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The Tribunal held that the service of notice through the ITBA portal by the CIT(A) was not a valid method as per Section 282(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Consequently, the principles of natural justice were violated as the assessee was not afforded a proper opportunity to be heard.
The Tribunal held that the service of notice through the ITBA portal by the CIT(A) was not a valid method as per Section 282(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Consequently, the principles of natural justice were violated as the assessee was not afforded a proper opportunity to be heard.
The Tribunal held that the Dividend Distribution Tax (DDT) is not a tax on the income of the assessee that would trigger the applicability of the DTAA. Instead, it is a charge levied at a specified rate on the profits of the company distributed as dividend, introduced for the specific purpose of taxing distributed profits. The Tribunal noted that the rate of DDT and the rate of tax applicable to the shareholder's income could be different. Furthermore, the Tribunal found that the assessee had not filed any return of income for claiming the refund in accordance with the provisions of Section 139 of the Act, as required under Section 239(1) of the Act. Consequently, the assessee's claim for refund was held to be not maintainable. The Tribunal dismissed the grounds of appeal and confirmed the order of the Ld. CIT(A) for all assessment years. The issue of consequential interest under Section 244A was not decided as the primary claim for refund was dismissed. The Tribunal did not expressly leave any issue undecided, but the reasoning implicitly addressed the applicability of DTAA and the procedural requirement for claiming refunds.
The Tribunal held that DDT is a charge on the profits of the company distributed as dividend and not a tax on the shareholder, thus the DTAA is not triggered. Furthermore, the assessee failed to file a return of income as required under Section 239(1) of the Income Tax Act for claiming the refund.
The Tribunal held that DDT is a charge on the distributed profits of a company and not a tax on the shareholder, thus the DTAA is not applicable. Furthermore, the claim for refund was not maintainable as the assessee had not filed a return of income as required by Section 239 of the Income Tax Act.
The Tribunal held that the Dividend Distribution Tax (DDT) is not a tax on the income of the assessee that would trigger the applicability of the DTAA. Instead, it is a charge levied at a specified rate on the profits of the company distributed as dividend. The Tribunal noted that DDT was introduced to tax distributed profits of companies, and its rate can differ from the tax rate applicable to the shareholder's income. Furthermore, the Tribunal found that the assessee had not filed any return of income for claiming the refund, which is a mandatory requirement under Section 239(1) of the Act for claims under Chapter XIX. Consequently, the assessee's claim for refund was deemed not maintainable. The grounds of appeal were dismissed, and the order of the Ld. CIT(A) was confirmed for all assessment years. The Tribunal did not expressly leave any issue undecided.
The Tribunal held that while the reopening of assessment was valid, the assessee's claim that the amount represented sale proceeds of investments needed further consideration. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the issue to the AO for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal partly allowed the appeal concerning the assessment, reducing the estimated profit rate. It allowed the appeals concerning penalties, cancelling them due to reasonable cause and the assessee's rural background and reliance on a consultant.
The Tribunal held that DDT is a charge on the distributed profits of a domestic company and not a tax on the shareholder, thus the DTAA is not triggered. Additionally, the assessee's claim for refund was not maintainable as it failed to file a return of income as required by Section 239(1) of the Act.
The Tribunal held that DDT is a charge on the profits of the company distributed as dividend and not a tax on the shareholder, thus the DTAA is not triggered. Furthermore, the assessee failed to file a return of income as required under Section 239(1) of the Income Tax Act for claiming the refund.
The Tribunal held that DDT is a charge on the profits of the company distributed as dividend and not a tax on the shareholder, thus the DTAA is not triggered. Furthermore, the assessee failed to file a return of income as required under Section 239(1) of the Income Tax Act for claiming the refund.
The Tribunal partly allowed the appeal concerning the assessment, reducing the estimated profit rate. It allowed the appeals concerning penalties, cancelling them due to reasonable cause and the assessee's rural background and reliance on a consultant.
The Tribunal partly allowed the appeal concerning the assessment, reducing the estimated profit rate. It allowed the appeals concerning penalties, cancelling them due to reasonable cause and the assessee's rural background and reliance on a consultant.
The Tribunal held that DDT is a charge on the profits of the company distributed as dividend and not a tax on the shareholder, thus the DTAA is not triggered. Furthermore, the assessee failed to file a return of income as required under Section 239(1) of the Income Tax Act for claiming the refund.
The Tribunal allowed the appeal of the assessee. It noted that the assessee had submitted all relevant documents to establish the loan transactions and interest payments. The AO himself recorded that the loan creditors submitted the requisite documents in response to notices under Section 133(6), except for one entity (Kanha Dealers Pvt. Ltd.), an amount related to which had already been deleted by the CIT(A). The Tribunal found that the AO failed to bring any cogent material or corroborative evidence on record to establish a nexus between alleged entry operators and the loan transactions. The lender companies had confirmed the transactions. The Tribunal relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court in Sree Leathers, which held that if the assessee furnishes full details regarding creditors, it is up to the department to pursue the matter further. The Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A)'s factual exercise, considering the creditworthiness of the lender companies, their response to notices, and their net worth running into crores, with declared incomes. The AO had not recorded reasons for finding the explanation unsatisfactory. The Tribunal concluded that the AO ignored settled legal principles and the basic tenets of law. Therefore, the addition sustained by the CIT(A) was deleted.
The Tribunal, following its own earlier decision in a similar case for AY 2018-19, set aside the order of the CIT(A) and remanded the matter to the AO. The AO is directed to examine whether the payments were made within the due dates as per the Provident Fund Act/ESI Act and allow the deduction accordingly. Any remaining disallowances are to be confirmed.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(Exemption) had rejected the application due to the non-furnishing of details. In the interest of justice and fair play, the assessee should be granted another opportunity to file proper submissions.
The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A) and dismissed the appeal of the Revenue. The Tribunal found that the assessee had provided a 'Cast Iron' documentary foundation to establish the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the transactions. The audited balance sheets of the subscribers demonstrated a substantial net worth far in excess of the amounts invested. The Tribunal noted that the AO's reliance on the non-appearance of directors was misplaced, as robust documentary evidence was available, and the AO had co-terminus powers to compel attendance under Section 131 of the Act. The Tribunal distinguished the case of NRA Iron & Steel, stating that its ratio applied only to 'phantom' or 'non-existent' entities, not to active, traceable taxpayers who responded to notices and confirmed transactions through banking channels. The valuation of shares was considered a matter of commercial wisdom, and the Revenue failed to prove a 'live link' showing funds originated from the assessee's own coffers. The Tribunal concluded that documented traceability through legitimate banking channels carries greater evidentiary weight than the subjective suspicion of an AO. The findings of the CIT(A) were based on a meticulous factual inquiry and sound appreciation of facts and settled legal principles, and no substantial question of law arose. The case was also covered by several decisions of the jurisdictional High Court.
The Tribunal held that since the reopening was based on material found during a search on a third party, the proceedings should have been initiated under Section 153C, not Section 147. Therefore, the reopening and consequent assessment were quashed.
The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(A) had passed the appellate order ex-parte due to the assessee's failure to respond to various notices issued during the appellate proceedings. The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's submission that notices were sent to an incorrect email address, leading to non-receipt and subsequent ex-parte order. To serve the ends of justice, the Tribunal decided to restore the appeal to the file of the Ld. CIT(A). The Ld. CIT(A) was directed to decide the appeal afresh after affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The issue of the merits of the original appeal before the CIT(A) was not adjudicated upon by the ITAT.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order, finding that the assessee had discharged its initial burden by providing documents to prove the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the loan transactions. The Tribunal also noted that the loans had been repaid and relied on judicial precedents supporting this view.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had provided all necessary evidence for the unsecured loans, including identities, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the transactions. The lenders also provided all requested details to the AO, and the loans were repaid. The Tribunal noted that the AO made the addition without proper investigation and that the case was covered by judicial precedents where no addition under Section 68 of the Act is permissible if the assessee furnishes all evidence and the loans are repaid.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) order was passed ex-parte without affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing. Restoring the appeal to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication would serve the interest of justice.
The Tribunal held that the income from the sale of green tea leaves, amounting to Rs. 2,74,52,602/-, is purely agricultural income and not part of the profit or loss from the business of growing and manufacturing tea. Therefore, it cannot be subjected to the provisions of the Income Tax Act under Rule 8. The Tribunal cited a Supreme Court decision in support of its view, stating that income from the sale of green tea leaves is agricultural in nature and not taxable under the Income Tax Act.
The Ld. CIT(A) annulled the assessment, holding that since the incriminating material was found during a search on a third party, proceedings should have been initiated under section 153C of the Act, not under sections 147/148.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had provided all necessary evidence for the unsecured loans, including identities, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the transactions. The lenders also provided all requested details to the AO, and the loans were repaid. The Tribunal noted that the AO made the addition without proper investigation and that the case was covered by judicial precedents where no addition under Section 68 of the Act is permissible if the assessee furnishes all evidence and the loans are repaid.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order, finding that the assessee had discharged its initial burden by providing documents to prove the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the loan transactions. The Tribunal also noted that the loans had been repaid and relied on judicial precedents supporting this view.
The Tribunal held that the reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer for reopening the assessment were vague, scanty, and ambiguous, failing to provide specific details of the alleged transactions. Consequently, the Tribunal quashed the assessment proceedings as invalid, relying on the precedent set in CIT vs. Insecticides (India) Ltd.
The Tribunal held that the show cause notice issued with a response period of less than seven days is invalid and a nullity in the eyes of law. This invalidity vitiates the subsequent assessment proceedings.
The Tribunal noted that the NFAC had passed the appellate order ex-parte because the assessee failed to respond to various notices during the appellate proceedings. Similarly, the AO had passed an ex-parte assessment order when the assessee did not respond to notices during the assessment proceedings. The Tribunal found that the ends of justice would be well-served by restoring the appeal to the file of the AO. Accordingly, the Tribunal restored the appeal back to the file of the AO with a direction to decide the same afresh after affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal held that the CBDT Circular No. 24/2022, dated 07.12.2022, indicates that salary up to Rs. 6,00,000/- results in no tax liability, with a nil tax payable after considering rebate u/s 87A. Since the salary paid to the four employees did not exceed this threshold, no TDS was liable to be deducted.
The Tribunal found the reasons for the delay to be bonafide and genuine, and thus condoned the delay. Subsequently, at the time of hearing, the assessee's Authorized Representative requested to withdraw the appeal.
The Tribunal held that for discretionary trusts taxed at the maximum marginal rate, surcharge is to be computed based on the rates prescribed in the Finance Act under the heading 'surcharge on income tax'. Since the assessee's income was below Rs. 50 lacs, no surcharge was attracted.
The Tribunal held that the threshold for surcharge applicability is Rs. 50 lacs, and since the assessee's income was below this limit, no surcharge is attracted. The maximum marginal rate for discretionary trusts is based on the highest income slab rates in the Finance Act, and surcharge is computed thereafter according to applicable slab rates.
The Tribunal held that the disclosed income, derived from various transactions and recorded in 'other documents' found during the search, did not fall within the definition of 'undisclosed income' under Section 271AAB. Furthermore, the AO failed to record satisfaction for initiating penalty proceedings.
The Tribunal held that for discretionary trusts taxed at the maximum marginal rate, surcharge is to be computed based on the rates prescribed in the Finance Act under the heading 'surcharge on income tax'. Since the assessee's income was below Rs. 50 lacs, no surcharge was attracted.
The Tribunal noted that both the assessee and the alleged broker denied the transactions. A letter from the broker explicitly stated that no such transactions were undertaken with the assessee. Therefore, the Tribunal found no basis for the addition made by the AO and upheld by the CIT(A).
The Tribunal held that the issue should be restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication. The assessee should be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
The CIT(A) allowed the assessee's appeal, holding that the Assessing Officer's addition was not sustainable in law. The tribunal noted that the assessee had provided all necessary documents and evidence, and that the subscriber companies had also responded to notices, even though they did not appear personally. The CIT(A)'s order was found to be reasonable and well-reasoned.
The Tribunal held that the AO lacked jurisdiction to make additions not mentioned in the reasons for reopening. It further held that the assessment order passed in the name of a non-existing, amalgamated entity is invalid. The Tribunal relied on various High Court and Supreme Court decisions to support its findings.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT's approval for reopening under Section 151 was mechanical, thus rendering the notice under Section 148 and the subsequent assessment invalid. Additionally, the Tribunal noted that no notice under Section 143(2) was issued after the assessee complied with the Section 148 notice, which is mandatory for assuming jurisdiction.
The Tribunal decided to admit the new evidences and remand the matter back to the CIT(A) for denovo adjudication after providing an opportunity of being heard to the assessee and taking a remand report from the AO.
The Tribunal noted that the show cause notice issued under Section 148A(b) provided less than the mandatory seven days for the assessee to respond. Citing various High Court and ITAT judgments, the Tribunal held that such a notice is invalid and vitiates the subsequent assessment proceedings.
The Tribunal noted that Mr. Barik Biswas admitted that the transactions belonged to him and the money was his. Furthermore, Mr. Barik Biswas had disclosed these accounts in his balance sheet and accounted for the transactions, and was assessed to tax on them. Therefore, the addition in the assessee's hands, even on a protective basis, was not justified.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal after noting sufficient cause. The Tribunal decided to remit the issue back to the AO for de-novo reassessment, granting the assessee a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present documentary evidence.
The Tribunal held that the notice under Section 148 was issued by an ACIT without the requisite pecuniary jurisdiction and was therefore invalid. Consequently, the assessment order based on this invalid notice was also quashed.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 was bad in law because the approval was granted by the PCIT-1, Kolkata, whereas Section 151(ii) of the Act mandates approval from the Pr. CCIT for reopening beyond three years. Citing decisions from the Bombay High Court and the Jurisdictional High Court, the Tribunal quashed the notice and the subsequent assessment.
The ITAT condoned the delay in the revenue's appeal. Regarding the grounds of appeal, the Tribunal found that the interest payment on delayed TDS was compensatory, not penal, and allowed the deletion of this addition. The Tribunal also upheld the CIT(A)'s deletion of additions related to salary and wages, doctor referral fees, and sales promotion expenses, citing lack of evidence, estimation basis for disallowance, and applicability of certain guidelines.