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522 orders · Page 1 of 11
The Tribunal held that Part III of the First Schedule of the Finance Act, 2020, specifically section 2(9), is applicable for AY 2021-22. Clause (e) of the surcharge provisions applies to the assessee's case, mandating a surcharge rate of 15%.
The Tribunal held that in the interest of justice, the penalty appeals should be remanded to the Ld.CIT(A) to be considered along with the quantum appeal, with a direction to grant a proper opportunity of being heard to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that for unabated assessment years, additions under Section 153A can only be made based on incriminating material found during a search. The statement recorded under Section 132(4) of the Act, referring to the partner's work, was not considered sufficient incriminating material for disallowance. Furthermore, the remuneration was paid to the partner for services rendered, and it was offered to tax in the partner's hands, making the disallowance unsustainable on merits as well.
The Tribunal held that the issue of double disallowance of provision for bad and doubtful debts and the non-grant of credit for advance tax paid required further verification. The matter was remanded to the Assessing Officer for necessary inquiries.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing the appeal was covered by the period extended by the Hon'ble Supreme Court due to COVID-19. Therefore, the appeal was within the limitation period and admitted. The Tribunal also noted that the CIT(A) did not decide the issue on merit, which is not in accordance with law.
The Tribunal held that in the interest of justice, the penalty appeals should be remanded to the Ld.CIT(A) to be considered along with the quantum appeal, with a direction to grant a proper opportunity of being heard to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that for unabated assessment years, additions under Section 153A can only be made based on incriminating material found during a search. The statement recorded under Section 132(4) of the Act, referring to the partner's work, was not considered sufficient incriminating material for disallowance. Furthermore, the remuneration was paid to the partner for services rendered, and it was offered to tax in the partner's hands, making the disallowance unsustainable on merits as well.
The Tribunal held that for unabated assessment years, additions under Section 153A can only be made based on incriminating material found during a search. The statement recorded under Section 132(4) of the Act, referring to the partner's work, was not considered sufficient incriminating material for disallowance. Furthermore, the remuneration was paid to the partner for services rendered, and it was offered to tax in the partner's hands, making the disallowance unsustainable on merits as well.
The Tribunal observed that the appeal should have been filed before the Delhi Benches due to the territorial jurisdiction. Citing a Supreme Court judgment, the Tribunal dismissed the present appeal.
The Tribunal held that the addition was unsustainable as it was based on a third party's statement and documents without providing the assessee an opportunity for cross-examination. The Tribunal affirmed the deletion of the addition by the Commissioner (Appeals).
The Tribunal noted that the assessee was not granted a proper opportunity of being heard and that the authorities below did not consider relevant CBDT circulars. Therefore, the issue was remanded back to the Assessing Officer for necessary verification considering the specific financial year of deposit and applicable circulars.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance under Section 14A cannot exceed the total expenditure claimed by the assessee. It followed its own previous decisions and the High Court's ruling in the assessee's own case for earlier assessment years.
The Tribunal observed that the assessee's claims for change of income and TDS credit were made through rectification applications, which are not permissible for changes not apparent from the record. The Tribunal found that the grounds related to the rejection of the rectification application were dismissed, but the ground regarding TDS credit required further verification.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had inadvertently selected the wrong section code and had not been given a proper opportunity to be heard before the CIT(E). Following the decision of a coordinate bench, the Tribunal directed the CIT(E) to grant final approval if the assessee is otherwise eligible.
The tribunal considered the provisions of Rule 128(9) which states that Form 67 shall be furnished on or before the due date for filing the return of income. The tribunal noted that the Revenue contended this 'shall' to be mandatory, while the assessee relied on coordinate bench decisions holding the condition to be directory. Following the precedents of coordinate benches which have decided this issue in favor of the assessee, considering the delay in filing Form 67 as a procedural irregularity.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 115 days due to bonafide reasons and compelling circumstances beyond the appellant's control. The Tribunal set aside the ex-parte orders of the Assessing Officer and CIT(A) and remanded the matter back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that for unabated assessment years, additions under Section 153A can only be made based on incriminating material found during a search. The statement recorded under Section 132(4) of the Act, referring to the partner's work, was not considered sufficient incriminating material for disallowance. Furthermore, the remuneration was paid to the partner for services rendered, and it was offered to tax in the partner's hands, making the disallowance unsustainable on merits as well.
The Tribunal held that for unabated assessment years, additions under Section 153A can only be made based on incriminating material found during a search. The statement recorded under Section 132(4) of the Act, referring to the partner's work, was not considered sufficient incriminating material for disallowance. Furthermore, the remuneration was paid to the partner for services rendered, and it was offered to tax in the partner's hands, making the disallowance unsustainable on merits as well.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. It restored the issue of rejection of books of accounts to the AO for de novo adjudication, directing the assessee to furnish all details and cooperate with the proceedings.
The Tribunal held that additions cannot be made solely based on statements or documents from third parties without providing the assessee an opportunity to cross-examine or contradict them. A suo-moto disclosure before the Settlement Commission without corroborative evidence is also insufficient for making an addition.
The Tribunal held that for unabated assessment years, additions under Section 153A can only be made based on incriminating material found during a search. The statement recorded under Section 132(4) of the Act, referring to the partner's work, was not considered sufficient incriminating material for disallowance. Furthermore, the remuneration was paid to the partner for services rendered, and it was offered to tax in the partner's hands, making the disallowance unsustainable on merits as well.
The Tribunal noted that the documentary evidence produced by the assessee before the Tribunal was not made available to the CIT(Exemption). Therefore, deeming it proper to restore the matter to the CIT(Exemption) for a fresh adjudication and decision on merits, the Tribunal allowed both appeals for statistical purposes. This implies that the CIT(Exemption) will re-examine the applications for registration under Section 12AB (as indicated in the order, though Section 12A was mentioned in the grounds) and approval under Section 80G, considering the evidence presented by the assessee. The specific findings on the interpretation of Section 2(15) or the charitable nature of the activities were not made by the Tribunal in this order, as the matter was remanded. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer's conclusion of a colorable device was irrational and unsustainable as the transactions were genuine. The law does not require an assessee to pay more tax if they arrange their affairs legitimately to reduce their tax liability.
The Tribunal held that the AO was duty-bound to refer the property valuation to the Department Valuation Officer (DVO) when the assessee objected to the stamp duty value. Since this was not done, the issue was remanded back to the AO.
The Tribunal held that the issue regarding the non-passing of a draft assessment order under Section 144C was a significant procedural flaw. The Tribunal noted that Section 144C mandates the AO to forward a draft assessment order to an 'eligible assessee' if any variation prejudicial to the assessee's interest is proposed. The assessee, being a non-resident, clearly falls within the definition of an eligible assessee. The AO's failure to follow this mandatory procedure renders the assessment order void and without jurisdiction. Therefore, the Tribunal decided to quash the assessment orders on this ground. Consequently, the Tribunal did not delve into the other grounds of appeal, as the primary issue of jurisdiction was decided in favour of the assessee. The Tribunal's reasoning is based on the clear mandate of Section 144C and the definition of an eligible assessee. The ratio decidendi is that an assessment order passed without adhering to the mandatory procedural requirements of Section 144C, when applicable, is a nullity. The operative direction is to quash the assessment orders. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal held that the value determined by the Charity Commissioner for the sale of the property, which was subsequently registered at a higher price, should be considered the fair market value. Therefore, invoking Section 50C was not justified as the actual sale consideration was higher than the stamp duty valuation.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer was mandated to issue a draft assessment order under Section 144C before passing the final assessment order, especially for non-residents who are defined as eligible assessees. Failure to do so renders the assessment order void.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. It restored the issue of rejection of books of accounts to the AO for de novo adjudication, directing the assessee to furnish all details and cooperate with the proceedings.
The Tribunal held that the issue regarding the non-passing of a draft assessment order under Section 144C was a substantial issue. The assessee, being a non-resident, was an 'eligible assessee' under Section 144C(15). The AO was mandated to issue a draft assessment order if any variation prejudicial to the assessee's interest was proposed. The Tribunal noted that the AO had made additions, thus requiring a draft order. The Tribunal referred to the decision in the case of CIT vs. M/s. K.K. Investments (P) Ltd. and others, which held that the requirement of issuing a draft assessment order under Section 144C is mandatory for eligible assessees, and failure to do so renders the assessment order void ab initio. Therefore, the Tribunal found merit in the assessee's ground regarding the non-compliance with Section 144C. The Tribunal decided to quash the assessment orders for all relevant assessment years on this ground. Consequently, the other grounds of appeal, including the absence of incriminating material, re-computation of LTCG, disallowance of deduction under Section 35AC, ad-hoc addition of cash in hand, and assessment of rental income, were rendered infructuous and did not require adjudication. The issue regarding the application of Article 22 of the India-UAE DTAA was also not decided as the primary issue of the validity of the assessment order was decided in favour of the assessee.
The Tribunal noted that the delay was only for one day and was caused by technical difficulties with the PF portal, which prevented timely deposit. Relying on a coordinate bench decision in a similar case, the Tribunal held that the assessee could not be penalized for circumstances beyond its control.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, accepting the assessee's explanation supported by documentary evidence of attempts to file a rectification application. The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and remanded the matter back to the Assessing Officer (AO) for considering the issue on merits. The reasoning for condoning the delay was that the assessee was prevented by sufficient cause. The Tribunal also relied on the decision of a co-ordinate bench in Arya Samaj v/s ITO, which held that a mistake in filling a column in the ITR should be allowed to be rectified in the interest of justice, remanding the matter to the AO to consider the earlier and subsequent returns and rectify the mistake. The operative direction is to remand the matter to the AO. The issue of disallowance of expenses was not adjudicated by the CIT(A) and is to be considered by the AO on remand.
The Tribunal noted that substantive hearings could not take place before the Assessing Officer (AO) or the CIT(A) due to the assessee's non-compliance. Despite this, the Tribunal sympathetically considered the assessee's AR's plea for restoring the matter in the interest of justice and fair play, especially since the assessee assured future compliance. The Tribunal acknowledged that the issues could not be adjudicated due to the assessee's non-compliance but decided to grant a last opportunity. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes, setting aside the orders of the lower authorities. The AO was directed to provide a due opportunity of hearing to the assessee in de novo assessment proceedings, with a stern warning that no further opportunity would be granted in case of further non-compliance. The assessee was directed to comply with all notices and provide requested details without fail.
The Tribunal held that the Arm's Length Price (ALP) of services cannot be treated as NIL simply because the revenue authorities deem them worthless or unnecessary. The assessee had provided documentary evidence to substantiate the need, rendition, and benefit of the services received, along with cost allocation details.
The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeal, upholding the CIT(A)'s decision to allow the deduction for MVAT paid under protest under Section 43B. For the assessee's cross-objections regarding deductions under Section 80G and Section 35AC, and the addition of Trait Fees, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded these issues back to the AO for fresh adjudication, allowing the assessee to furnish additional evidence.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were initiated without fresh tangible material and were therefore bad in law. Consequently, the assessment order passed under Section 147 was quashed.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had maintained and furnished required documentation and information for transfer pricing. The Tribunal also noted that the primary reason for the penalty was the AO's view that the TNNM method was inappropriate without segmental financials, but the AO ultimately accepted the assessee's benchmarking. Furthermore, the Tribunal found that the issue was identical to a previous year where the penalty was deleted.
The Tribunal noted the assessee's decision to opt for the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn, with liberty granted to reinstate if the scheme application is not accepted.
The Tribunal held that for unabated assessment years, additions under Section 153A can only be made based on incriminating material found during a search. The statement recorded under Section 132(4) of the Act, referring to the partner's work, was not considered sufficient incriminating material for disallowance. Furthermore, the remuneration was paid to the partner for services rendered, and it was offered to tax in the partner's hands, making the disallowance unsustainable on merits as well.
The CIT(A) held that the reopening of the case was bad in law and deleted the addition on merits, finding that the assessee had provided sufficient documentation and the AO failed to establish any rigging or cash trail. The Tribunal concurred, noting that the assessee had not claimed LTCG/STCG and had included the transactions in the profit and loss account.
The Tribunal observed that disallowance under section 14A cannot exceed the exempt income earned. It restored the matter to the AO for verification of the assessee's claim of no exempt income. Regarding the warranty provision, the Tribunal remanded the issue to the AO to verify if it was made on a scientific basis, to be considered in light of the Supreme Court's decision if found to be on a scientific basis.
The Commissioner deleted the addition, noting that while the shares were penny stocks, the Assessee traded them in the regular course of business to make a quick profit and was not part of a rigging nexus. The Commissioner also found that the AO erred in treating sale proceeds without considering purchase costs and that the Assessee incurred a net loss. The Tribunal upheld the Commissioner's decision.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged its onus by providing documentary evidence for the purchase and sale of shares through banking channels and the stock exchange. Since no adverse findings or allegations of price rigging were made against the assessee, the additions were deleted.
The Tribunal affirmed the CIT(A)'s decision, ruling that the internal audit memo, which was the sole basis for reopening the assessment, did not qualify as 'information' within the meaning of Explanation 1 to Section 148 of the Income Tax Act prior to its amendment by the Finance Act, 2022. As the notice under section 148 was issued before the amendment's effective date, the reassessment proceedings were held to be void ab initio and consequently quashed. The deletion of the addition under section 68 was rendered infructuous.
The Tribunal found that the Ld. CIT(A) did not follow the due procedure under Rule 46A of the Rules when admitting and considering additional evidence. Therefore, the order of the Ld. CIT(A) was set aside, and the matter was remanded back to the Ld. CIT(A) to follow the prescribed procedure.
The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A) and dismissed the appeal of the Revenue. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had deleted the addition after considering the submissions of the assessee and the material on record. The CIT(A) had found that the property was purchased out of the assessee's own funds and that the AO had not brought any material on record to controvert this. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the order of the CIT(A) and held that the addition made by the AO was not justified. The ratio decidendi is that if the assessee demonstrates that the investment is out of its own funds and the AO fails to bring any contrary material on record, the addition under Section 69B cannot be sustained. The operative direction is the deletion of the addition of Rs. 1,15,00,000.
The Tribunal noted that the documentary evidence produced by the assessee before the Tribunal was not made available to the CIT(Exemption). Therefore, deeming it proper to restore the matter to the CIT(Exemption) for a fresh adjudication and decision on merits, the Tribunal allowed both appeals for statistical purposes. This implies that the CIT(Exemption) will re-examine the applications for registration under Section 12AB (as indicated in the order, though Section 12A was mentioned in the grounds) and approval under Section 80G, considering the evidence presented by the assessee. The specific findings on the interpretation of Section 2(15) or the charitable nature of the activities were not made by the Tribunal in this order, as the matter was remanded. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal held that the issue of non-compliance with Section 144C of the Act is a jurisdictional issue. It noted that the assessee is a non-resident and therefore an 'eligible assessee' as per Section 144C(15). The AO made variations prejudicial to the assessee's interest by making additions, thus mandatorily requiring the issuance of a draft assessment order before the final assessment order. The Tribunal found that the AO failed to follow this mandatory procedure. Relying on various judicial pronouncements, including the decision in the case of CIT vs. Siemens India Ltd. (2008) 297 ITR 277 (Bom), the Tribunal held that the failure to issue a draft assessment order under Section 144C when required renders the assessment order void ab initio. Consequently, the Tribunal quashed the assessment orders passed by the AO for all the assessment years under appeal. As the assessment orders were quashed on jurisdictional grounds, the Tribunal did not delve into the other grounds raised by the assessee concerning incriminating material, LTCG, Section 35AC deduction, cash in hand, rental income, and the DTAA. The operative direction was to quash the assessment orders.
The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeal because the tax effect (Rs. 58 lakh) was below the monetary limit of Rs. 60 lakh for appeals to the ITAT, as per CBDT Circular no.9 of 2024. Consequently, the assessee's cross-objection became infructuous and was also dismissed, with a provision for restoration if the Revenue's appeal is later recalled.
The Tribunal noted continuous non-compliance by the assessee despite specific opportunities and directions. The appeal was listed for hearing multiple times, but the assessee or their representative did not appear.
For ITA No. 5240/Mum/2024 (Section 12AB registration), the Tribunal restored the matter to the Ld. CIT(E) for reconsideration. The assessee was directed to submit a copy of the Board resolution dated 09.10.2024 (passed to alter the MOA to align with Section 11) and proof of amendment in the trust deed. The Tribunal noted the assessee's submission that it had passed a resolution to alter its MOA and cited the co-ordinate bench decision in Critical Art and Media Practices v/s DIT(E) and the Delhi High Court decision in M.K. Nambyar Saarf Law Charitable Trust, which held that activities outside India are not a bar to registration, though income applied outside India may not be eligible for exemption under Section 11. For ITA No. 5241/Mum/2024 (Section 80G registration), the Tribunal remanded the matter to the Ld. CIT(E) for fresh adjudication on the basis of the revised Form 10AB filed by the assessee. The Tribunal noted that the Ld. CIT(E) had adjudicated on the earlier application without considering the revised application filed on 25.05.2024.