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The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)'s decision to sustain 50% of the addition was ad hoc and lacked proper reasoning. The Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to delete the entire addition of Rs. 10,70,100/-, effectively accepting the assessee's explanation for the cash deposits.
The Tribunal restored the case to the Assessing Officer for a fresh assessment, directing that the assessee be given a reasonable opportunity to present their case. The assessee was cautioned to comply with the AO's directions.
The Tribunal held that the notice under Section 142(1) was issued beyond the prescribed date of 31.12.2017 as per CBDT instructions, rendering the assessment proceedings void ab initio. Therefore, the assessment was quashed on this legal ground.
The Tribunal set aside the NFAC's order and restored the case to the Assessing Officer. The AO is directed to provide the assessee a fresh opportunity to present its case and admit all evidence. The assessee was cautioned to cooperate with the AO, failing which an ex-parte order could be passed again.
The Tribunal held that both the assessment order and the CIT(A)'s order were passed ex-parte without providing a reasonable opportunity to the assessee. Therefore, the CIT(A)'s order was set aside.
The Tribunal observed that the property transaction involved a residential unit valued below Rs. 2 crore, occurring between 12th November 2020 and 30th June 2021. Citing a CBDT circular, the Tribunal ruled that such transactions qualified for an increased safe harbor limit of 20% under Section 56(2)(x), thus making the addition by the AO invalid. The Departmental Representative also conceded the applicability of the circular.
The Tribunal held that when the total income is below the taxable limit, there is no legal requirement to file a return of income. Therefore, no adverse view can be taken against the assessee for not filing the return. The action of the Assessing Officer and the confirmation by CIT(A) were deemed unsustainable.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment notice issued under Section 148 was indeed barred by limitation as per Section 149 of the Act, following the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India vs. Rajeev Bansal. The Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A) that the notice was void ab initio.
The Tribunal found that the assessee did not receive a reasonable opportunity to be heard before the Assessing Officer and the CIT(A). Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned appellate orders and restored the issues back to the Assessing Officer for de novo orders.
The Tribunal found that the issue of assessment orders being barred by limitation was not decided by the CIT(A) and required factual verification. The Tribunal restored these appeals to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision on this preliminary issue. For other appeals concerning assessment year 2021-22, the Tribunal noted that the aspect of overall income disclosure sufficiency was also not decided by the CIT(A) and directed the CIT(A) to pass a fresh order after proper factual verification. The appeals were partly allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal found that the assessee did not receive a reasonable opportunity to be heard before the Assessing Officer and the CIT(A). Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned appellate orders and restored the issues back to the Assessing Officer for de novo orders.
The Tribunal found that the assessee did not receive a reasonable opportunity to be heard before the Assessing Officer and the CIT(A). Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned appellate orders and restored the issues back to the Assessing Officer for de novo orders.
The Tribunal found that the assessee did not receive a reasonable opportunity to be heard before the Assessing Officer and the CIT(A). Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned appellate orders and restored the issues back to the Assessing Officer for de novo orders.
The Tribunal found that the issue of assessment orders being barred by limitation was not decided by the CIT(A) and required factual verification. The Tribunal restored these appeals to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision on this preliminary issue. For other appeals concerning assessment year 2021-22, the Tribunal noted that the aspect of overall income disclosure sufficiency was also not decided by the CIT(A) and directed the CIT(A) to pass a fresh order after proper factual verification. The appeals were partly allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to delete the additions. It found that the fees collected were for educational purposes and utilized for student benefits, aligning with the assessee's charitable objects. The Tribunal also found that the other disallowances were not justified.
The Tribunal, in light of the decision of a Co-ordinate Bench in the case of Co-operative Cane Development Union Limited Maholi (Lakhimpur) vs ACIT, set aside the impugned order. The issue was restored to the file of the Assessing Officer with a direction to verify the correctness of the assessee's claim that the disallowed interest was earned from fixed deposits made in pursuance of RBI guidelines and statutory provisions governing reserve funds. The AO is to pass a fresh order after providing the assessee a reasonable opportunity. The Tribunal noted that the principle that interest income arising from investments in statutory reserve funds and other funds as per the UP Cooperative Societies Act is 'attributable' to the main activities of the Society has been accepted by the Revenue. The assessee is governed by the same Act. The Tribunal also referred to the Madras High Court decision in K. Saravanampatti Primary Agricultural Co-Operative Credit Societies Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, which held that statutory reserve funds could not be regarded as surplus funds. The Tribunal's reasoning is that if the investments are made in accordance with statutory provisions and by-laws, the interest earned is attributable to the main activity and thus eligible for deduction under Section 80P. The ground raised in the appeal was partly allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that neither the Assessing Officer nor the CIT(A) provided a reasonable opportunity to the assessee to present their case. The Departmental Representative agreed that the issue should be restored to the Assessing Officer for a fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued under section 148 on 28/07/2022 was barred by limitation, following the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India vs. Rajeev Bansal. Consequently, the assessment order was quashed and set aside.
The Tribunal held that the commission income, derived from the activity of marketing sugarcane for its members, is eligible for deduction under Section 80P. Regarding interest income from FDRs, the Tribunal noted that if these investments were made due to statutory requirements or for maintaining reserve funds, the interest income is attributable to the main business activity and eligible for Section 80P deduction. The matter was restored to the AO for fresh adjudication on this point for A.Y. 2018-19.
The Tribunal noted that the impugned order was passed before the date fixed for hearing and that the CIT(A)'s findings were based on surmises and conjectures. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the order and restored the grounds to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that, following Supreme Court precedent, appeals must be filed before the ITAT Bench that has jurisdiction over the AO who passed the assessment order. Therefore, the appeal filed before the Lucknow Bench was not maintainable.
The Tribunal condoned the 25-day delay in filing the appeal, accepting the assessee's submission of a medical emergency due to the Authorized Representative's brother's cancer diagnosis. Regarding the addition of Rs. 52,66,764/- made under Section 154, the Tribunal noted that the AO had initially passed an order under Section 143(3) allowing deduction on commission income. The subsequent rectification was based on an audit objection. The Tribunal observed that the AO had not examined the breakup of investments and interest earned in relation to the society's byelaws and relevant sections of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act. Citing the decision in K. Saravanampatti Primary Agricultural Co-Operative Credit Societies Ltd. v. ITO and the principle that interest income from statutory reserve funds is attributable to the main activities, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order. The issue was restored to the AO for re-computing the admissible deduction under Section 80P with reference to interest earned on investments made in accordance with the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act and Rules. The grounds related to the addition were allowed for statistical purposes. The addition made on account of interest on PF balance of seasonal employees was deleted as it could not be considered society's investment. The Tribunal allowed ITA No. 577/LKW/2024 and allowed ITA No. 578/LKW/2024 for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that it was not possible to determine the validity of the disallowances without proper inquiry into whether individual cash payments exceeded Rs. 20,000/-. The impugned appellate order was set aside, and the issue was restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh assessment.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to establish the genuineness and financial capacity of the lenders, as the funds originated from other sources and were routed through intermediaries. The mere routing of funds through banks was deemed irrelevant.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was not justified in imposing and sustaining the penalty, considering the extension of limitation periods granted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The penalty was directed to be deleted.
The Tribunal held that the requirement to file Form No. 10CCB along with the return of income is directory, not mandatory. Filing the audit report before the completion of assessment is considered substantial compliance.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. Subsequently, as the dispute was settled under the Vivad se Vishwas Scheme, the appeal was treated as withdrawn and dismissed. The assessee was granted liberty to seek restoration if the settlement failed.
The Tribunal noted that both the AO's order and the NFAC's dismissal were ex-parte. Considering the circumstances, the Tribunal decided to provide the assessee with one more opportunity to present their case.
The Tribunal restored the matter to the Assessing Officer for re-computing the admissible deduction under Section 80P concerning interest earned on investments made as per the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act. The AO was directed to provide an opportunity to the assessee for a fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal noted that the NFAC dismissed the appeal due to delay. Considering the peculiar facts, the Tribunal restored the case to the Assessing Officer to provide the assessee with another opportunity to present its case.
The Tribunal restored the matter to the Assessing Officer, granting the assessee one more opportunity to present her case and evidence, while cautioning her to comply with future directions.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee did not appear for the hearing and there was a delay in filing the appeal. However, condoning the delay and considering the facts, the Tribunal decided to provide the assessee one more opportunity.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. It noted that the orders passed by both the lower authorities were ex-parte and decided to give the assessee one more opportunity to present their case.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, restored the matter to the AO for fresh consideration, and cautioned the assessee to cooperate. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal found that the First Appellate Authority's sustenance of 10% of the addition (Rs. 12,92,151) was based on an estimate to safeguard revenue without disproving the assessee's explanation. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the order and directed the deletion of the entire addition.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(E)'s revision order under section 263 was bad in law because it failed to consider that the assessee had been granted registration under section 12A. Consequently, the assessee should have been assessed under sections 11 and 12, and the CIT(E)'s order ignoring this fact was quashed.
The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. Regarding the primary issue of depreciation on the 'Right to Collect Toll', the Tribunal held that the assessee was entitled to claim depreciation. It reasoned that while the Assessing Officer disallowed depreciation based on CBDT Circular No. 9 of 2014 and the lack of physical ownership, the concession agreement clearly stated that the capital investment in the project would be deemed to be acquired and owned by the concessionaire (assessee). The Tribunal found that the circular was applicable only where ownership was not vested with the assessee, which was not the case here. Furthermore, the Tribunal noted that the 'Right to Collect Toll' is an intangible asset, and the requirement of 'physical ownership' is not applicable to intangible assets. The Tribunal distinguished the precedents relied upon by the Revenue, finding them distinguishable on facts, particularly the nature of the contract (DBFOT vs. BOT) and the ownership rights granted. The Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to grant depreciation on the 'Right to Collect Toll' at the rate applicable to intangible assets (25%). The grounds raised in the assessee's Cross Objection were partly allowed. Ground 1 was treated as academic and partly allowed. Ground 2 was allowed in view of the dismissal of the Revenue's appeal. Ground 3 was partly allowed with a direction to the AO to verify records and allow brought forward business loss and unabsorbed depreciation.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)'s deletion of additions on account of sundry creditors was not justified as the assessee failed to establish genuineness and creditworthiness. However, the Tribunal found the CIT(A)'s ad hoc disallowance of expenses to be unjustified and restricted it to 10% based on a prior year's order.
The Tribunal held that since the assessment proceedings were quashed due to lack of jurisdiction (notice under Section 142(1) issued beyond the prescribed date), the penalty initiated and imposed would not survive. Therefore, the grounds raised by the assessee were allowed.
The ITAT held that the assessment proceedings under Section 153C were void ab initio because the bank account details, which formed the basis of the satisfaction note, were not seized during the search operation. Therefore, the jurisdictional requirements for initiating proceedings under Section 153C were not met.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT erred in assuming jurisdiction under Section 263 as the AO had conducted sufficient inquiries, as evidenced by an office note and the materials on record. The PCIT's order was based on a mere difference of opinion rather than a lack of inquiry.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT erred in assuming jurisdiction under Section 263 as the assessment orders were passed after obtaining necessary approval from the Additional CIT under Section 153D. Therefore, the revisionary powers under Section 263 could not be exercised.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)'s deletion of additions on account of sundry creditors was not justified as the assessee failed to establish genuineness and creditworthiness. However, the Tribunal found the CIT(A)'s ad hoc disallowance of expenses to be unjustified and restricted it to 10% based on a prior year's order.
The Tribunal held that the impugned penalty order suffers from delay and deserves to be quashed. Furthermore, the addition that formed the root cause of the penalty levy had been deleted in the quantum proceedings, rendering the penalty unsustainable.
The Tribunal held that since the assessment proceedings were quashed due to lack of jurisdiction (notice under Section 142(1) issued beyond the prescribed date), the penalty initiated and imposed would not survive. Therefore, the grounds raised by the assessee were allowed.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) passed a cryptic and non-speaking order, failing to provide a reasonable opportunity to the assessee. The additions made by the Assessing Officer were restored back to the Assessing Officer for a de novo assessment.
The Tribunal observed that both parties agreed that the appeal was not maintainable due to the low tax effect. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed in limine without going into the merits of the case. The cross-objections filed by the assessee were also dismissed as infructuous.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was correct in dismissing the appeal in limine as the assessee failed to deposit the admitted tax as required by Section 249(4) of the Income Tax Act, despite multiple opportunities. The Tribunal also noted the assessee's silence on the issue. The appeal was dismissed as not maintainable.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had sufficient cause for the delay and that the CIT(A) should have condoned the delay. The ex-parte assessment order was also noted. Consequently, the CIT(A)'s order was set aside and the issues were restored to the Assessing Officer for a de novo assessment.
The Tribunal held that the AO did not properly call for books of accounts or point out inaccuracies before disbelieving the assessee's claims. The CIT(A) also failed to consider the assessee's submissions. Therefore, the matter was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh consideration.