ITAT Lucknow Judgments — May 2025
71 orders · Page 1 of 2
The Tribunal held that the jurisdiction of the appellate forum, including the ITAT and High Court, is determined by the location of the Assessing Officer who passed the assessment order. Therefore, the Delhi Benches did not have territorial jurisdiction to decide these appeals and cross-objections.
The Tribunal held that the jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal and the High Court is determined by the location of the Assessing Officer who passed the assessment order. Even if cases are transferred under Section 127 of the Income Tax Act, the original jurisdiction remains with the High Court where the AO was situated. Consequently, the Delhi Benches do not have the territorial jurisdiction to decide these appeals.
The Tribunal held that the jurisdiction of an appeal lies with the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Assessing Officer who passed the assessment order is situated. Even if cases are transferred under Section 127 of the Income Tax Act, this does not alter the jurisdiction of the appellate forum. Consequently, the Delhi Benches lacked the territorial jurisdiction.
The Tribunal held that the territorial jurisdiction of the ITAT Benches is determined by the location of the Assessing Officer who passed the assessment order. Appeals transferred under Section 127 of the Income Tax Act do not change the jurisdiction of the appellate forum.
The Tribunal held that the jurisdiction of the High Court for appeals is determined by the location of the Assessing Officer who passed the assessment order, not the place of business or residence of the assessee. Even if cases are transferred under Section 127 of the Income Tax Act, the High Court within whose jurisdiction the AO passed the order continues to exercise appellate jurisdiction.
The Tribunal restored the appeal to the file of the Assessing Officer, directing that the assessee be given another opportunity to present their case and produce evidence. The Tribunal cautioned the assessee to comply with the AO's directions.
The Tribunal ruled that the CIT (Exemptions) had rejected the applications without granting the assessee a proper opportunity and without considering the details filed, thus violating natural justice. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the CIT (Exemptions)'s orders and directed a de novo assessment with adequate opportunity provided to the assessee.
The Tribunal observed that the NFAC's order was ex-parte. Considering the peculiar facts, the Tribunal deemed it fit to grant the assessee one more opportunity to present their case before the NFAC.
The Tribunal held that the CIT (Exemptions) rejected the applications without providing a reasonable opportunity to the assessee and without considering the details filed. Therefore, the impugned orders were set aside.
The Tribunal held that the AO's disallowance under Section 40A(3) was unsustainable as it was made on an estimated basis without identifying specific instances of violation. The Tribunal noted that disallowances under this section require identification of actual payments, not presumptions.
The Tribunal held that an order passed by the PCIT under section 119 of the Income Tax Act is not appealable before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT). Therefore, the appeal filed by the assessee is dismissed as not maintainable.
The Tribunal observed that the assessee neither appeared during the hearing nor filed any application for condonation of delay, as the appeal was beyond the time limit prescribed under Section 253(3) of the IT Act. Concluding that the assessee was not interested in prosecuting the appeal, the Tribunal dismissed it for non-prosecution.
The Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's non-compliance at both AO and NFAC levels but found reasonable cause for the same, considering the assessee's circumstances of working abroad and caring for parents. Consequently, the Tribunal restored the matter to the file of the Assessing Officer, directing a fresh opportunity of hearing to the assessee to present their case and evidence, with a warning that future non-compliance would result in an ex-parte order based on available records.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) invoked Section 36(1)(iii) without providing the assessee with an opportunity of being heard. Therefore, the disallowance is restored to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision after providing a reasonable opportunity.
The Tribunal noted non-compliance by the assessee but, considering the peculiar facts and the assessee's prayer, decided to grant one more opportunity. The case was restored to the Assessing Officer to allow the assessee to present their case and evidence.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) invoked Section 36(1)(iii) without providing the assessee with an opportunity to be heard on this specific provision. Consequently, the appeals were restored to the file of the CIT(A) with a direction to pass a de novo order after providing a reasonable opportunity to the assessee.
The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) had invoked Section 36(1)(iii) without affording the assessee an opportunity of being heard. With the agreement of both parties, the Tribunal restored all appeals to the CIT(A) for a de novo order after providing reasonable opportunity to the assessee.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals. It held that the assessee was not given a proper opportunity to be heard by the Ld. CIT(E) and that the rejection orders were passed ex-parte. The matter was restored to the Ld. CIT(E) for a fresh decision after affording the assessee a proper opportunity.
The Tribunal held that the assessee deserves one more opportunity to present their case before the NFAC. The appeals were restored to the NFAC for fresh adjudication after the assessee explains the delay and the NFAC condones it.
The Tribunal held that both the assessment order and the appellate order were passed ex-parte, and the assessee was not given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Therefore, the orders were set aside and restored to the Assessing Officer for de novo assessment.
Both the Revenue and the assessee's representatives agreed that the appeal was not maintainable due to the tax effect being below the prescribed limit. The Tribunal, therefore, dismissed the appeal in limine without considering its merits. The Revenue was granted liberty to seek restoration if the actual tax effect is later found to exceed the CBDT's monetary limit.
The Tribunal deleted the addition for provision for income tax. It remanded matters concerning the actual amount of PF disallowance, leave encashment, Section 14A applicability, fall in value of securities, and depreciation to the AO for re-examination. The disallowance of "NACH Expenses" was quashed, and the Revenue's appeal against the deletion of addition for exempt interest on GOI bonds by the CIT(A) was dismissed.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee was not properly represented before the lower authorities due to issues with notice service. Considering the peculiar facts, the Tribunal restored the matter to the AO for fresh adjudication after providing the assessee with a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal permitted the assessee to withdraw the appeal, with no objection from the Ld. D.R. The appeal was dismissed for statistical purposes, granting the assessee liberty to approach the Tribunal again if their Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme application is not finally accepted by the Department.
The Tribunal permitted the assessee to withdraw the appeal, consigning it to record. The Tribunal granted liberty to the assessee to approach it again if the DTVSV application is not finally accepted by the Department.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had non-compliance before the NFAC and AO. However, considering the prayer of the assessee's representative and the facts, the Tribunal decided to grant one more opportunity to the assessee to present their case. The appeal was restored to the Assessing Officer.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had sufficient cause for filing the appeal belatedly and directed the CIT(A) to condone the delay and decide the appeal on merits after providing a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The Tribunal also noted the issue of ex-parte assessment order.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals. It was held that the assessee was not given proper opportunity by the CIT(E) as the orders were passed ex-parte without proper notice. Therefore, the orders of the CIT(E) were set aside.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had the power to set aside assessments and remand them to the AO, especially after the amendment to Section 251 of the Income Tax Act by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2024. The CIT(A)'s orders, dated 29.10.2024, were within the purview of this amended power.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s orders, finding no error. It noted that an amendment to Section 251 of the Income Tax Act, effective from October 1, 2024, granted the CIT(A) the power to set aside assessment orders under Section 144 and refer the case back to the AO.
The Tribunal, considering the facts and in the interest of substantial justice, restored the appeals to the NFAC. The NFAC was directed to give the assessee an opportunity to explain the delay and then decide the appeals on merits.
The Tribunal upheld the Ld. CIT(A)'s decision to set aside the assessments and remand the cases. It noted that an amendment to Section 251(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, effective from October 1, 2024, explicitly grants the CIT(A) the power to set aside assessment orders under Section 144 and remand cases for fresh assessment. Since the CIT(A)'s orders were passed after this effective date, they were found to be in line with the amended provisions.
The Tribunal noted discrepancies in submissions made to the AO and the NFAC. It restored the file to the Assessing Officer to provide the assessee a fresh opportunity to reconcile figures and produce evidence for the impugned transactions, emphasizing full compliance from the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred by not inquiring into the assessee's claim of not being aware of the order and by dismissing the appeal in limine due to inordinate delay. The Tribunal noted that the delay period included the COVID-19 pandemic, during which limitation periods were waived, and restored the matter to the CIT(A) for a decision on merits.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was established for the object of general public utility, which is a charitable object. The proviso to Section 2(15) was not applicable as the assessee was not carrying out its activities with any profit motive, and its predominant object was the welfare of the people. Therefore, the appeals were allowed.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's primary object is general public utility, which is a charitable purpose under Section 2(15) of the Income Tax Act. The activities undertaken by the Authority do not involve trade, commerce, or business with a profit motive, and therefore, the proviso to Section 2(15) is not applicable. The Tribunal relied on various Supreme Court and High Court judgments.
The Tribunal, following the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in similar cases concerning development authorities, held that the assessee's activities were for general public utility and not in the nature of trade, commerce, or business. Therefore, the proviso to Section 2(15) was not applicable.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was established for the object of general public utility, which is a charitable purpose. The proviso to Section 2(15) was not applicable as the assessee was not carrying out activities with a profit motive, and its predominant object was the welfare of the people.
The assessee's Authorized Representative submitted an application to withdraw the appeal as they had opted for the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme. The Revenue had no objection to the withdrawal.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in passing an ex-parte order without providing a reasonable opportunity of hearing and without passing a speaking order on merits, as mandated by section 250(6) of the Income Tax Act. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter for a de novo decision on merits after giving the assessee a proper opportunity.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had demonstrated that it filed evidences related to its activities, which appeared to have escaped the CIT(Exemption)'s attention. To serve the principles of natural justice, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(Exemption)'s order.
The Tribunal held that the assessee should be given an opportunity to explain its case before the CIT(E) to uphold the principles of natural justice. Therefore, the impugned order was set aside, and the application was restored to the CIT(E) for reconsideration.
The Tribunal held that Section 14A disallowances are attracted only when there is exempt income. The amendment inserting an Explanation to Section 14A was found to be prospective and not applicable to the assessment years in question. Consequently, the Revenue's appeals were dismissed, and the assessee's appeal was partly allowed.
The Tribunal held that the Explanation to Section 14A is prospective in nature and not retrospective. Therefore, it has no application to the assessment years under appeal. The Tribunal further held that no disallowance under Section 14A can be made in the absence of any exempt income. Consequently, the Revenue's appeals were dismissed, and the assessee's appeal was partly allowed.
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