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Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, BANGALORE BENCH “B”
Before: SHRI N.V VASUDEVAN & SHRI JASON P BOAZ
O R D E R
PER SHRI JASON P BOAZ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER :
These appeals by the assessee are directed against the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)-10, Bangalore dated 25/10/2017; upholding the orders of the ITO, Ward-1, Udupi dated 31/3/2015 levying penalty of Rs.7,23,418/- and Rs.4,49,780/- u/s 271(l)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (in short 'the Act') for asst. years 2008-09 and 2009-10.
2.1 Aggrieved by the order’s of the CIT(A)-6, Bangalore dated 21/3/2015 for asst. years 2008-09 and 2009-10, upholding the levy of penalty u/s 271(1)(c) of the Act, the assessee has preferred appeals for both these years in which identical revised grounds of appeal are raised. We, therefore, extract hereunder the revised ground raised for asst. year 2008-09:-
“1. The learned CIT (A) erred in passing the order in the manner in which he did.
The learned CIT (A) ought to have appreciated the explanation of the Appellant that income declared in previous year was available for the source of Investment.
3. The learned CIT (A) having issued the notice under section 274 read with section 271(1)(c) of the Act in a mechanical manner, the penalty order passed under section 271 (1) (c) of the Act is not sustainable in the eye of law.
4. The Appellant begs to submit that the decision of the jurisdictional High Court in the case of CIT vs. Manjunatha Cotton & Ginning Factory (2013) 359 ITR 565 (Karn) is squarely applicable and therefore
the impugned order of the authorities below is required to be aide. 5. Without prejudice, the disallowance as made by the CIT (A) is arbitrary, excessive and ought to be deleted in full. 6. For these and such other grounds that may be urged at the time of hearing, the Appellant prays that the appeal may be allowed.”
2.1 Revised grounds Nos. 2 and 3.
“2. The learned CIT (A) ought to have appreciated the explanation of the Appellant that income declared in previous year was available for the source of Investment. 3. The learned CIT (A) ought to have appreciated that AO having issued the notice under section 274 read with section 271(1)(c) of the Act in a mechanical manner, the penalty order passed under section 271 (1) (c) of the Act is not sustainable in the eye of law.”
2.2 In these grounds (Supra), the sum and substance of the assessee’s contentions are that the penalty proceedings initiated by the AO for asst. years 2008-09 and 2009-10 vide notices issued u/s 274 r.w.s 271 of the Act dated 3/1/2013 (placed at page 1 and 1A of paper book pages 1-25) for levy of penalty u/s 271(1)(c) of the Act, are defective. In this regard the ld AR for the assessee has placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the case of Manjunatha Cotton & Ginning Factory (359 ITR 565) (Kar) and the rejection of the Revenue’s SLP by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of SSAS Emerald Meadows in SLP: (CC 11485/2016) dated 5/8/2016. The ld AR also placed reliance on the decision of the co- ordinate bench of this Tribunal in the following cases of - (1) C Ramaiah Reddy in dated 22/9/2017 and (ii) Arun Kumar in ITA No.117/Bang/2016 dated 16/12/2106 in support of the assessee’s case. It is contended that in similar circumstances, as in the case on hand, the co-ordinate benches of this Tribunal have held that the penalty proceedings initiated on the basis of defective notice has to be cancelled. 2.3 Per contra, the ld DR for Revenue supported the orders of the authorities below. It was submitted that since the ld CIT(A) had not considered and decided the issue of defective notice u/s 274 r.w.s 271 of the Act for initiation of penalty proceedings u/s 271(1)(c) of the Act, therefore the matter requires to be sent back to the file of the CIT(A) for adjudication of this ground. Reliance was placed on the decision of the co-ordinate bench in the case of Jaysons Infrastructure India Pvt. Ltd., in ITA No.997/Bang/2015. 2.4.1 We have heard the rival contentions and perused and carefully considered the material on record; including the judicial pronouncements cited. At the outset we may mention that while the aforesaid issue of defective notice was not before the ld CIT(A), however, since the facts of the matter on this issue are apparent from the copy of the said notice issued u/s 274 r.w.s 271 of the Act dated 31/12/2009 (filed by the assessee at page 10 and 11 of paper book pages 1 to 11) and the judicial view of Courts and ITAT co-ordinate benches in the matter (Supra) in our view, no useful purpose would be served in restoring the matter to the file of the ld CIT(A) as prayed for by the ld DR for Revenue. We have perused the copy of the notice issued u/s 274 r.w.s 271 of the Act; dated 31/12/2009 and find that it reveals that the AO has not deleted the inappropriate words and parts in the relevant paragraph of the notice, whereby it is not clear as to which default has been committed by the assessee; i.e whether it is for furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income or concealing particulars of income that penalty u/s 271(1)(c) of the Act is sought to be levied.
2.4.2 The Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the case of M/s Manjunatha Cotton & Ginning Factory in (359 ITR 565) (Kar) has held that a notice issued u/s 274 r.ws 271 of the Act without specifying the nature of default; i.e; whether the notice is issued for concealment of particulars of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income; is invalid and the consequential penalty proceedings/order are also not valid. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment of the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court (Supra) at paras 59 to 61 are extracted hereunder:-
“59 As the provision stands, the penalty proceedings can be initiated on various ground set out therein, if the order passed by the Authority categorically records a finding regarding the existence of any said grounds mentioned therein and then penalty proceedings is initiated, in the notice to be issued under Section 274, they could conveniently refer to the said order which contains the satisfaction of the authority which has passed the order. However, if the existence of the conditions could not be discerned from the said order and if it is a case of relying on deeming provision contained in Explanation-I or in Explanation- l(B), then though penalty proceedings are in the nature of civil liability, in fact, it is' penal in nature. in either event, the person who is accused Of the conditions mentioned in Section 271 should be made known about the grounds on which they intend imposing penalty oil as the Section 274 makes it clear that assessee has a right to contest such proceedings and should have full opportunity to meet the case of the Department and show that the conditions stipulated in Section 271(I)(c) c/a not exist as such he is not liable to pay penalty. The practice of the Department sending a printed farm where all the ground mentioned in Section 271 are mentioned would not satisfy requirement of law when the consequences of the assessee not rebutting the initial presumption is serious in nature and he had to pay penalty from 100% to 300% of tax liability. As the said provisions have to be held to be standby construed notice issued under Section 274 should satisfy the grounds which he has to meet specifically. Otherwise, principles of natural justice is offended if the show cause notice is vague. On the basis of such proceedings, no penalty could be imposed on the assessee.
Clause (c) deals with two specific offences, that is to say, concealing particulars of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. No doubt, the facts of some cases may attract both the offences and in some cases there may be overlapping of the two offences but in such cases the initiation of the penalty proceedings also must be for both the offences. But drawing up penalty proceedings for one offence and finding the assessee guilty of another offence or finding him guilty for either the one or the other cannot be sustained in law. It is needless to point out satisfaction of the existence of the grounds mentioned in Section 271(1)(c) when it is a sine qua non for initiation or proceedings, the penalty proceedings should be confined only to those grounds and the said grounds have to be specifically stated so that the assessee would have the opportunity to meet those grounds. After, he places his version and tries to substantiate his claim, if at all, penalty is to be imposed, it should be imposed only on the grounds on which he is called upon to answer. It is not open to the authority, at the time of imposing penalty to impose penalty on the grounds other than what assessee was called upon to meet. Otherwise though the initiation of penalty proceedings may be valid and legal, the final order imposing penalty would offend principles of natural justice and cannot be sustained. Thus once the proceedings are initiated on one ground, the penalty should also be imposed on the same ground. Where the basis of the initiation of penalty proceedings is not identical with the ground on which the penalty was imposed, the imposition of penalty is not valid. The validity of the order of penalty must be determined with reference to the information, facts and materials in the hands of the authority imposing the penalty at the time the order was passed and further discovery of facts subsequent to the imposition of penalty cannot validate the order of penalty which, when passed, was not sustainable.
The Assessing Officer is empowered under the Act to initiate penalty proceedings once he is satisfied in the course of any proceedings that there is concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of total income under clause (c). Concealment, furnishing inaccurate particulars of income are different. Thus the Assessing Officer while issuing notice has to come to the conclusion that whether is it a case of concealment of income or is it a case of furnishing of inaccurate particulars. The Apex Court in the case of Ashok Pai reported in 292 ITR 11 at page 19 has held that concealment of income and furnishing inaccurate particulars of income carry different connotations. The Gujarat High Court in the case of M4NU ENGINEERING reported in 122 ITR 306 and the Delhi High Court in the case of VIRGO IvL4RKETING reported in 171 Taxman 156, has held that penalty has to be clear as to the limb for which it is levied and the action being unclear penalty is not sustainable. Therefore, when the Assessing Officer proposes to invoke the first limb being concealment, then the notice has to be appropriately marked. Similar is the case for furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. The standard proforma without striking of. the relevant1 clauses will lead to an inference as to non-application of mind."
2.4.3 The aforesaid view taken by the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the case of Manjunatha Cotton & Ginning Factory (Supra) was followed by the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the case of SSAS Emerald Meadows in of 2015 dated 23/11/2015; wherein the Hon’ble Court upheld the order of co-ordinate bench of this Tribunal, cancelling the penalty levied on the basis of the defective notice issued by the AO. Revenue’s SLP filed against he said judgment of the Hon’ble High Court in the case of SSAS Emerald Meadows (Supra) has also been dismissed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in CC/1485/2016 dated 5/8/2016. In view of the aforesaid decisions of Hon’ble Karnataka High Court holding the ground (Supra), the decision of the co-ordinate bench cited by the ld DR would not come to Revenue’s rescue.
2.4.4 Respectfully following the judgments of the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the cases of M/s Manjunatha Cotton & Ginning Factory (359 ITR 565( (Kar) and SSAS Emerald Meadows in ITA No:380 of 2015 dated 23/11/2015, we hold that the notices issued by the AO u/s 274 r.w.s 271 of the Act dated 3/1/2013 for initiating penalty proceedings for asst. years 2008-09 and 2009-10 are invalid and consequently, the penalty proceedings conducted in pursuance thereof, are also invalid and we therefore delete the penalty levied u/s 271(1)(c) of the Act for asst. years 2008-09 and 2009-10. Consequently, the grounds at S.Nos. 2 and 3 raised by the assessee for both asst. years are allowed.
Since the very basis for levy of penalty u/s 271(1)(c) of the Act has been held by us to be invalid as discussed in paras 2.1 to 2.4.4 of this order (Supra), the other grounds of appeal at S.Nos. 1 and 4 to 6 raised on the merits of the levy of penalty u/s 271(1)(c) of the Act require no adjudication by us at this stage.
In the result, assessee’s appeal for asst. years 2008-09 and 2009-10 are allowed as indicated above.
Order pronounced in the open court on 2nd May, 2018.