PRAKASH NAGARI SAHAKARI PATHOSANSTHA MARYADIT, ISLAMPUR, TALUKA WALWA,ISLAMPUR vs. ITO WARD 5 SANGLI, AAYKAR BHAWAN

Basic Facts :  In this case, hearing was scheduled on 20.05.2026, none appeared on behalf of the assessee, hence, case was adjourned to 08.07.2026.  On 08.07.2026, none appeared on behalf of the assessee, hence, case was adjourned to 13.08.2026.  On 13.08.2026, Shri Amit Shintre appeared on behalf of the assessee through virtual requested for adjournment, hence, case was adjourned to 08.09.2026.

In this case there has been delay of 458 days in filing of the appeal before this Tribunal against the order of Addl./JCIT(A)-1, Chennai dated 18.09.2024. An affidavit has been filed by the Secretary of the assessee. The relevant paragraphs of the affidavit is reproduced here as under : “3. The delay is not intentional or deliberate. It occurred due to bona fide reasons: (a) Islampur being a semi urban place, specialized and updated guidance for ITAT remedy was not readily available; (b) We bona fide relied on our than tax consultant Shri. Anil Babaso Kadam who filed the return and guided the first appeal; (c) After receipt of order u/s 250, we consulted another consultant who advised that the demand appears correct considering section 80AC; (d) I am a Marathi - medium educated woman and not well versed with English and modern information technology and therefore relied upon professional advice. 4. On 15/02/2026, we approached CA Amit Shintre who advised filing of appeal in view of Pune ITAT ruling dated 12/02/2026 in Dagadu Dhondu Yeota vide ITA No. 2326/PUN/2025, which held that CPC had no jurisdiction prior to 01/04/2021 to disallow Chapter VI-A deduction through 143(1) adjustment for belated return.”

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee vs Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others Civil Appeal Nos.8183-8184 of 2013 vide order dated 13/09/2013 has laid down following principles for deciding Condonation Application: Quote, "15. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation. iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.

Taking into consideration totality of the facts, we are of the considered opinion that there was no sufficient cause for such inordinate delay. Hence, appeal is dismissed.

In the result, the appeal of the assessee is dismissed.