Facts
The assessee filed an appeal against the penalty levied under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for AY 2011-12. The penalty was imposed based on an assessment order originally framed under Section 153C r.w.s. 144.
Held
The Tribunal held that the penalty order passed by the Assessing Officer was barred by the statutory limitation period prescribed under Section 275(1)(a). The date of pronouncement of the tribunal's quantum order was considered for calculating the limitation.
Key Issues
Whether the penalty order passed by the Assessing Officer is barred by the statutory limitation period prescribed under Section 275(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Sections Cited
271(1)(c), 153C, 144, 275(1)(a)
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Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, DELHI BENCH: ‘B’ NEW DELHI
Before: SHRI SATBEER SINGH GODARA & SHIR S. RIFAUR RAHMAN
Assessment Year: 2011-12 Vs. DCIT, CMV Education Society, 2D, MIG Flats, W.E.A. Central Circle-6, 17A/56, Gulabi Bagh, Delhi New Delhi PAN: AAAAC1679A (Appellant) (Respondent) Assessee by Dr. Rakesh Gupta, Adv. Sh. Somil Aggarwal, Adv. Department by Ms. Pooja Swaroop, CIT(DR) Date of hearing 23.06.2025 Date of pronouncement 09.07.2025 ORDER
PER SATBEER SINGH GODARA, JM
This assessee’s appeal for assessment year 2011-12, arises against the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-24, [in short, the “CIT(A)”], New Delhi’s order dated 19.07.2023 passed in case no. CIT(A), Delhi-35/10015/2019-20, involving proceedings under section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). Heard both the parties. Case file perused.
Coming to the assessee’s sole substantive grievance canvassed in the instant appeal challenging both the learned lower authorities’ action levying section 271(1)(c) penalty of Rs.7,83,81,920/-; we note that there arises the first and foremost issue of validity thereof itself as the Assessing Officer had passed his penalty order on 28.02.2019.
There is hardly any dispute between the parties that the impugned penalty proceedings emanate from the Assessing Officer’s section 153C r.w.s. 144 assessment framed on 23rd March, 2015 upheld in the CIT(A)’s order dated 31st March, 2017 and confirmed in the tribunal’s quantum order dated 29th June, 2018.
Now comes the statutory limitation period in such an instance wherein the assessee concerned availed its appellate remedies against the assessment order under the provision of the Act. There could be hardly any dispute that section 275(1)(a) prescribes such a limitation as “after the expiry of the financial year in which the proceedings, in the course of which action for imposition of penalty has been initiated, are completed, or six months from the end of the month in which the order of the……………………………………., the appellate tribunal is received by the ……………………; whichever
2 | P a g e period expires later”. Meaning thereby that the above statutory limitation in the facts of the instant case has to be computed in the latter instance i.e. six months from the end of the month in which the order is received by the prescribed authority.
We make it clear that hon’ble jurisdictional high court’s Full Bench decision in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Odeon Builders (P.) Ltd. [2017] 80 taxmann.com 180 (Delhi) has already settled the issue that the date of service of the tribunal’s order in such an instance could very well be taken from the date of pronouncement itself which comes to 29th June, 2018 as against the Assessing Officer having passed his penalty order on 28th February, 2019 i.e. beyond the prescribed period of six months from the end of the month (supra).
This being the clinching factual backdrop, we hereby reject the Revenue’s vehement contentions supporting the Assessing Officer’s above penalty orders and conclude that the same is barred by the statutory limitation hereinabove. It is therefore held as non- est in the eyes of law and quashed accordingly. All other pleadings on merits between the parties stand rendered academic.