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105 orders · Page 1 of 3
The Tribunal held that the CIT (Exemption) failed to follow the principles of natural justice and the provisions of the Act by rejecting the applications without providing a proper opportunity for hearing and by not exercising independent judgment. The religious nature of objectives, in itself, does not disqualify a trust for registration under Section 12AB.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to establish the nexus between the 'loan against property' and the construction of the house property before the lower authorities. However, considering the assessee's explanation regarding non-representation before the lower authorities due to advocate's email issues, the Tribunal decided to restore the issue to the AO.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) confirmed the protective additions without ascertaining whether substantive additions were made in the hands of the cooperative society or the assessee, and without providing clear findings. The Tribunal also noted procedural defects including notices sent to the assessee's email when physical service was preferred.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had provided a reasonable cause for not appearing before the CIT. The Tribunal also noted that the CIT's order did not discuss the details submitted by the assessee. Therefore, the Tribunal restored both appeals to the CIT for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, on April 8, 2022, for AY 2015-16, is invalid and barred by time. The Tribunal noted that the last date for issuing a notice under Section 148 under the erstwhile Section 149(1)(b) for AY 2015-16 was March 31, 2022. The first proviso to the substituted Section 149(1) acts as a statutory bar, as the six-year limitation period under the old regime for AY 2015-16 expired on March 31, 2022. The Tribunal relied on the decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal and the Delhi High Court in Sheetal International (P.) Ltd. v. Chief CIT. It was reasoned that procedural compliance with Section 148A or exclusion of time under the provisos cannot override this fundamental jurisdictional defect of limitation. Consequently, the reassessment order dated January 15, 2025, was quashed. Since the sole legal ground was decided in favour of the assessee, other grounds became academic. The appeal was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(E) failed to provide the assessee with a reasonable opportunity to be heard before rejecting the registration application, as required by Section 12AB(1)(b)(ii)(B). The impugned order was therefore legally unsustainable.
The Tribunal noted the assessee's persistent failure to appear before or provide submissions to the lower authorities despite numerous opportunities. The appeals were filed before the Tribunal with explanations for non-compliance, but the fundamental lack of cooperation with the AO and CIT(A) was a significant factor.
The assessee submitted a memo stating they no longer wished to pursue the appeals. In view of this submission, the Tribunal treated both appeals as withdrawn.
The Tribunal noted the assessee's persistent failure to appear before or provide submissions to the lower authorities despite numerous opportunities. The appeals were filed before the Tribunal with explanations for non-compliance, but the fundamental lack of cooperation with the AO and CIT(A) was a significant factor.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) confirmed the protective additions without ascertaining whether substantive additions were made in the hands of the cooperative society or the assessee, and without providing clear findings. The Tribunal also noted procedural defects including notices sent to the assessee's email when physical service was preferred.
The Tribunal held that there was sufficient cause for the delay, as the assessee was genuinely unaware of the proceedings due to communication errors. Citing various judicial precedents, the Tribunal emphasized preferring substantial justice over technicalities. Consequently, the delay was condoned, and the matter was remitted to the CIT(A)/NFAC for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) confirmed the protective additions without ascertaining whether substantive additions were made in the hands of the cooperative society or the assessee, and without providing clear findings. The Tribunal also noted procedural defects including notices sent to the assessee's email when physical service was preferred.
The Tribunal found that while the CIT's concerns regarding safety and legal compliance for running a school were justified, the appellant was given a very short period (10 days) to furnish the required documents. Therefore, the Tribunal restored both appeals back to the CIT (Exemption) to grant the appellant an opportunity to produce the necessary details within 120 days.
The Tribunal held that the final assessment order was passed beyond the one-month period prescribed by Section 144C(13) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, from the end of the month in which the DRP's directions were received. Therefore, the assessment order was annulled.
The Tribunal found the assessee's reason for non-appearance to be bonafide. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the matter was remitted back to the CIT(Exemptions) for fresh consideration, with a direction to grant a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee.
The CIT(A)/NFAC dismissed the assessee's appeal, agreeing with the AO's ex-parte assessment due to the assessee's non-compliance with notices. The Tribunal, considering the assessee's plea of being a senior citizen and the failure to represent the case before lower authorities, decided to grant one more opportunity.
The Tribunal found that while the CIT's concerns regarding safety and legal compliance for running a school were justified, the appellant was given a very short period (10 days) to furnish the required documents. Therefore, the Tribunal restored both appeals back to the CIT (Exemption) to grant the appellant an opportunity to produce the necessary details within 120 days.
The assessee submitted a memo stating they no longer wished to pursue the appeals. In view of this submission, the Tribunal treated both appeals as withdrawn.
The ITAT found the assessee's reasons for the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A)/NFAC to be plausible and sufficient. The Tribunal acknowledged that the assessment and CIT(A)/NFAC orders were ex-parte and, in the interest of justice, decided to remit the matter back to the Assessing Officer for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal held that the appeal was not maintainable as the Memorandum of Appeal and Grounds of Appeal were not signed by the appellant, which is a requirement as per section 140 of the Act. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.
The Tribunal clubbed the related appeals for convenience. The specific findings on the merits of the case are not detailed in this excerpt, but the proceedings were initiated under Section 250 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
The Tribunal held that the issue regarding the allowability of ESOP expenditure in the assessee's own case is settled in favour of the assessee by the Karnataka High Court, which upheld the Tribunal's earlier decision. Therefore, the Revenue's appeal has no merit.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had provided a reasonable cause for not appearing before the CIT. The Tribunal also noted that the CIT's order did not discuss the details submitted by the assessee. Therefore, the Tribunal restored both appeals to the CIT for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's updated return was invalid as assessment proceedings were pending. However, the additions made by the AO were confirmed regarding the salary and Chapter VIA deduction discrepancies. The issue of unexplained bank credits was remitted to the AO. The Tribunal also directed the AO to give credit for taxes paid.
The Tribunal clubbed the related appeals for convenience. The specific findings on the merits of the case are not detailed in this excerpt, but the proceedings were initiated under Section 250 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
The Tribunal clubbed the related appeals for convenience. The specific findings on the merits of the case are not detailed in this excerpt, but the proceedings were initiated under Section 250 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
The Tribunal found the assessee's reason for non-appearance to be bonafide. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the matter was remitted back to the CIT(Exemptions) for fresh consideration, with a direction to grant a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the CIT (Exemption) failed to follow the principles of natural justice and the provisions of the Act by rejecting the applications without providing a proper opportunity for hearing and by not exercising independent judgment. The religious nature of objectives, in itself, does not disqualify a trust for registration under Section 12AB.
The Tribunal permitted the assessee to withdraw the appeal as the grievance no longer survived after the fresh assessment order. The Revenue had no objection to the withdrawal.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to substantiate the claim for consultancy charges as a business expenditure. The agreement lacked specifics on services, and no proof of service rendition was provided, making the expenditure not wholly and exclusively for business purposes.
The Tribunal held that the appeal filed by the Assessee was not maintainable. This was because the appeal was not verified by the Principal Officer of the University, as required by the Income Tax Rules. According to Section 13 of The RAJIV GANDHI UNIVERSITY OF HEALTH SCIENCES ACT, 1994, the Vice-Chancellor is the principal executive and academic officer. The ITAT noted that the return of income should be signed by the Principal Officer, who is the Registrar of the University. Since the appeal was not filed by the Principal Officer, it was dismissed as infructuous. However, to avoid injustice, the Assessee was directed to file a fresh appeal, correctly verified in accordance with the Income Tax Rules, 1962, along with an application for condonation of delay, if any. This fresh appeal would be considered on its merits.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, considering the ex parte assessment order, the dismissal on technical grounds, and the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic. The matter was restored to the AO for fresh adjudication on merits, allowing the assessee an opportunity to present their case.
The Tribunal held that the issue of eligibility for deduction under section 80P on the interest income was already decided and attained finality. However, the Tribunal found merit in the assessee's submission regarding the allowability of corresponding expenditure (cost of funds and administrative expenses) and restored this limited issue to the Assessing Officer for fresh examination.
The Tribunal held that the AO and CIT(A) erred in disallowing the deduction u/s 80P(2)(a)(i) based solely on the society's name and a partial reading of its objects. A careful perusal of the byelaws showed that providing credit facilities to members was indeed an objective. Therefore, the assessee is eligible for deduction u/s 80P(2)(a)(i) on the enhanced profit arising from the addition related to provisions.
Regarding the provision for interest, the Tribunal held that even if disallowed, the addition would be absorbed by the deduction u/s 80P(2)(a)(i), leading to a revenue-neutral exercise. For the interest income from scheduled banks, the Tribunal found that the AO did not properly examine the nature and source of funds, which are crucial for determining eligibility for deduction u/s 80P(2)(a)(i).
The Tribunal held that the verification of a return is a procedural requirement. A delay in verification, when the return was filed within the due date, is a curable procedural defect and does not invalidate the return. Therefore, the denial of deduction based solely on delayed verification is not justified.
The Tribunal held that the addition made by the AO and sustained by the CIT(A) under Section 69A was not justified. The Tribunal noted that the ownership of the land and the fact of agricultural activity were not disputed, and the AO did not provide material to show income from sources other than agriculture. The absence of bills alone cannot be a sole ground for treating receipts as unexplained income, especially given the nature of rural agricultural transactions.
The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had excluded certain companies from the list of comparables by relying on earlier orders of the Tribunal for the very same Assessment Year 2017-18. The Tribunal found that these earlier orders had attained finality. Therefore, the Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A)'s decision to exclude these companies, stating that there was no error in following the prior Tribunal decisions. The Tribunal also observed that the Revenue had not disputed the chart filed by the assessee regarding these exclusions. Regarding the inclusion of companies, the Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had also relied on earlier orders of the Tribunal, which the assessee had supported with case law compilations. The Tribunal was satisfied that the CIT(A) had followed these earlier orders and granted the necessary relief. The Tribunal also noted that the TPO had passed an order giving effect to the CIT(A)'s order, accepting it and revising the demand to Nil. The Tribunal explicitly stated that it was deciding the appeal on merits based on the earlier orders of the Tribunals and therefore, it was not adjudicating the limitation ground raised by the Revenue. The Tribunal concluded that the order of the CIT(A) required no interference.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal in limine without adjudicating on merits, as the assessee had provided a detailed statement of facts. The Tribunal also found that the AO's estimation of agricultural income lacked a scientific basis and cogent material, particularly considering the nature of crops and verifiable banking transactions. The addition made by the AO was not sustained.
The Tribunal held that the addition under Section 68 was misplaced as the assessee had provided details of members and the nature of transactions. The mere fact that demonetised notes were accepted by the society did not automatically make the credits unexplained.
The Tribunal found that while the AO and CIT(A) rejected the claim due to insufficient evidence and discrepancies, the assessee had produced some documents like land records and sale invoices. The Tribunal felt these required proper verification and set aside the CIT(A)'s order, restoring the matter to the AO for a fresh examination.
The Tribunal held that the fees received by the assessee from the Indian company for laboratory services are not to be treated as Fees for Technical Services (FTS) or Fees for Included Services (FIS). The Tribunal relied on a coordinate bench order in the assessee's own case for other assessment years and the judgment of the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in CIT vs. De Beers India Minerals (P.) Ltd. The reasoning was that the services rendered by the assessee, which involved testing and providing reports, did not 'make available' technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how, or processes to the Indian customer in a manner that the recipient could use the technology independently without recourse to the assessee. The utility of the services, in the form of a report, ended shortly after its rendition, and the Indian entity had to continuously refer to the assessee to understand the reports. The Tribunal noted that the revenue had not pointed out any contrary decision from higher judicial forums. Consequently, the appeal filed by the assessee was allowed. The judgment did not explicitly address issues 2, 3, and 4 regarding interest and penalty proceedings, implying they were either not pressed or were consequential to the main issue.
The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeal. Regarding the exclusion of CG-VAK Software & Exports Ltd., Larsen & Toubro Infotech Ltd., and Persistent Systems Ltd. (Grounds 2, 3, 7), the Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had relied on a Coordinate Bench order in IT(TP)A No. 2861/Bang/2017 for the same AY. This order directed the exclusion of these three companies for various reasons, including reliance on earlier Tribunal and Hon'ble Hyderabad Tribunal orders, and a Hon'ble Delhi Tribunal order concerning CG-VAK Software & Exports Ltd. The Tribunal found no contrary decisions from higher forums and agreed with the CIT(A)'s decision to exclude these companies, thus dismissing these grounds. Concerning the inclusion of comparable companies (Grounds 13, 14, 15, 16), the Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) had relied on the same Coordinate Bench order in NXP India Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCIT (IT(TP)A No. 2861/Bang/2017) for the AY 2013-14, which directed the inclusion of three specific companies for transfer pricing adjustment. As this order had attained finality, the Tribunal found no error in the CIT(A)'s decision to include these companies and dismissed these grounds. The Tribunal did not explicitly address grounds 1, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 17, as the Revenue had submitted they were general grounds, and the core issues of exclusion and inclusion were decided based on the Coordinate Bench's precedent.
The Tribunal held that the AO had made proper enquiries and taken a possible view based on the materials on record. Therefore, the assessment order was not erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue, and the PCIT's revisionary action was unjustified.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to include Akshay Software Technologies Ltd. as a comparable, finding it engaged in software services. It also considered the inclusion/exclusion of comparables for the MSS segment.
The Tribunal noted that the AO's addition under Section 68 might lead to double taxation if the amounts were already offered as income. The Tribunal found that while the assessee failed to provide adequate details, the issue of verification of cash deposits and their taxability needed further examination.
The Tribunal held that the provision for interest payable of Rs. 7,04,188/- was rightly disallowed by the Assessing Officer and confirmed by the CIT(A). The reasoning was that Section 43B of the Income Tax Act, 1961, mandates that any sum payable by way of interest is allowed as a deduction only in the year in which it is actually paid. Since the amount in question was a provision and not actually paid during the previous year under consideration, it was not an allowable expenditure for that year. The Tribunal also rejected the assessee's alternative argument for enhanced deduction under section 80P. It was noted that the claim for section 80P deduction had already been disallowed in the original assessment, and the current proceedings were based on the limited issue of disallowance of expenses not actually paid, as directed by the order under section 263. The Tribunal found the assessee's argument inconsistent with the settled position of law and accounting standards, which allow expenses only when actually incurred. Therefore, the addition of Rs. 7,04,188/- to the total income was upheld.
The Tribunal held that interest earned from temporary parking of surplus funds in banks by a cooperative society engaged in providing credit facilities is attributable to its business and eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i). However, the AO needs to verify the source of funds for these investments.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) should have examined the issues on merits after granting an adequate opportunity of hearing. Passing an ex-parte order without considering the merits defeats the purpose of appellate proceedings.
The Tribunal held that the notice u/s 148 was validly issued on March 31, 2021, based on ITBA portal records, and the amended provisions of the Finance Act, 2021, were not applicable. The Tribunal also found the AO's estimation of gross receipts and profit rate to be unsubstantiated and modified the profit rate.