ITAT Chennai Judgments — November 2025

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeals based on Section 249(4)(b) as advance tax is not payable on disputed additions. The Tribunal also condoned the delay in filing the appeals due to the assessee's lack of education and circumstances.

The Tribunal held that the assessee, being a cooperative society, is entitled to deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) on interest income earned from investments in another cooperative society (the cooperative bank). This decision was based on previous rulings by the jurisdictional High Court and the Tribunal itself in similar cases.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeals based on Section 249(4)(b) as advance tax is not payable on disputed additions. The Tribunal also condoned the delay in filing the appeals due to the assessee's lack of education and circumstances.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 300 days in filing the appeal by the assessee, holding that there was sufficient cause. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remitted the matter back to the AO for a de novo assessment.

The Tribunal held that the Ld.PCIT violated principles of natural justice by ignoring the assessee's request for adjournment and passing an ex-parte order without proper opportunity to respond. The revisional action was restored to the file of the Ld.PCIT.

The Tribunal held that the assessee, being a cooperative society, is entitled to deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) on interest income earned from investments in another cooperative society (the cooperative bank). This decision was based on previous rulings by the jurisdictional High Court and the Tribunal itself in similar cases.

The Tribunal held that the addition of gross cash deposits is incorrect and only the unexplained peak credit can be added to the total income. The CIT(A)'s direction to verify and tax only the peak credit was upheld.

The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had narrated facts of a different case and proceeded as if the assessment order was passed under Section 144 r.w.s. 147, indicating a non-application of mind. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remitted the matter back to the AO for de novo assessment.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeals based on Section 249(4)(b) as advance tax is not payable on disputed additions. The Tribunal also condoned the delay in filing the appeals due to the assessee's lack of education and circumstances.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) ought to have condoned the delay and decided the appeal on merits. The impugned order was set aside, and the matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) to decide the appeal afresh after condoning the delay.

The Tribunal held that advance tax liability is to be calculated based on admitted or undisputed income, not on additions made by the Assessing Officer which are disputed by the assessee. Therefore, the CIT(A) was not justified in dismissing the appeals solely on the basis of non-payment of advance tax on disputed additions.

The Tribunal noted that the AO and CIT(A) passed ex-parte orders due to the assessee's failure to provide evidence. However, considering the principles of natural justice, the Tribunal granted one more opportunity to the assessee to substantiate their case.

The Tribunal found that the assessee had indeed responded and provided acknowledgments as proof. It held that the ex-parte order violated natural justice.

The Tribunal held that the interest income received by the assessee, a cooperative society, from another cooperative bank is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). This was based on previous judgments of the jurisdictional High Court and the Tribunal itself.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeals for non-prosecution without considering the merits. One more opportunity was granted to the assessee to present her case.

The Tribunal, relying on a jurisdictional High Court decision, held that Section 200A, which enables the levy of fees under Section 234E while processing TDS statements, was introduced only from 01.06.2015. Since the relevant assessment years (2013-14 and 2014-15) pre-dated this effective date, there was no provision under Section 200A to impose late fees under Section 234E. Consequently, the impugned demand intimation letters were set aside.

The Tribunal held that the penalty under Section 271(1)(b) is for non-compliance with a notice and is independent of the quantum of the assessment order. Therefore, the penalty was confirmed to the extent of Rs. 10,000/- for one default.

The Tribunal found that the orders were passed ex-parte without sufficient opportunity for the assessee. While noting the assessee's negligence, the Tribunal, in the interest of natural justice, granted one more opportunity for denovo assessment.

The tribunal held that the Ld.CIT(A) erred in rejecting the appeals solely on the ground of delay without giving the assessee an opportunity to explain. The tribunal also noted that the AO did not provide proper opportunity to the assessee during assessment proceedings, especially considering the notice was issued during the Covid-19 pandemic.

The Tribunal acknowledged that both the AO and CIT(A) passed ex-parte orders because the assessee failed to furnish evidence regarding the cash deposits of Rs. 77,64,529/- in their bank account. The Tribunal noted the assessee's negligence in pursuing the matter before both the AO and CIT(A). However, in adherence to the principles of natural justice, the Tribunal decided to grant the assessee one more opportunity to substantiate their case before the AO. Consequently, the impugned orders were set aside, and the matters were remitted back to the AO for a denovo assessment. The assessee was directed to comply with all notices and furnish relevant details. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal, relying on a jurisdictional High Court decision, held that Section 200A, which enables the levy of fees under Section 234E while processing TDS statements, was introduced only from 01.06.2015. Since the relevant assessment years (2013-14 and 2014-15) pre-dated this effective date, there was no provision under Section 200A to impose late fees under Section 234E. Consequently, the impugned demand intimation letters were set aside.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal without awaiting the decision on the condonation petition. The matter requires fresh consideration.

The Tribunal held that the assessee, being a cooperative society, is entitled to deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) on interest income earned from investments in another cooperative society (the cooperative bank). This decision was based on previous rulings by the jurisdictional High Court and the Tribunal itself in similar cases.

The tribunal held that the Ld.CIT(A) erred in rejecting the appeals solely on the ground of delay without giving the assessee an opportunity to explain. The tribunal also noted that the AO did not provide proper opportunity to the assessee during assessment proceedings, especially considering the notice was issued during the Covid-19 pandemic.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeals for non-prosecution without considering the merits. One more opportunity was granted to the assessee to present her case.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeals based on Section 249(4)(b) as advance tax is not payable on disputed additions. The Tribunal also condoned the delay in filing the appeals due to the assessee's lack of education and circumstances.

The Tribunal held that the addition of gross cash deposits is incorrect and only the unexplained peak credit can be added to the total income. The CIT(A)'s direction to verify and tax only the peak credit was upheld.

The tribunal held that the Ld.CIT(A) erred in rejecting the appeals solely on the ground of delay without giving the assessee an opportunity to explain. The tribunal also noted that the AO did not provide proper opportunity to the assessee during assessment proceedings, especially considering the notice was issued during the Covid-19 pandemic.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeals based on Section 249(4)(b) as advance tax is not payable on disputed additions. The Tribunal also condoned the delay in filing the appeals due to the assessee's lack of education and circumstances.

The Tribunal, after hearing rival submissions and perusing the materials, observed that the CIT(A) had dismissed the appeal due to a delay of 88 days in filing. The assessee had provided reasons for the delay, which the CIT(A) did not accept. The Tribunal, however, was of the opinion that there was a sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal within the prescribed time. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order of the CIT(A) and remitted the matter back to the file of the AO for a denovo assessment. The AO was directed to afford a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The assessee was also directed to comply with all notices and furnish relevant details for fresh consideration. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeals based on Section 249(4)(b) as advance tax is not payable on disputed additions. The Tribunal also condoned the delay in filing the appeals due to the assessee's lack of education and circumstances.

The Tribunal held that the assessee, being a cooperative society, is entitled to deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) on interest income earned from investments in another cooperative society (the cooperative bank). This decision was based on previous rulings by the jurisdictional High Court and the Tribunal itself in similar cases.

The Tribunal, while acknowledging the assessee's negligence in pursuing the matter before the AO and the Addl. CIT(A), decided to grant one more opportunity in the interest of natural justice. The Tribunal noted that both the AO and the Addl. CIT(A) had passed orders ex-parte because the assessee failed to explain the sources for the amount of Rs. 10,50,000/-. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and remitted the matter back to the AO for a denovo assessment. The assessee was directed to comply with all notices and furnish relevant details. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes only.

The Tribunal held that the Ld.CIT(A) was duty-bound to decide the appeal on merits and not dismiss it ex-parte. The Tribunal also noted that the AO hurried the assessment order. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the order of the Ld.CIT(A) and restored the issue back to the AO for de novo consideration, granting one more opportunity to the assessee.

The Tribunal held that the penalty under section 270A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was not leviable. The assessee had computed capital gains by adopting the FMV as on 01.04.1981 as the cost of acquisition. The A.O., after referring the matter to the DVO, recomputed the capital gains based on the DVO's estimated FMV as on 01.04.1981, resulting in a difference of Rs. 77,97,750/-. The Tribunal agreed with the assessee's contention that since the capital gains were recomputed solely on the basis of the DVO's estimation of the cost of acquisition, such income falls under clause (b) of sub-section (6) of section 270A, which excludes income determined on the basis of an estimate from the scope of 'under-reported income'. The Tribunal relied on the decision in Satyam Print House v. ACIT, which held that on identical facts, such income is excluded from the definition of unreported income and deleted the penalty. Therefore, the penalty levied was cancelled. No issue was expressly left undecided.

The Tribunal held that the assessee had not earned any exempt income. Relying on the decision of the Madras High Court, it was held that no disallowance is called for u/s 14A when there is no exempt income. The explanation added to Section 14A w.e.f 01.04.2022 was held to be prospective.

The Tribunal admitted additional evidence (consultancy contracts) filed by the assessee under Rule 29 of the Income Tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963, citing difficulties in collating evidence post-Covid. Deeming the evidence crucial to the issue, the Tribunal restored the matter to the AO to examine the fresh evidence and decide on the allowability of the expenditure.

Following the jurisdictional High Court's decision, the Tribunal held that the notice under Section 148 issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) was invalid, as it is mandatory for such notices to be issued by the Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO). Consequently, the reassessment notice and all consequential orders were set aside, with a liberty for the Revenue to seek revival if the Supreme Court reverses the precedent relied upon.

The Tribunal held that the reassessment notice issued by the JAO after March 29, 2022, was invalid as it should have been issued by the FAO, following the jurisdictional High Court's decision in Hexaware Technologies Ltd.

The Tribunal noted that the AO and CIT(A) passed ex-parte orders due to the assessee's failure to furnish evidence and negligence. However, in the interest of natural justice, one more opportunity was granted to the assessee.

The Tribunal followed the decision of the Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court in TVS Credit Services Ltd. v. DCIT, which held that notices under Section 148 must be issued by the Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO) and not the JAO. Consequently, the notice and consequential assessment order were set aside.

The Tribunal held that the sale deed for the property in question pertains to another assessee with a similar name, not the appellant. The Tribunal restored the matter to the AO to verify facts and delete the addition if the documents do not pertain to the assessee.

The Tribunal held that the appeal deserved to be dismissed for want of prosecution and for non-compliance with the defects pointed out by the Registry. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) correctly observed that the assessee should be given another opportunity to present their case before the AO and that the total income should be determined after a thorough examination of facts and evidence. The appeal was dismissed.

The Tribunal held that the denial of exemption under Section 11 by the CPC was based on the assessee not renewing its registration under Section 12A by filing the application under Section 12A(1)(ac)(i) before June 30, 2021. The assessee has since filed the renewal application before the CIT(Exemptions) along with a petition for condonation of delay. The Tribunal opined that the Addl. CIT(A) was not justified in dismissing the appeals without awaiting the decision of the CIT(Exemptions) on the Section 12A registration. Therefore, the matters were remitted back to the file of the Addl. CIT(A) for fresh adjudication after receipt of the decision from the CIT(Exemptions). The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the income earned by the assessee, a primary agricultural co-operative credit society, from interest on deposits with other co-operative banks and financial institutions is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal reasoned that the primary object of such a society is to carry on the business of banking and providing credit to its members. Deposits made with other co-operative banks and financial institutions are a necessary adjunct to its primary business, enabling it to manage its funds and meet its obligations. Therefore, the interest earned on these deposits is an integral part of its overall banking and credit business. The Tribunal followed the ratio laid down in several High Court judgments, which have consistently held that such interest income is deductible under Section 80P(2)(a)(i). The Tribunal directed the deletion of the addition made by the Assessing Officer on account of disallowance of this income. No issue was expressly left undecided.

The Tribunal held that notices issued under Section 148 by the JAO after the CBDT's e-assessment scheme notification were invalid as they did not follow the mandatory faceless procedure. Consequently, the assessment orders were vitiated.

The Tribunal accepted the plea of the Departmental Representative. Relying on a Supreme Court judgment regarding appellate jurisdiction, the Tribunal held that appeals lie with the High Court within whose jurisdiction the assessing officer is located. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn.

The Tribunal held that the PCIT's assumption of jurisdiction under Section 263 was invalid because the reassessment under Section 153C was for unabated years and based on material from a third party, not directly incriminating the assessee for those specific years. The PCIT should have targeted the original assessment orders, which were time-barred.

The ITAT Chennai Bench heard the appeals filed by the assessee. The specific decision of the tribunal regarding the merits of the appeals is not detailed in the provided excerpt.