ITAT Visakhapatnam Judgments — June 2025

The Tribunal held that procedural mistakes that are curable and do not affect core eligibility should not penalize the assessee, especially for charitable institutions. The CIT should have allowed rectification and examined the application on merits.

The Tribunal held that the error was a mere technical lapse and procedural mistakes should not defeat substantive rights, especially for a charitable institution already holding 12AA and 80G registrations. It set aside the rejection order and remanded the matter back to the CIT(E) to allow the assessee to rectify the errors and decide the application afresh on merits after providing due opportunity of hearing.

The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s order was non-speaking and lacked cogent reasoning, especially as the lenders in different assessment years were different. The Tribunal noted that the AO had raised specific points about the lender's lack of creditworthiness and dummy directors, which were not addressed by the CIT(A).

The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s order was non-speaking and lacked cogent reasoning, especially as the lenders in different assessment years were different. The Tribunal noted that the AO had raised specific points about the lender's lack of creditworthiness and dummy directors, which were not addressed by the CIT(A).

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal held that such an error was merely a technical or procedural lapse and should not override the substantive rights of a charitable institution. Citing Supreme Court precedent, the Tribunal set aside the rejection orders and remanded the matters back to the Ld.CIT(E) to reconsider the applications on their merits, after allowing the assessee an opportunity to rectify the procedural errors.

The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s order was non-speaking and lacked cogent reasoning, especially as the lenders in different assessment years were different. The Tribunal noted that the AO had raised specific points about the lender's lack of creditworthiness and dummy directors, which were not addressed by the CIT(A).

The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s order was non-speaking and lacked cogent reasoning, especially as the lenders in different assessment years were different. The Tribunal noted that the AO had raised specific points about the lender's lack of creditworthiness and dummy directors, which were not addressed by the CIT(A).

The Tribunal held that the cash deposits during the demonetization period could not be sourced from pre-demonetization cash or business sales. However, it directed the AO to apply the pre-amended tax rate of 30% under Section 115BBE for these unexplained cash deposits.

The Tribunal held that procedural mistakes that are curable and do not affect core eligibility should not penalize the assessee, especially for charitable institutions. The CIT should have allowed rectification and examined the application on merits.

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal held that such an error was merely a technical or procedural lapse and should not override the substantive rights of a charitable institution. Citing Supreme Court precedent, the Tribunal set aside the rejection orders and remanded the matters back to the Ld.CIT(E) to reconsider the applications on their merits, after allowing the assessee an opportunity to rectify the procedural errors.

The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s order was non-speaking and lacked cogent reasoning, especially as the lenders in different assessment years were different. The Tribunal noted that the AO had raised specific points about the lender's lack of creditworthiness and dummy directors, which were not addressed by the CIT(A).

The Tribunal observed that the Ld.CIT(E) did not pass a speaking order justifying the rejection. Finding that the CIT(E) had not specified how the assessee's activities were not charitable, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order. The matter was restored to the Ld.CIT(E) to provide the assessee with another opportunity to furnish details and to pass a speaking order on merits.

The Tribunal condoned the 40-day delay, acknowledging the assessee's reasonable cause. While upholding the CIT(E)'s justification for rejection based on non-compliance, it set aside the CIT(E)'s order and remanded the case to provide the assessee one more opportunity to submit the necessary documents in the interest of natural justice.

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal found that the Ld. CIT(E)'s rejection order was not a speaking order, as it merely stated the absence of substantial charitable activities without specific elaboration. To uphold natural justice, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and restored the matter back to the Ld. CIT(E), directing him to provide another opportunity to the assessee to furnish the required details and to pass a speaking order on merits.

The Tribunal found that the CIT(Exemptions)'s orders were cryptic, non-speaking, and violated principles of natural justice. It set aside the impugned orders and remanded the applications back to the CIT(Exemptions) for fresh adjudication. The CIT(Exemptions) was directed to provide a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee society and pass detailed, speaking orders considering all submissions.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, acknowledging the assessee's bonafide reasons. It held that compensation for land acquired under the National Highways Act, 1956, is generally exempt from income tax as per Section 96 of the RFCTLARR Act. The matter was set aside to the Assessing Officer for verification of the claim.

The Tribunal found that the CIT(Exemptions)'s orders were cryptic, non-speaking, and violated principles of natural justice. It set aside the impugned orders and remanded the applications back to the CIT(Exemptions) for fresh adjudication. The CIT(Exemptions) was directed to provide a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee society and pass detailed, speaking orders considering all submissions.

The Tribunal held that the issue of depreciation on capital dredging was decided against the assessee in its own case for AY 2010-11, and thus the assessee's ground regarding depreciation was dismissed. The Tribunal also dismissed the revenue's grounds regarding disallowance of provision for interest on government loan and depreciation on railway permanent way, following previous decisions.

The Tribunal held that the issue of depreciation on capital dredging was decided against the assessee in its own case for AY 2010-11, and thus the assessee's ground regarding depreciation was dismissed. The Tribunal also dismissed the revenue's grounds regarding disallowance of provision for interest on government loan and depreciation on railway permanent way, following previous decisions.

The Tribunal observed that the Ld.CIT(E) did not pass a speaking order and merely stated that the assessee was not carrying out substantial charitable activities, without specifying how. The Tribunal found this approach incorrect and, in the interest of natural justice, decided to grant one more opportunity.

The Tribunal determined that the assessee, operating in a remote area with tribal employees unfamiliar with computers, had a bona fide reason for the delay, having learned of the assessment only upon receiving a demand letter. Citing a Supreme Court precedent, the Tribunal ruled that a liberal approach should be taken for condonation of delay. The CIT(A)'s order was set aside, and the matter was remanded to the CIT(A) to condone the delay and decide the appeal on its merits.

The Tribunal determined that the assessee, operating in a remote area with tribal employees unfamiliar with computers, had a bona fide reason for the delay, having learned of the assessment only upon receiving a demand letter. Citing a Supreme Court precedent, the Tribunal ruled that a liberal approach should be taken for condonation of delay. The CIT(A)'s order was set aside, and the matter was remanded to the CIT(A) to condone the delay and decide the appeal on its merits.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) cannot dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution and is statutorily obligated to decide on merits. The order of the CIT(A) was set aside.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal and admitted an additional ground concerning Section 115BBE. It acknowledged the bank's certificate supporting the assessee's claim and set aside the case, remanding it to the A.O. to re-adjudicate after providing the assessee a reasonable opportunity to furnish fresh documentary evidence, including complete customer details.

The Third Member agreed with the Accountant Member, holding that the income derived from the lease was indeed income from house property, contrary to the assessee's claim of business income. This decision was based on the majority opinion.

The Third Member agreed with the Accountant Member, holding that the income derived from the lease was indeed income from house property, contrary to the assessee's claim of business income. This decision was based on the majority opinion.

The Tribunal held that the approval under section 153D for assessment under section 153A is mandatory and cannot be a mere formality. It must be based on an application of mind after examining the relevant material. Since the approval in this case was granted mechanically and without proper application of mind, the assessment order was deemed invalid and void ab-initio.

The Tribunal held that the approval under section 153D for assessment under section 153A is mandatory and cannot be a mere formality. It must be based on an application of mind after examining the relevant material. Since the approval in this case was granted mechanically and without proper application of mind, the assessment order was deemed invalid and void ab-initio.

The Tribunal held that the approval under section 153D for assessment under section 153A is mandatory and cannot be a mere formality. It must be based on an application of mind after examining the relevant material. Since the approval in this case was granted mechanically and without proper application of mind, the assessment order was deemed invalid and void ab-initio.

The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's argument, stating that a newly formed trust that has not commenced activities cannot be expected to furnish financial details. Consequently, the Tribunal held that the Trust is entitled to registration under Section 12A and Section 80G and directed the Ld.CIT(E) to grant the registrations.

The Tribunal, after hearing both sides and perusing the material on record, observed that the Learned CIT(A) had provided opportunities on several occasions, but the assessee neither appeared nor complied with the notices. Considering the submissions of the Learned AR and the totality of facts, and in the interest of providing substantial justice, the Tribunal was of the opinion that the assessee should be given one more opportunity of being heard. Therefore, the Tribunal decided to remit the matter back to the file of the Learned CIT(A) for fresh consideration and decision on merits, in order to meet the principles of natural justice. The assessee was directed to cooperate with the proceedings before the Learned CIT(A) without seeking unnecessary adjournments. The grounds raised by the assessee were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal, considering the submissions of both parties and the material on record, observed that the CIT(A) had provided opportunities on several occasions, but the assessee neither appeared nor complied with the notices. However, in the interest of providing substantial justice and to meet the principles of natural justice, the Tribunal was of the opinion that the assessee should be given one more opportunity of being heard. Therefore, the Tribunal decided to remit the matter back to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh consideration and decision on merits. The assessee was directed to cooperate with the proceedings before the CIT(A) without seeking unnecessary adjournments. Consequently, the grounds raised by the assessee were allowed for statistical purposes. The specific findings on the validity of the notice under Section 148, the reassessment proceedings, and the additions made under Section 69A and towards capital gains were not adjudicated on merits, as the case was remitted.

The Tribunal partly allowed the appeals filed by the assessee and the revenue. Certain disallowances were confirmed, while others were set aside or modified based on judicial pronouncements and the facts of the case.

The Tribunal partly allowed the appeals filed by the assessee and the revenue. Certain disallowances were confirmed, while others were set aside or modified based on judicial pronouncements and the facts of the case.

The Tribunal partly allowed the appeals filed by the assessee and the revenue. Certain disallowances were confirmed, while others were set aside or modified based on judicial pronouncements and the facts of the case.

The Tribunal partly allowed the appeals filed by the assessee and the revenue. Certain disallowances were confirmed, while others were set aside or modified based on judicial pronouncements and the facts of the case.

The Tribunal partly allowed the appeals filed by the assessee and the revenue. Certain disallowances were confirmed, while others were set aside or modified based on judicial pronouncements and the facts of the case.

The Tribunal partly allowed the appeals filed by the assessee and the revenue. Certain disallowances were confirmed, while others were set aside or modified based on judicial pronouncements and the facts of the case.

The Tribunal partly allowed the appeals filed by the assessee and the revenue. Certain disallowances were confirmed, while others were set aside or modified based on judicial pronouncements and the facts of the case.

The Tribunal partly allowed the appeals filed by the assessee and the revenue. Certain disallowances were confirmed, while others were set aside or modified based on judicial pronouncements and the facts of the case.

The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's argument, stating that a newly formed trust that has not commenced activities cannot be expected to furnish financial details. Consequently, the Tribunal held that the Trust is entitled to registration under Section 12A and Section 80G and directed the Ld.CIT(E) to grant the registrations.

The Tribunal found that the Assessing Officer had conducted a detailed inquiry, called for all relevant details, and passed a detailed assessment order, specifically addressing the issues later raised by the Pr.CIT. Since the AO had already examined the issues and made additions, the Pr.CIT's order under Section 263, based on an alleged 'lack of enquiry', was quashed as unjustified.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the application for Section 12AB registration, acknowledging that the delay was due to circumstances beyond the assessee's control. It directed the CIT(E) to consider the application for registration on merits and pass orders in accordance with law.

The Tribunal determined that the misclassification was a bonafide mistake committed by the tax preparer, which could be rectified. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the Ld. CIT(A)'s order and remitted the case back to the jurisdictional AO for fresh consideration of the assessee's details and to pass orders in accordance with law.

The Tribunal found that the AO had conducted a detailed inquiry, called for and examined all necessary details, and made additions. Consequently, the AO's order was neither erroneous nor prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. Therefore, the Pr.CIT's invocation of revisional powers Under Section 263 was unjustified.

The Tribunal held that the exemption claimed under Section 10(38) for long-term capital gains from penny stock transactions was valid and the additions made by the Assessing Officer were not justified. For Ashok Kumar Agrawal (ITA No. 136/VIZ/2025), the Tribunal found no involvement in stock price manipulation and no incriminating material referred to by the AO. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court decision in PCIT v. Abhisar Buildwell Pvt. Ltd. It was further held that sworn statements from brokers cannot form the basis for additions without corroborating material, and that there must be a nexus between statements recorded and evidence found during search. Since the shares were purchased and sold through banking channels, and the AO's conclusions were based on conjecture without cogent material, the ground raised by the assessee was allowed. For Santosh Agrawal (ITA No. 150/VIZ/2025), the Tribunal noted that grounds 3 and 4 were identical to those in ITA No. 136/VIZ/2025, and the decision would apply mutatis mutandis. Therefore, the grounds raised by the assessee were allowed. The appeal by the revenue in IT(SS)A No. 10/VIZ/2025 was dismissed.

The Tribunal held that the exemption claimed under Section 10(38) for long-term capital gains from penny stock transactions was valid and the additions made by the Assessing Officer were not justified. For Ashok Kumar Agrawal (ITA No. 136/VIZ/2025), the Tribunal found no involvement in stock price manipulation and no incriminating material referred to by the AO. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court decision in PCIT v. Abhisar Buildwell Pvt. Ltd. It was further held that sworn statements from brokers cannot form the basis for additions without corroborating material, and that there must be a nexus between statements recorded and evidence found during search. Since the shares were purchased and sold through banking channels, and the AO's conclusions were based on conjecture without cogent material, the ground raised by the assessee was allowed. For Santosh Agrawal (ITA No. 150/VIZ/2025), the Tribunal noted that grounds 3 and 4 were identical to those in ITA No. 136/VIZ/2025, and the decision would apply mutatis mutandis. Therefore, the grounds raised by the assessee were allowed. The appeal by the revenue in IT(SS)A No. 10/VIZ/2025 was dismissed.

The Tribunal found that the CIT(E) had not properly considered the activities of the trust and the documents submitted. The Tribunal concluded that the trust was indeed carrying out charitable activities and directed the CIT(E) to grant registration.

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A), finding no reason to interfere. The Tribunal noted that the AO's own Remand Report corroborated the assessee's claim of having purchased only 43 plots for a consideration of Rs. 1,32,34,500/-, confirming the genuineness of her claim. Consequently, the Tribunal concluded that Section 69 of the Act was not applicable to the present case.