Landmark Cases on Penalty

The Assessing Officer must record clear satisfaction in the assessment order that the assessee concealed particulars of income or furnished inaccurate particulars, for initiating penalty proceedings under section 271(1)(c). Without such recorded satisfaction, the penalty proceedings lack jurisdiction and are unsustainable in law.

Penalty under section 271(1)(c) cannot be levied solely on the basis of findings in the assessment proceedings. The Assessing Officer must discharge the burden of proving concealment or inaccurate particulars with additional material.

Penalty proceedings are separate and distinct from assessment proceedings. A penalty under Section 271(1)(c) is not automatic and cannot be levied mechanically merely because an addition to income has been made.

Section 271 of the Income-tax Act, being a penal provision, must be construed strictly and narrowly. The case also initially held that a clarificatory amendment was not retrospectively applicable, a view later reversed by a larger bench.

For the imposition of penalty under section 271(1)(c), the specific conditions laid down in the section must be demonstrably met. The assessee's filed return is the primary document for furnishing income particulars, and inaccuracies therein are crucial for penalty imposition.

To levy a penalty under Section 271(1)(c), the Assessing Officer must clearly specify whether it is for concealment of income or for furnishing inaccurate particulars, and an ambiguous or unspecified charge renders the penalty invalid.

A penalty for concealment of income cannot be levied if an assessee files a revised return to buy peace and avoid litigation, and the revenue accepts this without objection.

An assessee's agreement to an addition or voluntary disclosure of income does not automatically establish concealment for levying penalty under Section 271(1)(c). While such agreement may arise from various reasons like avoiding litigation, the assessee must still discharge the burden of proving that the addition was not due to concealment.

The date of initiation of penalty proceedings for the purpose of Section 275(1)(c) is when the Assessing Officer records a satisfaction or recommends penalty, not the later date when the Joint/Additional Commissioner of Income Tax issues the penalty notice.

Penalty for furnishing inaccurate particulars is not attracted merely because some items are not included in the tax return or the return contains incorrect statements, provided these transactions are fully incorporated and reflected in the assessee's account books.

If an assessee has not maintained books of accounts, the question of getting those accounts audited under Section 44AB does not arise, and therefore, a penalty under Section 271B for failure to get accounts audited cannot be levied. Non-maintenance of books is separately punishable under Section 271A.

Whether there was sufficient cause for delay in making applications for registration under section 12A and 80G is always a question of fact, and contumacious conduct by the assessee must be established for levying penalty under section 271C for non-deduction of TDS.

Penalty under Section 271(1)(c) cannot be levied when the quantum appeal is pending before the High Court or where a quantum addition is confirmed and a question of law is admitted by the High Court.

Penalty under section 271AAB cannot be levied mechanically; the Assessing Officer must apply an independent mind, grant a hearing, and record satisfaction that the income genuinely falls within the statutory definition, which requires discovery of an unrecorded asset or income entry during search.

The Delhi High Court upheld the constitutional validity of Section 271(1B) of the Income-tax Act. For initiating penalty proceedings under Section 271(1)(c), the Assessing Officer's satisfaction is deemed recorded if the assessment or reassessment order includes a direction for such initiation.

A genuine personal transaction or a non-returnable transfer between family members or related entities does not constitute a 'loan' or 'deposit' under Section 269SS, and therefore, no penalty can be levied under Section 271D.

A penalty imposed under Section 271(1)(c) is vitiated if the show cause notice issued under Section 274 fails to specify the exact charge against the assessee by not striking out the inapplicable portions, thereby denying clear communication of the specific default (concealment or inaccurate particulars). The entire penalty proceedings, including the penalty order, are rendered invalid in such a scenario.

The relevant date for determining the limitation period under Section 275(1)(c) for passing penalty orders under Sections 271D and 271E is the date of passing the assessment order.

There is no legal presumption that every person knows the law, and the maxim 'ignorantia juris non excusat' does not imply universal legal awareness. This principle is applied when evaluating whether a taxpayer's genuine belief or ignorance of law impacts their liability for penalties or constitutes reasonable cause.

The court decides whether an assessee has concealed income and furnished inaccurate particulars, leading to penalty under section 271(1)(c). The cited passages suggest the case is relied upon when an assessee surrenders income during assessment proceedings due to inability to justify expenses.

A penalty notice under Section 271(1)(c) must unambiguously specify the exact charge—either concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars, but not both interchangeably. Failing to strike out the irrelevant limb invalidates the notice and leads to the deletion of the penalty.

Money received by a company as share application money from directors or shareholders, especially when no interest is charged and held in a current account, does not constitute a 'loan or deposit' under Section 269SS. Therefore, no penalty can be levied under Section 271D for such transactions.

The Supreme Court upholds the constitutional validity of Section 269SS of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which prohibits certain cash loans and deposits. This ruling is foundational for penalties under Section 271D and considering exemptions under Section 273B.

A return of income filed in response to a notice under Section 153A is considered a return filed under Section 139 for the purpose of levying penalty under Section 271(1)(c). The penalty is leviable on the income assessed over and above the income returned under Section 153A.

Where an assessee offers additional income during a survey action under section 133A and declares it in the return, and no other source of income is established, a penalty under section 271(1)(c) for concealment of income may not be leviable.

A mere technical defect or incorrect provision mentioned in the caption of a penalty notice issued under Section 271AAB does not vitiate the penalty proceedings if the body of the notice makes the intention clear and the assessee understood the charge.

A penalty under sections like 271D or 271E is not automatically imposed if the assessee proves there was a reasonable cause for the failure. The interpretation of 'reasonable cause' is that which would prevent a person of average intelligence and ordinary prudence from acting negligently or in bad faith.

Penalty under Section 271(1)(c) for concealment of income is not automatically imposed merely because an assessee files a revised return showing higher income, particularly after a survey, if the income is offered to buy peace or avoid litigation. There is no deeming fiction for higher income declared during a survey akin to Explanation 5 or 5A for search cases.

Penalty under Section 271C for failure to deduct tax at source is not leviable unless contumacious conduct on the part of the assessee is established. Where such conduct is not proven, the High Court upholds the deletion of the penalty.

Penalty under Section 271C for failure to deduct tax is not leviable if the assessee acted under a bona fide belief and without contumacious conduct.

Penalty proceedings under the Income-tax Act are quasi-criminal in nature, requiring the department to independently establish concealment and not automatically relying on assessment findings. A penalty under Section 271D or 271E for violating Section 269SS cannot be levied if the alleged loan amount is subsequently disclosed as income, as the foundation for the penalty is then lost.

A penalty under Section 271(1)(c) for furnishing inaccurate particulars of income is not attracted if the assessee offers a bonafide explanation, even though the distinction between concealment and furnishing inaccurate particulars can be thin or overlap.

Whether an assessee has shown 'reasonable cause' under Section 273B, particularly in the context of penalties under Section 271D for violations of Section 269SS, is a question of law involving a legal inference from primary facts. Penalties under Section 271D are not leviable if reasonable cause is established, even for journal entries, provided transactions are genuine and bona fide.

The power to impose a penalty under Section 28 (now 271(1)(c)) depends on the Assessing Officer's satisfaction about the existence of the specified conditions. This satisfaction must be recorded in the course of the assessment proceedings and before their conclusion.

For the imposition of penalty under section 271(1)(c) for concealment or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income, the act must be present in the income-tax return filed by the assessee.

To levy a penalty under section 271(1)(b), the Assessing Officer (AO) must record satisfaction in the assessment order. Mere initiation of penalty proceedings without such recorded satisfaction does not confer jurisdiction on the AO to levy the penalty.

For initiating penalty proceedings under Section 271D or 271E, the Assessing Officer must record satisfaction in the assessment order; non-recording of such satisfaction is fatal to the penalty.

The mere disallowance of an expenditure claimed by the assessee does not automatically mean that inaccurate particulars of income were furnished, and penalty under section 271(1)(c) cannot be imposed solely on this ground. There must be an independent finding of concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars, typically a conscious act.

When an assessee fails to maintain books of account, resulting in a confirmed penalty under section 271A, no additional penalty under section 271B can be levied for the failure to get accounts audited under section 44AB, as there are no accounts to audit.

Penalty under section 271(1)(c) can be levied even if the assessee voluntarily discloses income after detection by the department or subsequent to a search, especially when the explanation provided is not bona fide or cannot be substantiated.

The penalty provisions under Section 271AAB of the Income Tax Act are not mandatory, as indicated by the use of the word 'may' instead of 'shall', giving the Assessing Officer discretion whether to initiate and impose the penalty.

Penalty under section 271B is not leviable for a venial technical breach, such as the late filing of a tax audit report, if there is no mala fide intention and the assessee demonstrates reasonable cause.

Penalty under Section 271(1)(c) is not attracted when there is a genuine difference of opinion on a point of law between the assessee and the Assessing Officer. Such cases fall outside the scope of Explanation 1 to Section 271(1)(c).

A voluntary surrender of additional income made by an assessee to buy peace or avoid protracted litigation does not automatically constitute an admission of concealment or furnishing inaccurate particulars. Such an act alone cannot justify the levy of penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act.

Funds transferred whimsically between sister concerns under common family ownership and management, with centralized accounts, where there is no evidence of a formal loan or deposit repayable on demand or for a fixed period, do not constitute 'loans or deposits' under Sections 269SS and 269T of the Income Tax Act.

Penalty under section 271(1)(c) cannot be imposed based on a protective assessment order. Initiation of penalty proceedings is impermissible without a substantive assessment order that finally adds income to the assessee's hands.

An assessee cannot challenge a defect or the validity of a penalty notice issued under Section 271(1)(c) read with Section 274 at a later appellate stage if no objection was raised from the inception of the proceedings and the assessee participated substantively without demonstrating prejudice.