I used to sign all the returns and papers on the advice of my ITP without understanding the contents of the same. In tax matters I explicitly trusted my tax practitioner.

I was unaware of the fact that the appeal filed by me was dismissed and came to know of the same when the department contacted for payment of taxes.

It is humbly submitted that the delay in filing the appeal is not intentional and was due to the reasons mentioned above. Further, I also submit that my inability to get my DSC immediately also resulted in some delay

Hence, it is prayed that the delay of 38 days may kindly be condoned and the appeal admitted. Sd/- Bharat Kumar Rajpurohit Deponent

Signed at Hyderabad, this day of May, 2025.

VERIFICATION

ATTESTATION

I, ___________ Advocate & Notary do hereby affirm that Bharat Kumar Rajpurohit, the Deponent herein, identified by her PAN ATKPR9196D was administered an oath, under penalty of perjury, as to the truth of the contents of this affidavit.

Solemnly affirmed and sworn before me

Date: May, 2025 Place: Hyderabad

offered by the assessee is that he had studied only up to the 9th

standard, was not familiar with the functioning of the Income-tax portal,

and was dependent upon his income-tax practitioner for attending the tax matters. It is further contended that the assessee became aware of the

order passed by the Ld. CIT(A) only when the Department contacted him

for recovery of the outstanding tax demand. It is true that the delay

before this Tribunal is only 38 days, which by itself may not appear to be

substantial. However, the issue cannot be examined in isolation by

ignoring the conduct of the assessee throughout the litigation. The

present appeal arises out of an order whereby the Ld. CIT(A) had already

declined to condone an enormous delay of 513 days in filing the appeal

before him. We have carefully gone through para nos. 7.2 and 7.3 of the

impugned order of the Ld. CIT(A), which is to the following effect:

7.2 The appellant raised 8 grounds of appeal. Out of which, grounds of appeal No. 1 & 8 are general in nature. In grounds of appeal No. 2 to 7, appellant challenged the additions made in the assessment order. At this juncture, it is relevant to mention that from the Form-35, Appeal Memorandum, it was noticed that the date of service of order/notice of demand was on 30.09.2022 whereas the appeal was filed on 22.03.2024. As per Section 249(2) of the Act, the appellant is required to present the appeal within 30 days of service of notice of demand relating to assessment/penalty. It is noticed that there is a delay of 513 days in filing the appeal. Appellant filed an affidavit giving the reasons for condoning the delay, which are extracted hereunder:-

1, Bharat Kumar Rajpurohit a S/o Ashaji Rajpurohit aged about 35 years resident of 5-5-526/2, Pent House, Sayed Jung Lane, Troop Bazar Hyderabad, 500095, do solemnly affirm and state as under:

In my case, for the AY 2021-22, the assessment was completed u/s 144 by the Asst. Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle -3(4), Hyderabad, on30-09-2022 wherein the taxable income was determined at Rs. 1,49,53,087/- by making an addition of Rs.1,39,10,000/- u/s 69A of the Income Tax Act and consequently an amount of Rs. 1,34,55,485/- was determined as payable.

I submit that I studied only up to 9th class. I am not familiar with the working of the ITBA portal and had to depend on a small time ITP for all matters relating to tax compliances. I used to sign all the returns and papers on the advice of my ITP without understanding the contents of the same. In tax matters I explicitly trusted my tax practitioner.

For AY 2021-22, I was advised by my consultant to pay huge tax of Rs. 35,77,045/-which was adjusted against the cash seized by the department and he filed the return. I was assured that income tax matter for AY 2021-22 was closed on payment of huge tax.

I was not aware that assessment order was passed for this Financial year 2020-2021 (AY 2021-22) raising huge demand. I became aware of the order when some person from the department contacted me for payment of outstanding demand. Then I contacted a senior tax consultant who after browsing my portal informed me of the order and advised me to file appeal and also request for condonation of delay

It is humbly submitted that the delay in filing the appeal is not intentional and was due to my inability to navigate the ITBA portal and total dependency on my ITP. Hence, it is prayed that the delay may kindly be condoned and the appeal admitted."

7.3 On perusal of the affidavit it is noticed that the appellant mentions that the assessment was completed u/s 144 of the Act by the AO whereas the assessment order was completed u/s 143(3) of the Act as a regular assessment and not as a best judgement assessment. Further, appellant states that he had studied up to 9th class and depends on Income Tax practitioner for matters related to tax compliance. However, it is a fact that the appellant, who is engaged in the business of wholesale and retail trading of electrical goods, has been filing returns of income for various years as brought out in para number 4.3 of the assessment order. A person engaged in the business for a considerable amount of time and who has been filing returns of income cannot feign ignorance about the tax compliances. Appellant also stated that he became aware of the order only when he was contacted by the department for payment of outstanding demand. This statement of the appellant is unacceptable they are contrary to the facts of the case. Cash of Rs.1,00,00,000 was seized from the appellant, summons were issued by the DDIT(Inv.), Visakhapatnam and a statement was recorded, appellant filed return of income in response to notice u/s 142(1) and also participated in the assessment proceedings by providing certain explanations / details. These events establish beyond doubt that the appellant was fully aware of the ongoing departmental proceedings. It is only to cover up the huge delay in filing the appeal that the appellant had come up with a make- believe version. Further, appellant mentioned that he had hired a senior tax consultant. No documentary evidence was furnished to establish that Income Tax Practitioner (ITP) was replaced with a senior tax consultant to look after his tax matters. The appellant could not furnish any cogent reasons for delay in filing so as to fit into the scheme of 'reasonable cause'. Further, it is also relevant to highlight that the appellant did not furnish any response to the notices issued u/s 250 of the Act during the appellate proceedings. In my view, the onus is on the appellant to prove that there was reasonable cause for not filing the appeal in time by supporting cogent evidence. In the :: 7 :: facts and circumstances of the present case and after examining the documents on record, I am of the opinion that the appellant failed to prove his case for a reasonable cause not to file the appeal in time. I do not find any merit in the affidavit filed for condonation of delay. In view of the above discussion, the plea for condonation of huge delay of 513 days is rejected and the appeal is not admitted for adjudication. Since the appeal is not admitted, the question of adjudication on the grounds of appeal does not arise. 6. On perusal of above, we find that the Ld. CIT(A) at para no.7.2 has

reproduced the explanation furnished by the assessee for the delay before

him. Thereafter, in para no. 7.3, the Ld. CIT(A) has dealt with each of the

contentions raised by the assessee and has assigned detailed and cogent

reasons for declining to condone the delay. The Ld. CIT(A) has

categorically recorded that the assessee is engaged in the business of

wholesale and retail trading of electrical goods and has been regularly

filing returns of income over the years. Therefore, the plea that the

assessee was unaware of the tax compliances or the appellate

proceedings was found to be unacceptable. The Ld. CIT(A) has further

recorded that although the assessee claimed that he came to know about

the appellate order only when contacted by the Department for recovery

of demand, the records clearly revealed that cash amounting to about ₹1

crore had been seized from the assessee, summons had been issued by

the DDIT (Investigation), Visakhapatnam, the statement of the assessee

had been recorded, the assessee had filed the return of income in

response to the notice issued under section 142(1) of the Act and had

actively participated in the assessment proceedings by furnishing

explanations and supporting details. Thus, the Ld. CIT(A) concluded that :: 8 :: the assessee was fully aware of the departmental proceedings. The Ld.

CIT(A) has also recorded that despite issuance of notices during the

appellate proceedings, the assessee failed to furnish any satisfactory

explanation. Thus, the substantial delay of 513 days before the Ld.

CIT(A) was rejected by a well-reasoned order after considering all the

contentions advanced by the assessee.

same explanation which had already been considered and rejected by the

Ld. CIT(A). Except repeating that he is not well educated and was

dependent upon his tax consultant, no fresh material or documentary

evidence has been placed before us to justify either the earlier delay of

513 days before the Ld. CIT(A) or the present delay of 38 days before this

Tribunal. In our considered opinion, although the delay before this

Tribunal is comparatively short, the overall conduct of the assessee

cannot be ignored. The present delay is only a continuation of the earlier

negligent conduct, where the assessee had allowed the statutory period

before the Ld. CIT(A) to lapse by as many as 513 days without

establishing any sufficient cause. The explanation now offered is merely a

repetition of the explanation already found unacceptable by the Ld.

CIT(A). We, therefore, do not find any justifiable reason to take a

different view. Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the

present case, we are of the considered opinion that the assessee has

failed to establish “sufficient cause” within the meaning of the law for condoning the delay. The conduct of the assessee clearly indicates a

consistent lack of diligence in pursuing the statutory remedies. We,

therefore, find merit in the objections raised by the Ld. DR and hold that

no case is made out for condonation of the delay. Further, at this stage,

it would be relevant to refer to the settled legal position governing

condonation of delay. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of P.K.

Ramachandran Vs. State of Kerala [(1997) 7 SCC 556] at last para of the

order has held as under:

“Law of limitation may harshly effect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribe and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay filed in the High Court would stand rejected and the Miscellaneous First Appeal shall stand dismissed as barred by time. No costs.”

Court has held that the law of limitation may operate harshly in a

particular case, but it has to be applied with all its rigor when the statute

so prescribes and Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation

on equitable grounds in the absence of a satisfactory explanation.

Accordingly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that while

considering an application for condonation of delay, the Court must

examine whether sufficient cause has been shown and cannot condone

delay merely on sympathetic considerations. Similarly, in Basawaraj & Anr. Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14 SCC 81], the Hon’ble

Supreme Court at para No. 5 of the order has held as under:

“5. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bonafide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamount to showing utter disregard to the legislature.”

has categorically held that the expression “sufficient cause” means a

cause beyond the control of the party invoking the aid of the Court. It was

further held that where negligence, inaction or want of bona fides is

attributable to the party seeking condonation, delay cannot be condoned

as a matter of course. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that

the law of limitation is founded on public policy and Courts cannot extend

limitation on equitable grounds where no sufficient cause is

demonstrated.

Supreme Court in Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs. Vs. Special

Deputy Collector (LA), Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.31248 of 2018 dated 08.04.2024, wherein, at para nos. 13 to 26 of the order it is

held as under:

“13. It is very elementary and well understood that courts should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in dealing with the applications for condonation of the delay in filing appeals and rather follow a pragmatic line to advance substantial justice.

“12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.”

“15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” (emphasis supplied)

“(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;

(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;

(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;

(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;

(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;

vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;

(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and

(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.”

Hon’ble Supreme Court comprehensively reviewed the law relating to

condonation of delay and reiterated that the law of limitation is founded

upon public policy and there must be finality to litigation. The Hon’ble

Supreme Court observed that though the expression “sufficient cause”

occurring in section 5 of the Limitation Act deserves liberal construction,

such liberal approach cannot be stretched to defeat the substantive

provisions of limitation. The Court further held that concepts such as

“substantial justice”, “liberal approach” and “justice-oriented approach”

:: 15 :: cannot be employed to revive stale and dead claims. The Hon’ble

Supreme Court further held that even where sufficient cause is shown,

condonation of delay is not a matter of right and the power to condone

delay remains discretionary. Negligence, inaction, lack of bona fides,

absence of due diligence and inordinate delay are valid grounds for

refusing condonation. The Hon’ble Supreme Court ultimately upheld the

refusal to condone the delay and emphasized that Courts cannot extend

limitation on equitable or sympathetic considerations alone.

find that the assessee has failed to furnish any cogent, convincing and

bona fide explanation covering the entire period of delay before the Ld.

CIT(A) & before us. Therefore, respectfully following the principles laid

down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of P.K. Ramachandran

(supra), Basawaraj (supra) and Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs.

(supra), we are of the considered view that the assessee has failed to

establish “sufficient cause” for condonation of the delay before the Ld.

CIT(A) & before us. Accordingly, the petitions for condonation of delay are

rejected. Consequently, the appeal filed by the assessees dismissed as

barred by limitation, without going into the merits of the addition made

by the Ld.AO.

:: 16 :: 13. In the result, the appeal of the assessee is dismissed in limine as

time barred.

Order pronounced in the open Court on 23rd July, 2026.

Sd/- Sd/- (रिवश सूद) (मधुसूदन साविडया) (RAVISH SOOD) (MADHUSUDAN SAWDIA) �ाियक सद� /JUDICIAL MEMBER लेखा सद�/ACCOUNTANT MEMBER

Hyderabad, dated 23rd July, 2026. TLN

आदेशकी �ितिलिप अ�ेिषत/ Copy of the order forwarded to:

िनधा�रती/The 1 : BHARAT KUMAR RAJPUROHIT, 5-1-562/2, SYD JUNG LANE TROOP BAXAR, HYDERABAD-500 Assessee 095, TELANGANA राज�/ The Revenue 2 : DCIT., CENTRAL CIRCLE-3(4) O/O DCIT., CENTRAL CIRCLE-3(4) HYDERABAD. 3 The Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Hyderabad. िवभागीय�ितिनिध, आयकर अपीलीय अिधकरण, हैदराबाद / DR, ITAT Hyderabad. 4 गाड�फ़ाईल / Guard file 5

आदेशानुसार / BY ORDER

TUMMALACHARLA Digitally signed by TUMMALACHARLA LAKSHMI NARAYANA DN: cn=TUMMALACHARLA LAKSHMI LAKSHMI NARAYANA, c=IN, o=INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, ou=INCOME TAX NARAYANA APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, CHENNAI BENCH Date: 2026.07.29 18:01:00 +05'30' Sr. Private Secretary ITAT, Hyderabad