Section 153(2A) of the Income Tax Act
The decision most relied on for Section 153(2A) is 21. In SB Gurbaksh Singh v. Union of India (2 SCC 181), cited in 318 of the 172 judgments on BharatTax that turn on this section.
Leading authorities on Section 153(2A)
The time limit for the Assessing Officer to pass a final assessment order under Section 144C(13) following directions from the Dispute Resolution Panel is determined by the specific provisions of Section 153, particularly Section 153(2A).
The Supreme Court has not reached a majority verdict on whether the time spent in Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP) proceedings under Section 144C should be included within the overall limitation period prescribed by Section 153(3). Consequently, the legal position on the interplay between Sections 144C and 153 remains unresolved at the Supreme Court level.
A statute must be read as a whole, construing every clause with reference to its context and other provisions, to determine the legislature's real intention and ensure a consistent enactment. This principle, known as "ex visceribus actus," helps avoid inconsistencies within the law.
The grant of special leave by the Supreme Court signifies that an issue is admitted for final adjudication, and the correctness of the High Court's judgment is under scrutiny. The order granting leave does not affirm the High Court's view nor declare law; consequently, the High Court judgment loses its finality.
The time consumed in proceedings before the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP) under Section 144C must be subsumed within the limitation period prescribed under Section 153 for the completion of assessment, meaning these timelines are not mutually exclusive.
Courts must interpret statutes by reading the entire enactment as a whole to ascertain legislative intent, rejecting constructions that create inconsistency, render any provision otiose or a "dead letter," or defeat the plain intention of the legislature.
Statutory authorities must exercise their suo motu or revisional powers within a reasonable period, even if the governing statute does not prescribe a specific limitation period. What constitutes a 'reasonable period' depends on the nature of the statute, the rights and liabilities involved, and other relevant factors.
The legislature is presumed not to enact provisions that defeat the purpose of other related provisions or take away with one hand what it gives with the other, a principle applied in the interpretation of tax statutes.
The Supreme Court holds that legislative intent must be ascertained by reading the statute as a whole, construing one provision with reference to others to ensure a consistent enactment. Courts must consider the entire statute and its setting, not just the specific clauses, even if the language used has some inexactitude.
Judgments on Section 153(2A)
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