ITAT Pune Judgments — March 2026

The Tribunal noted that the appeal before the CIT(A)/NFAC was dismissed solely on the grounds of delay. The merits of the case were not considered by the lower appellate authority.

The Tribunal admitted the additional legal grounds, relying on the Hon'ble Supreme Court's decision in NTPC vs CIT. It was held that the notices under section 148 were issued beyond the 'surviving period' as per various High Court decisions, making them time-barred.

The Tribunal held that the notice u/s 148 issued for AY 2015-16 was time-barred. The Tribunal followed the decisions of the Supreme Court in Deepak Steel & Power Ltd. and other High Courts and ITAT benches, which held that for AY 2015-16, notices issued after April 1, 2021, are liable to be dropped.

The Tribunal, relying on Supreme Court judgments in Collector, Land Acquisition vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors. and Inder Singh Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh, held that substantial justice should be preferred over technical considerations. It found reasonable cause for the delay in filing before the Tribunal and condoned it.

The Tribunal held that deemed rental income on unsold inventory flats, which are stock-in-trade, cannot be added as income from house property, following various High Court and Tribunal precedents. Regarding the interest on fixed deposits, the Tribunal restored the issue to the CIT(A) for a fresh adjudication after granting an opportunity to the assessee to present evidence.

The Tribunal noted that an identical issue in the assessee's own case for AY 2017-18 was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. Following this precedent, the Tribunal restored the current appeals to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication with similar directions.

The Tribunal noted that a similar issue concerning the same assessee for a different assessment year was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. Following the precedent, the Tribunal restored the issue to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication with similar directions.

The Tribunal admitted the additional legal grounds, following the precedent set by the Supreme Court in NTPC vs CIT. It held that the notices under Section 148 and the consequent orders under Section 148A(d) were issued beyond the permissible time limit. The Tribunal relied on decisions of the Bombay High Court and Delhi High Court which quashed similar notices as time-barred.

The Tribunal held that the reassessment notices issued between July and September 2022, in pursuance of the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India vs. Ashish Agarwal, are to be considered as a substitution of notices issued between April 1, 2021, and June 30, 2021. Therefore, the sanctioning authority for these notices, according to the Supreme Court's ruling in Union of India vs. Rajeev Bansal, is the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax (PCIT) under section 151(i) of the Act, as the relevant time limits were extended by TOLA.

The Tribunal held that notices issued under section 148 between July and September 2022, in pursuance of the Apex Court's decisions in Ashish Agarwal and Rajeev Bansal, are deemed to be substitutions of notices issued under TOLA between April 1, 2021, and June 30, 2021. Therefore, the sanctioning authority under Section 151 is determined as if the approval was sought before June 30, 2021, making the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax the appropriate authority.

The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to claim the deduction under section 80P in the return of income and also did not file the return within the due date. Both these conditions are mandatory as per sections 80AC and 80A(5) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Therefore, the assessee is not eligible for the deduction.

The Tribunal held that the dismissal by the CIT(A)/NFAC on the ground of delay was not justified, especially when the assessee was challenging the very jurisdiction to levy the late fee. Following the Kerala High Court's decision in Jiji Varghese vs. ITO, the Tribunal directed the CIT(A)/NFAC to condone the delay.

The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A(c) for levying late fees under Section 234E is prospective from June 1, 2015. Therefore, late fees can only be levied for defaults committed on or after this date.

The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A(c) concerning the levy of late fees under Section 234E was prospective from June 1, 2015. Therefore, late fees could only be levied for defaults committed on or after this date.

The Tribunal held that the amendment to section 200A(c) for levying late fees under section 234E is prospective from June 1, 2015. Therefore, late fees cannot be levied for periods prior to this date. The matter was restored to the TDS Officer for recalculation.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)/NFAC was not justified in dismissing the appeal solely on the ground of delay, especially when the assessee's challenge was based on a lack of jurisdiction for levying the late fee before a certain date. Following the Kerala High Court's decision in Jiji Varghese vs. ITO, the Tribunal decided to condone the delay.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)/NFAC's dismissal of the appeal on grounds of delay was not justified, as the assessee's challenge was based on a lack of jurisdiction. Following the Kerala High Court's decision in Jiji Varghese vs. ITO, the Tribunal directed the CIT(A)/NFAC to condone the delay and decide the appeal afresh.

The ITAT held that the dismissal of the appeal by the CIT(A)/NFAC on the grounds of delay was not justified, especially when the assessee was challenging the very jurisdiction to levy the late fee. The Tribunal followed the Kerala High Court's ruling in Jiji Varghese vs. ITO. The appeals were set aside and restored to the CIT(A)/NFAC for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)/NFAC erred in dismissing the appeals solely on the ground of delay, especially when the jurisdiction to levy late fees was under challenge. Following the Kerala High Court's decision in Jiji Varghese vs. ITO, the Tribunal directed the CIT(A)/NFAC to condone the delay and decide the appeals afresh on merits.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)/NFAC erred in dismissing the appeals on the ground of delay, especially when the jurisdiction to levy late fees under Section 234E for the period before June 1, 2015, was under challenge. Following the Kerala High Court's decision in Jiji Varghese vs. ITO, the Tribunal found that delay should have been condoned in such cases.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)/NFAC's dismissal on grounds of delay was not justified, especially when the jurisdiction to levy the fee was under challenge. Following the Kerala High Court's decision in Jiji Varghese vs. ITO, the Tribunal directed the CIT(A)/NFAC to condone the delay and decide the appeal afresh on merits.

The Tribunal held that the dismissal of the appeals by the CIT(A)/NFAC solely on the grounds of delay was not justified, especially when the assessee was challenging the very jurisdiction to levy the late fee. Following the Kerala High Court's decision in Jiji Varghese v. ITO, the Tribunal directed the CIT(A)/NFAC to condone the delay and decide the appeals afresh on merits.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)/NFAC's dismissal of the appeal solely on the ground of delay was not justified, especially when the jurisdiction to levy the late fee itself was under challenge. Following the Kerala High Court's decision in Jiji Varghese vs. ITO, the Tribunal directed that the delay ought to have been condoned.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)/NFAC was not justified in dismissing the appeal on the ground of delay, especially when the jurisdiction to levy late fees itself was under challenge. Following the Kerala High Court's decision in Jiji Varghese vs. ITO, the Tribunal directed the CIT(A)/NFAC to condone the delay and decide the appeals afresh on merits.

The tribunal held that the CIT(A)/NFAC erred in dismissing the appeal solely on the ground of delay, especially when the assessee's challenge was based on a lack of jurisdiction to levy the late fee for the period prior to June 1, 2015. Following the Kerala High Court's decision in Jiji Varghese vs. ITO, the tribunal found that delay should have been condoned.

The Tribunal held that the dismissal by the CIT(A)/NFAC on the ground of delay was not justified, especially when the assessee was challenging the very jurisdiction to levy the late fee. Following the Kerala High Court's decision in Jiji Varghese vs. ITO, the Tribunal found that the delay, if any, ought to have been condoned.

The Tribunal, citing Supreme Court decisions emphasizing substantial justice over technicalities, held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeals solely on the ground of delay without considering the merits. The Tribunal restored the appeals to the CIT(A) with a direction to condone the delay and decide the matters on merit. For penalty appeals, the Tribunal observed that penalty under section 270A cannot be levied on amounts subsequently allowed as deduction by the Tribunal, and set aside the penalty on the allowed deduction amounts, also directing cancellation of penalty on a debatable issue.

The Tribunal held that the appeals should be restored to the CIT(A)/NFAC with a direction to condone the delay and decide the matters on merit, considering the principles of substantial justice. Subsequently, based on prior ITAT rulings, the Tribunal deleted the penalty attributable to the allowed deduction under section 80P for interest earned from cooperative banks and also directed cancellation of penalty on the disallowed interest on MSEDCL deposit, deeming it a debatable issue.

The Tribunal held that substantial justice should be preferred over technical considerations, especially when the delay is not deliberate. Citing Supreme Court judgments, the Tribunal restored the appeals to the CIT(A)/NFAC, directing them to condone the delay and decide the cases on merit. The Tribunal also deleted the penalty pertaining to the amount that was ultimately allowed as deduction.

The Tribunal noted that the additions had a direct correlation with the assessee's husband's income tax return. While the husband had shown the sale and purchase of property for claiming benefits, the assessee's income computation was not furnished, and supporting documents for short-term capital gain were lacking. The Tribunal restored the issues to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) by considering the assessee's reasons as a 'reasonable cause' and relying on Apex Court judgments. The Tribunal also noted that the CIT(A) had not decided the issues on merits.

The CIT(A) dismissed the appeal filed with a delay of 971 days without condoning the delay, stating that there was no reasonable cause for the delay and thus the appeal could not be admitted. The ITAT, however, condoned the delay of 971 days, considering the peculiar facts and legal precedents.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, noting it was not intentional. It found that the CIT(A) had erred by dismissing the appeal ex-parte without a proper hearing and by not disposing of the appeal on merits as required. The case was remitted back to the CIT(A).

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, considering the justice-oriented approach and relevant judgments. Since the Ld.CIT(A) had not decided the issue on merits, the case was remitted back for de novo adjudication.

The CIT(A) dismissed the assessee's appeal in limine due to a delay of 807 days without condoning it. The Tribunal, considering the peculiar facts and the 'reasonable cause' for the delay, condoned the delay. The Tribunal also noted that the assessee had furnished details of deductions claimed and paid due taxes.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), citing the issues faced by the assessee due to fraud by the erstwhile secretary and the COVID-19 pandemic. The Tribunal remitted the case back to the CIT(A)/NFAC for de novo adjudication on merits.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 807 days in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) based on the 'reasonable cause' presented by the assessee, who claimed to be misguided by their tax consultant. The issues raised in the appeals were remitted back to the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 45 days, citing a justice-oriented approach and reliance on Supreme Court judgments. The appeal was remitted to the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication to provide the assessee with a reasonable opportunity to present their case.

The Tribunal held that the assessee falls under the provisions of Section 10(23C)(iiiae) and there is no specific requirement for registration for such institutions. The Tribunal also found that the assessee maintained regular books of accounts which were duly audited.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, citing a justice-oriented approach and reliance on Supreme Court judgments. The Tribunal remitted the case back to the CIT(A) for a fresh adjudication on merits.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee neither participated in the proceedings before the Assessing Officer nor the CIT(A), resulting in ex-parte orders. However, considering the totality of facts and the assessee's prayer, an opportunity was granted to the assessee to present their case before the CIT(A).

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 268 days for the appeal before it, noting the circumstances and the Supreme Court's liberal approach. It also found that the CIT(A) had erred in dismissing the appeal without adjudicating on merits and remitted both the quantum addition and penalty appeal to the CIT(A) for denovo adjudication.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 391 days, relying on Apex Court judgments, finding the delay not intentional. The Tribunal remitted the appeal back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits after providing a reasonable opportunity to the assessee.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal in limine without discussing the merits, as Section 250(6) mandates a speaking order. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remitted the matter back for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal held that while the assessee did not respond to the notices, it was in the interest of justice to grant one final opportunity. The issue was restored to the file of the CIT(Exemption) with a direction to allow the assessee to substantiate its case.

The Tribunal noted that the quantum appeal was still pending before the CIT(A)/NFAC and that the penalty appeal was dismissed due to non-compliance. The Tribunal held that the penalty appeal should have been decided only after the quantum appeal was decided and restored the penalty issue to the file of CIT(A)/NFAC for adjudication after the quantum appeal is decided.

The Tribunal held that substantial justice is more important than procedural delay and that the assessee had sufficient cause for the delay. They directed the CIT(A) to condone the delay and decide the appeal on merits.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)/NFAC erred in dismissing the appeal solely on the ground of delay without considering the reasons provided by the assessee and without granting an opportunity for hearing.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)/NFAC erred in dismissing the appeal solely on grounds of delay without considering the reasons provided by the assessee. The Tribunal restored the issue to the CIT(A)/NFAC to condone the delay and decide the appeal on its merits.