LATE SH. SURJIT SINGH REPRESENTED BY LEGAL HEIR SMT. DAVINDER KAUR,MOHALI vs. INCOME TAX OFFICER, MOHALI

The assessee was a co-owner, along with his brother, Shri Piara Singh, of the agricultural land which was sold during the relevant previous year. The Statement of Facts records that both the co-owners held an undivided 50% share in the same parcel of land and that the land was sold under the same transaction during the same assessment year.

The assessee has now preferred the present appeal against the order of the learned CIT(A), after a delay of 2544 days. An application seeking condonation of the said delay has been filed by the legal heir. The case of the assessee, as emerging from the application for condonation and the Statement of Facts, is that the delay was neither intentional nor deliberate. It has been stated that after disposal of the appeal by the CIT(A) in December 2018, the assessee was suffering from serious and prolonged illness and, owing to his deteriorating health, could not take effective steps to pursue further appellate remedies. It has further been stated that the assessee expired on 03.01.2021 and that his legal heirs, being

It has further been submitted that the matter of the assessee was closely connected with the appeal of his brother, Shri Piara Singh, who was co-owner of the same agricultural land. According to the assessee, identical proceedings had been undertaken in the case of the brother in respect of the very same land and transaction. The brother pursued the matter before the appellate authorities and, after remand proceedings, the Assessing Officer, in the remand report, accepted that the land was agricultural land and was situated at approximately 1,100 metres from National Highway-21. The learned CIT(A), NFAC, thereafter allowed the brother's appeal vide order dated 05.01.2026.

It is on the basis of the aforesaid subsequent development that the legal heir claims to have become aware of the factual and legal position and, after obtaining professional advice, filed the present appeal. It has been contended that there was no deliberate abandonment of the appellate remedy and that refusal to condone the delay would result in injustice, particularly when relief has subsequently been granted in the case of the co-owner in respect of the same land and transaction.

It was further submitted that the assessee's case cannot be viewed in isolation because his brother was a co-owner of the very same agricultural land and the two cases arose from the same transaction and the same assessment year. The brother had diligently pursued the appellate proceedings and, after remand, the Assessing Officer himself accepted, in the remand proceedings, that the land was agricultural land situated approximately 1,100 metres from National Highway-21. The learned CIT(A), NFAC, ultimately allowed the brother's appeal on 05.01.2026, holding the land to be rural agricultural land outside the ambit of "capital asset" under section 2(14) of the Act.

The learned AR submitted that the aforesaid subsequent adjudication constitutes a material development directly governing the assessee's case. It was argued that, upon becoming aware of

The learned AR further submitted that there was no mala fide intention, no attempt to derive any undue advantage and no conscious decision to abandon the appellate remedy. Reliance was placed upon the settled principle that the length of delay is not decisive if the explanation is bona fide and that substantial justice should prevail over technical considerations. The learned AR accordingly prayed that the delay of 2544 days be condoned and the appeal be admitted for adjudication on merits.

Per contra, the learned DR opposed the application for condonation of delay. It was submitted that the delay of 2544 days is exceptionally long and that the explanation furnished by the assessee does not satisfactorily account for the entire period of delay. It was submitted that the order of the learned CIT(A) was passed on 20.12.2018 and, therefore, the assessee was required to take appropriate appellate steps within the statutory period. The plea of illness, even if accepted, has not been shown to explain the entire period commencing from 20.12.2018 up to the filing of the

We have carefully considered the application for condonation of delay, the Statement of Facts, the submissions advanced on behalf of the assessee and the objections of the learned DR. We have also perused the order of the learned CIT(A) dated 20.12.2018 and the material placed on record. At the outset, there is no dispute that the present appeal has been filed with a delay of 2544 days. The impugned order of the learned CIT(A) was passed on 20.12.2018, whereas the present appeal has been instituted only in 2026. The magnitude of the delay is, therefore, substantial and cannot be treated as a mere marginal or technical delay. We are

In the present case, the explanation furnished by the assessee, when examined with reference to the chronology of events, does not satisfactorily account for the entire period of 2544 days.

The first circumstance relied upon is the illness of the assessee after the disposal of the appeal by the CIT(A) in December 2018. The application states that the assessee was suffering from serious and prolonged illness and that his deteriorating health prevented him from effectively pursuing further appellate remedies. However, no material has been brought on record before us specifying the period for which the assessee remained incapacitated or demonstrating that his medical condition

The second circumstance relied upon is the death of the assessee on 03.01.2021. The assessee's death is undoubtedly a significant circumstance. However, the present appeal was not filed immediately thereafter. The application merely states that the legal heirs were laypersons, unaware of the technicalities of income-tax litigation and of the remedies available under the Act. We are unable to accept such a general explanation as sufficient cause for the entire period subsequent to the death of the assessee. The application does not disclose when the legal heir first became aware of the impugned order, when professional advice was first obtained, or what prevented the legal heir from taking steps for filing the appeal for the intervening period. Thus, there is a significant unexplained interval not merely before the death of the assessee but also after his death.

We also find that considerable reliance has been placed upon the subsequent proceedings in the case of the assessee's brother, Shri Piara Singh. There is no dispute that the brother was a co-owner of the same agricultural land and that the two cases arose from the same transaction. The Statement of Facts records that identical proceedings were undertaken in the brother's case

We find it particularly significant that the favourable order in the brother's case was passed only on 05.01.2026. The application states that, upon becoming aware of this subsequent adjudication and obtaining professional advice, the legal heir promptly filed the present appeal. Even if this explanation is accepted for the period immediately preceding the filing of the present appeal, it does not explain the enormous period between

In other words, the subsequent favourable order in the case of the co-owner may explain the assessee’s decision to approach the Tribunal in 2026, but it does not satisfactorily explain the failure to pursue the statutory remedy within the prescribed period or during the intervening years. If such a plea were to be accepted as sufficient cause for condoning an extraordinary delay, the same principle would necessarily have to be applied uniformly to the Revenue as well. For instance, if, after expiry of the prescribed limitation period, a favourable decision is rendered by a higher Court or by the Tribunal in a matter concerning the Revenue, could the Revenue then be permitted to file an appeal after a lapse of five years merely on the ground that such subsequent decision prompted it to pursue the appellate remedy? In our considered view, the answer has to be in the negative. Acceptance of such a principle would effectively render the statutory period of limitation uncertain and open-ended, with the filing of an appeal becoming dependent upon subsequent developments occurring years after the expiry of the prescribed period. Such an approach would create an anomalous and chaotic situation, introduce an element of uncertainty and unpredictability into the appellate process, and would be wholly inconsistent with the discipline of limitation

We are also unable to accept the proposition that the absence of technical knowledge of the legal heirs, by itself, constitutes sufficient cause for such an extraordinary delay. Ignorance of law or unfamiliarity with appellate procedure may, in an appropriate case, be one of the circumstances to be considered along with other facts. But it cannot automatically justify an unexplained delay extending over several years. The applicant is required to demonstrate reasonable diligence and to explain the period for which the statutory remedy remained unexercised.

The principle that substantial justice should prevail over technicalities cannot be applied in isolation. The discretion to condone delay is intended to prevent genuine cases of injustice where the litigant, despite reasonable diligence, was prevented by sufficient cause from approaching the appellate forum in time. It is not intended to obliterate the statutory period of limitation altogether.

The present case is, therefore, not one where the entire delay stands satisfactorily explained by a continuous chain of circumstances. The explanation proceeds from illness to the death of the assessee, thereafter to the alleged lack of awareness of the legal heirs, and finally to the subsequent favourable decision in the brother's case. Even taken cumulatively, these circumstances do not satisfactorily account for the full period of 2544 days.

In the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the considered view that the assessee has failed to establish sufficient cause for the delay of 2544 days in filing the present appeal. The explanation furnished is general and does not account for the entire period of delay with the degree of specificity and

In view of the above, we do not find it appropriate to condone the delay. Accordingly, the application to condone the delay in filing the appeal is dismissed. As a consequence thereof, the appeal filed by the appellant is also dismissed.

In the result, the appeal of the assessee is dismissed.