BIRLA CARBON INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED,MUMBAI vs. THE PRINCIPAL COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, MUMBAI - 5, MUMBAI

In course of assessment proceeding, the Assessing Officer (‘A.O.’ for short) having noticed that in the previous year relevant to assessment year under dispute, the assessee had entered into international transactions with its Associated Enterprises (AEs) made a reference to the Transfer Pricing Officer (‘TPO’ for short) to determine the arm’s length price (‘ALP’ for short) of the international transactions and Specified Domestic Transactions (‘SDT’ for short) as well. While undertaking the transfer pricing analysis u/s. 92CA(3) of the Act, the TPO having found that the price at which the assessee has undertaken transactions with AEs is not at arm’s length had suggested an adjustment of Rs.94,58,84,979/-. In terms with the adjustment suggested by the TPO, the A.O. framed a draft assessment order u/s. 144C(1) of the Act on 22.09.2021.

After receiving the draft assessment order as aforesaid, the assessee raised objections before ld. DRP. On 11.07.2022, ld. DRP disposed of the objections of the assessee by issuing certain directions to the A.O. in the matter of transfer pricing adjustment in relation to SDT. In terms with the directions issued by ld. DRP, the A.O. passed the final assessment order on 29.07.2022 u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 144C(13) of the Act.

Before us, ld. Counsel appearing for the assessee submitted that the final assessment order passed u/s. 144C(13) of the Act, cannot be subjected to revisionary jurisdiction u/s. 263 of the Act. In support of such contention ld. Counsel relied upon the following decisions: 1. Barclays Bank vs. CIT (in vide order dated 03.01.2022) 2. Accenture Solutions Private Limited vs. PCIT (TS-524-ITAT-2025(MUM-TP).

Whereas ld. Departmental Representative (ld.DR) strongly relied upon the observations of ld. PCIT, referring to the decision of Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in case of Devas Multimedia (P.) Ltd. Vs. Pr. CIT [WP No. 11618 of 2016 dated 27.09.2019 (Kar).

Keeping in view the aforesaid statutory provision, if we look at the legal position, it can be seen that in case of Barclays Bank PLC (supra), the co-ordinate bench, while seized with the identical issue, has held as under: 12. We have carefully gone through the submissions in the case laws and the records.

First, we note that in this case, the assessment order was passed after transfer pricing adjustment were made by the TPO. These have been detailed in the assessment order para '7' of the assessment order referred above. The TP adjustment made by TPO were in total Rs. 83,045,395/-. Assessee had made objection before the DRP and pursuant to DRP direction, the assessment was framed as per section 144C(13).

As against the above, Ld.CIT has noted that in this case TPO has not proposed any adjustment. This is contrary to the facts in this case, the above shows that Ld.CIT has exercised his jurisdiction u/s 263 without properly appreciating the assessment order passed. He also seems to be ignoring the fact that assessee has chosen to file objection before the DRP. When the assessment order has been passed pursuant to the direction of (A.Y.2018-19) Birla Carbon India Private Limited vs. Pr. CIT DRP, the appeal from the said assessment order does not lie with the ld.CIT(A), but lies directly to the ITAT as per provision of section 253(d). Now, the issue to be addressed in this case is whether, the Ld.CIT has erred in initiating proceedings u/s. 263 of the Act, when the original assessment order has been passed u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 144C(13), on the basis of the directions of the Dispute Resolution Panel(DRP).

We may gainfully refer to the provision of section 263 in this regard. "263. (1) The Principal Commissioner or Commissioner may call for and examine the record of any proceeding under this Act, and if he considers that any order passed therein by the [Assessing] Officer is erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interests of the revenue, he may, after giving the assessee an opportunity of being heard and after making or causing to be made such inquiry as he deems necessary, pass such order thereon as the circumstances of the case justify, including an order enhancing or modifying the assessment, or cancelling the assessment and directing a fresh assessment. Explanation 1.--For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that, for the purposes of this sub-section,-- (a) an order passed [ on or before or after the 1st day of June, 1988] by the Assessing Officer shall include (i) an order of assessment made by the Assistant Commissioner [or Deputy Commissioner] or the Income tax officer on the basis of the directions issued by the [Joint] Commissioner under section 144A. (ii) an order made by the [Joint] Commissioner in exercise of the powers or in the performance of the functions of an Assessing officer conferred on, or assigned to, him under the orders or directions issued by he Board or by the [Principal ] Chief Commissioner or] Chief Commissioner or[Principal Director General or] Director General or[ Principal Commissioner or] Commissioner authorized by the Board in this behalf under section 120. (b) "record" [ shall include and shall be deemed always to have included] all records relating to any proceeding under this Act available at the time of examination by the [Principal [Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal] Commissioner or] Commissioner; (c) where any order referred to in this sub-section and passed by the Assessing Officer had been the subject matter of any appeal [filed on or before or after the 1st day of June, 1988], the powers of the [Principal Commissioner or] Commissioner under this sub-section shall extend [and shall be deemed always to have extended to such matters as had not been considered and decided in such appeal.]"

A reading of the above shows that the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief commissioner may revise order passed by the AO, if the same is erroneous in so far as prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. The Explanation 1(a) of the Act referred above explains the order passed by the AO which can be subject matter of section 263 revision. The above explanation explains/clarifies that order of the AO in certain cases passed on the direction of certain superior officers can also be subject matter of section 263. The above explanation does not include the order passed under the direction of DRP u/s. 144C(13) of the Act. The legislature in its wisdom has thought it appropriate to include orders passed by the AO under direction u/s. 144A, but not under direction u/s. 144C(13). This is also in accordance with the provisions of the Act contained in section 144C, which we shall detailed at a later stage. The Ld.CIT in this case seems to be quiet conscious of this fact as he has mentioned on one of the issues, that AO has not properly followed the direction u/s. 144A. But, he is quiet silent and has nowhere mentioned that the final assessment order is passed after the direction of DRP. Admittedly, this is not a case, where draft assessment order is being revised. This is a case where final assessment order passed pursuant to the direction of DRP u/s. 144(3) is being revised by Ld.CIT. Ld. Counsel of the assessee in this regard submits that from (A.Y.2018-19) Birla Carbon India Private Limited vs. Pr. CIT the Finance Act, 2009, memorandum explaining the rationale behind the insertion of section 144C of the Act by the Finance Bill, 2009 as also the CBDT Circular No. 5 of 2010 dated 3 June 2010 issued explaining the said insertion, the notes on clauses, etc., it can be seen that consequential amendments have been made to various provisions of the Act as a result of insertion of section 144C in the Act. Such consequential amendments have been made to section 13 1, section 246A and section 253 of the Act. That however, no amendment is made in section 263 of the Act as a consequence of insertion of section 144C of the Act to deem such orders being capable of being revised. That therefore, the memorandum, circular, etc. support the Assessee's stand that once the Assessing Officer passes an order in accordance with the Directions issued by a superior authority (being DRP) the same cannot be revised by the CIT under section 263 of the Act. The above submission has sufficient cogency as our following discussion will further oxygenate the same.

It will also be gainful to refer to the provision of section 144C dealing with the reference to DRP (1) The Assessing Officer shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act, in the first instance, forward a draft of the proposed order of assessment (hereafter in this section referred to as the draft order) to the eligible assessee if he proposes to make, on or after the 1st day of October, 2009, any variation in the income or loss returned which is prejudicial to the interest of such assessee. (2) On receipt of the draft order, the eligible assessee shall, within thirty days of the receipt by him of the draft order,-- (a) file his acceptance of the variations to the Assessing Officer; or (b) file his objections, if any, to such variation with,-- (i) the Dispute Resolution Panel; and (ii) the Assessing Officer. (3) The Assessing Officer shall complete the assessment on the basis of the draft order, if-- (a) the assessee intimates to the Assessing Officer the acceptance of the variation; or (b) no objections are received within the period specified in sub-section (2). (4) The Assessing Officer shall, notwithstanding anything contained in section 153 [or section 153B], pass the assessment order under sub-section (3) within one month from the end of the month in which,-- (a) the acceptance is received; or (b) the period of filing of objections under sub-section (2) expires. (5) The Dispute Resolution Panel shall, in a case where any objection is received under sub-section (2), issue such directions, as it thinks fit, for the guidance of the Assessing Officer to enable him to complete the assessment. (6) The Dispute Resolution Panel shall issue the directions referred to in sub-section (5), after considering the following, namely:-- (a) draft order; (b) objections filed by the assessee; (c) evidence furnished by the assessee; (d) report, if any, of the Assessing Officer, Valuation Officer or Transfer Pricing Officer or any other authority; (e) records relating to the draft order; (f) evidence collected by, or caused to be collected by, it; and (g) result of any enquiry made by, or caused to be made by, it. (7) The Dispute Resolution Panel may, before issuing any directions referred to in sub-section (5),-- (a) make such further enquiry, as it thinks fit; or (b) cause any further enquiry to be made by any income-tax authority and report the result of the same to it.

Further, the scheme of the Act itself does not provide any interference in the direction of the DRP as the law containing section 144C(13) directs that the AO shall pass an order inconformity with the directions of the DRP without providing any further opportunity of being heard to the assessee. When the Act itself provide, that order has to be passed by the AO without providing any opportunity to the assessee pursuant to the direction of the DRP, the direction given in this order u/s. 263 by the Ld.CIT to the AO to call for the details of allowability of various deductions claimed by the assessee, in light of the observations discussed by him is quiet contrary to the sanguine provisions of law. Even otherwise, the order passed by the Ld.CIT is an exercise in futility inasmuch as, if the AO proceeds to pass an order by giving the assessee an opportunity of being heard, the same will be against the mandate of section 144C(13). Furthermore, it is also settled law that in assessment u/s. 144C, AO has to invariably pass a draft assessment order and give the same to the assessee for filing objection before DRP. Hence, the direction by the Ld.CIT to the AO to pass an order by-passing the provisions of passing the draft assessment order is also not sustainable in law.

Now, we examine the constitution of DRP. As evident from the above, the DRP constitutes a collegium comprising of three Principal Commissioners or Commissioners of Income-tax, the directions given by them is binding upon by the AO. Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the case of Vodafone India Services Pvt.Ltd. vs Union of India & Others 2013 SCC online Bom 1534 has expounded upon the proceedings at DRP as under:- "The proceeding before the DRP is not an appeal proceeding but a correcting mechanism in the nature of a second look at the proposed assessment order by high functionaries of (A.Y.2018-19) Birla Carbon India Private Limited vs. Pr. CIT the revenue keeping in mind the interest of the assessee. It is a continuation of the Assessment proceedings till such time a final order of assessment which is appelable is passed by the Assessing Officer. This also finds support from Section 144C(6) which enables the DRP to collect evidence or cause any enquiry to be made before giving directions to the Assessing Officer under Section 144C(5). The DRP procedure can only be initiated by an assessee objecting to the draft assessment order. This would enable correction in the proposed order (draft assessment order) before a final assessment order is passed. Therefore, we are of the view that in the present facts this issue could be agitated before and rectified by the DRP." [underline ours] 21. The above exposition duly elaborates upon the provisions of the Act contained under section 144C.

From the above, it is also apparent that members of the DRP are three in numbers and are individually equivalent in rank to the CIT, who is initiating proceedings u/s. 263 against the order passed by the AO pursuant to their direction. Now as far as equivalence of single CIT to a 'colliguem of 3 CIT is concerned, it is settled law that bench comprising single persons is not higher/superior than a collegiums of three persons. Hence, it is abundantly clear that the DRP stands at a higher pedestal than the CIT passing an order alone.

Furthermore, we may refer to the decision of Hon'ble Bombay High court in the case of Virendra Kumar Jhamb vs. N.K.Vohra (supra). In this case, the Jurisdictional High Court held that the assessee had approached the DDIT (investigation) under the Direct tax Amnesty Scheme. The CIT had accepted that the taxable income be computed at 8 percent of the total receipts. A second CIT, on scrutiny and verification of the assesses records, found the decision of the earlier CIT to be fair and justifiable. A subsequent CIT, sought to revise the order under section 263, and tax income at 9 percent of the receipts. The Bombay High Court inter alia held that the assessment orders were solely based on the directives of the earlier CITs, and the same could not be revised by the subsequent CIT under section 263.

In light of the above discussion and case laws, the case laws referred by the Ld.CIT-DR are not applicable on the facts of the case. As, we have already noted that the submission of Ld.CIT-DR are at variance with the exposition by Hon'ble Bombay High Court in Vodafone India Services Pvt.Ltd.(supra). The Ld.CIT-DR in his submission has emphasized that proceeding before DRP is akin to appeal before Ld.CIT(A). This is quiet contrary to the Hon'ble Bombay High Court exposition noted above and the other decisions of Hon'ble Jurisdictional High court referred above.

The case of Devas Multimedia Pvt.Ltd.(supra) by the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court was in connection with the writ petition filed by the assessee, where assessee has objected to the notice issued u/s. 263 of the Act. Furthermore, Hon'ble High Court has expounded that writ court cannot examine the validity of notice on merits. Furthermore, the said decision has distinguished following decision of Hon'ble Bombay High Court, i) Vodafone Services Pvt.Ld.(supra) wherein Hon'ble Bombay Court has expounded that proceedings before the DRP is not an appeal proceedings, but correction mechanism in the nature of a second look at the proposed assessment order by high functionaries of revenue (ii)Vodafone India Services Pvt.Ltd. vs. Union of India (2014) 368 ITR 1(Bom.). In the present case, this Tribunal is under the jurisdiction of Hon'ble Bombay High Court. Hence, we do not have any authority whatsoever to deviate from the exposition of the Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court that the proceedings at DRP is not an appeal proceedings, but a correcting mechanism. Furthermore, the ratio from the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the case of Virendra Kumar Jamb(supra) also support this view.

Hence, in light of the aforesaid discussions and precedents from Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court, we set aside the orders of Ld.CIT and hold that he cannot legally assume jurisdiction u/s. 263 of the act on an order passed by the AO pursuant to the direction of DRP. This is over and above our other observations in para '14' of this order, where we have noted that Ld.CIT has passed this order without properly appreciating the assessment order. Since, we have quashed assessment order on jurisdiction itself, we are not dealing with the merits of the case.

Pertinently, in case of Barclays Bank (supra), the co-ordinate bench after taking note of the decision of Hon’ble Karanataka High Court in case of Devas Multimedia (P.) Ltd. (supra) has decided the issue in favour of the assessee following the decision of Hon’ble Bombay High Court. In view of the aforesaid, respectfully following the decisions of the co-ordinate benches cited before us by ld. Counsel for the assessee, we hold that the exercise of jurisdiction u/s. 263 of the Act to revise the final assessment order passed in pursuance to the directions of ld. DRP is invalid. Consequently, the impugned order passed u/s. 263 of the Act is declared as invalid and squashed. Resultantly, the final assessment order dated 29.07.2022 stands restored. The other issues raised in appeal but not deliberated upon in the present order are kept open.