MICRO CAPITALS PVT. LTD. ,THANE vs. DCIT,C.C-4(3),KOLKATA, KOLKATA

(A.Y. 2013-14) Micro Capitals Pvt. Limited ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-5, Kolkata dated 19.05.2017, which is arising out of the order under section 144 of the Act on 22.03.2016 framed by ld. ITO, Ward-15(3), Kolkata.

During the course of hearing, ld. Counsel for the assessee referring to the contents of condonation application stated that the assessee was prevented for sufficient cause for filing the appeal within the statutory time limit. Reliance was placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Senior Bhosale Estate (HUF) –vs.- ACIT reported in (2019) 112 taxmann.com 134 (SC) and the judgment of the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in the case of Vijay Kumar Ruia –vs.- CIT reported in (2011) 15 taxmann.com 310 (Allahabad). In support of this contention for condonation of delay, relevant extract of the condonation petition is extracted below:-

We have heard the rival contentions, perused the relevant records placed before us and the judgments referred and relied therein. We find merit in the contention of the ld. Counsel for the assessee and are of the view that there was sufficient reason, for (A.Y. 2013-14) Micro Capitals Pvt. Limited which the assessee was restrained from filing the appeal before this Tribunal within the statutory time limit. Sub-section 5 of Section 253 contemplates that the Tribunal may admit an appeal or permit filing of memorandum of cross- objections after expiry of relevant period, if it is satisfied that there was a sufficient cause for not presenting it within that period. This expression sufficient cause employed in the section has also been used identically in sub-section 3 of section 249 of Income Tax Act, which provides powers to the ld. Commissioner to condone the delay in filing the appeal before the Commissioner. Similarly, it has been used in section 5 of Indian Limitation Act, 1963. Whenever interpretation and construction of this expression has fallen for consideration before Honble High Court as well as before the Honble Supreme Court, then, Honble Court were unanimous in their conclusion that this expression is to be used liberally. We may make reference to the following observations of the Hon’ble Supreme court from the decision in the case of Collector Land Acquisition Vs. Mst. Katiji & Others, 1987 AIR 1353: 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

Similarly, we would like to make reference to authoritative pronouncement of Honble Supreme Court in the case of N. Balakrisknan Vs. M. Krishnamurtky (supra). It reads as under: “Rule of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life-span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim Interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be putt to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi lain Vs. Kuntal Kumari [AIR 1969 SC 575] and State of West Bengal Vs. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality [AIR 1972 SC 749]. It must be remembered that in every case of delay there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn 8

We do not deem it necessary to re-cite or recapitulate the proposition laid down in other decisions. It is suffice to say that the Honble Courts are unanimous in their approach to propound that whenever the reasons assigned by an applicant for explaining the condonation of delay, then such reasons are to be construed with a justice oriented approach.

In the light of the above, we are of the view that while making this appeal time barred, the assessee will not gain anything. The delay has not been adopted by the assessee as a strategy to litigate with the Revenue. The delay is the result of human lapses and we find merit in the contention of the ld. Counsel for the assessee and are of the view that there was sufficient reason, which the assessee was restrained from filing the appeal before this Tribunal within the statutory time limit. Therefore, in the interest of justice, we condone the said delay of 2193 days and admit the appeal for adjudication on merit. 9