220 orders · Page 1 of 5
The Tribunal held that the AO made the addition by inferring that the entire sale transactions in "Eins Edutech Ltd." shares were bogus, without providing cogent evidence contrary to the documentary evidence submitted by the assessee, such as bills, contract notes, demat statements, and bank statements. The AO did not dispute that the purchase and sales transactions were carried out through recognized stock exchanges, payments were made via account payee cheques, Securities Transaction Tax (STT) was charged, and these were reflected in the assessee's books. The AO's doubt stemmed from price rigging information and a report from the Investigation Wing. The Tribunal noted that the assessee purchased shares for Rs. 12,39,622.56 and sold them for Rs. 14,18,919.95, offering a short-term capital gain of Rs. 1,79,297/-. The addition of Rs. 20,17,964/- by the AO was based on adding the sale consideration (Rs. 14,18,919/-) with a stock journal entry of Rs. 5,99,045/- related to a share split, which was incorrect as the STCG was already taxed. The Tribunal found no reason to deviate from the CIT(A)'s findings and dismissed the Revenue's appeal.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. It noted that the assessee was ex-parte before the CIT(E) and directed the assessee to submit the required documents/information to the CIT(E) for fresh adjudication, restoring the matter to the CIT(E)'s file.
The Tribunal held that the AO exceeded his jurisdiction by converting the limited scrutiny to full scrutiny without following prescribed procedures and obtaining necessary approvals. Therefore, the addition made on account of bank deposits was deleted.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had provided sufficient evidence, including notarized receipts and affidavits, to explain the sources of the cash deposits. The AO had not adequately verified these documents. Therefore, the addition of Rs. 20,00,120/- as unexplained income was deleted.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had passed an ex-parte order because the assessee failed to furnish any evidence or written submissions in support of its grounds of appeal, despite several opportunities. The Tribunal acknowledged that the assessee was ex-parte before the CIT(A) and thus could not present its defense. While emphasizing the assessee's duty to appear before statutory authorities, the Tribunal held that the dispute should be decided on merits to avoid scuttling rights without a proper hearing. Therefore, the Tribunal restored the matter to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, providing one more opportunity for hearing. The assessee was directed to be cooperative and not seek frivolous adjournments. The Tribunal clarified that this decision was for statistical purposes and did not reflect any opinion on the merits of the dispute, which would be adjudicated independently by the CIT(A).
The Tribunal noted that the assessee was ex-parte before the AO and CIT(A) and failed to present their case adequately. While upholding the need for merits-based decision and natural justice, the Tribunal restored the matter to the AO to provide one more opportunity for hearing, subject to the assessee's cooperation and no frivolous adjournments.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged the onus of explaining the source of cash deposits during the demonetization period. The addition made by the AO and confirmed by the CIT(A) was not sustainable as the assessee provided supporting affidavits and other income explanations.
The Tribunal held that while the assessee was negligent, the principles of natural justice require an opportunity of being heard. Therefore, the matter is restored to the AO for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, finding that the assessee, an NRI, had provided sufficient documentary evidence to explain the source of funds for investments and bank balances. The additions were deleted as the CIT(A) had rightly considered the evidence.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, accepting the explanation that it was due to the Chartered Accountant's inadvertent omission. Regarding the first issue, the Tribunal noted that the learned CIT(A) had issued five notices under section 250 of the Act, to which the assessee did not respond. The Tribunal found no merit in the contention that principles of natural justice were violated, as ample opportunity was provided. Therefore, the appeal was not to be restored on this ground. On the second issue concerning the addition of Rs. 37,13,331/-, the Tribunal observed that the assessee had surrendered this amount as undisclosed income during search proceedings under section 132(4) but later retracted from this statement while filing the return of income. The Tribunal held that such retraction must be supported by strong evidence and be prompt. In the absence of specific, prompt retraction and supporting evidence, the Tribunal found no merit in the assessee's claim that no offer or surrender was made or legally retracted. The Tribunal upheld the observations of the Assessing Officer and the conclusions of the learned CIT(A) regarding the profit earned. On the third issue regarding the disallowance of Rs. 55,445/-, the Tribunal noted that the assessee claimed deduction for interest on a housing loan taken for a property owned by his wife, Smt. Laxmi Devi. The Tribunal found that the assessee failed to establish his claim by leading cogent and convincing evidence to support his claim or rebut the Assessing Officer's allegations. The alternative plea to allow the deduction in the hands of the wife was also not supported by any provision. Therefore, the Tribunal found no merit in the contention raised by the appellant challenging the second addition. The appeal was dismissed, sustaining the impugned order of the learned CIT(A).
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, noting the appellant's mistaken belief regarding the necessity of RPT Act registration. The matter was remanded to the CIT(E) for a fresh decision on the Section 12AB application, requiring the appellant to provide all necessary details and documentation.
The Tribunal held that the NFAC erred in quashing the assessment proceedings on technicalities without examining the merits. The Tribunal found that the assessee had miserably failed to establish the essential three ingredients prescribed in Section 68 of the Act, namely, identity of creditors, genuineness of the transaction, and creditworthiness of the party. The Tribunal noted that even if loans are squared up in the same year, they can still be tested under Section 68, especially in cases of suspected accommodation entries. The Tribunal also held that the NFAC's finding that the assessment should have been carried out under Section 153C was erroneous, as the case fell within the purview of Section 148. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court decision in PCIT, Central-3 vs. Abhisar Buildwell (P.) Ltd. The Tribunal set aside the order of the NFAC and confirmed the order of the AO. The ratio is that the principle of 'substance over form' and doctrines like 'piercing the corporate veil' can be applied in tax matters to tax underlying assets in cases of fraud or tax avoidance, and an assessee must satisfy the conditions of Section 68 for cash credits.
The Tribunal allowed the appeal. Regarding Ground No. 2, concerning the validity of reopening, the Tribunal found that the issue of share capital was raised and addressed during the original assessment under Section 143(3). The AO had issued a questionnaire on November 4, 2014, specifically querying the share capital. The assessee had provided documentary evidence in response. Therefore, the reopening under Section 147 was considered a change of opinion without fulfilling the conditions of the proviso to Section 147, making the notice under Section 148 and subsequent assessment orders void ab initio. Consequently, Ground No. 2 was allowed, and the reopening was quashed. As for Ground No. 1, concerning the addition on merits, the Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged its onus under Section 68 by providing documentary evidence such as share application forms, bank statements, ITRs of lenders, and financial statements of investor companies. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court decision in CIT vs. Lovely Exports Pvt. Ltd., stating that the Revenue should proceed against the shareholders if they are alleged to be bogus, rather than adding the amount to the assessee's income. The Tribunal also noted that the primary basis for the addition was the statement of Shri Mukesh Banka, which was later retracted. Following the jurisdictional High Court's decision in PCIT Vs. M/s. Esspal International P. Ltd., which held that additions cannot be made solely on a retracted statement, the Tribunal deleted the addition on merits. Ground No. 3 became infructuous. The appeal was allowed.
The Tribunal noted that the additional documents submitted by the assessee were not verified by the Assessing Officer. Consequently, the Tribunal restored the matter to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication after verification of the documents and allowing the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. It was held that the matter should be remanded to the Assessing Officer to provide the assessee with a reasonable opportunity of being heard, given the circumstances of non-service of notices.
The Tribunal held that since the incriminating material was recovered during a search on a third-party group and not directly from the assessee, the appropriate provision for re-opening the assessment was Section 153C, not Section 148. It noted the department's failure to provide copies of the incriminating material to the assessee. Relying on a High Court decision, the Tribunal concluded that the reopening under Section 148 was invalid in this scenario and set aside the CIT(A)'s order.
The Tribunal held that a revised return filed within the prescribed time under Section 139(5) is valid and can include claims not made in the original return. The furnishing of Form 10DA before the Assessing Officer was considered sufficient compliance.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee did not comply with multiple notices issued by the CIT(A). Despite this non-compliance, the Tribunal decided to grant one more opportunity to the assessee to present their case before the CIT(A) for effective adjudication. The appeal was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh decision.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had miserably failed to establish the essential three ingredients prescribed in Section 68 of the Act, namely, the identity of the creditors, the genuineness of the transaction, and the creditworthiness of the parties. The Tribunal noted that even if loans are squared up during the year, they can still be tested under Section 68, especially in cases of alleged accommodation entries. The Tribunal found the NFAC's reasoning that the assessment should have been carried out under Section 153C to be erroneous, stating that the case fell within the purview of Section 148. The Tribunal relied on the Hon'ble Apex Court's decision in PCIT, Central-3 vs. Abhisar Buildwell (P.) Ltd. ([2023] 149 taxmann.Com 399 (SC)) for this conclusion. The Tribunal also emphasized the principle of 'Substance over Form' in cases involving accommodation entries, citing the Vodafone International Holdings B.V. vs. Union of India case. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the order of the NFAC, sustained the AO's action on merits, and confirmed the addition made under Section 68.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to establish the essential three ingredients prescribed under Section 68 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, namely, identity of creditors, genuineness of the transaction, and creditworthiness of the party. The Tribunal emphasized that even if a loan or borrowing is squared up within the year, it can still be tested under Section 68, especially in cases of accommodation entries. The Tribunal found the NFAC's decision to be erroneous regarding the applicability of Section 153C, stating that the case fell under Section 148. Relying on the principle of substance over form and the Supreme Court's decision in PCIT, Central-3 vs. Abhisar Buildwell (P.) Ltd., the Tribunal concluded that the AO's action was sustained. The NFAC's order was set aside as it was silent on the merits and relied solely on technicalities. The addition of Rs. 5,05,77,100/- made by the AO under Section 68 was upheld. The Tribunal did not expressly leave any issue undecided.
The CIT(A) accepted the assessee's submission that the stock was valued at market price by the department, not cost price. By reducing the Gross Profit rate of 30.90% from the market value, the CIT(A) restricted the addition to Rs. 63,70,395/-.
The Tribunal held that the benefit of Section 11 was denied due to non-registration under Section 12AA. However, subsequent to the CIT(A)'s order, the assessee obtained registration under Section 12AA, which was made applicable retrospectively. This removed the sole ground for disallowance.
The Tribunal held that proceedings under Section 147/148 were initiated based on material seized during a search, which should have led to proceedings under Section 153C, not Section 148. The CIT(A) was justified in quashing the assessment proceedings.
The Tribunal held that the Learned PCIT was the competent authority to grant approval under Section 151 of the Act, rejecting the contention that the approval was not granted by the specified authority. The contention regarding violation of the Apex Court's directives in Ashish Agarwal's case was also found to be without merit.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeals without providing the assessee with an opportunity to explain the delay with sufficient cause. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) should have allowed for a fresh decision on the condonation of delay after giving the appellant a reasonable opportunity to be heard.
The Tribunal held that the proceedings initiated under Section 148 were not valid when the AO had seized material relating to the assessee during a search conducted on another entity. The Tribunal found that Section 153A/153C, with their non-obstante clause, override general provisions like Section 147/148 in cases of search or requisition, and thus the AO should have proceeded under those sections.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeals without providing the assessee with an opportunity to explain the delay with sufficient cause. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) should have allowed for a fresh decision on the condonation of delay after giving the appellant a reasonable opportunity to be heard.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to the benefit of the new tax regime under Section 115BAC. The Tribunal noted that the assessee filed her revised return and Form 10-IE before the due date for filing the revised return. Citing decisions from coordinate benches of the ITAT, Pune (in Akshay Devendra Birari vs. DCIT) and Amritsar (in Harbans Singh vs. AO CPC), the Tribunal observed that the requirement of filing Form 10-IE is directory and not mandatory. It was held that it is sufficient compliance if the form is available with the Assessing Officer (or CPC in this case) at the time of processing the return. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the action of the CPC in not granting the benefit of the new tax regime and directed the AO to amend the intimation under Section 143(1) by allowing the benefit of the new tax regime. The ratio decidendi is that procedural requirements for opting for a beneficial tax regime, like filing a specific form, can be condoned if the substantive conditions are met and the form is available before the authorities at the time of assessment or processing.
The tribunal held that the assessee failed to establish any sufficient cause for the delay in filing the appeal. The reasons provided, such as family problems and illness of relatives, were found to be insufficient and not adequately explained.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, acknowledging the merit in the assessee's submissions regarding the extraordinary circumstances. However, the matter was restored to the file of the AO for a fresh adjudication, with a cost of Rs. 5,000/- imposed on the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the addition of Rs. 2,67,500/- was not sustainable as the diary entries lacked dates, making it impossible to ascertain if they pertained to the relevant financial year. Similarly, the addition of Rs. 9,600/- for interest on cash loans was not sustained due to a lack of material suggesting any cash loan was advanced.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, citing the need for substantial justice and a liberal approach. However, the Tribunal noted that the assessee was ex-parte in the lower proceedings. Therefore, the matter was restored to the AO for a fresh adjudication, providing one more opportunity to the assessee, with a cost of Rs. 5,000/-.
The ITAT dismissed the assessee's application for condonation of delay. The Tribunal noted that the affidavit filed in support of the application was unattested, and no explanation was provided for this deficiency. Furthermore, the documents submitted by the assessee to substantiate the claim of multiple civil and criminal proceedings were incomplete. The first page of the complaint under the Negotiable Instruments Act did not provide sufficient particulars regarding the period of proceedings, and only the first page of the Section 482 Cr. P.C. petition was filed, preventing the Tribunal from ascertaining the pendency period. The Tribunal also observed that the assessee could not explain why the appeal was not pursued before the learned CIT(A) and instead opted for litigation in civil/criminal courts. Regarding financial stringency, the assessee failed to demonstrate how business losses prevented the filing of the appeal. Consequently, the Tribunal held that the assessee failed to establish any sufficient cause for the 497-day delay in filing the appeal. As the delay condonation application was dismissed, the appeal itself was dismissed as barred by limitation.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. It held that the reassessment proceedings were void ab initio due to improper service of notice under Section 148. Consequently, the addition made by the AO was deleted.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had not supported his grounds of appeal with documentary evidence. However, considering the assessee's claim to explain cash deposits and their non-participation, the matter was remanded to the CIT(A) for fresh decision.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was entitled to TDS credit on the rental income once it was proven that TDS was deducted on the declared income and deposited with the government, irrespective of the ownership or usage of the land for agricultural purposes.
The Tribunal held that the appeal filed by the department was barred by limitation. Additionally, it was not maintainable because the department had already issued a notice u/s 153C of the Act to the assessee on 20.01.2025.
The Tribunal held that since the document was not found at the assessee's premises and the identity of the AOP was not established, the addition under section 68 was not justified. The Tribunal also noted that the assessment was unabated and no incriminating material was found.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order, noting the assessee's consistent non-compliance before the Assessing Officer. Therefore, the Tribunal found no grounds to interfere with the impugned order.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) did not consider the directions previously issued by a coordinate bench for assessment year 2010-11, which were relevant to the identical issue in assessment year 2009-10. Therefore, the matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the AO's addition was unsustainable in law as there was no deficiency pointed out in the assessee's books of accounts. The sales were from the available stock, and applying Section 68 r.w.s. 115BBE on cash deposits made during demonetization, without proper justification or investigation into the books, was considered a double addition.
The Tribunal held that although the assessee was non-compliant, the CIT(A) should have decided the appeal on merits. Therefore, the matter is remanded back to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision after providing one more opportunity to the appellant.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged the initial onus by identifying the creditor as his son, Shri Anil Gupta. The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer had not brought any material on record to disprove the assessee's claim or to show that the son did not have the capacity to advance the loan. The Tribunal found that the Assessing Officer had mechanically made the addition without conducting any independent inquiry or investigation to ascertain the truthfulness of the assessee's explanation. The Tribunal further observed that the Commissioner (Appeals) had also failed to provide any cogent reasons to uphold the addition. Therefore, the Tribunal decided that the addition of Rs. 1,50,000/- was not sustainable. The Tribunal directed the deletion of the addition from the assessee's income. The ratio decidendi is that once the assessee identifies the source of a cash credit and provides a plausible explanation, the onus shifts to the revenue to disprove it, and a mechanical addition without proper investigation is not justified.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was justified in deleting the penalty under Section 271(1)(c). The core reasoning was that the assessee had made a complete disclosure in the income tax return filed under Section 153A, incorporating the surrendered amount, and this return was accepted by the Assessing Officer (AO). The Tribunal emphasized that penalty under Section 271(1)(c) can only be imposed if the conditions stipulated in the provision are satisfied, meaning there must be actual concealment or non-disclosure of particulars of income. The Tribunal relied on the principle that suspicion cannot substitute proof and that additions or penalties cannot be sustained without incriminating material found during the search. Citing CIT vs. SAS Pharmaceuticals and CIT v. Reliance Petroproducts Pvt. Ltd., it was held that concealment must directly relate to particulars disclosed in the return. Furthermore, following the Delhi High Court's decision in Pr. CIT vs. Neeraj Jindal, the Tribunal noted that once a return filed under Section 153A is accepted, the original return under Section 139 abates, and concealment must be assessed with reference to the Section 153A return. Since the assessee disclosed the income in the Section 153A return, no concealment could be attributed. The appeals filed by the Revenue were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was justified in deleting the penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The reasoning was based on the principle that penalty cannot be imposed unless the conditions stipulated in Section 271(1)(c) are duly satisfied. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had made a complete disclosure in the income tax return filed under Section 153A, offering the surrendered amount for tax, and this return was accepted by the Assessing Officer (AO). Therefore, no concealment could be attributed. The Tribunal relied on the precedents of CIT vs. SAS Pharmaceuticals (Delhi HC) and CIT v. Reliance Petroproducts Pvt. Ltd. (SC), which clarify that unless the conditions under Section 271(1)(c) are satisfied, no penalty can be imposed. The concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars must directly relate to the particulars disclosed in the return of income. Furthermore, the Tribunal cited the case of Pr. CIT vs. Neeraj Jindal (Delhi HC), which held that once a return filed under Section 153A is accepted, the original return under Section 139 abates and becomes non-est, and concealment must be seen with reference to the return filed under Section 153A. Since the surrendered income was disclosed in the return filed under Section 153A and accepted by the AO, no concealment could be inferred. The appeals of the Revenue were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that while the Assessing Officer can make additions on grounds other than those initially recorded for reassessment, this is permissible only if the initial reason for reopening is valid. However, if the initial reason for reopening is found to be invalid, the AO cannot independently make additions on other grounds without issuing a fresh notice.
The Tribunal held that the impounded paper was a rough noting for tentative repayment or interest, not evidence of fresh cash advances. The assessee's explanation that these amounts were already recorded as banking channel advances and interest was accounted for was accepted.
The Tribunal held that if the Assessing Officer (AO) finds that the income initially believed to have escaped assessment has not actually escaped, he cannot proceed to assess other income without issuing a fresh notice under Section 148. The reassessment proceedings are confined to the reasons recorded for reopening.
The CIT(A) quashed the assessment proceedings based on a High Court judgment. The Tribunal noted that similar appeals had been decided in favor of the assessee following the High Court's decision and a Supreme Court precedent, rendering the Revenue's appeal infructuous.
The Tribunal held that since the surrendered income was duly incorporated in the return filed under Section 153A and accepted by the AO, there was no concealment. The penalty could not be imposed as the conditions under Section 271(1)(c) were not satisfied.