Section 144C(3) of the Income Tax Act

Fees for technical services under Section 9(1)(vii) can include payments for fully automated services even without direct human interface, as modern technological developments blur the specific human element in such processes.

The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) cannot expand the scope of an assessment or improve the Assessing Officer's case in a manner that usurps the revisional power of the Commissioner of Income Tax under Section 263 of the Income-tax Act.

For fees for technical services to be taxable under a tax treaty's 'make available' clause, a transfer of technology enabling the recipient to independently perform the service in the future is necessary, beyond mere service rendition. The case also clarifies that re-insurance services do not constitute 'imparting' of information taxable as royalty.

If an assessee possesses interest-free funds exceeding investments in tax-free securities, it is presumed that investments are made from these own funds, precluding disallowance of interest expenditure under Section 14A read with Rule 8D(2)(ii). Additionally, weighted deduction under Section 35(2AB) is computed on the gross expenditure incurred, not net expenditure after reducing income earned.

For services to qualify as 'Fees for Technical Services' or 'Fees for Included Services' under Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements (DTAAs), they must 'make available' technical knowledge, experience, skill, or processes to the recipient, enabling them to apply such expertise independently.

The Supreme Court holds that for a service to qualify as 'fees for technical services' under Section 9(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act or Article 12 of a DTAA, direct human involvement or intervention in rendering the service is essential. This principle applies to telecommunication services like interconnect charges and roaming charges, and also to services related to software use.

Reassessment under Section 147/148 is invalid if it constitutes a mere change of opinion by the Assessing Officer without any fresh tangible material, especially after the assessee made a full and truthful disclosure during the original scrutiny assessment under Section 143(3).

A statute's object is to ascertain legislative intent from its plain language, avoiding any construction that adds, substitutes, or rejects words as meaningless. This principle applies to interpreting statutory deadlines, such as those for Transfer Pricing Officer and Assessing Officer orders under Section 153, requiring strict calculation based on the literal meaning of terms like "before" and "prior to".

Service tax paid to the Government of India is not 'on account of' the provision of services for mineral oil exploration and production, and thus does not form part of the aggregate taxable amount under Section 44BB(2)(a) and (b).

Companies with significantly higher turnover, indicating differing functional and risk profiles, are not comparable for transfer pricing benchmarking. Such large companies must be excluded from the list of comparables when benchmarking against an assessee with a much smaller turnover.