ITAT Hyderabad Judgments — August 2025

The Tribunal held that the penalty order was barred by limitation as per Section 275(1)(c) of the Act. Following the Karnataka High Court's decision and the principle of favoring the assessee when two interpretations are possible, the penalty order was quashed.

The Tribunal held that the penalty order was barred by limitation as per Section 275(1)(c) of the Act. Following the Karnataka High Court's decision and the principle of favoring the assessee when two interpretations are possible, the penalty order was quashed.

The Tribunal held that the penalty order was barred by limitation as per Section 275(1)(c) of the Act. Following the Karnataka High Court's decision and the principle of favoring the assessee when two interpretations are possible, the penalty order was quashed.

The Tribunal held that the penalty order was barred by limitation as per Section 275(1)(c) of the Act. Following the Karnataka High Court's decision and the principle of favoring the assessee when two interpretations are possible, the penalty order was quashed.

The Tribunal held that dismissing an appeal ex-parte without considering the merits would result in a denial of justice. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the impugned order was set aside, and the matter was remitted back to the Ld. CIT(A) for de novo adjudication, granting the assessee an opportunity to present their case on merits.

The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s finding that the AO's order, passed to give effect to the Tribunal's earlier remand, was invalid and without jurisdiction. This was because the AO failed to issue a mandatory draft assessment order under Section 144C(1) before passing the final assessment, a procedural flaw already established as rendering such orders void by the jurisdictional High Court in the assessee's own case.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(Exemptions) erred by not providing an opportunity to the assessee to explain the delay, especially since notices were issued after the deadline, creating a bona fide belief. Citing the new proviso to Section 12A(1)(ac) (introduced by Finance Act, 2024) which allows condonation of delay for reasonable cause, the Tribunal set aside the rejection order. The matter was remanded to the CIT(Exemptions) for fresh consideration, directing to allow the assessee to file an application for condonation of delay.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee had opted for the DTVSV Scheme and had filed the necessary forms for withdrawal. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn.

The Tribunal noted that while the assessee did not comply with lower authorities, they have now provided documents evidencing ownership of agricultural land. Considering the nature of the issue and principles of natural justice, the Tribunal decided to grant one final opportunity to the assessee to substantiate their claim of agricultural income.

The tribunal held that Aurigene Discovery Technologies Ltd. is not functionally comparable to the assessee as the assessee is exclusively engaged in R&D services, while Aurigene operates in multiple segments with R&D forming a small part of its revenue, lacking segmental profitability data. The tribunal directed the AO/TPO to exclude Aurigene from the list of comparables, making other TP-related grounds academic. Additionally, the AO was directed to reconsider an addition for interest payable to MSMEs and rectify a computational error in the aggregate income-tax liability.

The Tribunal restored the issue to the CIT(A) to verify if the interest income was assessed in the hands of REC Ltd. and if REC had opted for the Vivad se Vishwas Scheme. If the claim is found in order, the addition in the assessee's hands will be vacated.

The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) dismissed the assessee's appeal in limine, ruling that an appeal against an assessment order passed in pursuance of the Dispute Resolution Panel's directions is maintainable only before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal upheld the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)'s decision, confirming that the appeal against such an order correctly lies with the Tribunal under Section 253(1)(d) of the Income Tax Act.

The Tribunal held that the conditions precedent for cancellation of registration were not satisfied. The allegations of violations were found to be devoid of merit, and the order of cancellation was deemed illegal.

The Tribunal held that the conditions precedent for cancellation of registration under Section 12AB(4)(ii) were not satisfied. The allegations of violations were found to be devoid of merit, and the cancellation order was deemed illegal.

The Tribunal held that the conditions precedent for cancellation of registration under Section 12AB(4)(ii) were not satisfied. The allegations of violations were found to be devoid of merit, and the PCIT's order was quashed.

The Tribunal held that the conditions precedent for cancellation of registration were not satisfied. The allegations were found to be devoid of merit, and the cancellation order was deemed illegal.

The Tribunal held that the conditions precedent for cancellation of registration were not satisfied. The allegations were found to be devoid of merit, and the cancellation order was deemed illegal.

The Tribunal held that the conditions precedent for the cancellation of the appellant society's registration under Section 12AB(4)(ii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were not satisfied. The Tribunal found the allegations made by the PCIT regarding specified violations during the relevant previous year to be devoid of merit. Consequently, the Tribunal quashed the order passed by the PCIT cancelling the registration of the society. The registration granted under Section 12AA of the Act was restored under Sections 12AA/12AB of the Act. The Tribunal explicitly stated that the reasons provided in its decision for AY 2019-20 (ITA No.873/Hyd/2025) would apply mutatis mutandis to the present appeal for AY 2022-23. The Tribunal found the PCIT's order to be illegal and unsustainable. No issue was expressly left undecided.

The Tribunal held that the conditions precedent for cancellation of registration were not satisfied. The allegations made by the PCIT were found to be devoid of merit, and the order cancelling the registration was quashed.

The Tribunal held that the conditions precedent for cancelling the society's registration were not satisfied. The Tribunal found the PCIT's allegations of violations to be without merit and quashed the cancellation order, restoring the society's registration.

The Tribunal held that the conditions precedent for cancellation of registration were not satisfied. The allegations made by the Principal Commissioner were found to be devoid of merit, and the cancellation order was deemed illegal.

The Tribunal held that the conditions precedent for cancellation of registration were not satisfied. The allegations of violations were found to be devoid of merit, and the order of cancellation was deemed illegal.

The Tribunal noted that the PCIT cancelled the registration based on findings of suppressed fee receipts and diversion of funds to trustees, which were allegedly not for the society's objects. The PCIT also relied on a diary found during a search indicating significant cash expenditure not for the society's purposes.

The Tribunal held that the conditions precedent for cancellation of registration under Section 12AB(4)(ii) were not satisfied. The allegations of violations were found to be devoid of merit, and the PCIT's order was quashed.

The Tribunal held that the PCIT's cancellation of registration was based on suspicion and surmises without sufficient evidence. The Tribunal found no concrete material to prove the collection of capitation fees or diversion of funds for personal benefit.

The Tribunal examined the grounds raised by the appellant, which included jurisdictional issues regarding the PCIT's power to cancel registration and arguments that excess fees were already assessed in the hands of individual trustees. The Tribunal considered the society's objects and its established educational institutions.

The Tribunal held that the conditions precedent for cancellation of registration under Section 12AB(4)(ii) were not satisfied. The allegations of violations were found to be devoid of merit, and the cancellation order was deemed illegal.

The Tribunal held that the conditions precedent for cancellation of registration were not satisfied. The allegations of violations were found to be without merit, and the cancellation order was deemed illegal.

The Tribunal held that the conditions precedent for cancelling the society's registration were not satisfied. The Tribunal found the PCIT's allegations of violations to be without merit and quashed the cancellation order, restoring the society's registration.

The Tribunal observed that the law regarding trust registration has undergone amendments causing confusion and that the CIT(E) rejected the application routinely without considering the assessee's explanation for delay or the merits of the case. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(E)'s order and remanded the matter back for fresh consideration, directing the CIT(E) to evaluate the application for condonation of delay and the merits of the regular registration application.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 403 days, noting that the assessee had substantiated the reasons with medical evidence and that a liberal approach is warranted for delays attributable to circumstances beyond the litigant's control. The appeal was admitted for adjudication on merits.

The Tribunal held that the reasons provided by the assessee for the delay were vague, general, and lacked sufficient cause. The Tribunal noted the assessee's negligent conduct throughout the proceedings, including before lower authorities.

The Tribunal condoned the 97-day delay in filing the appeals, finding sufficient cause. It observed that the CIT(E)'s rejection orders were cryptic and non-speaking, failing to consider the evidence of charitable activities submitted by the assessee. Consequently, the Tribunal remitted the matter back to the CIT(E) for fresh consideration after providing the assessee a proper opportunity of being heard and considering all relevant evidence.

The Tribunal condoned the delays in filing appeals before the CIT(A) and the Tribunal, citing reasonable cause and lack of deliberate intent. The Tribunal also held that the Assessing Officer erred in taxing gross receipts instead of net income and remanded the matter for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal held that the adjustment made under Section 50C during the processing of the return under Section 143(1) was not a prima facie adjustment and required detailed deliberation. Given the pending litigation regarding the property's title and valuation, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and restored the issue to the Assessing Officer for fresh consideration.

The Tribunal condoned the delays in filing appeals before the CIT(A) and the Tribunal, citing reasonable cause and lack of deliberate intent. The Tribunal also held that the Assessing Officer erred in taxing gross receipts instead of net income and remanded the matter for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal found discrepancies and ambiguities in the facts recorded by the CIT(A). The CIT(A)'s order was set aside, and the matter was remanded to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication, considering the assessment order was ex-parte and based on estimation.

The Tribunal condoned the 97-day delay in filing the appeals, finding sufficient cause. It observed that the CIT(E)'s rejection orders were cryptic and non-speaking, failing to consider the evidence of charitable activities submitted by the assessee. Consequently, the Tribunal remitted the matter back to the CIT(E) for fresh consideration after providing the assessee a proper opportunity of being heard and considering all relevant evidence.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) should have considered the bonafide reasons explained by the assessee for non-appearance. The Tribunal decided to remit the issue back to the Assessing Officer for de-novo consideration.

The Tribunal held that overdue receivables from Associated Enterprises (AEs) are international transactions requiring benchmarking. It also directed the Assessing Officer to compute interest on overdue receivables using LIBOR plus 200 basis points.

The Tribunal condoned the delays in filing appeals before the CIT(A) and the Tribunal, citing reasonable cause and lack of deliberate intent. The Tribunal also held that the Assessing Officer erred in taxing gross receipts instead of net income and remanded the matter for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal condoned the delays in filing appeals before the CIT(A) and the Tribunal, citing reasonable cause and lack of deliberate intent. The Tribunal also held that the Assessing Officer erred in taxing gross receipts instead of net income and remanded the matter for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal upheld the AO's proportional allocation of most expenses, finding no infirmity in that approach. However, the specific issue regarding the allocation of 'insurance and rent, fees, rates and taxes' was restored to the AO for limited verification to determine if these expenses belonged to the eligible unit.

The Tribunal found that the CIT(E)'s rejection order was cryptic and failed to detail specific deficiencies in the submitted documents. In the interest of natural justice, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(E)'s order and restored the matter for fresh adjudication, granting the assessee an opportunity to present additional evidence and be heard.

The Tribunal noted that an order passed under Section 119(2)(b) is not an appealable order before the ITAT. The assessee's counsel acknowledged this and sought permission to withdraw the appeal. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in partially allowing the assessee's appeal and that the appeal should have been allowed in its entirety. The Tribunal found that the seized material was unreliable, lacked specifics, and had no corroborative evidence. The admission of additional income was considered voluntary, made to buy peace and avoid litigation, and not based on specific evidence. The Tribunal agreed with the assessee that not the entire turnover, but only the profit component, should be taxed. The Tribunal found the CIT(A)'s estimation of a 15% net profit rate for undisclosed cash receipts to be reasonable, considering the peculiar facts of the case and the lack of concrete evidence from the Revenue. The Tribunal also found that the CIT(A) erred in not upholding the estimation of income at 14% on disclosed receipts when the books were rejected by the Assessing Officer. The Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to re-examine the profit margins on disclosed turnover and undisclosed income, considering the specific nature of the business and the lack of reliable seized material. The Tribunal set aside the orders of the lower authorities and remanded the matter back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication in accordance with the observations made.

The Tribunal noted that the AO rejected the assessee's books of account under Section 145(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, due to omissions and incorrect entries, and the inability to vouch for the correctness and completeness of the accounts. The AO estimated income based on the material on record, considering the undisclosed turnover of Rs. 76.84 crores for AY 2019-20. The assessee claimed expenses of Rs. 58.79 crores for this undisclosed turnover but could not provide complete documentary evidence. The Tribunal observed that the percentage of overall profit (9.40%) and the percentage of net profit as per the return (8.00%) were lower than the percentage of additional income admitted to the additional turnover (10.47%). The Tribunal found that the assessee failed to substantiate its claim of expenses for the undisclosed turnover. It was held that regular administrative and statutory expenses should be the same for disclosed and undisclosed turnover, as no separate establishments were found. The Tribunal also noted issues with payments to landlords, non-substantive claims for expenses, and commission payments to agents not subjected to TDS. The CIT(A) had reduced the profit rate from 18% to 15% for undisclosed receipts and directed the AO not to disturb the profit margin on disclosed turnover. The Revenue appealed against the reduction in profit rate and the decision on disclosed turnover. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had partially allowed the assessee's appeal. The Tribunal did not expressly state its finding on each specific ground of appeal in the provided text but indicated that the CIT(A)'s order was being reviewed. The operative directions are not fully detailed in the excerpt, but the context suggests the Tribunal is reviewing the CIT(A)'s decision on profit estimation and the rejection of books.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(Exemptions)'s orders were non-speaking and violated principles of natural justice as they lacked reasoned analysis and specific findings. The applications were rejected without affording adequate opportunity to the assessee.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(Exemptions) should have provided an opportunity to explain the delay, especially since notices were issued after the due date. The matters were restored to the CIT(Exemptions) for fresh consideration, allowing the assessee to seek condonation of delay.

The Tribunal addressed the issue of suppressed turnover and the rejection of books of account. The assessee contended that the seized material was unreliable and "dumb," lacking corroborative evidence for cash receipts and suppressed turnover. The assessee also argued that any admission of income was conditional and general. The Revenue, on the other hand, questioned the CIT(A)'s reduction of the estimated profit rate from 18% to 15% on undisclosed cash receipts and the decision not to disturb the profit margin on disclosed turnover despite inflated expenses. The Revenue also challenged the CIT(A)'s decision not to uphold the 14% estimation on disclosed receipts when books were rejected. The Tribunal's decision on these specific points is not fully detailed in the provided excerpt, but it appears to be examining the validity of the AO's rejection of books and the subsequent estimation of income. The excerpt indicates a discussion around whether there was a case to reject the books of accounts to estimate income at a higher level, with the assessee arguing against it.