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Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, DELHI BENCH: ‘SMC’ NEW DELHI
Before: SHRI SAKTIJIT DEY, JUDUCIAL MEMBER
Date of hearing 21.06.2022 Date of pronouncement 30.06.2022 ORDER This is an appeal by the assessee against order dated 16.12.2021 passed by National Faceless Appeal Centre (NFAC), Delhi, for the assessment year 2013-14.
Though, the assessee has raised a number of grounds, however, the basic grievance is against ex-parte disposal of the appeal, that too, in limine by the first appellate authority.
I have heard the parties and perused the materials on record.
Briefly the facts are, the assessee is a resident individual. For the assessment year under dispute, the assessee filed her return of income on 30.09.2013 declaring total income of Rs.9,66,530/-. The return filed by the assessee was processed under section 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (in short ‘the Act’) by the Centralized Processing Centre (CPC), Bengaluru. While processing the return of income, certain adjustments were made resulting in determination of total income at Rs.11,79,750/-. Contesting the adjustment made in the intimation issued under section 143(1) of the Act, the assessee preferred an appeal before the first appellate authority. While deciding the appeal of the assessee, NFAC noticed that the intimation under section 143(1) of the Act was issued by CPC on 03.05.2014. Therefore, the appeal should have been filed on or before 02.06.2014. Whereas, the assessee has filed the appeal on 15.07.2020. Alleging inordinate delay of 2119 days in filing the appeal, learned first appellate authority dismissed assessee’s appeal in limine without condoning the delay.
Having considered rival submissions, I find, while dismissing assessee’s appeal on the ground of delay, the first appellate authority has observed that the intimation under section 143(1) of the Act was dispatched to the email address of the assessee.
Therefore, it has to be presumed that the assessee has received the intimation under section 143(1) of the Act in time. Further, he has observed that the reason shown by the assessee for condonation of delay was not supported by affidavit. Rebutting the aforesaid allegation of the first appellate authority, learned counsel for the assesse has submitted before me that the intimation issued under section 143(1) of the Act was never received by the assessee, as, it was sent to a wrong email address. Further, he submitted, the assessee could come to know about the intimation issued under section 143(1) of the Act only when the refund arising in assessment year 2019-20 was adjusted by the Assessing Officer against the demand of the impugned assessment year. Therefore, after obtaining a certified copy of the intimation issued under section 143(1) of the Act, the Assessee filed the appeal in time.
From the aforesaid facts, it is clear that the assessee never admitted of filing the appeal belatedly. Therefore, the reasoning of the first appellate authority that the reasons shown for delay was not supported by any evidence, was not a valid reason.
I have further noticed, in the return of income filed for the impugned assessment year, the assessee has mentioned her email address as starninenine@gmail.com, whereas, both the intimation issued under section 143(1) of the Act as well as the observations made by NFAC clearly reveal that the intimation under section 143(1) of the Act was sent to the email address “mailoffice7772@gmail.com”. Thus, prima facie, it appears that the intimation under section 143(1) of the Act was not sent to the email address provided in the return of income filed by the assessee.
Thus, keeping in view the aforesaid factual position, the contention of the assessee that she never received the intimation under section 143(1) of the Act as it was sent in wrong address, is certainly believable. Therefore, in my view, learned Commissioner (Appeals) was unjustified in dismissing assessee’s appeal in limine on the ground of delay. Therefore, I hold the impugned order of the NFAC unsustainable. Accordingly, I set aside the first appellate order.
Further, considering the fact that the issue raised on merits is relating to disallowance of depreciation, I deem it appropriate to restore the matter back to the Assessing Officer to factually verify assessee’s claim of depreciation after calling for necessary details relating to the assets, on which depreciation has been claimed and past history of such claim.
Needless to mention, before deciding the issue, the Assessing Officer must afford reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee. Grounds are allowed for statistical purposes.
In the result, the appeal is allowed for statistical purposes.
Order pronounced in the open court on 30th June, 2022