UMASHANKER RAO KONDA,HYDERABAD vs. ITO, WARD - 4(1), HYDERABAD

आयकर अपील�य अ�धकरण, हैदराबाद पीठ IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL Hyderabad ‘A‘ Bench, Hyderabad �ी रिवश सूद,�ाियक सद� एवं �ी मधुसूदन साविड़या लेखा सद� सम� | Before Shri Ravish Sood, Judicial Member A N D Shri Madhusudan Sawdia, Accountant Member आ.अपी.सं /ITA No.2256/Hyd/2025 (िनधा�रण वष�/Assessment Year: 2017-18) Shri Umashanker Rao Vs. Income Tax Officer Konda, HYDERABAD Ward 4(1) PAN: AJEPK5858K Hyderabad (Appellant) (Respondent) िनधा�रती �ारा/Assessee by: N O N E राज� व �ारा/Revenue by: Shri Mohan Babu, Sr. AR सुनवाई की तारीख/Date of hearing: 03/08/2026 घोषणा की तारीख/Pronouncement: 03/08/2026 आदेश/ORDER Per Madhusudan Sawdia, A.M.:

This appeal is filed by Shri Umashanker Rao Konda (“the assessee”), feeling aggrieved by the order passed by the Learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), National Faceless Appeal Centre (NFAC) (“Ld. CIT(A)”) dated 04.10.2023 for the A.Y. 2017-18. 2. The assessee has raised the following grounds of appeal:

+6. At the outset, the Ld. DR submitted that the present appeal is barred by limitation, since there is inordinate delay of 716 days in filing the appeal before the Tribunal. Referring to the petition for condonation of delay and the affidavit filed by the assessee, the Ld. DR submitted that the only explanation offered by the assessee is that the tax consultant who was handling the appellate proceedings before the Ld. CIT(A) did not inform the assessee about the passing of the appellate order. According to the Ld. DR, such an explanation is vague and general in nature and is not supported by any documentary evidence. It was, therefore, submitted that the assessee has failed to establish sufficient cause for condonation of the inordinate delay of 716 days and consequently, the appeal deserves to be dismissed as barred by limitation.

proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay filed in the High Court would stand rejected and the Miscellaneous First Appeal shall stand dismissed as barred by time. No costs.” 9. On perusal of the above, it is evident that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the law of limitation may operate harshly in a particular case, but it has to be applied with all its rigor when the statute so prescribes and Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds in the absence of a satisfactory explanation. Accordingly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that while considering an application for condonation of delay, the Court must examine whether sufficient cause has been shown and cannot condone delay merely on sympathetic considerations. Similarly, in Basawaraj & Anr. Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14 SCC 81], the Hon’ble Supreme Court at para No. 5 of the order has held as under:

“15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bonafide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamount to showing utter disregard to the legislature.”

“13. It is very elementary and well understood that courts should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in dealing with the applications for condonation of the delay in filing appeals and rather follow a pragmatic line to advance substantial justice. 14. It may also be important to point out that though on one hand, Section 5 of the Limitation Act is to be construed liberally, but on the other hand, Section 3 of the Limitation Act, being a substantive law of mandatory nature has to be interpreted in a strict sense. In Bhag Mal alias Ram Bux 8|22 and Ors. vs. Munshi (Dead) by LRs. and Ors.1, it has been observed that different provisions of Limitation Act may require different construction, as for example, the court exercises its power in a given case liberally in condoning the delay in filing the appeal under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, however, the same may not be true while construing Section 3 of the Limitation Act. It, therefore, follows that though liberal interpretation has to be given in construing Section 5 of the Limitation Act but not in applying Section 3 of the Limitation Act, which has to be construed strictly.

condone the delay depending upon the bona fides of the party. 19. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and Ors.4, it had been held that the court cannot grant an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. The court has time and again repeated that when mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone. 20. In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh Kumar and Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors.5 wherein while observing, as above, this Court further laid down that if some person has obtained a relief approaching the court just or immediately when the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take the benefit of the same approaching the court at a belated stage simply on the ground of parity, equity, sympathy and compassion. 21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.6, where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High Court should have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. 22. It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar Chokhani & Ors.7, that the merits of the (2011) 4 SCC 363 AIR 2009 SC 1927 13 | 2 2 case cannot be considered while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer8, this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the

courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds. 24. It would be beneficial to quote paragraph 12 of the aforesaid decision which clinches the issue of the manner in which equilibrium has to be maintained between adopting liberal approach and in implementing the statute as it stands. Paragraph 12 reads as under “12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.” 25. This Court in the same breath in the same very decision vide paragraph 15 went on to observe as under: “15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” (emphasis supplied) 26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:

(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.” 12. On perusal of the above, it is evident that in the above decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court comprehensively reviewed the law relating to condonation of delay and reiterated that the law of limitation is founded upon public policy and there must be finality to litigation. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that though the expression “sufficient cause” occurring in section 5 of the Limitation Act deserves liberal construction, such liberal approach cannot be stretched to

defeat the substantive provisions of limitation. The Court further held that concepts such as “substantial justice”, “liberal approach” and “justice-oriented approach” cannot be employed to revive stale and dead claims. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that even where sufficient cause is shown, condonation of delay is not a matter of right and the power to condone delay remains discretionary. Negligence, inaction, lack of bona fides, absence of due diligence and inordinate delay are valid grounds for refusing condonation. The Hon’ble Supreme Court ultimately upheld the refusal to condone the delay and emphasized that Courts cannot extend limitation on equitable or sympathetic considerations alone. 13. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, we find that the assessee has failed to furnish any cogent, convincing and bona fide explanation covering the entire period of delay of 716 days. Therefore, respectfully following the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of P.K. Ramachandran (supra), Basawaraj (supra) and Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs. (supra), we are of the considered view that the assessee has failed to establish “sufficient cause” for condonation of the inordinate delay of 716 days. Accordingly, we decline to condone the delay of 716 days in filing the present appeal. Consequently, since the appeal itself is barred by limitation, the same is dismissed in limine, without adjudicating the grounds raised by the assessee on merits.

Order pronounced in the Open Court on 3rd August, 2026. Sd/- Sd/- (RAVISH SOOD) (MADHUSUDAN SAWDIA) JUDICIAL MEMBER ACCOUNTANT MEMBER Hyderabad, dated 3rd August, 2026. Vinodan/sps Copy to: S.No Addresses 1 Shri Umashanker Rao Konda, Flat No.1001, C Block, Ramky One Galaxia, Nalgandla, Hyderabad 500019 2 Income Tax Officer Ward-4(1), Hyderabad 3 Pr. CIT , Hyderabad 4 DR, ITAT Hyderabad Benches 5 Guard File By Order