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The Tribunal held that the assessee is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) for interest income earned on its deposits with co-operative banks, namely Deccan Gramin Bank and AP Grameen Vikas Bank. The Tribunal relied on the conflicting decisions of the Karnataka and Gujarat High Courts, preferring the view favorable to the assessee, which held that interest income earned by a co-operative society on its investments with a co-operative bank is eligible for deduction. The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's grounds related to this issue. Regarding the interest paid on share capital, the Tribunal followed the decision of the ITAT in Bhavana Rishi Co-operative Urban Bank Limited, holding that share capital in a co-operative society can be treated as borrowed capital and interest paid thereon is allowable. Alternatively, even if added back, it would increase business profits qualifying for Section 80P deduction, thus not impacting tax liability. The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to vacate the disallowance. Consequently, both appeals filed by the Revenue were dismissed.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(E) rejected the Section 80G application without proper reasoning or considering the documentary evidence and charitable activities of the assessee-trust. Concluding that the trust is prima facie eligible for Section 80G registration, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(E)'s order and remitted the matter back for re-verification and reconsideration.
The Tribunal found that the assessee failed to produce evidence to prove that the donations were genuine and not against alleged cash receipts. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matters to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.
The ITAT upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, ruling that the assessee is not a 'co-operative bank' under Section 80P(4) as it lacks an RBI license, citing the Supreme Court's decision in *Mavilayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd.* It was held that providing credit facilities to non-members does not automatically disentitle the society from Section 80P(2)(a)(i) deduction for income from members, though profits attributable to non-members are not deductible. The ITAT also confirmed the eligibility for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) for interest earned from investments with other co-operative societies/banks and allowed the deduction for interest paid on share capital.
The Tribunal found that the assessee failed to produce evidence to prove that the donations were genuine and not against alleged cash receipts. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matters to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal found that the assessee failed to produce evidence to prove that the donations were genuine and not against alleged cash receipts. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matters to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal upheld the PCIT's order, confirming that the Assessing Officer's failure to conduct a proper inquiry into the second property, which involved an unexplained cash investment, rendered the assessment order erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. The Tribunal affirmed that the PCIT had validly exercised revisionary powers under Section 263 of the Income Tax Act.
The Tribunal found that the assessee failed to produce evidence to prove that the donations were genuine and not against alleged cash receipts. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matters to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's valid reason for non-compliance and the ex-parte nature of the CIT(A)'s order. Emphasizing principles of natural justice, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits, ensuring the assessee receives another opportunity for a hearing.
The Tribunal noted that both lower authorities passed ex-parte orders and the assessee claimed a violation of natural justice. Considering the circumstances, the Tribunal decided to provide one more opportunity to the assessee to substantiate their case.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer's satisfaction note for issuing notice under Section 153C was valid, as the AO of the searched person and the assessee were the same. The CIT(A) erred in quashing the assessment order based on the invalidity of the notice.
The Tribunal found that the assessee failed to produce evidence to prove that the donations were genuine and not against alleged cash receipts. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matters to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal noted conflicting claims regarding the submission of evidence (husband's bank statements showing cash withdrawals) between the assessee and the Assessing Officer, and the assessee's failure to appear before the CIT(A). Concluding that the matter required fresh examination, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the case to the Assessing Officer, directing him to verify the relevant evidences filed by the assessee to prove the source of cash deposit.
The Tribunal considered the assessee's application for withdrawal of the appeal. The Department's DR raised no objection. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that the learned CIT(E) rejected the application filed by the assessee-trust for registration under Section 80G of the Act on the ground of a wrong section being quoted, without considering the details filed by the assessee. The Tribunal observed that the CIT(E) appeared to have considered an incorrect application (Form-10A for Section 12A) instead of the Form-10AB filed for Section 80G registration. The Tribunal found the order of the CIT(E) to be lackadaisical and passed in a casual manner, without considering the details filed by the assessee or whether it was a charitable trust eligible for registration. Therefore, the Tribunal was of the considered view that the assessee trust needed one more opportunity of hearing before the learned CIT(E). The Tribunal set aside the order of the learned CIT(E) and restored the matter to his file with a direction to re-decide the issue afresh after providing an adequate opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The grounds raised by the assessee were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(E) had rejected the application without proper consideration of the documentary evidence and submissions. Therefore, the order of the CIT(E) was set aside.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(E) dismissed the application without adequately considering the documentary evidence and submissions provided by the assessee. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(E)'s order and remanded the matter back for a fresh decision after providing the assessee-trust with an adequate opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal held that a notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in the name of a deceased person is unenforceable and void ab initio. The Tribunal relied on the judgments of the Bombay High Court in Devendra Vs. Addl. CIT, the Delhi High Court in Savita Kapila Vs. ACIT, the Madras High Court in Alamelu Veerappan Vs. ITO, and the Bombay High Court in Sumit Balkrishna Gupta Vs. ACIT, which established that issuing notice to a correct person is a foundational requirement for acquiring jurisdiction to reopen an assessment and is not a mere procedural requirement. The Tribunal further noted that Section 292B or Section 292BB of the Act do not protect notices issued to dead persons. Consequently, the assessment framed by the AO based on such a notice was quashed. The appeals were allowed, quashing the assessment orders for both AY 2016-17 and AY 2017-18.
The Tribunal found that there was no dispute regarding the assessee being a cooperative society and earning interest on loans and advances to its members. The primary dispute revolved around the quantum of interest income and the eligibility for deduction under Section 80P. The Tribunal noted the assessee's contention that it had provided supporting documents, but the AO disallowed the claim for not furnishing a specific list of members with corresponding interest. Crucially, the Tribunal observed that the learned CIT(A) had passed ex-parte orders without providing adequate opportunity to the assessee for both assessment years. In the interest of justice and to meet the ends of justice, the Tribunal deemed it fit and proper to restore the matters back to the file of the Assessing Officer. The AO was directed to re-decide the issues afresh after providing adequate opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The assessee was cautioned that it would be solely responsible for pleading and proving its case by furnishing all documentary evidence. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal found that there was no dispute regarding the assessee being a cooperative society and earning interest on loans and advances to its members. The primary dispute revolved around the quantum of interest income and the eligibility for deduction under Section 80P. The Tribunal noted the assessee's contention that it had provided supporting documents, but the AO disallowed the claim for not furnishing a specific list of members with corresponding interest. Crucially, the Tribunal observed that the learned CIT(A) had passed ex-parte orders without providing adequate opportunity to the assessee for both assessment years. In the interest of justice and to meet the ends of justice, the Tribunal deemed it fit and proper to restore the matters back to the file of the Assessing Officer. The AO was directed to re-decide the issues afresh after providing adequate opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The assessee was cautioned that it would be solely responsible for pleading and proving its case by furnishing all documentary evidence. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal restored the issue of unexplained cash deposits to the AO for re-adjudication. It vacated the ad-hoc disallowance on 'Other liabilities' and partly allowed the appeal concerning sundry creditors, remanding it to the AO for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal held that a notice issued in the name of a dead person is void ab initio and cannot be sustained. It is a fundamental requirement that the notice for reopening an assessment must be issued to a living person, and the absence of this renders the entire proceeding invalid.
The Tribunal found that there was no dispute regarding the assessee being a cooperative society and earning interest on loans and advances to its members. The primary dispute revolved around the quantum of interest income and the eligibility for deduction under Section 80P. The Tribunal noted the assessee's contention that it had provided supporting documents, but the AO disallowed the claim for not furnishing a specific list of members with corresponding interest. Crucially, the Tribunal observed that the learned CIT(A) had passed ex-parte orders without providing adequate opportunity to the assessee for both assessment years. In the interest of justice and to meet the ends of justice, the Tribunal deemed it fit and proper to restore the matters back to the file of the Assessing Officer. The AO was directed to re-decide the issues afresh after providing adequate opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The assessee was cautioned that it would be solely responsible for pleading and proving its case by furnishing all documentary evidence. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that since the CIT(A) adjudicated the appeal on merits, it implicitly condoned the delay in filing the appeal. Regarding the merits, the Tribunal found that the A.O. was statutorily obligated to allow the notional deduction under Section 24(a) for 'Income from House Property'. Therefore, the matter was restored to the A.O. for re-adjudication, allowing the assessee an opportunity to substantiate her claim.
The Tribunal held that assessment proceedings against a deceased person without involving legal heirs are void ab initio. The assessment order passed by the AO in the name of the deceased assessee is a nullity and cannot be sustained.
The Tribunal held that assessment proceedings against a deceased person without involving legal heirs are void ab initio. The assessment order passed by the AO in the name of the deceased assessee is a nullity and cannot be sustained.
The Tribunal held that the delay of 1379 days was inordinate and the assessee had not filed any application explaining the reasons for the delay. Therefore, the CIT(A) was justified in declining to condone the delay. The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A).
The Tribunal held that assessment proceedings against a deceased person without involving legal heirs are void ab initio. The assessment order passed by the AO in the name of the deceased assessee is a nullity and cannot be sustained.
The Tribunal held that assessment proceedings against a deceased person without involving legal heirs are void ab initio. The assessment order passed by the AO in the name of the deceased assessee is a nullity and cannot be sustained.
The Tribunal found the CIT(E)'s order 'lackadaisical' for rejecting the application without considering documentary evidence and providing proper reasons. It emphasized that charitable activities by trusts should be encouraged. The case was remitted back to the CIT(E) for fresh consideration, with a direction to provide the assessee a proper hearing and consider all documentary evidence.
The Tribunal observed that the assessee had explicitly opted out of email service for notices in Form 35, yet the CIT(A) served notices only via the ITBA portal, without providing any physical notices. Concluding that the assessee was denied a reasonable opportunity of being heard, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s ex-parte order and remanded the matter for fresh adjudication, leaving the merits open.
The Tribunal observed that the assessee had explicitly opted out of email service for notices in Form 35, yet the CIT(A) served notices only via the ITBA portal, without providing any physical notices. Concluding that the assessee was denied a reasonable opportunity of being heard, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s ex-parte order and remanded the matter for fresh adjudication, leaving the merits open.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal for non-prosecution without considering the merits. The Tribunal stated that the CIT(A) has a statutory obligation to dispose of appeals on merits and cannot summarily dismiss them for non-prosecution.
The Tribunal noted that the issue of limitation regarding the notice u/s 148 was raised for the first time. Considering the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Rajiv Bansal, the Tribunal decided to remand the issue to the CIT(A) for adjudication.
The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A) and dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. The Tribunal noted that the donation to IISc, Bengaluru, was eligible for deduction under Section 35(1)(ii) as per the receipt issued by IISc and a relevant CBDT notification. It was also observed that donations to eligible institutions under either Section 35(2AA) or Section 35(1)(ii) are eligible for a 150% weighted deduction. The Tribunal found that the assessee's claim under Section 35(2AA) was an inadvertent error, and since the donation was eligible for deduction under Section 35(1)(ii), the deduction should not be denied solely due to the incorrect section cited. The Tribunal distinguished the case from Goetze (India) Ltd. v. CIT, stating that this was a rectification of a mistake, not a fresh claim. Furthermore, the Tribunal held that even if the amount was spent on constructing an auditorium, it could be used for scientific research activities like seminars and workshops, thus qualifying for deduction. The Tribunal concluded that there was no loss of revenue to the department, and the Assessing Officer erred in disallowing the claim.
The Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's contention that notices from the CIT(A) were not properly served, preventing them from explaining the delay or merits. Concluding that it was a fit case to grant another opportunity, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter for fresh adjudication. The assessee was directed to file a condonation of delay application, and the CIT(A) was instructed to provide a reasonable opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing one appeal due to the extraordinary circumstances of the pandemic and personal tragedy. For the substantive issue, the Tribunal remitted the matter back to the Assessing Officer to examine the back-to-back agreements for JV project works.
The tribunal held that both appeals filed by the assessee are allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had provided sufficient evidence, including bank statements and loan confirmations, to explain the source of investment for the property purchase. The lower authorities erred in ignoring these evidences.
The Tribunal observed that the Assessing Officer and CIT(A) sustained additions without adequately considering the assessee's explanation and bank statements. The assessee contended the deposits were re-deposits of loans taken for agricultural activities of its members. The Tribunal restored the issues back to the Assessing Officer for a de novo verification, granting the assessee an opportunity to present supporting documentary evidence.
The Tribunal held that the ex-parte order by the CIT(A) was due to improper service of notices, as they were not sent to the email address provided by the assessee. Consequently, the CIT(A)'s order was set aside.
The Tribunal found the CIT(E)'s observation regarding lack of substantial charitable activity incorrect, considering the appellant's educational objects and its nascent stage of establishing universities. It noted the appellant's claim of submitting all necessary documents. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(E)'s order and remitted the matter back for reconsideration, directing the CIT(E) to re-examine the case based on the trust's objects and any additional evidence.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing one appeal due to the extraordinary circumstances of the pandemic and personal tragedy. For the substantive issue, the Tribunal remitted the matter back to the Assessing Officer to examine the back-to-back agreements for JV project works.
The Tribunal held that the initiation of proceedings under Section 153C was invalid because the Assessing Officer failed to establish that the seized material (JDA) constituted incriminating material with a bearing on the determination of total income for a particular assessment year. The receipt of refundable security under the JDA was not considered undisclosed income.
The Tribunal held that the initiation of proceedings under Section 153C was invalid because the Assessing Officer failed to establish that the seized material (JDA) constituted incriminating material with a bearing on the determination of total income for a particular assessment year. The receipt of refundable security under the JDA was not considered undisclosed income.
The Tribunal held that the initiation of proceedings under Section 153C was invalid because the Assessing Officer failed to establish that the seized material (JDA) constituted incriminating material with a bearing on the determination of total income for a particular assessment year. The receipt of refundable security under the JDA was not considered undisclosed income.
The Tribunal held that the amount advanced to M/s Kamineni Health Care Pvt Ltd was an investment in shares and not a loan, and also that it was funded by own interest-free funds. For M/s United Steel Allied Industries Pvt. Ltd., the Tribunal upheld the treatment as a loan but directed interest to be levied only for the actual period of the advance.
The Tribunal held that the payments made to retailers for promotional expenses did not fall under the definition of 'commission' under Section 194H. It also found that the Assessing Officer erred in disbelieving the genuineness of expenditure solely based on unserved notices, considering the time gap and nature of the business.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had provided details of cash sales and paid VAT/sales tax, indicating the source of deposits. However, due to the absence of audit reports (Form 3CA and 3CD), a de novo verification by the Assessing Officer was deemed necessary.
The Tribunal held that the initiation of proceedings under Section 153C was invalid because the Assessing Officer failed to establish that the seized material (JDA) constituted incriminating material with a bearing on the determination of total income for a particular assessment year. The receipt of refundable security under the JDA was not considered undisclosed income.