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Facts
The assessee filed an appeal before the Tribunal with a delay of 92 days. The assessee contended that the delay was caused due to notices and orders being sent to incorrect email addresses, leading to a lack of awareness of the proceedings. The Revenue objected to the condonation of delay, citing the assessee's non-appearance before lower authorities.
Held
The Tribunal held that there was sufficient cause for the delay, as the assessee was genuinely unaware of the proceedings due to communication errors. Citing various judicial precedents, the Tribunal emphasized preferring substantial justice over technicalities. Consequently, the delay was condoned, and the matter was remitted to the CIT(A)/NFAC for fresh adjudication.
Key Issues
Whether the delay in filing the appeal is liable to be condoned due to sufficient cause, and whether the matter should be remitted for fresh adjudication on merits.
Sections Cited
250, 253(5), 271F, 271(1)(c)
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Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, “B’’BENCH: BANGALORE
Before: SHRI WASEEM AHMED & SHRI KESHAV DUBEY
PER KESHAV DUBEY, JUDICIAL MEMBER:
This appeal at the instance of the assessee is directed against the order of ld. CIT(A)/NFAC dated 7.5.2025 vide DIN & Order No. ITBA/NFAC/S/250/2025-26/1076070074(1) passed u/s 250 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (in short “the Act”) for the AY 2016-17.
The assessee has raised the following grounds of appeal:-
Mr. Venkatesh Sajeevaiah, Bengaluru Page 4 of 13 3. At the outset, the ld. A.R. of the assessee submitted that there is a delay of 92 days in filing the appeal before this Tribunal. The ld. A.R. of the assessee also drew our attention on an application for condonation of delay along with an affidavit in original sworn before the notary public dated 19.2.2026, which is reproduced below for ease of reference and record:
Mr. Venkatesh Sajeevaiah, Bengaluru Page 5 of Mr. Venkatesh Sajeevaiah, Bengaluru Page 6 of Mr. Venkatesh Sajeevaiah, Bengaluru Page 7 of Mr. Venkatesh Sajeevaiah, Bengaluru Page 8 of 13 Mr. Venkatesh Sajeevaiah, Bengaluru Page 9 of 13 4. On going through the application for condonation, we find that the assessee could not file the appeal within the prescribed period for the reason that the assessee was served notices by the Department on the email ID i.e. Venkicacs@gmail.com belonging to his erstwhile CA Mr. Venkatesh and another email ID rakeshheggade6@gmail.com which does not belong to the assessee. Further, even the impugned appellate order was not served on the email ID provided in Form 35 i.e. venkatesh020373@gmail.com which belongs to the assessee and hence the assessee was not aware of the said order passed ex-parte by the NFAC at the relevant point of time. The assessee became aware of the order passed by the ld. CIT(A) only in the month of October,2025 when copies of the penalty notices u/s 271F & 271(1)(c) of the Act were served physically. Further, based on advice received from his consultant, the assessee updated his email ID rashmirashi1987@gmail.com on the e filing portal of the department and accordingly filed his second appeal seeking condonation of delay. The ld. A.R. also submitted that the delay is unintentional and no benefit can be attributed to the assessee in filing the appeal belatedly. He thus prayed to condone the delay and requested to consider the issues raised by the assessee on merits.
On the contrary the ld. D.R. vehemently objected for granting the condonation of delay and submitted that the assessee had neither appeared before the AO nor before the ld. CIT(A) which clearly demonstrate the careless attitude of the assessee.
We have perused the details filed by the assessee to justify the delay and we are satisfied that there is no malafide intention on the part of the assessee in filing the appeal belatedly before us. It is to be noted that u/s 253(5) of the Act the Tribunal may admit the appeal filed beyond the period of limitation where it has established Mr. Venkatesh Sajeevaiah, Bengaluru Page 10 of 13 that there exists a sufficient cause on the part of the assessee for not presenting the appeals within the prescribed time. The explanation therefore, becomes relevant to determine whether the same reflect sufficient and reasonable cause on the part of the assessee in not filing these appeals within the prescribed time. We have gone through the reasons explained by the assessee in which the assessee alleged that he was completely unaware of the order passed by the ld.CIT(A) as all the communications were sent on other email ids which did not belong to the assessee. It is only after the physical receipt of the penalty notices, the assessee came to know that the order has already been passed by the ld. CIT(A) and thereafter he approached the present counsel to take necessary action.
6.1 While considering a similar issue the Apex Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji and Ors. (167 ITR 471) laid down six principles. For the purpose of convenience, the principles laid down by the Apex Court are reproduced hereunder:
(1) Ordinarily, a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.
(2) Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this, when delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. (3) 'Every day's delay must be explained' does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational, commonsense and pragmatic manner.
(4) When substantial justice and technical consideration are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a nondeliberate delay. (5) There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk.
Mr. Venkatesh Sajeevaiah, Bengaluru Page 11 of 13 (6) It must be grasped that the judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.
6.2 When substantial justice and technical consideration are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have vested right for injustice being done because of nondeliberate delay. Therefore, we have to prefer substantial justice rather than technicality in deciding the issue. As observed by Apex Court, if the application of the assessee for condoning the delay is rejected, it would amount to legalize injustice on technical ground when the Tribunal is capable of removing injustice and to do justice. Therefore, this Tribunal is bound to remove the injustice by condoning the delay on technicalities. If the delay is not condoned, it would amount to legalizing an illegal order which would result in unjust enrichment on the part of the State by retaining the tax relatable thereto. Under the scheme of Constitution, the Government cannot retain even a single pie of the individual citizen as tax, when it is not authorized by an authority of law. Therefore, if we refuse to condone the delay, that would amount to legalize an illegal and unconstitutional order passed by the lower authority.
6.3 Further, in the case of People Education & Economic Development Society Vs/ ITO reported in 100 ITD 87 (TM) (Chen), wherein held that “when substantial justice and technical consultation are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of non-deliberate delay”.
6.4 The next question may arise whether delay was excessive or inordinate. There is no question of any excessive or inordinate when the reason stated by the assessee was a reasonable cause for Mr. Venkatesh Sajeevaiah, Bengaluru Page 12 of 13 not filing the appeal. We have to see the cause for the delay. When there was a reasonable cause, the period of delay may not be relevant factor. In fact, the Madras High Court in the case of CIT vs. K.S.P. Shanmugavel Nadai and Ors. (153 ITR 596) considered the condonation of delay and held that there was sufficient and reasonable cause on the part of the assessee for not filing the appeal within the period of limitation. Accordingly, the Madras High Court condoned nearly 21 years of delay in filing the appeal. When compared to 21 years, 92 days cannot be considered to be inordinate or excessive. Furthermore, the Chennai Tribunal by majority opinion in the case of People Education and Economic Development Society (PEEDS) v. ITO (100 ITD 87) (Chennai) (TM) condoned more than six hundred days delay. Therefore, in our opinion, by preferring the substantial justice, the delay of 92 days has to be condoned and accordingly we condone the delay and admit the appeal for adjudication.
Now having condone the delay, we find that the assessee could not represent his case before the ld. CIT(A)/NFAC. The reasons for being non-responsive before the ld. CIT(A)/NFAC can well be understood on going through the affidavit filed by the assessee for condoning the delay which are discussed above in detail. This being so, in the interest of justice, equity and fair play, we deemed it fit and proper to remit the entire issue in dispute to the file of ld. CIT(A)/NFAC to decide a fresh in accordance with law. Needless to say, a reasonable opportunity is being heard must be granted to the assessee. The assessee is also directed to produce all the supporting documents/ evidence/information in support of his claim. We make it clear that in case of further default, the assessee shall not be entitled for any leniency. It is ordered accordingly.
In the result, appeal filed by the assessee is partly allowed for Statistical purposes.