ITAT Lucknow Judgments — February 2026

The Tribunal observed that neither the AO nor the CIT(A) provided reasonable opportunity to the assessee. Consequently, the impugned order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the issues in dispute were restored to the file of the Assessing Officer to pass a de novo assessment order in accordance with law, after providing proper opportunity to the assessee.

Following the precedent set in the identical case, the Tribunal set aside the order of the Ld. CIT(A) for AY 2020-21. The case was remanded to the Assessing Officer with a direction to pass a de novo assessment order, providing the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard.

The ITAT condoned the delay in filing the appeal, acknowledging the difficulties. While noting the assessee's failure to comply with notices at lower stages, the Tribunal held that the entire cash deposit from petrol sales cannot be automatically treated as income without proper verification. Therefore, the matter was restored to the file of the AO for a fresh assessment, directing the AO to provide the assessee a proper opportunity to furnish all necessary evidence. A cost of Rs. 5,000/- was imposed on the assessee for non-compliance before the CIT(A).

The ITAT noted that the quantum appeal related to the long-term capital gains disallowance had already been remanded back to the CIT(A) for re-adjudication. Given this, the ITAT decided to also restore the penalty proceedings under section 271(1)(c) to the CIT(A) to be decided afresh concurrently with the quantum appeal.

The ITAT observed that the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal for default without deciding on the merits, despite the assessee having filed a statement of facts. The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was obliged to decide the issue on merits and could have sought a remand report. Consequently, the matter was restored to the file of the CIT(A) to decide on merits after providing the assessee an opportunity to make submissions.

The Tribunal observed that Section 43CA read with Section 50C(2) permits the AO to refer the valuation to a DVO if the assessee disputes the stamp duty value as exceeding the fair market value. The Tribunal held that since the assessee had disputed the stamp duty value, the AO should have referred the matter to the DVO. Consequently, the Tribunal restored the issue back to the AO to refer the matter to the Valuation Officer, directing the assessee to produce the pre-dated agreements.

The Tribunal held that the cancellation order was unsustainable as it relied on set-aside assessment orders and the subsequent fresh assessments accepted the Trust's activities as genuine. The Tribunal quashed the cancellation order and restored the registration.

The Tribunal found that no admitted tax was payable, thus section 249(4)(b) was not applicable. The CIT(A)'s order was set aside, and the CIT(A) was directed to admit the appeal for adjudication on merits. Consequently, the issues in dispute regarding additions were restored to the Assessing Officer for a de novo assessment.

The Tribunal held that the loss from derivative trading was a business loss, not a capital loss, and should be allowed to be set off against other business income. The AO's reclassification and the CIT(A)'s upholding of it were deemed unjustified.

The Tribunal held that there were sufficient circumstances for the delay in filing the appeal, including non-service of the order and the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic. It emphasized that substantial justice should be preferred over technical considerations.

The ITAT held that the CIT(A) erred in remanding the matter for de novo assessment without first adjudicating the legal and jurisdictional issues raised by the assessee concerning the validity of the Section 148 notice and assessment order, particularly in light of the 'e-Assessment of Income Escaping Scheme, 2022'. The ITAT allowed the additional ground of appeal and remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) for adjudication of these legal issues, with other grounds becoming infructuous.

The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had failed to consider the additional evidence filed by the assessee under Rule 46A and had mechanically affirmed the AO's additions. Therefore, the matter was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) did not provide adequate opportunity to the assessee and failed to address the issues on merits. Therefore, the appeal was restored to the CIT(A) for a fresh adjudication.

The CIT(A) deleted the penalty, finding that separate bills were issued for distinct medical services, none of which exceeded Rs. 2,00,000. The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, clarifying that a patient's admission and treatment do not automatically constitute a single 'event' or 'occasion' under section 269ST, especially when services are billed individually rather than as a composite package. Since no single transaction exceeded the prescribed cash limit, the penalty under section 271DA was not leviable.

The Tribunal observed that it was unclear if the CIT(A) had communicated the consequences of non-compliance to the assessee before dismissing the appeal for default. Therefore, the Tribunal restored the matter back to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication after providing a proper opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal noted inconsistencies in the assessee's explanations and figures presented. It found that while contemporaneous evidence suggested the purchase and location of the machinery, it was unclear if this was fully presented to the AO or formed the basis of the CIT(A)'s decision.

The Tribunal held that the commission paid to foreign subsidiaries for procuring export orders did not accrue or arise in India. The services were rendered outside India, and the source of income was the transaction abroad, not the place of payment.

The Tribunal observed that the nature of interest income and WCT recovery was not adequately examined by the lower authorities. It admitted additional evidence and restored the matter to the AO for a de novo assessment. The AO is directed to re-examine the classification of these incomes and their appropriate taxation rate after considering new information provided by the assessee.

The Tribunal found a gross violation of natural justice, acknowledging that the CIT(A) issued notices to an incorrect email, leading to an ex-parte order. Considering the assessee's limited income and the large cash deposits, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter back to the Assessing Officer for a de novo assessment, granting the assessee a proper opportunity to explain the source of deposits. The appeal grounds were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal found that the assessee was not given adequate opportunity to present its case before the CIT(E) rejected the application. Therefore, the order of the CIT(E) was set aside, and the application was restored for a fresh decision.

The Tribunal held that the AO erred in rectifying the order under section 154 as the issue of interest on self-assessment tax was debatable, with multiple High Court judgments supporting the assessee's claim. Therefore, it was not a mistake apparent from the record.

The Tribunal held that the authorities below mechanically followed the outcome of the Section 143(1) processing without proper application of mind. The matter was remanded to the Assessing Officer to examine the exemption claim on merits.

The Tribunal held that the assessee discharged its primary onus by providing details of lenders and their bank statements. The AO failed to bring further evidence to disprove the genuineness and creditworthiness of the lenders, making the addition under Section 68 invalid.

The Tribunal held that a mere change in trading patterns cannot be a ground for addition. The AO failed to demonstrate with evidence why the assessee's explanation for cash sales was unacceptable or point out defects in purchases, stock, or sales. Therefore, the addition made under Section 68 was not justified.

The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) failed to pass a speaking order on merits, thus violating Section 250(6) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order dated 17.09.2025 and remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) with a direction to pass a de novo speaking order in accordance with law, after providing a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee.

The Tribunal upheld the deletion of the addition by the CIT(A). It held that for assessments under Section 153A following a search, additions can only be made based on incriminating material found during the search. In the absence of such material, completed assessments cannot be disturbed.

The Tribunal upheld the deletion of the addition by the CIT(A). It held that for assessments under Section 153A following a search, additions can only be made based on incriminating material found during the search. In the absence of such material, completed assessments cannot be disturbed.

The Tribunal ruled that the PCIT's order under section 263 was invalid because the PCIT failed to specifically point out what inquiries the Assessing Officer ought to have conducted, as required by Explanation 2(a) to section 263. Without such specific guidance on the lack of enquiry or verification, the AO's order could not be deemed erroneous and prejudicial to the Revenue. The PCIT's order was therefore quashed.

The Tribunal noted that the rejection was due to non-compliance, not an adverse inference on merits. Considering the assessee's small-town location and claims of non-service of notices and the CIT(E)'s order, the Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal and remanded the case back to the CIT(E) for a fresh decision on merits after providing the assessee a proper opportunity of being heard.

The Tribunal noted that the quantum appeal concerning the Section 69A addition had been restored to the Assessing Officer for a *de novo* adjudication. As the penalty under Section 271AAC(1) is consequential to the quantum addition, the Tribunal similarly restored the penalty issue to the AO for a *de novo* order.

The Tribunal upheld the deletion of the addition by the CIT(A). It held that for assessments under Section 153A following a search, additions can only be made based on incriminating material found during the search. In the absence of such material, completed assessments cannot be disturbed.

The Tribunal restored certain matters to the file of the AO for fresh examination, allowing the assessee to produce now-furnished evidence. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were vitiated due to the AO's failure to provide adequate time to the assessee and to consider the reply filed by the assessee before passing the order under section 148A(d). Consequently, the initiation of proceedings was deemed void ab initio.

The Tribunal found that both the Assessing Officer and the CIT(A) failed to provide a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee. Consequently, the CIT(A)'s order was set aside, and the matter was restored to the file of the Assessing Officer to pass a de novo speaking order on merits, ensuring a reasonable opportunity for the assessee.

The Tribunal noted that neither the Assessing Officer nor the CIT(A) had provided a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the issues to the file of the Assessing Officer with a direction to pass a fresh speaking order on merits after providing proper opportunity to the assessee.

The Tribunal observed that the assessee was not given a reasonable opportunity during both assessment and appellate proceedings. Consequently, the Tribunal remitted the disputed addition back to the Assessing Officer with a direction to pass a fresh assessment order in accordance with law, after providing the assessee a proper opportunity.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee was not given a reasonable opportunity by both the AO and CIT(A). Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the matter to the Assessing Officer with a direction to pass a de novo assessment order on merits, after providing adequate opportunity to the assessee.

The Tribunal found that there was sufficient cause for the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), falling within the meaning of Section 249(3) of the Income Tax Act. Consequently, the CIT(A)'s order was set aside, and the CIT(A) was directed to condone the delay, admit the appeal, and pass a de novo order on merits after providing a reasonable opportunity to the assessee.

The tribunal found that the CIT (Exemptions) passed the impugned orders without providing the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Consequently, both appeals are restored to the file of the CIT (Exemptions) with directions to pass a de novo order in accordance with law after affording a proper opportunity to the assessee.

The Tribunal observed that neither the Assessing Officer nor the CIT(A) had adequately examined the assessee's accounting method of treating membership/enrollment fees as capital receipts or the claim that interest income and related expenses should be assessed under the same head. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the case to the Assessing Officer for a de novo assessment, directing a fresh examination of these issues and allowing the assessee reasonable opportunity.

The ITAT noted that the assessee's representative did not press the grounds related to the validity of reopening under Sections 148A/148 and admitted to lacking supporting evidence for claimed purchases. The Tribunal found no material to demonstrate that the 8% estimation of profit on turnover was excessive or unreasonable. Therefore, the ITAT upheld the rejection of books of account due to insufficient evidence and confirmed the 8% profit estimation, dismissing the appeal.

The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s direction to the Assessing Officer to verify the correct opening stock quantity. It found this direction fair and reasonable given the assessee's own admission of a typographical error by their advocate. The Tribunal concluded that merely directing verification of the stock quantity caused no prejudice to the assessee, thereby sustaining the CIT(A)'s impugned appellate order.

The Tribunal held that the discount offered under the scheme was an incentive for purchasing jewelry and not interest on deposits. Therefore, TDS under Section 194A was not applicable.